Classification of Criminal Offences
Ecuador’s Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code (Código Orgánico Integral Penal, or COIP) classifies criminal offences as crimes (delitos) or minor offences (contravenciones).
Constituent Elements
To be punishable, conduct (an act or omission) must be defined as an offence by law, be unlawful in the absence of a justification such as self-defence or necessity, and be attributable to a person capable of understanding their actions.
Intent
Criminal offences generally require intent (dolo): the person acts deliberately, knowing that the conduct is an offence. Negligence only gives rise to liability where the law expressly so provides, and no white-collar offence in the COIP can be committed negligently.
Attempt
Attempts are punishable with one third to two thirds of the penalty for the completed offence. An attempt exists where the offender intentionally begins to commit an offence but the result does not occur for reasons beyond their control. Attempt is possible for result offences such as fraud (estafa), but not for conduct-only offences such as extortion by a public official (concusión).
Burden and Standard of Proof
The Ecuadorian criminal system is governed by the presumption of innocence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution, which must prove the offence and the defendant’s liability beyond reasonable doubt.
By way of exception, illicit enrichment (by public officials) and unjustified private enrichment (by private individuals) are based on an unjustified increase in wealth, so in practice the person under investigation must explain the lawful origin of that increase. These are the only offences in which the burden of proof is effectively reversed.
Types of Limitation Period
Ecuadorian criminal law provides three types of limitation period:
Calculation
The first two periods equal the maximum penalty for the offence and are never shorter than five years. For fraud (five to seven years’ imprisonment), for example, the state has seven years from the offence to bring charges and a further seven years from the charges to obtain a final judgment. Once the period expires, the criminal action is extinguished.
Offences Not Subject to Limitation
Under the Constitution, four offences against the public administration are not subject to any limitation period: embezzlement of public funds (peculado), bribery (cohecho), extortion by public officials (concusión) and illicit enrichment. Other white-collar offences, such as money laundering, fraud and tax offences, follow the general rules.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
In addition to the territoriality principle, Article 14 of the COIP extends Ecuadorian jurisdiction to acts committed abroad where they:
Blocking Statutes and Mutual Legal Assistance
Ecuador has no blocking statutes. However, bank secrecy, tax confidentiality and the Organic Law on Personal Data Protection serve an equivalent function: information cannot be handed directly to foreign authorities and may only be obtained by court order or prosecutorial request through formal co-operation channels.
Mutual legal assistance is channelled mainly through multilateral conventions, such as the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the Palermo and Vienna Conventions and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
Extradition
Ecuador has around 16 bilateral extradition treaties in force, including with the USA and Spain, and is a party to the Inter-American Convention on Extradition and the OAS Convention on Extradition.
The ban on extraditing Ecuadorian nationals was lifted by a constitutional amendment approved by referendum in April 2024 (in force since 9 May 2024) and applies only to acts committed after that date. The Organic Law on Extradition, published on 7 August 2026, requires dual criminality, designates the President of the National Court of Justice as the central authority and excludes extradition for political offences or where there is a risk of the death penalty, torture or cruel treatment.
Major Cross-Border Case
International Task Forces
Ecuador is a member of GAFILAT (the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America), INTERPOL, AMERIPOL and the Egmont Group, and co-operates with the EU through the EL PAcCTO programme. It is not a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
Corporate Criminal Liability
Legal entities bear autonomous criminal liability for offences committed for their benefit by their representatives, managers or agents, but only where the law expressly provides for it – for example, fraud, cybercrimes, environmental offences, bribery, influence peddling, tax fraud, illegal deposit-taking and money laundering.
Corporate liability is independent of individual liability and persists even if the individual offender is not identified, so both may be sanctioned for the same act.
The COIP expressly provides that the liability of legal entities is not extinguished by merger, transformation, demerger, dissolution or liquidation.
Corporate Liability in Practice
There is no guideline on when to prosecute the company, the individuals or both. In practice, the Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General del Estado) focuses on the directors and employees involved and brings in the legal entity in larger corruption, money laundering and tax cases, where corporate sanctions (fines, closure or dissolution) have greater impact.
Liability of Managers and Directors
In law, managers and directors are only liable for their own participation as principals or accomplices, not by virtue of their role. In practice, however, they are sometimes charged merely because of their position, in breach of the principle of personal liability.
Parent Company Liability
The COIP does not provide for group liability. A parent company may only be liable for acts of its subsidiary on a case-by-case basis, where some participation in and benefit from the unlawful act is proven.
Prevention and Compliance Programmes
Ecuador does not recognise a UK-style “failure to prevent” offence.
An effective compliance programme does not exempt a company from liability but only mitigates it, and there is no mechanism for applying this mitigation where the penalty is dissolution (disolución) or extinction (extinción).
Sentencing Process
There are no sentencing guidelines. Judges set the penalty within the statutory range, considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances, in the same reasoned judgment that determines guilt, without a separate hearing.
Application of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances
If there is at least one aggravating circumstance, the judge must impose the maximum penalty increased by one third. If there are at least two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating ones, the judge must impose the minimum penalty reduced by one third.
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
For individuals, the most relevant mitigating factors are voluntarily repairing the damage or compensating the victim, voluntary surrender and co-operation with the investigation.
A “transcendental” mitigating factor also allows defendants who provide precise and verifiable information to receive one third of the applicable penalty.
Relevant aggravating factors include abusing one’s position as a public official, acting with two or more people and affecting multiple victims.
For legal entities, mitigating factors include having an effective compliance programme in place before the offence, self-reporting or confessing, co-operating with the investigation and fully repairing the damage.
Settlement Agreements
There are no deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements. The closest mechanism is the abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado), which resembles a plea agreement (see 4.3 Plea Agreements, Co-Operation, Self-Disclosure and Leniency).
Full Reparation for Victims
The Constitution and the COIP recognise full reparation (reparación integral) as a right of the victim arising directly from the conviction, without separate civil proceedings.
Article 78 of the COIP provides for measures that may be combined: restitution, rehabilitation, material and non-material compensation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.
In white-collar cases, material compensation for the proven loss is usually the most relevant measure, and is set by the court that convicts, whether at first instance, on appeal or in cassation.
Victims may bring separate civil proceedings for losses not covered by the reparation ordered.
There is no class action as such. In schemes with multiple victims (such as illegal deposit-taking or pyramid schemes), the victims are usually joined in a single criminal proceeding, each receiving a proportional share of the reparation.
Main Authorities
The Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General del Estado) leads criminal investigations and prosecutions, acting through specialised units for anti-money laundering, anti-corruption, public administration offences and transnational organised crime.
Administrative and civil enforcement runs independently of criminal proceedings. The Comptroller General (Contraloría General del Estado) may establish the administrative and civil liability of those who manage public funds, which is not a prerequisite for prosecution. The Financial and Economic Analysis Unit (UAFE) is the financial intelligence unit and sanctions AML breaches. The Superintendencies of Companies, Banks and the Popular and Solidarity Economy, and the Internal Revenue Service (SRI), have their own sanctioning powers.
In 2021–22, a specialised judicial unit, court and chamber for corruption and organised crime with nationwide jurisdiction were created in Quito. Under Resolution 187-2026, in force since 7 September 2026, the Judiciary Council abolished them and transferred their cases to the ordinary criminal courts of Quito, raising the number of competent judges from 19 to more than 50. The measure has been criticised for the loss of specialisation.
Senior officials with procedural immunity, such as the President, ministers and members of the National Assembly, are tried exclusively by the National Court of Justice.
High-profile prosecutions, particularly of former officials for corruption, are often accompanied by public debate about possible politicisation.
Initiation of Investigations
The Prosecutor’s Office opens and directs investigations, without judicial authorisation, on the basis of a complaint, a report from a public body or a court decision, or on its own initiative.
Anyone may file a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office or the Judicial Police. Under Article 422 of the COIP, public officials must report offences they learn of in the course of their duties.
Many investigations originate from reports by other bodies: the UAFE (unusual or suspicious transactions), the Comptroller General (evidence of criminal liability), and the Superintendencies and the SRI within their remit. Whistle-blowers may benefit from protection and incentives (see 4.4 Whistle-Blower Protection).
The preliminary investigation may last up to one year for offences punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, or two years for more serious offences, after which the Prosecutor’s Office must close the case or bring charges. In practice, these time limits are often exceeded without consequence.
Powers of the Prosecutor’s Office
The Prosecutor’s Office may directly request documents, accounting records and financial information related to the investigation from individuals and legal entities, without judicial authorisation, and may request the lifting of bank and securities secrecy. If a company refuses to provide the requested information, the Prosecutor’s Office may obtain a production order from a criminal guarantees judge (Juez de Garantías Penales), failing compliance with which a search may be ordered.
Searches of offices, homes and vehicles and the seizure of evidence (computers, documents, etc) require prior judicial authorisation and are carried out by the Prosecutor’s Office with the Judicial Police.
Questioning
Third parties, including employees not under investigation, may be summoned to give a statement and compelled to appear. A suspect or defendant, by contrast, cannot be compelled to self-incriminate: they may remain silent, and their statement is not given under oath.
Tracing, Freezing and Seizing Digital Assets
There is no specific law on tracing, freezing or seizing digital assets. Digital assets are not legal tender and are generally treated as incorporeal movable property, so the general rules apply:
Since July 2024, the Organic Law on the Prevention, Detection and Combating of Money Laundering and the Financing of Other Crimes has required virtual asset service providers to report to the UAFE the origin, intermediaries and beneficiaries of transactions, which is the main practical means of tracing.
In practice, freezing digital assets depends on the co-operation of exchanges, mostly foreign, and on international judicial assistance, and the state has no official wallet for seized assets.
Use of AI by the Authorities
There is no law on the use of AI by investigative authorities; the 2026 National Strategy for the Ethical and Responsible Development and Use of AI is merely a policy instrument (see 3.15 Artificial Intelligence and Automation Misuse). In practice, since 2025 the Comptroller General has used pattern recognition to analyse public officials’ asset declarations, which helps detect illicit enrichment, and the UAFE, the SRI, the National Public Procurement Service (SERCOP) and the Superintendency of Economic Competition use analytical tools whose findings often lead to complaints.
AI-Assisted Internal Investigations
There is no framework for assessing AI-assisted internal investigations. To have evidential value, their findings must be validated by professionals and, where necessary, introduced through expert reports that explain the methodology and allow it to be reproduced.
Internal Investigations
There is no general obligation to carry out internal investigations, except for AML reporting entities, which must have a risk management programme and a compliance officer. The Prosecutor’s Office gives them no special evidential weight, although they may mitigate liability if they help clarify the facts.
Internal investigations must comply with the Organic Law on Personal Data Protection, which requires a legal basis (such as legitimate interest or a legal obligation) and proportionality, and with due process under labour law: dismissal for cause requires prior authorisation (visto bueno) from the Labour Inspector. Reviewing corporate emails and devices is defensible if there is a prior policy known to the employee, whereas accessing personal communications may constitute a criminal violation of privacy.
Sharing Findings with the Authorities
There is no general duty to share internal investigation findings with the authorities, although the Prosecutor’s Office may request them. The exception is a suspicious transaction, which the compliance officer must report to the UAFE.
Legal Privilege
Ecuador does not recognise legal privilege as understood in common law. Professional secrecy prevents lawyers from being compelled to testify about what they learn in practice, and its unlawful disclosure is an offence (see 3.9 Cybercrimes, Computer Fraud and Protection of Company Secrets). However, it does not necessarily protect documents held by the company, so internal investigation reports may be requested by the Prosecutor’s Office.
Initiation of Criminal Proceedings
Criminal proceedings begin with a charging hearing (audiencia de formulación de cargos), requested by the Prosecutor’s Office once it has sufficient evidence of the offence and of the liability of those to be charged. Neither the judge nor the defendants may oppose the charges, although they may make submissions on any precautionary measures requested.
Principles Governing the Prosecutor’s Office
The Prosecutor’s Office has limited discretion. Under the principles of legality and objectivity, the facts charged must have constituted an offence under the COIP when they occurred, and the conduct must fit the statutory definition.
Its main discretion lies in the principle of discretionary prosecution (principio de oportunidad), which allows it not to investigate, or to discontinue an investigation, for offences punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment that do not seriously affect the public interest (see 4.2 De Minimis). It may also request that the investigation be closed or decide not to indict at the end of the pre-trial stage, subject to judicial review and, where applicable, review by a senior prosecutor.
Charging Individuals and Legal Entities
Corporate liability is independent (see 1.5 Corporate and Personal Liability) and there are no public guidelines on whether to charge the company, the individual or both; the decision is made case by case. In practice, the Prosecutor’s Office charges individuals, alone or with the legal entity, but not legal entities alone.
Alternative Resolution Mechanisms
Ecuador does not provide for deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements in the strict sense.
The abbreviated procedure, available for offences punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment, covers white-collar offences except their most serious forms. Conciliation, limited to offences punishable by up to five years, excludes many of them and is prohibited for offences against the public administration. Effective co-operation (cooperación eficaz) is the mechanism most used in corruption, money laundering and organised crime cases (see 4.3 Plea Agreements, Co-Operation, Self-Disclosure and Leniency).
None of these mechanisms is conditional on corporate compliance programmes.
Ecuador has no single body of “corporate criminal law”. The main offences are set out in the COIP:
Corruption and Influence Peddling Offences
Extortion by public officials (concusión) – where an official abuses their position to demand an undue benefit – is punishable by three to five years’ imprisonment (five to seven years with violence or threats). Bribery (cohecho) applies equally to the official who receives or accepts an undue benefit and to the person who offers it, and is punishable by one to three years’ imprisonment for the acceptance or offer, three to five years if the act is performed, and five to seven years if it is linked to another offence.
Influence peddling – abusing one’s position or hierarchical relationships to influence another official to obtain a favourable decision – is punishable by three to five years’ imprisonment, as is merely offering to do so.
Private-sector corruption applies to a director who accepts, receives or solicits an undue benefit in the course of business, and to the person who offers it, and is punishable by five to seven years’ imprisonment, rising to seven to ten years in aggravated cases.
For bribery, influence peddling and private-sector corruption, legal entities face dissolution and a fine of 500 to 1,000 SBU.
The COIP does not criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials as a separate offence, despite Ecuador’s commitments under UNCAC and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. However, the proceeds of such bribes passing through Ecuador may be prosecuted as money laundering (see 3.13 Money Laundering) or be subject to asset forfeiture.
Compliance Programmes in the Private Sector
Private individuals and legal entities are not required to maintain an anti-corruption compliance programme, and failing to have one is not an offence. Its only effect is to mitigate the liability of a legal entity that implemented it before the offence.
The anti-corruption reform of February 2021 set out the minimum elements for a compliance system to operate as a mitigating factor, including risk identification and management, internal controls with defined responsibilities, ongoing monitoring, a whistle-blowing channel, a code of ethics, training, internal investigation mechanisms and a disciplinary regime. In practice, the authorities assess whether the programme is actually implemented, not merely documented.
Sector-Specific Obligations
AML reporting entities (such as financial institutions, insurers, real estate companies and virtual asset service providers) must maintain a compliance programme with a compliance officer, a manual, due diligence and reporting to the UAFE. Failure to do so leads to administrative and, in some cases, criminal sanctions.
Duty to Report
Article 422 of the COIP imposes a general duty to report on public officials. Article 422.1 extends it to any citizen who, in the course of their activities, learns of offences such as bribery, extortion by public officials, influence peddling or private-sector corruption, although there is no specific penalty for failing to report.
Insider Dealing
Insider dealing is not a separate criminal offence. It is prohibited at administrative level by Article 27 of the Securities Market Law (Book II of the Organic Monetary and Financial Code): those with access to inside information by virtue of their position may not use it to gain an advantage in buying or selling securities. The Superintendency of Companies, Securities and Insurance sanctions breaches with fines and the suspension or cancellation of registration in the Public Securities Market Register.
In criminal law, this conduct may fall within the following offences:
Financial, Banking and Market Offences
The main offences are:
Legal entities are also liable under the tiered regime in Article 325 of the COIP, ranging from a fine of 100 to 200 SBU to extinction and a fine of 1,000 to 5,000 SBU, depending on the severity of the offence.
Tax Fraud Offences
Tax fraud (Article 298 of the COIP) punishes simulating, concealing, omitting, falsifying or deceiving the tax authority to evade taxes, through 20 types of conduct grouped by severity: one to three years’ imprisonment for conduct such as using false data in registrations or returns, or altering or destroying accounting records (paragraphs 1 to 11); three to five years for using invoices for non-existent transactions or with shell companies (paragraphs 12 to 14); and five to seven years for omitting income, claiming false expenses or undue tax benefits, failing to pay over taxes withheld, obtaining undue refunds or using front men (paragraphs 15 to 20). Penalties increase where the tax evaded exceeds 100 SBU, up to seven to ten years for taxes withheld.
Legal entities may be subject to extinction and a fine of 50 to 100 SBU.
What Must Be Proven
The Prosecutor’s Office must prove intentional deceit, simulation or concealment directed at the tax authority, the resulting tax loss or evasion, and the defendant’s knowing participation. In Judgment 41-19-IN/25 (September 2025), the Constitutional Court confirmed that the offence punishes fraud, not mere non-payment, and therefore does not breach the prohibition on imprisonment for debt. Customs fraud is addressed in 3.10 Financial/Trade/Customs Sanctions.
Reporting Requirements
There is no specific obligation to prevent tax evasion, but there are reporting obligations, such as the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), under which financial institutions report accounts held by non-residents to the SRI, and the annual Beneficial Ownership and Shareholding Structure Report (REBEFICS), under which all companies disclose their beneficial owners and control structure. Non-compliance gives rise to administrative liability.
Offences in Relation to Financial Record-Keeping
Ecuador has no separate offence of “false accounting”.
Keeping accounting records is a corporate and tax obligation, and breaches are in principle administrative, sanctioned by the Superintendency of Companies and the SRI with fines and, in the Superintendency’s case, even dissolution. They only become criminal when records are manipulated to deceive the tax authority, regulators or creditors.
In such cases, the following offences, among others, may apply:
The Prosecutor’s Office must prove the elements of the relevant offence and the use of false accounting or financial information. Legal entities may be criminally liable for all of these offences.
Cartels
Cartels are sanctioned mainly through administrative proceedings under the Organic Law on the Regulation and Control of Market Power. A prohibited horizontal agreement requires two or more operators acting in concert, with an anti-competitive object or effect and an actual or potential impact on the Ecuadorian market.
Hardcore cartels (price-fixing and market or customer sharing) are very serious infringements, punishable by the Superintendency of Economic Competition with fines of up to 12% of the infringer’s total turnover in the previous financial year (up to 8% and 10% for minor and serious infringements, respectively), without the need for a criminal conviction.
Price collusion may also constitute the criminal offence of speculation (agiotaje – Article 308 of the COIP): fraudulently raising or lowering the price of goods through a meeting or coalition among their main holders in order to sell them only at a set price, which is a price-fixing cartel in the strict sense. Penalty: one to three years’ imprisonment.
Liability of Legal Entities
Liability under competition law is strict and administrative: participation in the prohibited conduct suffices, without proof of intent. A company is only criminally liable if the conduct constitutes an offence under the COIP, such as speculation, under the rules in Article 49 of the COIP (see 1.5 Corporate and Personal Liability).
Consumer Offences
Ecuador has specific consumer protection offences in the COIP.
Deceiving a buyer – misleading a buyer or user as to the identity or quality of goods or services by fraudulently supplying something other than what was offered, or goods of similar appearance but different origin – is punishable by six months to one year’s imprisonment. Legal entities face a fine of ten to 15 SBU.
Administrative Infringements
The Organic Law on Consumer Protection also provides for purely administrative infringements, such as misleading advertising (Article 72: USD1,000 to USD4,000), failure to honour guarantees (Article 71) and the sale of dangerous products (Article 74: USD1,000 to USD5,000), which apply where the conduct falls short of criminal deception.
Main Offences in Relation to Cybercrimes
Unauthorised access to a computer, telematic or telecommunications system, or remaining in it against the owner’s will (Article 234 of the COIP), is punishable by three to five years’ imprisonment.
Attacks on the integrity of computer systems (Article 232 of the COIP) – destroying, damaging, deleting or altering data, or creating and distributing malware – are punishable by three to five years’ imprisonment.
Unlawful interception of data without a court order (Article 230 of the COIP), which also covers phishing (false websites or certificates) and card cloning, is punishable by three to five years’ imprisonment.
Computer Fraud
The COIP also punishes fraudulent appropriation by electronic means (Article 190 – one to three years’ imprisonment), where systems or networks are manipulated to appropriate another’s property, and unlawful electronic transfer of assets (Article 231 – three to five years’ imprisonment), where a system is altered for profit to appropriate another’s assets.
Disclosure of Trade or Industrial Secrets
The closest criminal offence is disclosure of secrets (Article 179 of the COIP), punishable by six months to one year’s imprisonment, which covers secrets learned through one’s position, employment or profession. If the information is held in a database, unlawful disclosure of databases (Article 229) may also apply, punishable by one to three years’ imprisonment (three to five years if aggravated).
Outside criminal law, the Organic Code of the Social Economy of Knowledge (Código Ingenios) protects trade secrets as undisclosed information, and breaches give rise to civil and administrative actions before the National Intellectual Rights Service (SENADI), including precautionary measures and damages.
Customs and Foreign Trade Offences
The following conduct constitutes a criminal offence under the COIP:
These offences also entail confiscation, and legal entities may be liable under Article 49 of the COIP. Below the thresholds, or without intent, the conduct is an administrative contravention under the Organic Code of Production, Trade and Investment (COPCI).
The National Customs Service may also suspend or cancel an importer’s or exporter’s registration without a criminal conviction. The regime is national, aligned with the World Customs Organization’s Harmonized System, the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement and Andean Community rules.
Financial offences are addressed in 3.4 Insider Dealing, Market Abuse and Criminal Banking Law; in such cases, the Superintendency of Banks may also revoke the institution’s operating authorisation or take it over.
International Sanctions Regime
Ecuador has no autonomous sanctions regime. It applies the UN Security Council’s targeted financial sanctions on terrorism and proliferation, which are binding on Ecuador as a UN member state, through asset-freezing orders governed by UAFE Resolution UAFE-DG-2022-0095. A reporting entity that fails to screen, freeze or report faces administrative fines and may commit the offence of failure to apply controls (Article 319 of the COIP, six months to one year’s imprisonment). Making funds available to designated persons may constitute terrorist financing (Article 367 of the COIP, 22 to 26 years). Sanctions imposed by other jurisdictions, such as those of OFAC (USA) or the EU, are not binding in Ecuador, although financial institutions apply them in practice for contractual and risk management reasons.
Concealment
Ecuador has abolished concealment (encubrimiento) as a form of criminal participation; the COIP recognises only principals and accomplices. Conduct traditionally regarded as concealment – harbouring the offender, hiding evidence or instruments of another’s offence, or obstructing its investigation – is now the separate offence of procedural fraud, punishable by one to three years’ imprisonment.
It must be proven that the person (i) knew that the person they assisted had committed an offence; (ii) acted after that offence (providing accommodation or a hiding place, means to benefit from its proceeds, or hiding instruments or evidence); and (iii) intended to help the offender.
The provision refers to the criminal conduct “of one or more persons” other than the concealer, so the same individual cannot be charged both with the predicate offence and with concealing it.
Concealing proceeds is a different matter. Handling stolen goods (receptación) – hiding, holding, transporting, selling or transferring goods known to be of unlawful origin – is punishable by six months to two years, and money laundering punishes the concealment or disguise of the unlawful origin of assets.
Money laundering is a separate offence that does not exclude the perpetrator of the predicate offence, so the same person may be prosecuted for both – eg, for embezzlement of public funds and for laundering the proceeds.
Principals and Accomplices
The COIP does not recognise a “conspirator” as such, but distinguishes between principals and accomplices. A principal directly commits the offence, orders it through others or makes a substantial and deliberate contribution without which it would not have been committed. An accomplice intentionally assists with secondary acts before or during the offence, without which it would still have been committed, and receives one third to one half of the principal’s penalty.
Offences Related to Conspiracy
The offence closest to conspiracy is criminal association (asociación ilícita), which punishes two or more people who associate to commit offences with three to five years’ imprisonment, regardless of whether a specific offence is committed.
A stable association seeking to commit serious offences (punishable by more than five years) for financial gain may constitute organised crime, with higher penalties for those who finance, direct or plan the group and lower penalties for those who collaborate with it. Occasional associations are dealt with under the general rules on principals and accomplices.
Money Laundering Offence
Money laundering punishes anyone who, directly or indirectly, holds, acquires, transfers, possesses, manages, uses, transports, converts or benefits from assets knowing them to be of unlawful origin.
Predicate Offences
There is no closed list of predicate offences: the assets need only derive from an activity that constitutes an offence. In practice, the most common are corruption, drug trafficking, extortion and human trafficking. Money laundering is independent of the predicate offence, so no prior conviction is required; circumstantial evidence of unlawful origin suffices.
Penalties
Penalties are tiered: five to seven years’ imprisonment if the amount is below 100 SBU; seven to ten years if there is no criminal association; ten to 13 years if the amount is 100 SBU or more, there is a criminal association or certain financial institutions are used; and 19 to 22 years if the amount exceeds 200 SBU, the association operates through companies or public institutions are used.
Legal entities are liable where money laundering is committed for their benefit (Article 49 of the COIP). An entity created to commit the offence faces a fine of five times the value of the assets, confiscation, dissolution and liquidation.
Obligation to Prevent
The Organic Law on the Prevention, Detection and Combating of Money Laundering and the Financing of Other Crimes (in force since July 2024) and its regulations (Executive Decree 298 of February 2026) require reporting entities (such as banks, co-operatives, exchange offices, notaries and insurers) to implement compliance and due diligence programmes and to report suspicious transactions and those of USD10,000 or more. Breaches are administrative infringements punishable by the UAFE with fines of one to 40 SBU. An employee responsible for prevention who fails to apply the required controls also commits the offence in Article 319 of the COIP, punishable by six months to one year’s imprisonment.
Competent Authorities
The UAFE is the financial intelligence unit and the sanctioning authority for preventive obligations, the Superintendencies supervise the entities they regulate, and the Prosecutor’s Office investigates and prosecutes money laundering.
Ecuador has no unified ESG regime, but it criminalises its core components separately.
Environmental Offences
Environmental offences in the COIP include water pollution (three to five years’ imprisonment), prohibited or unauthorised handling of hazardous substances (one to three years) and illegal mining (16 to 20 years, rising to 22 to 26 years if it causes serious environmental harm), the last being particularly sensitive given the weight of the extractive sector.
Legal entities face tiered sanctions depending on the offence, from a fine of 100 to 300 SBU with temporary closure and confiscation, to a fine of 500 to 1,000 SBU with permanent closure, confiscation and remediation. Penalties may be reduced by up to one quarter if the offender compensates for the damage under the supervision of the National Environmental Authority.
Serious Human Rights Violations
Human trafficking covers the recruitment, transport or receipt of persons for exploitation, such as forced labour or debt bondage, and is punishable by 16 to 19 years’ imprisonment, rising to 30 years in aggravated cases. Forced labour and other forms of labour exploitation are punishable by ten to 13 years.
Legal entities may be subject to extinction and a fine of 10,000 SBU.
Supply Chain Due Diligence
There is no mandatory human rights or environmental due diligence law for supply chains.
Artificial Intelligence
There is no specific AI law, although several bills have been introduced. On 15 September 2026, the National Assembly shelved the Organic Bill on the Regulation and Promotion of Artificial Intelligence; a few days earlier, the Organic Bill on the Development, Ethical Use and Governance of Artificial Intelligence was introduced. Neither has been approved.
There is no specific regime for algorithmic trading or automated decision-making, so misuse of AI would be prosecuted under existing offences. For example, unlawful electronic transfer of assets (three to five years’ imprisonment) covers manipulating a system or algorithm to appropriate another’s assets; attacks on the integrity of computer systems (three to five years) cover the use of malicious software, including AI models used for that purpose; and fraud (five to seven years, or seven to ten years if aggravated) may apply where AI is used to mislead a victim.
There is no specific criminal or regulatory regime for crypto-assets. The US dollar is the only legal tender, and the Central Bank has stated that crypto-assets are not an authorised means of payment. However, investing in, trading and holding them is not prohibited, and they are treated as private assets under general contract and commercial law, not as regulated securities.
Crypto-related fraud, market manipulation and money laundering may be prosecuted under existing offences: illegal deposit-taking (for cryptocurrency pyramid schemes), fraud (where the loss relates to crypto-assets) and money laundering, which applies to any type of asset.
Obligations of Service Providers
Virtual asset service providers (exchanges and custodians) are AML reporting entities and must register with the UAFE, appoint a compliance officer, implement an AML manual and report suspicious transactions and those of USD10,000 or more. Breaches are administrative infringements punishable by UAFE fines.
Common Defences
The most common defences are lack of intent or of the elements of the offence, mistake of fact or law, grounds of justification, absence of criminally relevant conduct, the availability of adequate non-criminal remedies, limitation (except for offences not subject to limitation) and procedural defects leading to nullity or the exclusion of evidence.
Despite the presumption of innocence, an active defence is advisable, submitting the defence’s own evidence in good time rather than merely challenging the prosecution’s evidence. As these cases usually rest on large volumes of financial and accounting records, the expert reports must be reviewed carefully.
Compliance Programmes and Legal Entities
An effective compliance programme is not a defence that excludes liability. Since the 2021 anti-corruption reform (Articles 45 and 49 of the COIP), having one in place before the offence mitigates the criminal liability of the legal entity for all offences for which it may be liable, including bribery, money laundering, tax fraud and environmental offences (see 3.3 Anti-Bribery Regulation).
Practical Effect of Compliance Programmes on Individual Liability
In practice, however, a compliance programme may be decisive in excluding the liability of directors, managers and employees. Almost all white-collar offences require intent and personal participation, and a programme that genuinely works provides documentary evidence that the director acted with due diligence. This often makes it possible to argue that they were unaware of the unlawful act and reasonably relied on the controls, so there was no intent.
De Minimis Exceptions
The COIP sets no general monetary threshold below which white-collar conduct falls outside criminal law. However, some offences set thresholds that determine whether the conduct is criminal or merely administrative (eg, customs fraud), or the applicable penalty (eg, money laundering).
Discretionary Prosecution
The principle of discretionary prosecution operates similarly to a de minimis exception, allowing the prosecutor not to investigate, or to discontinue an investigation, for offences punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, unless the public interest is seriously affected. It is not available for organised crime and certain other offences, so the most serious white-collar offences fall outside its scope.
Exempt Sectors
There are no sector or industry exemptions, and corporate criminal liability applies regardless of the company’s size or business. Certain regulated sectors (banking, insurance, securities and tax) are also subject to parallel administrative regimes, which do not replace criminal liability.
Abbreviated Procedure
The abbreviated procedure allows sentence bargaining for offences punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment, which covers most white-collar offences except their most serious forms. The defendant admits the facts and may negotiate a lower penalty with the Prosecutor’s Office, of no less than one third of the minimum penalty for the offence.
Mitigating Factors
Self-reporting and co-operation are general mitigating factors. Voluntary surrender when evasion was possible, effective co-operation with the investigation and full reparation of the damage may reduce the minimum penalty by one third, provided that at least two mitigating factors apply and there are no aggravating factors.
Effective Co-Operation
Effective co-operation applies where a defendant provides objective, verifiable information not previously known to the Prosecutor’s Office that helps identify other participants or dismantle the organisation. The penalty may then be reduced to no less than 20% of the minimum penalty (or 10% in cases of high social significance). It requires an agreement with the Prosecutor’s Office approved by the court, unlike the “transcendental” mitigating factor (see 1.6 Sentencing and Penalties), which allows one third of the penalty to be imposed without a prior agreement.
Conciliation
Conciliation extinguishes the criminal action for offences punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, but excludes offences against the public administration (bribery, extortion by public officials, embezzlement of public funds and illicit enrichment) and those affecting state interests.
Protection of Whistle-Blowers
Since a COIP reform that entered into force in June 2020, whistle-blowers reporting offences against the public administration and organised crime have been entitled to specific protection. They may request that their identity be kept confidential, with enhanced protection for reports of embezzlement of public funds, illicit enrichment, extortion, bribery, influence peddling, money laundering and organised crime, to safeguard their and their family’s physical, psychological, financial and employment well-being.
The Victim and Witness Protection System may also protect a whistle-blower who becomes a witness, through relocation, police protection and medical, psychological and employment assistance, although it is not designed specifically for economic offences.
Incentives
A reward of 10% to 20% of the assets recovered is available to those who provide useful information in cases of embezzlement of public funds, illicit enrichment, money laundering, organised crime and drug trafficking. It is payable only after a final judgment and excludes participants in the offence.
Internal Whistle-Blowing Channels
No law requires companies to maintain an internal whistle-blowing channel, although entities under AML supervision must appoint a compliance officer and maintain reporting lines. In practice, an ethics hotline allowing anonymous reports is a standard feature of corporate compliance programmes.
Official Anonymous Reporting Channels
Official channels include a fully anonymous online form and chatbot run by the General Secretariat for Public Integrity, the Prosecutor’s Office’s “Transparency Mailbox”, the Comptroller General’s email, web form and 1800-ÉTICOS hotline, and the UAFE’s own channels.
Impact on Defence Strategy
When an investigation spans several jurisdictions, the defence cannot be planned in isolation: what is admitted, disclosed or negotiated in one country may be used in the others, and the Ecuadorian system offers few tools for a co-ordinated resolution. In particular:
Co-Ordinated Defence Mechanisms
No mechanisms are regulated by law. Joint defence agreements may be concluded contractually and, in practice, the defence co-ordinates with foreign counsel to keep a consistent account of the facts, control what is disclosed, where and when, and anticipate how it will be used in each country.
Limits to Cross-Border Co-Operation
Cross-border co-operation is subject to recognised limits that the defence may invoke:
The coming year is expected to be marked by the implementation of Executive Decree 298 (February 2026), which strengthens the AML obligations of banks, co-operatives, real estate companies, notaries, jewellers and lawyers, regulates administrative freezing of funds by the UAFE and opens the register of beneficial owners.
A comprehensive reform of the COIP is awaiting its second debate in the National Assembly. Among other changes, it would split embezzlement of public funds into four offences with harsher penalties and remove the 40-year cap on cumulative sentences. An “Anti-Mafia Law” is also progressing, which would extend prosecution to financiers and money laundering operators, allow the suspension of lawyers convicted of corruption or money laundering and strengthen confiscation.
The first extraditions of Ecuadorian nationals and the first asset forfeiture cases are also likely, as is the impact of the abolition of the specialised anti-corruption courts (see 2.1 White-Collar Enforcement Authorities) and progress on the AI bill (see 3.15 Artificial Intelligence and Automation Misuse).
Whymper N27-70 y Francisco de Orellana
Edificio Sassari
4th Floor
Quito 170109
Ecuador
+593 2 600 0450
info@rodriguez-co.com www.rodriguez-co.com
Introduction
This article explains how, in less than a decade, Ecuador has moved from having no meaningful tradition of prosecuting economic crime to having specialised prosecutors, anti-money laundering units, courts dedicated to organised crime (until their recent abolition), a regime of asset forfeiture that does not require a criminal conviction, and a fully operational system of corporate criminal liability. Above all, it explains what this transformation means for those who invest in Ecuador, operate in the country or are considering establishing a presence here. The central message is clear: criminal exposure is no longer a secondary concern limited to reputation. It has become a risk to the very continuity of the business.
Why Financial Crime Matters in Ecuador
Until 2017, Ecuador had no established track record in combating corruption and no specialised capacity to investigate financial crime. That year, the national government and the Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General del Estado) – with the support of the United Nations, the Organization of American States and the government of the United States – focused their efforts on training prosecutors throughout the country to investigate and dismantle the financial structures of organised crime.
In 2017, the Prosecutor’s Office established its anti-money laundering unit. At the same time, institutional co-operation was strengthened between Ecuador’s Financial and Economic Analysis Unit (UAFE) – the national authority that receives and analyses reports of suspicious transactions – the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Egmont Group, the international network of financial intelligence units.
This shift – from a criminal justice system focused on violent crime to one that also targets financial crime – was driven by the sharp growth of drug trafficking and organised crime in Ecuador. It became essential to attack the financial structures of these organisations, based on a sound premise: a criminal organisation is not dismantled by arresting its operators, but by depriving it of its economic capacity and its assets.
International assessments followed the same direction. In December 2022, at the GAFILAT plenary (GAFILAT being the Latin American regional body of the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF), Ecuador passed its mutual evaluation and avoided being placed on the FATF “grey list” of jurisdictions under increased monitoring. The result was rightly welcomed as an institutional success. However, it had a consequence that is seldom discussed: it turned regulatory pressure on the private sector into a permanent state policy rather than a temporary measure. This is the environment in which every company operating in Ecuador now conducts its business.
At the same time, this growth and specialisation of economic criminal law have become intertwined with a different effort: the fight against tax fraud and the embezzlement of public funds. The result has been a significant number of false positives, in which major companies and multinationals have become the subject of criminal investigations within a system that still struggles to distinguish lawful, properly documented financial transactions from unlawful ones. In our view, this confusion between what is genuinely illegal and what is simply not understood is the principal structural weakness of Ecuador’s economic criminal justice system today.
The New Institutional Landscape
To understand the risk, an investor must first understand who can trigger it. The Ecuadorian system no longer depends on a single authority; several now play a role. These include the Prosecutor’s Office and its specialised units; the UAFE, as the financial intelligence unit that receives suspicious activity reports; the Internal Revenue Service (SRI), whose complaints have become a significant source of criminal cases; the Superintendency of Companies, Securities and Insurance; the Superintendency of Banks; the Office of the Comptroller General, in matters of public procurement; and the government agency responsible for administering seized assets.
Two further developments have significantly expanded the reach of the system. The first was the declaration of an internal armed conflict in January 2024, which redirected public resources, heightened the political sensitivity of investigations and normalised an exceptional approach to criminal prosecution. The second was the approval, in the April 2024 referendum, of the extradition of Ecuadorian nationals. This removed a long-standing barrier and created a real risk of cross-border prosecution for local directors and shareholders.
In practice, this means that a single business transaction may be reviewed simultaneously, and without co-ordination, by four or five authorities, each applying different standards of evidence. A tax assessment may become a criminal complaint; a suspicious transaction report may give rise to a preliminary criminal investigation; and a preliminary investigation may result in an asset forfeiture claim that does not depend on any conviction. For this reason, companies should assess their exposure as a whole, rather than authority by authority.
Part One: Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Corporate Criminal Liability
This analysis is divided into two parts: (i) the fight against corruption; and (ii) the effort to dismantle criminal organisations by targeting their finances. The first part is of particular relevance to investors and multinational groups that intend to remain in, or enter, the Ecuadorian market.
Companies as criminal offenders
Since 2014, Ecuador’s Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code (Código Orgánico Integral Penal, or COIP) has allowed a company to be held criminally liable in its own right. In other words, a company in Ecuador can itself commit a crime. Article 49 of the COIP provides that private legal entities, whether Ecuadorian or foreign, are criminally liable for offences committed for their own benefit or for the benefit of their members, through the acts or omissions of those who own, control, manage or represent them.
Two features of this regime deserve particular attention. First, the liability of the company is independent of any liability of the individuals involved: a company may be sanctioned even if no director or employee is identified or convicted. Second, the penalties are not limited to financial sanctions. They range from fines to the closure of premises, a prohibition on contracting with the state, the confiscation of assets and, in the most serious cases, the compulsory dissolution and liquidation of the company. For the local subsidiary of a multinational group, this last outcome would mean the complete loss of the investment.
A closed list: which offences can a company commit?
This question is essential, because Ecuador applies a closed-list system (numerus clausus) of corporate criminal liability. This means that a company cannot be prosecuted for every offence contained in the COIP, but only for those offences for which the law expressly provides corporate liability.
The following list selects and groups the economic and financial offences for which a company may in fact be held criminally liable in Ecuador:
For an investor, this list offers little comfort. It covers almost every area of a company’s operations: its supply chain, its treasury, its dealings with the tax authority, its payroll, its environmental impact, its relationship with the public sector and its handling of sensitive information. In practice, virtually no company of significant size in Ecuador carries out ordinary business activities that fall entirely outside this list.
Compliance as a mitigating factor: from paper to practice
In parallel with this regime, Ecuador introduced a mitigating factor for companies that maintain an effective and robust compliance programme designed to prevent offences. The reform of February 2021 – known as the Anti-Corruption Law – amended, among other provisions, Articles 45 and 49 of the COIP and, for the first time, expressly recognised compliance programmes as a mitigating circumstance in corporate criminal liability. As a result, demand for compliance services and compliance officers has grown rapidly in Ecuador.
The difficulty is that much of this growth has been merely formal. In our experience, most Ecuadorian compliance programmes were designed to be shown rather than to operate in practice: generic manuals, risk matrices copied from other industries, whistle-blowing channels that leave no audit trail, and compliance officers without genuine independence or a direct reporting line to the board of directors.
At a minimum, a compliance programme capable of being defended before an Ecuadorian judge requires:
Ultimately, the question a court will ask is not whether the programme existed, but whether it worked.
It is also important to manage expectations. In Ecuador, a compliance programme is currently a mitigating factor, not a defence that excludes liability. The academic and judicial debate on whether an adequate programme could exclude liability altogether – on the grounds that there was no organisational failure – remains open. Its resolution is likely to be the most significant development in Ecuadorian economic criminal law in the coming years.
Part Two: Targeting the Finances of Criminal Organisations
Money laundering and the expanding range of reporting entities
Ecuador’s anti-money laundering regime has progressively expanded the range of entities subject to reporting obligations. These obligations are no longer limited to banks, credit unions, brokerage firms and insurance companies; they now extend to real estate companies, vehicle dealers, jewellers, notaries and other participants in the real economy. As a result, the obligations to appoint a compliance officer accredited by the UAFE, to maintain prevention manuals and to report unusual and unjustified transactions are no longer exclusive to the financial sector.
For a business outside the financial sector, the risk arises in two ways. The first is direct: failure to implement anti-money laundering controls is a stand-alone offence for which the company itself may be held liable. The second is indirect and far more common: the company is named as a counterparty in a report filed by another entity, and that report becomes the starting point of a preliminary investigation in which the company must explain the origin and destination of funds that nobody had previously questioned.
Beneficial ownership and corporate transparency
A less visible but decisive trend is the strengthening of the traceability of beneficial ownership, that is, the identification of the individuals who ultimately own or control a company. The exchange of information between the Superintendency of Companies, the Internal Revenue Service and the UAFE – including information on shares, equity interests and assets held abroad by Ecuadorian residents – has considerably reduced the room available for opaque corporate structures.
The implications for multinational groups are concrete. Legitimate holding structures in low-tax jurisdictions, which are entirely lawful in their home countries, now attract a disproportionate level of scrutiny in Ecuador. This is not because they are illegal, but because the Ecuadorian system is not yet comfortable distinguishing international tax planning from the concealment of assets. Documenting the business purpose of each layer of the structure is therefore no longer merely good practice; it has become an essential defence tool.
Asset forfeiture: a risk that does not require a conviction
The Organic Law on Asset Forfeiture (extinción de dominio), published in May 2021 and amended in 2024, is probably the development most underestimated by foreign investors. Asset forfeiture is a court decision that transfers ownership of assets to the state without any payment or compensation. It is a proceeding concerning property: it is directed against assets rather than against individuals, and it is conducted as an autonomous process, separate from and independent of any criminal case.
The implications are significant. No prior criminal conviction is required. The action may cover assets of unlawful or unjustified origin, as well as assets intended for unlawful use, whether located in Ecuador or abroad, and whether they belong to individuals or companies, Ecuadorian or foreign, that carry out economic activities in the country. In practice, the burden of explanation shifts to the owner, who must demonstrate how the assets were lawfully acquired.
Consider a company that acquired assets – real estate, shareholdings, machinery or receivables – from a third party who, years later, turns out to be linked to an investigation. For that company, effective protection lies not in claiming good faith, but in being able to prove it. This requires:
The Grey Zone: Tax Fraud, Embezzlement and False Positives
Why should this matter to investors? The growth of organised crime in Ecuador has led to stricter financial controls across every financial transaction in the country, without exception. In addition, in our experience, given the difficulty the state faces in effectively targeting criminal organisations, a significant share of public enforcement resources has been directed towards the mass investigation of formal companies, frequently on grounds such as tax fraud.
This shift follows an institutional logic that is easy to identify. Pursuing a drug trafficking network is difficult, dangerous and uncertain in its outcome. Pursuing a formal company with accounting records, a known address and assets that can be seized is simpler, safer and statistically rewarding. The result is an undesirable imbalance: the system reports enforcement figures on economic crime that are explained, to a significant extent, by cases against compliant taxpayers rather than by the dismantling of criminal organisations.
In this context, an effective defence in Ecuador no longer begins when formal charges are brought. It begins at the administrative stage, with the preparation of a well-founded technical file capable of demonstrating – through documents prepared at the time of the events – the commercial rationale of the transaction being challenged. Companies that keep this documentation in order from the outset are in a far stronger position to resolve matters before they escalate into criminal proceedings.
Outlook
Ecuador’s economic criminal justice system will continue to become stricter, driven by pressure to comply with international standards, the political need to demonstrate results in the fight against organised crime, and the reorganisation of the courts that hear these cases. A sustained increase in cases against companies, more frequent use of asset forfeiture and the first substantive judicial debates on the adequacy of compliance programmes can all be expected.
What the system still lacks is rigour in the way charges are formulated. Until clear criteria are developed to distinguish lawful financial transactions from unlawful ones, and for as long as interim measures – such as asset freezes and other restrictions imposed while an investigation is under way – continue to operate as a punishment imposed in advance, the country will continue to generate false positives that deter investment without dismantling a single criminal organisation. This is the challenge that will define the next stage of Ecuadorian economic criminal law.
For investors, the practical lesson is clear: Ecuador continues to offer real business opportunities, but it now demands a degree of preventive preparation that was unnecessary only a few years ago. Companies that arrive with a compliance programme tailored to their actual operations, properly documented corporate structures and the ability to respond promptly to an investigation can keep their criminal risk at a manageable level.
Whymper N27-70 y Francisco de Orellana
Edificio Sassari
4th Floor
Quito 170109
Ecuador
+593 2 600 0450
info@rodriguez-co.com www.rodriguez-co.com