Japanese law does not classify offences as misdemeanours and crimes, although there is a Minor Offences Act. The main piece of legislation is the Penal Code (PC), but many statutes include criminal sanctions. The constituent elements of a crime are that:

• the act needs to correspond to the statutory definition of a crime; and
• the person who committed the act must have had the intention to commit a crime or acted negligently.

A crime must also be “illegal” – ie, excluding self-defence, emergency or other justifiable acts. Attempted offences are only punished if there is a provision punishing attempts.

Legislation

The main laws and regulations relevant to white-collar crime are as follows.

• The PC contains provisions on white-collar crime, including fraud, misappropriation, breach of trust and theft as basic categories of crimes.
• The Companies Act (CA) contains provisions on special breaches of trust (a specific category of crime related to corporate fraud) committed by directors and specified corporate officers.
• The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (FIEA) includes provisions on:
1. the requirements for the proper disclosure of corporate affairs and the prohibition of misconduct in relation to securities transactions;
2. breaches of these rules; and
3. administrative dispositions and criminal punishment.
• The Act on the Punishment of Organised Crime and the Control of Criminal Proceeds (APOC) contains provisions on special categories of crimes regarding organised crime and the concealment and confiscation of the proceeds of crimes.

Corporate Fraud Offences

The main offences relevant to white-collar crime include the following.

• Fraud (PC, Article 246): defrauding someone and causing such person to deliver property. Many types of fraudulent acts qualify as crimes. Attempts are punishable.
• Theft (PC, Article 235): stealing property. Withdrawing money from ATMs using an illegally obtained cash card is a crime. Attempts are punishable.
• General breach of trust (PC, Article 247) and special breach of trust (CA, Article 960) committed by an individual responsible for the affairs of another for the purpose of promoting their own interest or the interest of third parties, or inflicting damage on someone or on someone’s property in breach of their duties. Certain forms of misconduct committed by officers and employees of financial institutions may constitute a breach of trust. When committed by directors, etc, there may be a “special breach of trust”. Attempts are punishable.
• Misappropriation (embezzlement during business activities) (PC, Article 253): embezzlement by one person of the property of another in the course of business. This includes certain forms of misconduct by officers and employees of financial institutions.
• Misconduct in relation to securities transactions (FIEA, Article 197): the use of illegal means that can involve making false statements on important matters, spreading rumours and using fraudulent means, or other similar acts in relation to securities transactions. Companies can also be punished. Attempts are not punishable.
• Infringement of trade secrets (Unfair Competition Prevention Act (UCPA), Article 21): obtaining trade secrets through fraudulent acts to make wrongful gains and other related misconduct. Certain attempts are punishable.
• Unauthorised computer access (Act on Prohibition of Unauthorised Computer Access (APUCA), Articles 2–4 and 11): unauthorised computer access using another person’s ID and password without the permission of the administrator or authorised user. Attempts are not punishable.
• Providing or using a personal information database without permission for unlawful purposes (Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI), Article 179) – eg, a personal information database is provided or misappropriated/used without permission for unlawful purposes by a personal information-handling business operator. Attempts are not punishable.
• Tax evasion (Corporation Tax Act (CTA), Article 159): tax evasion through wrongful acts.
• Misleading representation (Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations (AUPMR), Articles 5, 7 and 46): misleading the general public/consumers into believing a product is significantly superior to other products or that the price or other terms are significantly more favourable than those of competitors (or than they are) and failing to comply with a cease-and-desist order, etc, from the supervisory authority. Attempts are not punishable.

Further Offences

Sanctions against white-collar crime also apply to:

• the counterfeiting of private documents (PC, Article 159), which involves the use of documentation in the name of a company without the necessary authority;
• false entries in original notarised deeds (PC, Article 157), which involves making an application to register fake directors (or the filing of other registered matters), causing the registration office to register false information; and
• the obstruction of business using fraudulent means (PC, Article 233).

These crimes require intent. To secure the conviction of a company or an individual, the public prosecutor must prove beyond reasonable doubt the occurrence of a criminal act and criminal intent.

The burden of proof lies with the prosecutors, who must prove in court beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which they were indicted (Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), Article 336 and Constitution of Japan). There is no statutory presumption mechanism beyond deductions and inferences through case-by-case fact-finding by the court.

Administrative Sanctions

An administrative disposition is valid unless rescinded by the court. The recipient needs to file a lawsuit. There is no general rule regarding burden of proof in administrative litigation. The standard of proof is “certainty of veracity to the extent an ordinary person would not raise doubts”.

The limitation period depends on the type of crime and the amount of the statutory penalty (CCP, Article 250), and ranges from one to 30 years (except for offences punishable by death). The limitation period starts running when the criminal act stops. Where accomplices are involved, the period starts when the last criminal act committed by an accomplice has ceased. If the offender is abroad, the limitation period is tolled during their time abroad. Article 55 of the CCP clarifies the calculation method.

Japanese laws do not generally apply to foreign companies’ activities outside Japan. However, the PC may apply to persons who commit certain serious crimes abroad. If only part of the act or the result of a crime occurs in Japan, it is considered as a “crime occurring in Japan” and the PC may apply if fraud causes loss to a Japan resident.

By contrast, the extraterritorial application of administrative powers is generally not specified. Administrative laws and regulations may generally apply to acts outside Japan if they affect persons and properties in Japan.

Co-Operation

Evidence for criminal cases in Japan can be obtained from foreign countries based on a treaty or agreement regarding mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (eg, with the USA, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, the EU, Russia and Vietnam, except for cases that do not constitute a crime under the laws of these countries). Otherwise, co-operation occurs through diplomatic channels based on reciprocity (the Act on International Assistance in Investigation and Other Related Matters (AIAI)).

Assets derived from criminal activities can be seized abroad based on treaties or agreements, and through diplomatic channels. Japan has ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which allows for requests for assistance relating to organised crime between authorities in signatory countries, without going through diplomatic channels.

Administrative authorities usually share information on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

Blocking Statute

No statute explicitly blocks the assertion of foreign jurisdictions within Japan, but the AIAI lists matters for which assistance is not provided.

Extradition

Japan has entered into extradition treaties with the USA and Korea. Japan is a party to multilateral treaties with provisions on extradition, such as the UNTOC and the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

The Extradition Act allows the Minister of Justice to extradite fugitive criminals (even voluntarily), subject to court review, except in prescribed cases.

In principle, only individuals are criminally liable, and most related crimes are covered by the PC without dealing with legal entities. A legal entity can only be held criminally liable if there is a specific statutory provision (PC, Article 8).

A legal entity may be fined if it has been proven that one of its officers or employees has committed a specific crime in connection with its business. While it is possible to punish legal entities only, without punishing individuals (provided the individual’s offence is proven), there is no clear policy. In a merger context, the criminal liability of the dissolving company cannot be assumed by the surviving company.

The parent company or group companies of a violating company may be held liable only in cases such as joint tort liability under the Civil Code. Japan has no criminal liability provisions for “failure to prevent”-style offences.

Administrative sanctions (eg, administrative monetary penalties) can be imposed on legal entities without a dual liability provision (eg, under the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade (AMA)).

The court decides the punishment within parameters set by statutes at its discretion, considering factors such as:

• how the defendant committed the crime;
• the seriousness of the damage;
• motive;
• the defendant’s criminal record;
• whether the defendant has compensated for the damage; and
• whether the defendant is remorseful.

The court may render suspended sentences if certain conditions are met – eg, if the defendant is a first-time offender sentenced to imprisonment of not more than three years (PC, Chapter 4). There are no clear guidelines or standards. However, based on past sentences, punishments in similar cases do not vary significantly.

Although not explicitly provided by law, the amount of the fine may be affected if it can be demonstrated that the company had established an appropriate system to prevent the violations or has made remediation efforts.

As part of the sentencing procedure, after examining the evidence, the prosecutors must state their opinion, including the sentence. The defendants and their attorneys can also state their opinions (CCP, Article 293). The court is not bound thereby, but in practice a more lenient sentence is often handed down.

There are no rules or guidelines governing the assessment of penalties if a deferred prosecution agreement, non-prosecution agreement or plea agreement is reached.

Civil Remedies

Victims of white-collar offences may seek remedies in case of tort under the Civil Code (Article 709). Proceedings are generally initiated before the district court as the court of first instance (otherwise, the summary court for petty claims). Civil proceedings are conducted separately from white-collar crime cases.

Where justified, the Crime Victims Protection Act allows victims to inspect and copy case records after the first trial date until the conclusion of the case; Article 47 of the CCP and the Act on Records of Final Criminal Judgments are also relevant. Theoretically, contractual liability and unjust enrichment can be pursued as civil remedies, but in a white-collar crime context, seeking tortious liability is usually sufficient.

Remission Scheme Against Organised Crime

Property directly damaged by a crime and seized will generally be returned by the court or prosecutor’s office after conclusion of the criminal case. However, it is difficult to return property that cannot be identified as belonging to victims.

In principle, property extorted from a victim because of a crime or property derived therefrom is not confiscated (PC, Article 19-2; APOC, Article 13). When the nature of the crime makes it difficult to exercise the right to claim against the offender (eg, organised crime), or when it is difficult to exercise the right to claim owing to disguised or concealed facts, confiscation of stolen property is permitted. Cryptocurrency may be confiscated in cases involving organised crime. Under a restitution order system concerning the confiscation of the proceeds of crime and the collection of equivalent sums, the prosecutor’s office can conduct procedures to issue remission payments to victims, etc, from confiscated or forcibly collected property, based on the Act on Payment of Compensation for Criminal Damage Using Stolen and Misappropriated Property.

When a current deposit account used for criminal purposes is frozen, the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan and the bank where such deposit account is opened may take the initiative of distributing the funds to victims (Act on Payment of Damage Recovery Benefits from Funds in Deposit Accounts Used for Crime).

Class Actions

US-style class actions are not available in Japan. However, certain consumer organisations certified by the Prime Minister (the Secretary-General of the Consumer Affairs Agency (CAA)) may file actions against business operators to request injunctions to end or prevent violations of the Consumer Contract Act by business operators against many unspecified individuals.

Certified organisations can file actions for the “confirmation of common obligations” and take judicial action to ascertain the rights of consumers, but they cannot represent consumers without their individual consent. Recently, there has been growing discussion about granting qualified consumer organisations standing to seek injunctions against dark patterns in online transactions (no bill yet).

Two main types of authorities are involved in the investigation and prosecution of white-collar offences. Prosecutors and administrative authorities exercise parallel enforcement powers. Prosecutors generally await an accusation from the relevant administrative authority before prosecuting violations of administrative law.

Authorities With Powers Over Criminal Cases

The police and the public prosecutor’s office have powers over criminal cases. They can conduct compulsory investigations but often make enquiries or interview suspects on a voluntary basis. On top of the principal sentence for a criminal offence, the courts may confiscate the proceeds of crime or collect the cash equivalent. Certain drug-related proceeds are subject to mandatory forfeiture or collection. The prosecutor’s office has special investigation departments in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, and the police have special divisions. There is no special court for white-collar crimes.

Authorities With Powers Under Administrative Laws and Regulations

Ministries and agencies have authority under administrative laws and regulations.

White-collar crimes are often dealt with by the financial authorities, which have regulatory authority over financial institutions (including banks, insurance and securities companies) to ask questions, conduct site inspections and order the submission of reports and materials. They generally conduct investigations into financial institutions on a voluntary basis to compel them to improve business procedures in accordance with laws and administrative guidance.

The Financial Services Agency of Japan (FSA) is responsible for ensuring the stability of the financial system, protecting investors and carrying out surveillance over securities transactions. The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) is responsible for daily market surveillance, inspections of securities firms, inspections of disclosure documents and related activities. The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) is also important as an administrative authority with respect to cases involving AMA infringements.

Various ministries and agencies deal with money laundering, including the National Police Agency (NPA), the FSA, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Justice.

The CAA has general regulatory authority over misleading labelling. The competent authorities for individual laws regulating labelling and advertising in specific fields (eg, under the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Act) are also regulatory authorities.

For violations of administrative regulations, penalties are often prescribed in addition to administrative sanctions. When the administrative authorities believe a crime has been committed with respect to laws and regulations under their jurisdiction, they must press charges through the investigative authorities.

Administrative Sanctions

Non-compliance with administrative regulations may give rise to administrative sanctions, including:

• cancellation of an entity’s business licence;
• suspension of all or part of a business;
• business improvement and reporting; and
• administrative fines or surcharges.

Public Policy or Political Pressure

The political neutrality of Japan’s law enforcement authorities is relatively well maintained. However, under democratic principles and based on internal policies, the possibility of selective case handling cannot be ruled out.

In general, the authorities mentioned in 2.1 White-Collar Enforcement Authorities have discretion to initiate an investigation. No specific law provides objective requirements under which the authorities are obliged to initiate an investigation, even though the AMA requires the authorities to initiate an investigation when they accept a report. The Administrative Procedure Act (eg, for notice hearings) does not apply to investigations aimed directly at gathering information.

Powers to Conduct Searches and Compel Disclosure

In principle, in criminal cases and having obtained a warrant issued by a court (CCP, Article 218), the police or public prosecutors have the power to conduct searches (including obtaining evidence) when necessary (the scope is broad). Requests for hearings and submissions can also be made on a voluntary basis (Article 197). Rejection of a request may trigger an arrest. Public offices or public or private organisations may be asked to report on matters relating to an investigation.

Administrative authorities supervising licensed enterprises (eg, the FSA) may conduct on-site inspections. The scope of intervention is broad, as in the case of criminal investigations. They cannot use force, but evading, preventing or obstructing an inspection usually constitutes a crime.

It is often difficult to file an action to revoke an administrative disposition, and an investigation cannot end until the court decides to revoke or suspend it. As an alternative to a compulsory investigation, the authorities often ask enterprises to submit information on a voluntary basis, while a formal report submission order is issued in cases that have attracted public attention.

Administrative authorities can decide to conduct a dawn raid (a customary JFTC practice in cartel investigations), especially when they have concerns about the destruction or concealment of evidence. They may order a person who possesses electronic records or has authority to access and use such records to provide them (Articles 218-1 and 102-2).

Questioning Powers

In criminal cases, the police or public prosecutors can interrogate suspects arrested or detained with a court warrant (CCP, Article 198). The requirement for arrest is “when there is probable cause to suspect that the suspect has committed a crime” (Article 199). Suspects can also be interviewed on a voluntary basis (Article 197).

Plea bargaining (limited to cases involving the criminal conduct of third parties, as opposed to one’s own) is available under Article 350-2 et seq of the CCP. Prosecutors can grant immunity from prosecution to a witness, although the courts tend to scrutinise the credibility of their testimony and there have only been a few cases.

Arrest and detention help to prevent escape and the destruction of evidence, and are a means of furthering criminal investigations. They are also used by the police and prosecutors to interrogate suspects and defendants.

The administrative authorities supervising licensed enterprises usually have the power to ask questions and order the submission of reports. The requirements and sanctions for non-compliance are generally the same as for administrative inspections. Enterprises are often interviewed and monitored on a voluntary basis.

In criminal cases, the suspects and the accused have the right to remain silent (CCP, Article 198) and the right to confidential communication with a defence attorney (Article 39). These rights are based on the Constitution. Attorney-client privilege is not recognised under Japanese law in a criminal context, although attorneys have the right to object to the seizure of documents pertaining to their client. In practice, attorneys are not allowed to attend the interrogation of suspects during criminal investigations.

Unlawfully obtained evidence may be excluded by a court, taking into account the seriousness of the illegality and the necessity of preventing procedural violations and solving cases. Appeals against the retention or seizure of evidence can be filed with a court (CCP, Article 430).

Attorney-client privilege is not available throughout examinations conducted by the administrative authorities, with the exception of cartel matters under the AMA and related JFTC guidelines. In practice, the administrative authorities do not permit counsel to be present at such examinations.

Power of Arrest and Detention, and Relief

See Questioning Powers, above. An appeal may be filed against a detention order (CCP, Article 429). The period of arrest is up to 72 hours, and detention is up to 20 days. There is no right to bail before indictment. When indictment takes place during detention, detention continues after the indictment and can be renewed if deemed necessary by the court. The same applies to cases in which a person is detained after indictment.

Defendants may be entitled to bail with limited exceptions, in particular when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the accused may conceal or destroy evidence (CCP, Article 89). A court can also allow defendants to post bail on its own authority when it deems it appropriate (Article 90). In order to prevent defendants on bail from absconding, the CCP includes:

• penalties for failure to appear;
• reporting orders;
• supervisor appointments; and
• orders to install GPS.

Not all these provisions adopted in 2023 have yet come into force.

The details have not been made public, but the tax and police authorities use AI in investigations (for digital forensics, they appear to use the services of external vendors).

Directors’ Duty of Care

There is no specific statutory obligation to conduct an internal investigation, even if there is suspicion of wrongdoing. However, a director’s duty of care to a company could prompt senior management to commence internal investigations. Under the CA, if a director fails to investigate despite being aware of the possibility of misconduct, they may be found to be in breach of their duty to mitigate company losses or damage.

In addition, industry-specific regulations may indirectly compel a company to conduct investigations. For example, when a pharmaceutical company becomes aware of issues relating to the efficacy or safety of its pharmaceutical products, it must report the issue to the authorities, and an investigation (even preliminary) must be conducted.

Self-Regulated Organisations

Self-regulated organisations have established their own guidelines, such as the Japan Exchange Regulation (JPX-R) concerning the obligations of listed companies to try to conduct investigations when they become aware of misconduct (so-called principles).

Reports to the FSA

Most regulated firms supervised by the FSA (banks, insurance companies and securities companies) are required to file a report with the FSA when they become aware of a prescribed incident of misconduct. The report must include a “summary of the incident”, “analysis of factors leading to occurrence”, “matters addressed” and “details of personnel action”.

Data Protection and/or Labour Laws

Data protection is generally not an issue as long as internal company investigations are legitimate. However, according to case law, employees are not under an unlimited duty to co-operate – they must only do so when it is necessary and reasonable in order to perform their work.

Obligation to Share or Legal Privilege

There is no legal obligation to report the results of an internal investigation to the authorities as a matter of course, but there is also no special legal privilege regarding internal investigations.

Only public prosecutors have the authority to prosecute (CCP, Article 247). In most cases, prosecutors ultimately decide to prosecute criminal cases based on the results of a police investigation, although they may proceed with investigations independently. If the administrative authorities become aware of the existence of a crime in connection with the laws and regulations under their jurisdiction, they must file a complaint with the police or the prosecutor’s office.

The prosecutor’s office decides at its discretion whether to prosecute by considering, for example:

• the possibility of proving the offender’s guilt;
• the severity of the damage; and
• the conclusion of a settlement or the chances of reaching one.

However, a criminal case will be commenced if the Committee for the Inquest of Prosecution resolves that the case should be prosecuted, even if the prosecutor has decided otherwise.

There are no clear prosecution rules or guidelines.

Under the CCP, there is no deferred prosecution system or non-prosecution agreement scheme; however, see 4.3 Plea Agreements, Co-Operation, Self-Disclosure and Leniency.

In addition to offences under the PC and other laws (see 1.1 Criminal Offences), the CA imposes sanctions against the fraudulent activities of corporate officers and employees. Types of corporate crime include the following.

Special (Aggravated) Breach of Trust 

A director can be criminally liable for aggravated breach of trust if they breach their duties in order to unduly seek their own benefit or in the interest of a third party, or to inflict damage on the company’s assets (imprisonment up to ten years and/or a fine not exceeding JPY10 million) (CA, Article 960).

Endangering a Company’s Assets (CA, Article 963)

This includes:

• making false statements or concealing facts about the company’s capitalisation or subscription payments (imprisonment up to five years and/or a fine up to JPY5 million);
• acquiring shares unlawfully at the company’s expense;
• distributing a dividend in breach of the law; and
• disposing of corporate assets in speculative transactions outside the scope of the corporate objects.

Other CA Offences

These include:

• using false documentation (Article 964);
• disguising capital contributions through borrowings (Article 965);
• providing consideration for the exercise of shareholders’ rights (Article 970); and
• bribery – a director can be criminally liable for giving or accepting a bribe under the CA if they accept, solicit or promise to accept property benefits in connection with corporate duties in response to a wrongful request (Articles 967 and 968).

Fraud and embezzlement are covered by the PC.

General

Various statutes prohibit bribery and classify it as a crime, as follows:

• the PC with respect to Japanese public officers;
• the CA with respect to directors;
• the UCPA with respect to foreign public officers; and
• the Act on Punishment of Public Officials’ Profiting by Exerting Influence with respect to members of parliament, the Diet, etc.

The Political Funds Control Act and the Public Officers Election Act regulate political contributions. 

The National Service Act and the National Public Service Ethics Act regulate the conduct of national public servants and benefits they receive from certain persons and organisations. The National Public Service Ethics Board provides guidance on the code of ethics for national public officials regarding gifts, hospitality and other business courtesies, and concerning facilitation payments in an administrative disciplinary context.

Public Officials

The PC prohibits a public official from accepting, soliciting or promising to accept a bribe in connection with their duties. It also prohibits a person from giving, offering or promising to give a bribe to a public official. Employees of state-owned or state-controlled entities (eg the Bank of Japan, national universities and Japan Tobacco) are usually deemed to be public officials and subject to the bribery provisions of the PC or similar provisions under special laws. Intention to commit the offence (awareness of the bribe) is required.

Unless otherwise provided, the maximum prison term for a person found guilty of bribery is 20 years under the PC. A public officer found guilty of receiving a bribe, excluding specified offences, may be punished with imprisonment with work for a term not exceeding five years. For specified offences, acceptance of a bribe on request by a public officer may be punished with imprisonment for not more than seven years; if the public officer consequently acts illegally or refrains from acting in the exercise of their duty, the prison term will be increased by one to 20 years. A person found guilty of giving, offering or promising to give a bribe may be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than JPY2.5 million. 

A person who jointly commits the crime of bribery or induces another to do so may be punished as severely as the principal. An accessory to its commission is subject to a lesser punishment.

Foreign Public Officials

Japan is a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

The UCPA prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign public officials for the purpose of having them act or refrain from acting in a particular way in relation to their duties, or of having them use their position to influence another foreign public official to act or refrain from acting in a particular way to make illicit gains from international business transactions (Article 18(1)).

A violation is subject to imprisonment up to ten years and/or a fine of up to JPY30 million. If an individual who violates the UCPA’s foreign bribery provision is an employee, agent, officer or director of a company and the bribe is made in connection with the company’s business, the company can be subject to a fine of up to JPY1 billion.

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has published best practice guidelines entitled “Guidelines for the Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials”.

Private Commercial Bribery

No general law prohibits commercial bribery among private persons, but bribery of corporate board members is a crime under the CA. Directors or statutory auditors are prohibited from accepting or soliciting property benefits in connection with their duties, and those who have provided, offered or promised to give such benefits will be punished. The CA also makes bribery or the provision or request of benefits regarding the exercise of shareholders’ rights a crime.

Specific laws regulate the provision of advantages or benefits between private parties. For example, the FIEA generally prohibits Financial Instruments and Exchange Business Operators (FIEBOs), such as securities companies and banks, from providing property benefits to clients to make up for losses in securities or derivatives transactions.

The Cabinet Office Ordinance on financial instruments and exchange business restricts FIEBOs and their officers or employees from providing a special advantage to clients. The Ordinance also restricts the staff of registered credit-rating agencies (CRAs) from receiving, demanding or accepting an offer of money or goods that exceeds JPY3,000 per case from their clients in general. No criminal punishment sanctions these acts, but FIEBOs or CRAs may be subject to administrative action by the regulator.

No statute specifically requires companies to prevent bribery or influence peddling, nor to maintain an anti-bribery compliance programme. However, the CA requires directors to establish internal controls to prevent unlawful conduct; failure to do so constitutes a breach of their duty of care.

There is no systematic market practice in combating corruption and corporate crime. However, most – if not all – listed companies in Japan have established or strengthened their internal control systems and compliance procedures by, for example:

• rolling out in-house education and training courses;
• strengthening internal audit rules;
• increasing audit frequency; and
• setting up credible whistle-blowing systems and hotlines.

Insider Trading

The FIEA prohibits:

• insider trading (Articles 166 and 167);
• unfair trading (Article 157);
• spreading rumours, using fraudulent means and committing assault or intimidation (Article 158); and
• market manipulation (Article 159) (collectively, market abuse).

Regulatory Authorities and Guidelines

The regulatory and supervisory authorities relevant to insider trading and market abuse are the FSA and the SESC (see 2.1 White-Collar Enforcement Authorities), which periodically issue and update FIEA-related guidelines. Self-regulatory organisations – such as JPX-R, the Japan Securities Dealers Association (JSDA) and the Japan Investment Advisers Association (JIAA) – publish self-regulatory guidelines for the prevention of insider trading.

Offences

Insider trading offences under the FIEA include the following.

Insider trading by a “Corporate Insider” (Article 166)

A “Corporate Insider” who has come to know of a “Material Fact” pertaining to the business or other matters of a listed company or a listed investment company (each a “Listed Company”), or of a subsidiary of a listed company or an asset management company of a listed investment company, and who makes a sale, purchase or other transfer for value or agrees to a transfer for value of shares of the Listed Company before the Material Fact is publicised, violates the FIEA insider trading rules.

“Corporate Insiders” include:

• officers, agents, employees or other workers (“Officers”) of the Listed Company (including its parent company and subsidiaries, as well as asset management companies or specified associated companies of a listed investment company) who have come to know of a Material Fact in the course of their duties;
• shareholders entitled to inspect accounting books of the Listed Company who have come to know of a Material Fact during an inspection;
• investors of the listed investment company or an investor of the parent investment company who are entitled to inspect the accounting books of the listed investment company and have come to know of a Material Fact during an inspection;
• persons with statutory authority over a Listed Company who have come to know of a Material Fact in the course of the exercise of such authority (eg, a public officer with the statutory authority to grant permissions and initiate investigations or inspections);
• persons who have concluded or are negotiating a contract with the Listed Company and who have come to know of a Material Fact during the conclusion, negotiation or performance of the contract;
• officers of a juridical person listed in the second, third and fifth items above, who have come to know of a Material Fact in the course of their duties;
• persons who have ceased to be any of the persons listed above for less than a year;
• persons who have received information on a Material Fact from a person listed above; and
• officers of a juridical person who have received information on a Material Fact in the course of their duties from a person referred to in the above point belonging to the same juridical person.

“Material Facts” include:

• decisions by the organ of the Listed Company that is responsible for making decisions on the execution of the operations of the Listed Company regarding certain important matters;
• the occurrence of certain important facts in the Listed Company;
• the existence of a significant difference between the latest publicised forecasts of sales, current profits, net income and dividends of the Listed Company; and
• other important matters that would have a significant influence on investors’ decisions (catch-all clause).

Decisions, occurrences, differences in settlement of account information, and the matters covered by the catch-all clause (similar to the above) with respect to the subsidiaries of a Listed Company also constitute Material Facts, as do decisions and occurrences with respect to the asset management company of a listed investment company.

Insider trading in connection with a tender offer (Article 167)

The same punishment for insider trading by a Corporate Insider is imposed on persons who have come to know of a fact concerning the launching or suspension of:

• a tender offer; or
• the purchase of 5% or more of the voting rights of a Listed Company.

Communicating information and advising on transactions (Article 167-2)

A Corporate Insider aware of a Material Fact must not inform another person thereof and must not advise another person to sell or purchase stock of the subject listed company for the purpose of allowing such other person to make profits or avoid losses before such Material Fact is publicised. If such other person commits insider trading after receiving said information or advice, the person who provided information on such Material Fact or advice will be punished.

Insider trading offences are not strict liability offences in terms of criminal liability; criminal intent by the person who has committed the offence must be established. Attempts are not punishable. Insider trading actions can be brought against individuals and corporates.

Penalties

For insider trading, the punishment is imprisonment for up to five years and/or a maximum fine of JPY5 million (Article 197-2). Property or earnings gained through insider trading are confiscated, and any shortfall is collected from the offender (Article 198-2). If insider trading is committed by a company’s representative, agent or employee, said company can be punished with a maximum fine of JPY500 million (Article 207(1)(ii)).

The FSA may order a person who commits insider trading or violates the above-mentioned regulation regarding the communication of information to pay an administrative surcharge (Article 175).

Recent Developments

Amendments to the FIEA and the Payment Services Act (PSA) were enacted in 2026 (the “2026 FIEA/PSA Amendments”) and strengthen Japan’s market framework for addressing market misconduct through significant revisions to the insider trading and unfair trading regimes. Key changes include:

• the introduction of insider trading regulations applicable to crypto-assets;
• the transfer of the regulatory framework for crypto-assets from the PSA to the FIEA;
• the expansion of the categories of persons subject to insider trading regulations;
• revisions to the administrative monetary penalty regime; and
• the enhancement of regulatory investigatory powers.

Depending on the provision, the 2026 FIEA/PSA Amendments will take effect within one year of promulgation, on 1 April or 1 October 2027.

Market Abuse

The FIEA (Article 157) prohibits:

• the use of wrongful means regarding the sale and purchase of securities or other securities transactions, etc;
• the acquisition of money or other property by misrepresenting important matters or omitting important matters necessary to avoid a misunderstanding regarding the sale of securities, other securities transactions, etc; and
• the use of false quotations to induce sales, purchases or other securities transactions, etc.

Article 158 prohibits spreading rumours or using fraudulent means, assault or intimidation for the purpose of:

• carrying out sales and purchases of securities or other transactions regarding securities; or
• causing quotations to fluctuate.

The FIEA prohibits market manipulation. The main acts prohibited as such (Article 159) include:

• conducting a series of trades that mislead other investors into thinking that the trading of a listed security is active, to create an environment in which other investors want to trade in said security;
• conducting a series of trades to influence the market price of the security for the same purpose; and
• making trades without intending to transfer rights (“wash sales”) or conspiring with others on certain trades (“collusive trading”) to mislead other investors regarding the overall trading environment.

Penalties

A person who commits market abuse can be punished by imprisonment of up to ten years and/or a maximum fine of JPY10 million (Article 197(1)(v)).

A person who commits market abuse and sells or purchases securities at prices that are the result of market abuse, with the intention of making economic gains, can be punished by imprisonment for up to ten years and a maximum fine of JPY30 million (Article 197(2)).

Property or earnings gained through market abuse are confiscated, and any shortfall is collected from the offender (Article 198-2). If the violation is committed by a company’s representative, agent or employee, said company can be punished with a fine of up to JPY700 million (Article 207(1)(i)).

In addition, the FSA may order a person who commits administrative market abuse to pay a fine under the FIEA (Article 174).

Tax evasion is punishable under the law applicable to each type of tax. If a taxpayer under-reports its payable tax amount, fails to file a tax return or fails to pay withholding tax by the due date, the tax authorities can impose additional tax as an administrative penalty. Delinquent tax can also apply.

Under-Reporting

The penalty for under-reporting is 10% of the tax increment (the difference between unreported and reported taxes) resulting from a correction or an amended return when the original final return was filed on or before the due date. If the tax increment exceeds the tax amount of the original tax return filed by the due date or JPY500,000 (whichever is greater), 15% additional tax is applied to the excess amount.

Notwithstanding general rules, where a taxpayer who has not been notified of the commencement of a tax audit files an amended tax return voluntarily, additional tax is not applied. If a voluntarily amended return is filed by a taxpayer notified of the commencement of a tax audit without awareness of the possible correction based on the audit, 5% additional tax is applied. If the tax increment exceeds the tax amount of the original tax return filed by the due date or JPY500,000 (whichever is greater), 10% additional tax is applied to the excess.

Failure to File

In the case of failure to file a tax return, the extra tax is 15% of the principal amount of tax determined by the tax office or set out in a final or amended return if the final tax return was filed after the due date. Where the principal amount exceeds JPY500,000, the additional tax rate becomes 20% of the excess; for taxes for which returns are due on or after 1 January 2024 and where the principal amount exceeds JPY3 million, the additional tax rate becomes 30% of the excess. An extra 10% is added to those rates if extra tax for failure to file or a heavy additional tax has been imposed within five years regarding the tax in question.

Notwithstanding the general rule, where a taxpayer who has not been notified of the commencement of a tax audit files a tax return voluntarily after the due date, 5% additional tax is applied. If a taxpayer who has been notified of the commencement of a tax audit files a return voluntarily without any awareness of the possible correction or determination based on the audit, 10% additional tax is applied (15% to the excess of the principal tax over JPY500,000).

Withholding Tax

In the case of failure to pay withholding tax, 10% of the unpaid amount of the principal tax is added in the case of payment notification after the deadline. However, where a taxpayer voluntarily pays the tax after the due date, the extra tax rate is reduced to 5%.

Tax Evasion

An additional penalty tax applies at the rate of 35% for under-reporting tax and for failure to pay withholding tax, and 40% for failing to file a tax return. An extra 10% is added to these rates if either an additional tax for failure to file or a heavy additional tax is imposed within five years regarding the same tax.

In addition, a tax offender may be subject to imprisonment for up to ten years and/or a fine. If the amount of corporation tax evaded exceeds an amount specified under the relevant article (eg, CTA, Article 159), the fine may, depending on the circumstances, be reduced to an amount in excess of the specified amount but not more than the amount of corporation tax evaded.

Reporting

In addition to the general self-assessment tax system, residents holding foreign assets above a certain threshold must submit a “Foreign Assets Statement”, and individuals with taxable income and assets above a certain threshold or residents holding assets above a certain threshold must submit a “Statement of Assets and Liabilities”.

Obstruction

In the case of audit by the tax authorities, a taxpayer is punishable by imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of up to JPY500,000 if they do not answer, provide false answers or obstruct the audit.

Corporate Duties

A company may be liable to a criminal fine if an officer or employee is found guilty of a corporate income tax offence.

The Companies Act

According to the CA and its implementing regulations, joint stock companies and limited liability membership companies must timely prepare accurate accounting books (Articles 432 and 615), and joint stock companies must publish their balance sheets and, where applicable, their profit and loss accounts (Article 440).

In addition, a director (or other relevant person; the same hereafter) of a company who fails to prepare accounting books or balance sheets properly will be subject to a maximum administrative fine of JPY1 million (Article 976). When a director uses documents containing false statements about important matters when soliciting subscribers for shares of the company, they may be subject to imprisonment for up to five years and/or a maximum fine of JPY5 million (Article 964).

The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act

The FIEA and its implementing regulations require public offering issuers of securities to prepare financial and accounting documents in accordance with the rules applicable to financial statements (Article 193), file them with the FSA as part of the securities registration statement, and publish annual and semi-annual securities reports (available to the public).

Under the FIEA, failure to submit any required financial statement or report is subject to a penalty, depending on the type of document. For example, a person who initiates a public offering before a securities registration statement has been accepted, or who fails to submit an annual securities report by the prescribed deadline, will be subject to imprisonment for up to five years and/or a maximum fine of JPY5 million (Article 197-2). A person who makes false statements about important matters regarding those documents will be subject to imprisonment for up to ten years and/or a maximum fine of JPY10 million (Article 197-1).

In addition, if the FIEA violation is committed by an officer or employee of a company, the company will also be fined for a violation of:

• Article 197-1 – a maximum fine of JPY700 million; and
• Article 197-2 – a maximum fine of JPY500 million (Article 207).

Furthermore, the violation will be subject to a separate surcharge payment order by the FSA (Articles 172-1 to 172-4).

Cartels

The AMA governs cartels (including bid-rigging), which are prohibited as “unreasonable restraints of trade”, defined as “business activities, by which any enterprise, by contract, agreement or any other means irrespective of its name, in concert with other enterprises, mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a manner as to fix, maintain or increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities or counterparties, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade” (Article 2(6)).

The JFTC can conduct primary investigations and impose cease-and-desist orders and administrative fines (surcharge payment orders). The surcharge amount is 10% of:

• the sales or purchase amounts of the goods or services in question; and
• the amounts of sales or purchases of closely connected trade during the violation period (up to ten years from the investigation date).

Financial gains made for not supplying the goods or services subject to the violation are added to these amounts. In addition, the maximum surcharge amount can be increased by 50% for repeat offenders and those playing a proactive role in its commission/ringleaders. A leniency programme allows the JFTC to factor in the order of leniency applications received and the degree of co-operation, and to award a corresponding discharge of, or discount from, the administrative fines.

Criminal Sanctions

Cartelists can face criminal sanctions. The filing by the JFTC of a criminal accusation to the Prosecutor General is the exclusive means by which a criminal prosecution can be brought against enterprises and individuals for cartel violations (AMA, Article 96(1)). Violations may result in a maximum fine of JPY500 million for enterprises, or imprisonment of up to five years and a fine of up to JPY5 million for individuals.

Other Unfair Trade Practices

The JFTC imposes administrative fines (pursuant to surcharge payment orders) if an enterprise is found to be engaged in “private monopolisation” or certain unfair trade practices under the AMA. Surcharges are calculated by applying certain rates to the sales of the relevant goods or services during the violation period (up to ten years). In the case of control-type private monopolisation, the calculation method is the same as for cartels. The sales calculation methods and surcharge rates differ according to the type of conduct, as follows.

• For control-type private monopolisation: 10% of sales (increased by 50% if the enterprise has been ordered to pay surcharges or has been subject to a similar order for private monopolisation or restraint of trade during the past ten years).
• For exclusionary-type private monopolisation: 6%.
• For unfair trade practices (concerted refusal to deal, discriminatory pricing, unjust low price and resale price maintenance) corresponding to a repeat violation within ten years: 3% of sales. A rate of 1% and a different calculation method apply to abuses of superior bargaining position, for which a payment order can be imposed for the first violation.

Criminal sanctions may apply for private monopolisation but have so far never been imposed. Enterprises face a maximum criminal fine of JPY500 million.

The Penal Code

A person who defrauds another person of property can be punished by imprisonment of up to ten years (PC, Article 246).

The Act on Specified Commercial Transactions

The Act on Specified Commercial Transactions regulates transactions involving:

• door-to-door, mail order and telemarketing sales;
• multi-level marketing transactions;
• the provision of specified continuous services; and
• business opportunity sales transactions and door-to-door purchases.

Taking door-to-door sales as an example, making misrepresentations about the performance or value of a product is prohibited. Violators may face business improvement, business suspension or business prohibition. They may also be subject to imprisonment of up to three years or a maximum fine of JPY3 million.

The Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations

The AUPMR regulates premiums and representations in connection with transactions of goods and services to ensure fair competition and protect the interests of consumers. It prohibits certain acts punishable by surcharge payment order (Article 8), including:

• representations where the quality, standard or any other content of goods or services is portrayed to consumers as being much better than that of the actual goods or services, or much better than those of other businesses, contrary to fact; and
• representations by which the price or other trade terms of the goods or services could be misunderstood by consumers to be much more favourable than those actually offered or those of other businesses supplying the same or similar goods or services.

In the violation of a corrective order (order for action) (AUPMR, Article 46), the penalties are imprisonment of up to two years and/or a maximum fine of JPY3 million. A fine of up to JPY1 million may be imposed directly on a malicious enterprise making representations while being aware that they are improper, without an order for action being issued (Article 48). Cease-and-desist orders can be issued to stop misrepresentations and prevent recurrence. The administrative fine is 3% of sales made during the misrepresentation period.

If the business can prove that it did not know the representation was misleading and that it has seriously considered whether it was misleading, the fine is not imposed. If the business reports the misrepresentation before an investigation is started, the fine is reduced by half. If the business makes a plan to refund consumers to compensate for the misrepresentation, and if the plan is approved by the CAA and implemented by the business, the fine is reduced or eliminated.        

Cybercrimes and Computer Fraud

The PC prohibits the creation, provision, release, acquisition and storage of malware with the intention of applying or using such malware in the electronic device of another person. Offenders risk imprisonment for up to three years or a fine of up to JPY500,000, or two years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to JPY300,000 for acquisition and storage (Article 168).

For the unauthorised acquisition, use or disclosure of trade secrets (including electronically stored secrets), the UCPA imposes imprisonment for up to ten years, a maximum fine of JPY20 million, or both (Article 21) (see below).

In the case of phishing and unauthorised access to identifying information, the APUCA imposes imprisonment for up to one year or a maximum fine of JPY500,000 (Article 12). Unauthorised access, including hacking, is punishable with imprisonment of up to three years or a maximum fine of JPY1 million.

The following acts are also relevant:

• the APPI on data protection;
• the Telecommunications Business Act, which seeks to protect the secrecy of communications; and
• the Act on Punishment of Activities Relating to Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and the Protection of Children (CPA).

Protection of Company Secrets

The UCPA protects trade secrets and shared data with limited access. A trade secret is technical or business information that is useful for commercial activities and is controlled as a secret and not publicly known. Shared data with limited access is technical or business data that is handled as data to be provided to specific persons on a regular basis, and that is accumulated in substantial quantities by electronic, magnetic or other methods that cannot be recognised by human senses alone (excluding information kept secret).

According to Article 21, a person who uses or discloses a trade secret acquired by the following means can face imprisonment of up to ten years and/or a maximum fine of JPY20 million:

• fraud (deceiving, assaulting or intimidating a person);
• asset theft;
• breaking into facilities;
• using unauthorised access under the APUCA;
• misappropriating a recording medium containing trade secrets; and
• other unlawful means.

The following individuals will be punished:

• a person who was an officer or employee of the trade secret holder, to whom the trade secret holder had disclosed trade secrets, and who has offered to disclose them to make wrongful gains or cause damage to the trade secret holder; or
• a person who receives a request to use or disclose trade secrets while holding that position, in breach of their legal duty regarding the management of trade secrets, and who uses or discloses them after leaving that position.

The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act

The MOF and METI can impose financial/trade sanctions under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA). Trade control is exercised through FEFTA-compliant measures, such as:

• importation/exportation permission and approval screening; and
• on-site inspection and disposal of illegal exports.

Furthermore, Japan exchanges information with other countries to combat attempts to circumvent export bans and prevent sanctioned countries from acquiring restricted goods or sensitive technologies through illicit means.

In June 2026, amendments to the FEFTA were promulgated to strengthen Japan’s foreign investment screening regime. Key changes include:

• the introduction of review requirements for certain indirect acquisitions of Japanese companies;
• the establishment of a statutory framework for risk-mitigation measures;
• the expansion of anti-circumvention provisions; and
• enhanced powers to address national security concerns.

The provisions establishing Japan’s new inter-agency review framework took effect in June 2026; other amendments will take effect within one year of promulgation.

Export Control

Japan’s export control system structure is a complicated mix of primary and secondary legislation:

• the FEFTA provides the legal basis for export control;
• the Export Trade Control Order specifies the controlled goods under Article 48(1) of the FEFTA; and
• the Foreign Exchange Order specifies controlled technology under Article 25(1) of the FEFTA.

The FEFTA defines the basic framework of the control of exports of weapons and dual-use items, as well as technology transfers and METI licence requirements. Persons conducting a transaction subject to Article 25(1) or 25(4) without the necessary licence face criminal penalties (Article 69-6).

Any person who meets either of the following conditions will be punished with imprisonment of up to seven years and/or a maximum fine of JPY20 million (in some cases, five times the value of the items involved exceeding JPY20 million):

• any person who conducted a transaction subject to the provisions of Article 25(1) or 25(4) without a licence; or
• any person who exported goods subject to Article 48(1) without a licence.

Imprisonment of up to ten years and/or a fine of up to JPY30 million applies to transactions involving, or exports of:

• specific technology used for the design, manufacture or use of:
1. nuclear weapons, etc;
2. goods used for such nuclear weapons, etc; and
• specific goods under Article 48(1) identified as being used specifically for nuclear weapons or for their development.

Foreign Direct Investments

Depending on the type of business in which the target entity is engaged or the nationality of the foreign investor, the FEFTA requires a foreign investor to submit a prior notification and/or a post-transaction report through the Bank of Japan to the MOF and relevant ministries. The FEFTA prohibits certain investments in foreign companies by Japanese investors without prior clearance. Violations are subject to administrative and criminal penalties.

The Customs Act

Under this Act, acts subject to administrative and criminal penalties include:

• exporting or importing prohibited items, being exempted from customs duties through deception or falsification; and
• exporting or importing goods by making false declarations or producing falsified documents.

Harbouring Criminals and Suppressing Evidence

Persons who harbour or enable the escape of another who has committed a crime punishable with a fine or harsher punishment, or who has escaped from confinement, will be punished by imprisonment of up to three years or a fine not exceeding JPY300,000 (PC, Article 103). Persons who damage, forge, counterfeit or alter evidence relating to the criminal case of another, or who use counterfeit or altered evidence, will be subject to the same sanctions (PC, Article 104). Regarding perjury, a sworn witness who gives false testimony can be punished with three months to ten years in jail (PC, Article 169).

The APOC contains provisions on special categories of crime by organised crime and on the concealment, receipt and confiscation of proceeds of crimes.

Under the PC, two or more persons who commit a crime together are deemed to be principals, and a person who induces another to commit a crime may be treated in sentencing as a principal (Articles 60 and 61). An accessory (who aids a principal) is also punishable, but to a lesser extent (Articles 62 and 63).

The following laws prohibit or restrict money laundering:

• the APOC;
• the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (APTCP); and
• the FEFTA.

These are supplemented by the Guidelines on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AMLG) and the related FSA FAQ.

The Japan Financial Intelligence Centre (JAFIC), within the NPA, is the relevant financial intelligence unit (FIU) under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regime, collecting and analysing information on money laundering.

The APTCP and FEFTA impose obligations on financial institutions to use certain measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, including:

• know-your-customer (KYC) measures;
• record-keeping of transactions; and
• reporting suspicious transactions to the authorities.

Non-compliance can lead to administrative sanctions by the authorities.

The APOC prohibits certain types of conduct, including the following.

• Concealing or attempting to conceal facts relating to the acquisition and disposal of the proceeds of crimes or their source. Sanctions are imprisonment for up to ten years and/or a fine of up to JPY5 million.
• Accepting the proceeds of crimes. Sanctions are imprisonment for up to seven years and/or a fine of up to JPY3 million.
• Planning to carry out criminal acts for a criminal organisation, terrorist group or organised crime group involving two or more persons, with one or more conducting preparatory acts such as securing funds or goods or inspecting locations ahead of crimes in accordance with a plan. Sanctions are imprisonment for up to five years.

Obtaining bank books or cash cards with the intention of receiving banking services by passing off as another is punishable under the APTCP.

Terrorist Financing

Laws combating the financing of terrorism (CFT regulations) include:

• the Act on Punishment of the Financing of Criminal Activities for the Purpose of Intimidation of the General Public and of Governments (Terrorist Financing Suppression Act);
• the APTCP;
• the FEFTA; and
• the Act on Special Measures concerning the Freezing of Terrorist Assets under UN Security Council Resolution 1267.

These are supplemented by the AMLG and related FSA FAQ.

JAFIC is the relevant FIU under the FATF scheme, and collects and analyses information on terrorist financing.

The MOF is also in charge of the CFT regulations and has the authority to monitor and inspect suspicious cross-border financings that may be associated with terrorism under the FEFTA.

The Terrorist Financing Suppression Act prohibits acts relating to financing by persons attempting to carry out terrorist acts or their accomplices.

Environmental Pollution

No general criminal provisions prohibit environmental pollution but penalties are provided for in specific environmental laws (eg, the Water Pollution Control Act and the Air Pollution Control Act). Certain penalties can only be imposed if an entity fails to comply with an improvement order issued by the authorities.

Human Rights Violations

No criminal provisions prohibit human rights violations in general. However, the Constitution, PC, Labour Standards Act, Immigration Control Act, Employment Security Act, CPA and other laws prohibit violations of personal liberty, human trafficking, forced labour and similar acts, while establishing remedial measures and penalties. Many provisions also apply to acts committed by Japanese nationals abroad.

Compliance

Companies are expected to verify their supply chains. Non-binding Guidelines on Respecting Human Rights in Responsible Supply Chains, based on the United Nations Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (UN Guiding Principles) and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, provide for the identification and assessment of adverse impacts, vulnerable stakeholders and the prevention or mitigation of adverse impacts, etc, across the supply chain.

No specific regulation governs the misuse of AI, algorithmic trading or automated decision-making (the Act on Promotion of Research and Development and Utilisation of Artificial Intelligence-Related Technologies does not specify prohibited acts). Those engaging in high-frequency trading activities must generally register (FIEA).

Main Offences

Cases involving the fraudulent transfer or misappropriation of cryptocurrency and investment fraud have been reported.

Classification

The PSA defines cryptocurrencies as a type of payment instrument. Consequently, the FIEA, which protects investors, does not typically apply to crypto transactions (but may apply to investment businesses involving cryptocurrencies), impacting enforcement.

Under the PSA, cryptocurrency exchange operators must register and establish proper systems and comply with AML requirements. Non-compliance may result in corrective orders and the revocation of their registration.

The 2026 FIEA/PSA Amendments reclassify crypto-assets as financial products under the FIEA. Crypto-assets will be regulated as a distinct category of “financial instruments” separate from securities.

As explained in 1.2 Burden of Proof, prosecutors must prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Defendants often claim that their conduct was based on a legitimate business purpose. These claims are rebuttable. No special defence exists for white-collar offences.

Lack of Intent

All crimes listed in 1.1 Criminal Offences require intent. To secure the conviction of a company or an individual, the prosecutor must prove the occurrence of a criminal act and sufficient criminal intent beyond reasonable doubt. Lack of intent can be a defence.

Dual Liability

In principle, only individuals are criminally liable, but legal persons can be held criminally liable if a specific statutory provision exists. A company’s liability could be discharged or mitigated if it can demonstrate that it exercised due care in the appointment and supervision of the individual subject to criminal liability. In practice, this defence is difficult.

Compliance Programme

Regarding the company’s liability in a dual liability context, the existence of compliance programmes or in-house training could be important to prove the absence of negligence. This may be viewed favourably by the prosecutors or courts but very few court cases have involved exemptions.

No industries or sectors are exempt for the crimes described in 1.1 Criminal Offences.

Bribery of Domestic Officials

The PC does not define a bribe, but it is generally interpreted as an advantage given to a public official to influence the performance of their duties. It is not limited to a monetary or property benefit, and can include the satisfaction of a demand of the official. Gifts, travel, meals, entertainment or free lease of property are generally viewed as an advantage.

Gifts, gratuities, etc, within the scope of social courtesy are not deemed to be bribes, although the criteria are unclear.

Bribery of Foreign Officials

The UCPA does not expressly allow small facilitation payments. There is no clear “safe harbour” rule for them under the UCPA or the METI guidelines on bribery of foreign officials; provided the prerequisite “to obtain illicit gains in business with regard to international commercial transactions” is satisfied, such payment will constitute a bribe under the UCPA. However, the following acts are less likely to be regarded as bribery:

• providing promotional products for general distribution (eg, calendars and widely distributed souvenirs);
• providing sweets and drinks at business meetings;
• the use of company cars when foreign officials visit the company on business when necessary for transportation purposes;
• providing inexpensive seasonal gifts according to local customs; and
• providing travel and meal expenses based on the company’s own standards in accordance with local laws, when the inspection of a factory and laboratory is needed, and where their display is not sufficient to gain understanding of a company’s products, services and quality.

Safe Harbours and Insider Trading

Certain transactions not considered to undermine the fairness and credibility of a securities market are exempt from the FIEA insider trading regulations, including:

• over-the-counter or negotiated transactions between specific persons who have unpublished material information pertaining to a listed company;
• the acquisition of shares through the exercise of share options; and
• transactions based on contracts or plans made before becoming aware of material information.

Plea Agreements

The plea bargaining system allows a suspect and a defendant to negotiate with prosecutors in the presence and with the consent of their attorneys. Evidence of criminal conduct by, or testimony on the criminal conduct of, third parties (individuals or companies) can be provided against:

• the absence or withdrawal of prosecution;
• the limitation or change of facts or offences to be prosecuted; or
• the setting of a specific sentence required by the prosecutor, etc.

The system covers white-collar crimes such as fraud, bribery, embezzlement and antitrust offences, certain offences relating to taxation and trading in financial products.

An individual or a company can co-operate with prosecutors in relation to third-party suspects by, for example:

• assisting with the evidence;
• responding truthfully to interrogation; and
• providing full disclosure of information in the investigation or in a court trial.

To prevent a co-operating party from providing false information on a third-party suspect in the hope of receiving a reduced penalty, false information may trigger criminal sanctions.

Surrender Under the PC

If the perpetrator of a crime denounces themselves before being exposed as a suspect by an investigative authority, punishment may be reduced. This rule also applies with respect to crimes that cannot be prosecuted without criminal complaint, and to persons turning themselves in to a person who has the right to make a criminal complaint (PC, Article 42).

Leniency Under the AMA

Cartels and bid rigging are caught by Articles 3 and 6 of the AMA, which prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade.

The AMA leniency programme operates as a system whereby administrative surcharges are waived or reduced on the condition that the enterprises that have been involved in cartels or bid rigging voluntarily report these activities to the JFTC. The sooner they report their activities before the JFTC initiates an investigation, the more surcharges they will be exempt from. Under the current system, the following applies.

• All enterprises can co-operate in the JFTC’s investigations voluntarily.
• Before an investigation starts:
1. the first enterprise to report its involvement in a cartel to the JFTC is entitled to full exemption from administrative surcharges;
2. the second enterprise that reports a violation is entitled to a 20% reduction in administrative surcharges;
3. the third, fourth and fifth enterprises that report a violation are entitled to a 10% reduction in administrative surcharges; and
4. the sixth and any other enterprises that report a violation are entitled to a 5% reduction in administrative surcharges.
• After a dawn raid takes place and within 20 days thereafter, enterprises that report a violation are entitled to:
1. a 10% reduction in administrative surcharges, provided not more than five applicants applied before and after the dawn raid – the number of eligible beneficiaries is limited to three after the dawn raid; or
2. a 5% reduction in administrative surcharges.

A further discount rate may apply according to the degree of co-operation with the investigation, at a rate depending on the timing of the application. Enterprises reporting a violation before a dawn raid are entitled to a reduction in administrative surcharges of up to 40%, while those applying thereafter are only entitled to a reduction of up to 20%.

JFTC Guidelines clarify how an applicant’s co-operation level is assessed.

When more than one enterprise of the same group commits an infringement, group enterprises can file a single joint application, in which case the same leniency status/pecking order is granted to all group enterprises named as applicants on the form.

To be eligible for a reduction, applicants must not be involved in illegal activities after the JFTC commences its investigation.

Other Co-Operation or Self-Disclosure

The administrative authorities, prosecutors or courts may also consider co-operation and self-disclosure as a factor to reduce or control (as applicable) administrative dispositions, surcharges, criminal charges or punishment.

The Whistle-Blower Protection Act (WPA) provides that a business operator is not authorised to dismiss or treat a worker (including retired employees and officers) unfavourably based on the worker’s whistle-blowing, nor to claim damages against them for damage suffered by the business operator because of the worker’s whistle-blowing, where:

• it is made to a prescribed reporting destination about a reportable fact (ie, any prescribed criminal act, a prescribed act for which a civil fine can be imposed or an act subject to an administrative disposition under which violations are punishable or for which fines may be imposed) that has occurred or is about to occur in a business operator’s organisation where said worker works; and
• it meets the prescribed requirements (eg, no malicious or wrongful purpose or, in the case of whistle-blowing to an administrative body, believing in the occurrence of the reportable fact and submitting a written document about prescribed matters).

Under the WPA, effective 1 December 2026, individuals who dismiss or discipline whistle-blowers for making public interest disclosures may face imprisonment for up to six months or a fine of up to JPY300,000, and companies retaliating against whistle-blowers may be subject to a fine of up to JPY30 million.

Companies must establish a system to appropriately respond to whistle-blowing (an efforts obligation for companies with fewer than 300 employees).

Detailed guidance on how business operators should establish whistle-blowing systems has been issued by the CAA (Guidelines for Appropriate and Effective Implementation of the Whistle-Blowing System), together with commentaries. The requirements include having the following in place:

• a proper policy;
• a helpline free from conflict;
• disciplinary sanctions in case of breach of internal whistle-blowing rules;
• rules prohibiting retaliation;
• measures for ascertaining whether whistle-blowers are being treated inappropriately; and
• rules dealing with confidentiality and leakage.

Establishing an internal whistle-blowing system is not a safeguard. There are no special incentives for whistle-blowers. Many authorities accept anonymous reports, although anonymous reports have limitations, including credibility.

When investigations occur across multiple jurisdictions, defence strategies are affected by factors such as differences in national legal systems (the existence of privilege, double jeopardy, plea bargaining, data protection, etc) and the impact of information sharing between authorities. This includes determining which country’s proceedings should be prioritised.

Important amendments to the CCP and WPA will come into force between 2026 and 2027 (the effective dates are yet to be announced).

The CCP has been amended to ensure the appearance of defendants at trial, including by introducing a system under which defendants may be ordered to wear GPS devices. The GPS provisions are scheduled to come into force within five years from May 2023.

The WPA will impose penalties on those who dismiss or discipline employees for making whistle-blower disclosures. It also adds provisions presuming that dismissals or disciplinary actions taken within one year of a whistle-blowing report were motivated by that report (effective 1 December 2026).

The 2026 FIEA/PSA Amendments transfer the regulatory framework for crypto-assets from the PSA to the FIEA, strengthen market misconduct regulations through the introduction of crypto-asset insider trading rules, and enhance the regulatory framework applicable to crypto-asset businesses. These amendments also revise market misconduct regulations relating to securities, including by expanding the categories of persons subject to insider trading regulations, revising the administrative monetary penalty regime, and enhancing regulatory investigatory powers. The crypto-asset-related provisions are scheduled to take effect within one year of promulgation, while other provisions of the amendments will take effect later in 2027.