South Korea has signed up to the following:

• the United Nations Convention against Corruption (the “UN Anti-Corruption Convention”);
• the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the “OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”); and
• as a member of the Financial Action Task Force.

In South Korea, bribery and corruption are governed by criminal law. The Criminal Code establishes the primary framework for addressing these offences, encompassing both public officials and private individuals.

The Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes (the “Specific Crimes Act”) and the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes (the “Specific Economic Crimes Act”) also address matters relating to bribery and corruption. The Criminal Procedure Act defines the processes for investigating and prosecuting such cases.

Specific laws targeting bribery and corruption include:

• the Code of Conduct for Public Officials of Korea (CoC);
• the Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (the “ACRC Act”);
• the Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions Act (FBPA); and
• the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (the “Graft Act”), commonly also known as the “Kim Young-ran Act”.

Moreover, certain industries have sector-specific regulations that allow the exchange of benefits under specified conditions. These include:

• the pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors (regulated by the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act and the Medical Devices Act);
• insurance (under the Insurance Business Act);
• financial investments (governed by the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act); and
• defence (regulated by the Code of Conduct of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration).

To clarify the permissible and prohibited actions under the Graft Act, the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) website regularly publishes and updates resources, such as Graft Act commentary, significant rulings and decisions related to the Act, manuals and administrative rulings.

Amendment to the Enforcement Decree of the Graft Act (Amended on and Effective as of 27 August 2024)

The Enforcement Decree of the Graft Act was amended to increase the maximum amount expendable for public officials for a meal from KRW30,000 to KRW50,000. The increase was to reflect the changed socio-economic conditions, including inflation, since the ceiling for these expenses was initially set about 20 years ago (in 2003) under the CoC.

Amendments to the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act (Amended on 6 February 2024, and effective as of 7 August 2024)

The Act was amended to:

• provide coverage in connection with legal assistance costs for internal whistle-blowers;
• remove the cap on the compensation that can be awarded to whistle-blowers (compensation is now based on a certain percentage (up to 30%) of the financial benefit accrued by the public institution or the amount legally confirmed as a result of the relevant report); and
• establish legal basis to allow the ACRC to verify the ability of a party responsible for causing damage or incurring expenses to pay compensation, when the ACRC subrogates and exercises the right to claim damages after disbursing relief funds.

Amendments to the Enforcement Decree of the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act (Amended on 30 July 2024, and effective as of 7 August 2024)

In connection with the foregoing amendments to the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act, the Enforcement Decree for the Act was also updated to provide a legal foundation for implementing delegated matters and for ensuring effective enforcement of the Act, specifically as follows.

Procedure for payment of legal aid costs to lawyers assisting internal whistle-blowers

When a lawyer applies for legal aid costs for assisting an internal whistle-blower, they must submit evidence proving the assistance provided. The ACRC will review the application and determine whether to approve the payment, and will decide on the payment items and amount. The decision will then be communicated to the applicant.

Recovery criteria and procedure for illegally obtained legal aid costs

Full recovery of legal aid costs is required if the payment was obtained through false or fraudulent means.

Costs received for the same reason multiple times will also be fully recovered. Costs mistakenly paid due to errors will be fully recovered as well.

Upon identifying recovery grounds, the ACRC will notify the lawyer in writing, detailing:

• the reason for recovery;
• the recoverable amount, including interest;
• the total amount due;
• the payment deadline; and
• the payment method.

The deadline for payment will be at least 30 days from the notification date.

Clarification of notification timing for protection and support measures

Administrative agencies, supervisory bodies and investigative authorities with oversight of or regulatory powers over public interest violations must notify whistle-blowers about protection and support measures at the time of receiving or transferring a whistle-blower report to a competent investigative body. Public organisations, including public corporations established under related laws, must provide similar notifications when accepting whistle-blower reports.

Removal of the cap on compensation for internal whistle-blowers

To encourage whistle-blowing, the previous cap of KRW3 billion on compensation for internal whistle-blowers has been eliminated.

Amendments to the Whistle-Blower Protection Act (Amended on and Effective as of 27 February 2024)

An additional 19 acts have been designated as falling under the scope of public interest violation acts, including:

• the National Finance Act;
• the Industrial Cluster Development and Factory Establishment Act; and
• the Act on the Management of Subsidies for Local Governments.

The Criminal Code does not explicitly define the term “bribery”, but it does distinguish between receiving and offering bribes. The term has been interpreted broadly to cover any valuable benefits received by the recipient, including money and other types of tangible and intangible advantages, such as gifts and acts of hospitality.

Receiving Bribes

The act of receiving bribes includes:

• receiving bribes in connection with the person’s duties;
• where the public official or the arbitrator demands or promises a bribe; and
• where the bribe is offered, demanded or promised to a related third party/intermediary.

While the timing of the bribe is not important, the “bribery” described above after engaging in corrupt activities is also prohibited.

Offering Bribes

The act of offering a bribe includes instances where a person makes a statement of intent to offer a bribe, promises to offer a bribe and provides a bribe in the manner just described above.

Public Versus Private

Public sector bribery does not require proof of an “improper request” as long as the benefit relates to the official’s duties. In private sector cases, an “improper request” is necessary (eg, offering money to secure a bid). Courts have ruled that a bribe received “in connection with a public official’s duties” includes not only the legal duties of the public official but also the de facto duties of the official as well as the duties of the department to which the public official belongs. However, benefits unrelated to official duties (eg, gifts exchanged as social courtesy or due to personal relationships) are excluded.

Who Qualifies as a Public Official?

“Public officials” refers to individuals performing a certain public function delegated by a state or local government. The statutes define a public official as follows.

• The State Public Officials Act and Local Public Officials Act: any person employed by a state or local government.
• The Specific Crimes Act: any senior staff employee of a “state-owned” or “state-controlled” entity, which is listed in the Enforcement Decree of the Specific Crimes Act.
• The Act on Administration of Public Entities: any director, officer or employee of a “public corporation” and “quasi-government entity” is deemed to be a public official. A list of the public corporations and quasi-government entities is updated and issued annually by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance.

Foreign Public Official

Under the FBPA, it is illegal to give, offer or promise benefits to foreign public officials to secure improper advantages in international transactions. A “foreign public official” under the Act refers to:

• a person who provides a legislative, administrative or judiciary service for a foreign government;
• a person to whom a business of a foreign government was delegated;
• a person who works for a public statutory institution/organisation;
• a person who works for a corporation in which the investment made by a foreign government accounts for more than 50% of the paid-in capital, or which is controlled by a foreign government; and
• a person who works for a public international organisation.

South Korean law prohibits giving, offering or promising benefits to foreign public officials to secure improper advantages in international business transactions. The legal framework does not differentiate significantly between domestic and foreign public officials, as various statutes impose penalties for bribery and corruption regardless of the official’s nationality.

Gifts, Hospitality and Exceptions

South Korea generally treats gifts and hospitality as bribes. However, the Graft Act provides certain exceptions for specific expenses related to official duties, social customs or rituals, within the following limits (as per the Enforcement Decree):

• Food and drink: KRW50,000.
• Funerals and wedding contributions: KRW50,000, except in the case of condolence and congratulatory flowers, where up to KRW100,000.
• Gifts (excluding agricultural products or processed goods with more than 50% of agricultural or fisheries content): KRW50,000.
• Gifts that are agricultural products or processed goods with more than 50% of agricultural or fisheries content: KRW150,000. This is temporarily relaxed to KRW300,000 before and after Korean traditional holidays.

Facilitation Payments

South Korea does not explicitly regulate facilitation payments, treating them as bribes if bribery elements are present. However, the FBPA exempts payments authorised under the laws of the foreign official’s country from being considered a bribe. Accordingly, if the facilitation payment is allowed in the foreign official’s country, such payment will not be subject to the FBPA.

The Criminal Act

Article 132 of the Criminal Act addresses influence-peddling committed by public officials within the scope of their official capacity. A public official who uses their official position to mediate in a way that directly or indirectly influences another public official’s duties, and who in turn accepts, demands or promises to receive money or benefits in exchange for such mediation, is punishable by imprisonment for up to three years or with disqualification from office for up to seven years.

The Specific Crimes Act

Article 3 of the Specific Crimes Act applies to non-public officials with influence over public officials, and offers stricter penalties than the Criminal Act. It expands the scope of influence-peddling to include any individual, regardless of public official status, who mediates influences with respect to public officials’ duties, and who in turn accepts, demands or promises to receive money or benefits in exchange for such mediation – this is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or with a fine of up to KRW10 million.

The Attorney-at-Law Act

Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act seeks to address corruption in public administration or legal proceedings, particularly where public officials’ roles are involved. It punishes anyone who receives, promises to receive, or causes a third party to provide money, goods, entertainment or other benefits under the pretence of making requests or arrangements related to matters handled by public officials, or anyone who offers or promises to offer such benefits to others, subject to imprisonment for up to five years or to a fine of up to KRW10 million.

Overlap and Redundancy in Legislation

Article 132 of the Criminal Act has become almost obsolete due to the broader and stricter provisions under the Specific Crimes Act and the Attorney-at-Law Act. These laws largely cover similar offences, leading to calls for legislative reform to consolidate the laws and improve clarity in their application.

Influence-Peddling in International Contexts (FBPA)

The FBPA does not explicitly address influence-peddling involving foreign officials. However, Article 3(2) of the FBPA penalises third-party bribery where money or benefits are given to a third party intending to bribe a foreign official. In any event, this provision focuses on third-party bribery rather than influence-peddling.

The Graft Act

Article 5 of the Graft Act prohibits any form of improper solicitation to public servants, whether made directly or indirectly. This prohibition applies universally, including to foreign nationals, and is enforced regardless of whether an economic benefit is offered or promised in connection with the solicitation. The following actions are classified as improper solicitations and are strictly prohibited:

• requesting unauthorised facilitation of tasks, such as granting permits, licences, approvals or other statutory authorisations;
• seeking mitigation or waiver of administrative penalties, including taxes, fines, charges or surcharges;
• attempting to influence decisions related to recruitment, employment, promotion or assignment of public officials;
• requesting disclosure of confidential job-related information, such as tender processes, auctions, patents, military operations or taxation, in violation of laws;
• soliciting the selection or exclusion of specific individuals, organisations or entities as contracting parties in breach of statutory rules; and
• intervening in public institution processes, including assessments, judgments or certifications, to unlawfully influence or manipulate outcomes in violation of applicable laws or regulations.

Article 39(1) of the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies provides that if an individual who is responsible for accounting tasks within the company – as specified in Article 401-2(1) of the Commercial Act (executives such as directors, chairpersons, presidents, etc) and Article 635(1) (auditors, audit committee members, business executives, etc), or anyone else in charge of the company’s accounting – violates the accounting standards set forth in Article 5 of the same Act by falsifying financial statements or disclosures, or by failing to include or falsifying the required information in the audit report that should be included by the auditor or a certified public accountant belonging to the auditing organisation, they shall be punished with imprisonment for up to ten years or with a fine of not less than twice and not more than five times the profit obtained or the loss avoided through the violation.

Article 39(2) of the same Act states that if the total assets of the company amount to at least KRW1 trillion (ie, the total assets exceed KRW500 billion, which is 5% of total assets), and the falsified financial amounts that affect profit/loss, equity capital, etc, exceed 10% of the total assets, the penalty will be life imprisonment or imprisonment for at least five years. If the falsified amount exceeds 5% of the total assets, the penalty will be imprisonment for at least three years.

Misappropriation of Public Funds by a Public Official

Misappropriation of public funds is not governed by separate legal provisions but is punishable under the general provisions for embezzlement in the course of duty, as specified in Article 356 of the Criminal Act. The penalties include imprisonment for up to ten years or a fine of up to KRW30 million.

While there are no specific statutes targeting the misuse of public funds or by public officials, the fact that the crime involves public resources of public officials can be considered an aggravating factor during sentencing.

For cases involving substantial financial gains:

• if the illicit gain is between KRW500 million and KRW5 billion, the punishment is imprisonment for at least three years; and
• if the illicit gain exceeds KRW5 billion, the penalty is life imprisonment or imprisonment for at least five years, as stipulated by Article 3 of the Specific Economic Crimes Act.

Unlawful Taking of Interest by a Public Official

The receipt of any economic benefit, including monetary or non-monetary assets, by a public official is treated as bribery under Article 129 of the Criminal Act. The act is punishable according to the same provisions governing bribery-related crimes.

Embezzlement of Public Funds by a Public Official

When a public official embezzles public funds, it is prosecuted under the general embezzlement provisions of Article 356 of the Criminal Act, similar to the misappropriation of public funds. The penalties remain consistent with those outlined for misappropriation.

Favouritism by a Public Official

In cases of favouritism, such as irregularities in public sector hiring, the offence is considered an obstruction of official duties through deception (fraudulent means) under Article 137 of the Criminal Act. This provision addresses interference with public officials’ duties and prescribes penalties of imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of up to KRW10 million.

Bribery can occur through intermediaries. Article 130 of the Criminal Code provides that bribing a public official or an arbitrator who causes, demands or promises a bribe to be given to a third party on acceptance of an unjust solicitation in connection with their duties shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or with suspension of qualifications for not more than ten years. Article 133(2) also sets out that a person who, for the purpose of offering a bribe, delivers money or goods to a third party, or who receives such delivery with the knowledge of its nature, shall be punished as a briber.

South Korean law does not require registration or reporting of communications with public officials or state-owned enterprises.

Depending on the specific case, a statute of limitations of five to ten years typically applies, though if the amount of the bribe exceeds KRW100 million, a 15-year statute of limitations may apply. See Article 249 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

The criminal laws of South Korea apply to the following persons.

• Article 2 of the Criminal Code: anyone, including Korean nationals and foreign nationals, who commit a crime within the territory of South Korea. This includes cases where any part of the criminal act takes place in South Korea or its effects are felt within South Korea.
• Article 3 of the Criminal Code: all Korean nationals who commit a crime outside the territory of South Korea.
• Article 6 of the Criminal Code: Foreign nationals who commit crimes outside the territory of South Korea against South Korea or its nationals. However, the criminal law of South Korea will not apply if the act does not constitute a crime or if prosecution or execution of the sentence is exempted under the law of the place where it was committed.

In general, individuals can only be held liable for bribery if specific sentencing provisions apply to the circumstances surrounding the bribery.

Directors and officers of a corporation are not automatically liable for bribery committed by their employees. However, if they consented to or approved the corrupt actions, they could be charged with conspiracy to commit bribery.

The Graft Act, FBPA and certain industry-specific laws (eg, the Medical Devices Act, Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, Framework Act on the Construction Industry, and Housing Act) explicitly impose vicarious liability on corporations. Under these laws, a corporation can be criminally liable for bribery committed by its employees or agents. However, a corporation can avoid liability by proving it took adequate steps to supervise its employees.

Vicarious liability applies to the corporation itself, meaning a successor entity can be held accountable for offences committed by the target entity prior to a merger or acquisition.

No defence is available under South Korean legislation.

See 4.1 Defences.

No de minimis exception is applicable to bribery in general. However, please see 2.1 Bribery for certain exceptions applicable to gifts and entertainment with a monetary threshold.

No specific sectors or industries are exempt from the anti-bribery regime.

There are no safe harbour or amnesty programmes based on self-reporting or compliance procedures/remediation efforts under Korean law.

However, Article 51 of the Criminal Act requires the following factors to be considered when determining a sentence:

• the offender’s age, character, intelligence and environment;
• the relationship with the victim;
• the motive, means and outcome of the crime; and
• the circumstances after the crime

Among the foregoing factors, the “circumstances after the crime” includes factors such as self-reporting, adequate compliance procedures and remediation efforts, which are considered favourable circumstances.

See also 3.3 Corporate Liability regarding the vicarious liability exception. A corporation will not be found liable for the actions of its employees if the corporation can demonstrate that it discharged its duty to adequately supervise those employees.

The criminal consequences are different depending on the type of the bribery and corruption offences under the following provisions.

Violation of the Domestic Public Official Bribery Offence Under the Criminal Code

Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code

A recipient of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment.

Article 2(1) of the Specific Crimes Act

A recipient of a bribe may face an aggravated penalty of five years’ imprisonment up to life imprisonment if the amount received is KRW30 million or more, depending on the exact amount of the bribe.

Article 2(2) the Specific Crimes Act

An additional fine of two to five times the amount of the bribe could be imposed, regardless of the amount of the bribe.

Article 133(1) of the Criminal Code

A giver of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW20 million.

Violation of the Domestic Private Commercial Bribery Offence Under the Criminal Code

Article 357(1) of the Criminal Code

A recipient of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW10 million.

Article 357(2) of the Criminal Code

A giver of a bribe may face up to two years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW5 million.

Article 5(1), (2) and (4) of the Specific Economic Crimes Act

A recipient who is an employee or officer of a financial institution is subject to imprisonment for up to five years or to disqualification for up to ten years. Depending on the amount received, the penalty may be increased to life imprisonment or imprisonment for at least ten years. Additionally, a fine of at least twice and up to five times the amount received may be imposed.

Article 6 of the Specific Economic Crimes Act

The giver is subject to imprisonment of at least five years or to a fine of up to KRW30 million. 

Violation of the Foreign Public Official Bribery Offence Under the FBPA

Article 3(1) of the FBPA

A giver of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW50 million where the benefit gained from the bribe is KRW10 million or less.

Article 3(1) of the FBPA

A giver of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to twice the value of the benefit where the benefit gained from the bribe exceeds KRW10 million.

Article 4 of the FBPA

A corporation may face a fine of up to KRW1 billion if it is found liable for its employee’s violation of the FBPA and if the benefit gained from the bribe is KRW500 million or less.

Violation of Prohibition of Payment and Receipt of Money or Valuables Under the Graft Act

Article 22(1) of the Graft Act

A recipient or giver of money or valuables exceeding KRW1 million per instance or KRW3 million per fiscal year may be punished with imprisonment of up to three years or with a fine of up to KRW30 million.

Article 23(5) of the Graft Act

A recipient or giver of money or valuables not exceeding KRW1 million per instance or KRW3 million per fiscal year in connection with the recipient’s duties may be subject to an administrative fine equivalent to two to five times the value of the money or valuables received or given.

Article 24 of the Graft Act

The employer of the giver may be subject to vicarious liability up to the same level of a criminal fine or administrative fine of the giver, unless the employer has exerted due care and supervision.

Additional Disadvantageous Measures Against the Offender

Article 14(1) of the Specific Economic Crimes Act

Under this article, if an officer or employee of a financial company is convicted of bribery, they will be prohibited from working for a certain period at:

• any financial company;
• any institution capitalised wholly or partially by the State or a local government;
• any institution that receives any contribution or assistance from the State or a local government; and
• any enterprise that is closely related to the convicted offence.

Article 14(2) of the Specific Economic Crimes Act

This article provides that the above offender and the enterprise in which the offender acts as a representative or executive is prohibited from obtaining any licence, registration or authorisation in connection with government-licensed businesses for a certain period of time.

Under specific business sector regulations that restrict giving or accepting benefits, the relevant individual and/or business operator may be subject to licence revocation or suspension. For example, under Article 36(1)(10) of the Medical Devices Act, the relevant authorities may revoke a licence for manufacture, importation or sale if the manufacturer, importer or distributor has committed illegal rebates against healthcare professionals.

The Sentencing Commission affiliated with the Supreme Court of Korea establishes separate sentencing guidelines for individual offences. The guidelines outline mitigating, standard and aggravating sentencing ranges, enabling judges to determine an appropriate sentencing range by adjusting the range and then deciding on a final sentencing period.

Specifically, the sentencing guidelines for bribery offences provide for different ranges of sentences based on the amount of the bribe. For example, if the amount of the bribe received is between KRW50 million and KRW100 million, the basic sentencing range is five to seven years; the mitigated range is three years and six months to six years, and the aggravated range is six to eight years.

The movement within the sentencing range and the specific sentence selected within the range are determined by considering mitigating and aggravating factors. Repeated offences (recidivism) are an aggravating factor that increases the sentence.

There is no legal obligation on individuals and/or companies to disclose violations of anti-bribery and anti-corruption provisions of which they become aware.

See 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme. 

This topic is not applicable.

The ACRC Act and the Graft Act include provisions for protecting and incentivising whistle-blowers in cases of bribery and corruption, including those reporting corruption-related issues.

Specifically, the ACRC Act contains provisions designed to protect whistle-blowers, which are mirrored in the Graft Act. By way of illustration, the following provisions are included in the ACRC Act.

Protection Measures

A reporting person may file an application for protection with the ACRC.

Article 62(2) of the ACRC Act

A person who reports an issue and experiences or expects to experience any adverse action can request the ACRC to take the necessary steps to reinstate or protect them from such action. Such measures include reinstating or maintaining a licence, permit, contract or employment position.

Article 63 of the ACRC Act

If a reporting person requests reinstatement or protection, it is assumed that they have experienced an adverse action.

Article 64(2) of the ACRC Act

If necessary, the ACRC can instruct the police to implement protective measures such as providing security guards, escorts, protective custody, surveillance and other similar actions to protect the whistle-blower.

Exemption and Reduction

Under Article 66 of the ACRC Act, if the report results in the discovery of the reporting person’s own criminal activity, they may request an exemption from or reduction of the penalties that would normally be imposed on them.

Confidentiality

Article 64(1) of the ACRC Act

Disclosing the personal identification details of a reporting person, or any information that could reveal their identity, is prohibited.

Article 88 of the ACRC Act

Violating this provision can result in five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW50 million.

Prohibition of Adverse Action

Article 62(1) of the ACRC Act

Taking any action that causes personal, administrative or economic harm to a reporting person is prohibited.

Article 90 of the ACRC Act

Violating this provision can result in three years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW30 million.

The Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act

This Act is a separate law on whistle-blowers. This act addresses matters relating to public health and safety, the environment, consumer interests or fair competition by protecting whistle-blowers who report actions subject to penalties or administrative measures under laws concerning public interest violations (protection for public interest whistle-blowing).

Note that this law does not apply to general bribery and corruption under the Criminal Code, Specific Crimes Act, Specific Economic Crimes Act and Graft Act. However, it covers bribery and corruption under the specified industry-oriented legislation, such as the Framework Act on the Construction Industry, Pharmaceutical Affairs Act and Medical Devices Act. Specifically, the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act provides the following provisions for protection purposes.

Confidentiality

Articles 11 and 12 of the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act protect individuals who assist with public interest reporting in the same manner as whistle-blowers, including confidentiality and other protections. If whistle-blowers, their co-operators or their relatives/household members suffer or are at risk of harm due to the public interest report, their personal information may be omitted from investigation and criminal procedure records.

In turn, disclosing, sharing or reporting personal information of whistle-blowers or co-operators, or any details that could reveal their identity, is strictly prohibited.

Violations of these provisions may result in imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of up to KRW50 million.

Protection of personal safety

Article 13 of the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act states that whistle-blowers, their co-operators or their relatives/household members may request personal protection measures if there is clear evidence that they have suffered or are at significant risk of serious harm to their life or physical safety due to the public interest report.

Liability reduction

Articles 14 and 16 of the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act state that, if a whistle-blower or their co-operator is found to have committed a criminal act related to the public interest report, they may be eligible for sentence reduction or exemption. If the public interest report contains confidential information related to their duties, it is considered that the duty to maintain confidentiality under laws, collective agreements or employment rules has not been violated. Claims for damages by the person being reported as a result of the public interest report are prohibited.

Prohibition of retaliatory actions

Article 15 of the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act prohibits taking retaliatory actions based on public interest reports; interference with or coercion to cancel a public interest report is also prohibited. Violations of this provision may result in imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of up to KRW50 million.

The ACRC Act

The ACRC Act (Article 68) and Graft Act (Article 15) contain nearly identical provisions to incentivise whistle-blowers, as follows.

Compensation

A reporting person can request compensation from the ACRC of up to KRW3 billion if their report leads to income recovery, increased revenue or reduced expenses for a public institution, or if it provides facts towards achieving such results.

Financial Reward

If reporting results in significant financial benefit or prevents financial loss to a public institution, or if it otherwise promotes any public interest, the ACRC may provide a reward (or recommend a reward) to the reporting person of up to KRW500 million.

Relief Money

The ACRC may provide relief money to reporting individuals, their relatives, cohabitants or those who have assisted in related audits or investigations. This assistance covers various expenses or damages incurred due to the report, including:

• costs for physical or mental treatment;
• moving expenses related to office transfer or dispatched service;
• legal procedure expenses for litigation filed based on the report; and
• compensation for wage loss during a period of disadvantageous measures.

The Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act

Articles 26 through 29 of the Public Interest Whistle-Blower Protection Act also contain provisions to incentivise whistle-blowers, as follows.

Compensation

If the report leads to the recovery or increase of direct revenue for the State or local government, or if the legal relationship regarding it is finalised, a reward can be requested within the range of 30% of the confirmed amount (with no upper limit on the payment).

Financial Reward

If a public interest report results in significant financial benefits for a public institution or prevents a loss, or contributes to the promotion of the public interest, a reward of up to KRW500 million may be granted, or honours such as decorations or medals may be awarded.

Relief Money

Whistle-blowers, their co-operators or their relatives/household members who suffer from the following due to the public interest report may apply for compensation, including:

• physical and mental treatment costs;
• relocation expenses incurred due to reassignment, secondment, etc;
• costs incurred in legal proceedings related to the public interest report; and
• wage loss during the period of retaliatory actions.

When an individual or a corporation is convicted of a bribery-related crime, the penalties or administrative sanctions imposed are as referenced in 5.1 Penalties on Conviction.

Additionally, if a bribery crime leads to direct financial loss or infringement of rights, the victim may seek compensation through a civil lawsuit against the perpetrator (the person who offered or received the bribe). Since bribery is a legally prohibited act, if someone suffers harm as a result, the victim can claim damages based on Article 750 of the Civil Code (liability for unlawful acts). For example, if a prosecutor accepts a bribe from a complainant and files charges in a case, the defendant in that case may be able to seek damages from the prosecutor.

Furthermore, Article 399 of the Commercial Code stipulates that directors are liable for damages to the company if they engage in illegal acts. If a director uses company funds to offer a bribe while performing company duties, it constitutes a violation of the law as defined by Article 399. Therefore, the director is responsible for compensating the company for the amount of the bribe, as ruled in the Supreme Court decision of 28 October 2005 (Case No 2003Da69638).

Public Prosecution

Prosecutors have prosecutorial powers to investigate and prosecute bribery and corruption.

Article 196 of the Criminal Procedure Act grants prosecutors the authority to begin an investigation if there is suspicion of a crime being committed.

However, according to Article 247 of the Criminal Procedure Act, even if a prosecutor believes a crime has occurred based on their investigation, they may choose not to pursue prosecution, taking into account factors such as the offender’s age, character, behaviour, intelligence, environment, relationship to the victim, motive and methods, as well as the aftermath of the crime.

The Special Investigation Department within each prosecutor’s office prioritises bribery and corruption cases in its enforcement efforts.

National Police Agency

The police can also investigate crimes but do not have authority to prosecute.

The Bureau of Audit and Inspection (BAI)

The BAI is an agency within the executive branch responsible for auditing the accounts of State agencies and overseeing the actions of administrative agencies and public officials. Under the ACRC Act, the BAI has the authority to conduct audits if a public report is filed regarding a violation of the Graft Act. Additionally, public officials are required to report to the BAI or the appropriate investigative body if they become aware of corrupt activities by other officials or if they are coerced or offered into engaging in such activities. The BAI will investigate these reports, and, depending on the findings, may discipline the offending official or refer the case to the relevant authority if criminal activity is suspected.

The Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC)

Anyone who becomes aware of violations of the Graft Act, corrupt activities or violations of the CoC may report them to the ACRC.

Upon receiving reports, the ACRC verifies basic information about the reporter, the circumstances of the report and its purpose. It may request the submission of documents that are necessary to verify the authenticity of the reported information.

If the ACRC deems an audit, investigation or inquiry to be necessary with respect to the reported matters, it must refer them to the BAI, or to the relevant agency depending on the nature of the offence.

If the report involves matters requiring investigation/prosecution of a high-ranking public official, the ACRC must file a complaint with the prosecutors or with the relevant agency depending on the nature of the offence.

The Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (the “Corruption Investigation Office”)

The Corruption Investigation Office was established in early 2020 with the authority to investigate crimes allegedly committed by high-ranking public officials.

Such officials include:

• the President;
• members of the National Assembly;
• members of the judiciary;
• prosecutors;
• certain public officials in political service;
• the head of a local government;
• the superintendent of education;
• police officers above the rank of the superintendent;
• military officers of the rank of General or higher; and
• persons who held the above positions within the last three years.

The Corruption Investigation Office may also investigate the family members of high-ranking public officials, including extending investigations to the President’s first cousins. It also holds the power to initiate and continue prosecution against high-ranking public officials. The scope of its investigations is limited to offences that were specifically designated for the office to address upon its establishment, such as corruption-related crimes (eg, bribery).

Other Administrative Agencies

For investigation of violations of anti-corruption law in certain specific industries (such as the pharmaceuticals industry), the prosecution may also form a joint task force with the relevant administrative agencies (eg, the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety).

The jurisdictions of the prosecutor’s office and the police in this context are the same as with respect to their reach under criminal law. The BAI supervises the duties of administrative agencies and public officials. The ACRC is responsible for preventing corruption in public officials, public institutions and non-profit private organisations. The Corruption Investigation Office has the authority to investigate and prosecute high-ranking public officials and their families. See 7.2 Enforcement Bodies.

Deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements are not available in South Korea. Whether or not to prosecute the defendant falls to the prosecutors’ discretion, and there is no statutory mechanism to allow negotiation or consultation with the defendant regarding whether to prosecute such defendant.

In 2016, South Korea underwent a major political and social scandal, commonly referred to as the “Choi Soon-sil Gate”, where former President Park Geun-hye and her close confidante were implicated in significant abuses of power. This scandal ended with the impeachment and removal of President Park.

During the scandal, investigations revealed that top executives from major domestic conglomerates, allegedly under Presidential pressure, provided financial contributions to sports teams and cultural foundations associated with the President’s confidante. The independent counsel determined that these contributions constituted acts of bribery aimed at securing business favours, and subsequently charged the implicated parties with offences including bribery, embezzlement and perjury.

The legal proceedings concerning the foregoing extended over approximately four years, during which both the President and corporate leaders were convicted of bribery. The case had profound societal repercussions, intensifying public demand for ethical corporate practices and underscoring the necessity of robust compliance frameworks within large corporations, as evidenced by the scrutiny and reforms prompted during the trials.

Korean investigative and enforcement authorities are adopting a strong approach towards combating bribery. Once investigative leads are obtained, there is a high likelihood of indictment, and when bribery and corruption are proven, the courts impose substantial penalties for these crimes. See 5.1 Penalties on Conviction with respect to specific legal penalties.

According to Article 542-13 of the Commercial Act, companies of a certain size (total assets of KRW500 billion or more) must establish “compliance standards” and appoint a compliance officer who meets specific qualifications (such as being a licensed attorney) to ensure the implementation of these standards. The compliance standards include matters related to legal regulations and procedures that employees must follow in their work, as well as systems for education and monitoring to prevent and address violations of the law by employees.

There is no direct criminal penalty for violating the obligation to establish compliance standards or appoint a compliance officer. However, if the company suffers damage due to the failure to establish an adequate compliance system, shareholders may file a lawsuit for damages against the company’s directors, claiming that they failed to fulfil their duty of loyalty and care by not establishing and operating an internal control system. Recently, courts have shown a tendency towards increasingly recognising director liability in such cases.

The sentencing guidelines for bribery-related offences in South Korea do not explicitly recognise the implementation of a compliance programme within a company as a mitigating factor. South Korea has a sentencing committee under the Supreme Court that provides standards reflecting the nature of each crime. While these standards are not legally binding, if a judge departs from them, they must justify the decision in the judgment.

There have been cases where the courts considered the presence of a compliance programme when determining the sentence. For instance, as noted in 7.5 Recent Landmark Investigations or Decisions, the court acknowledged that the decision of the head of a large corporation to strengthen the compliance monitoring system after the offence should be viewed as a “post-offence circumstance”, which is one of the factors to be considered under Article 51(4) of the Criminal Code. However, the court also emphasised that, for a compliance programme to be used as a mitigating factor, its effectiveness must be thoroughly proven. In this case, the court found that the compliance programme had not been demonstrated to be effective, and thus could not be considered a mitigating factor.

In South Korea, there are no compliance programme guidelines similar to (for example) the US Department of Justice’s “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs” issued at the Ministry of Justice level. However, two key compliance programme guidelines have been published by regulatory authorities.

The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) introduced the Fair Trade Compliance Program (the “Fair Trade CP”) in 2001 to promote fair and autonomous market operations by corporations. At the time of its initial implementation, the programme was operated through policy recommendations, administrative rules and notices issued by the KFTC, encouraging voluntary adoption by the market. In 2023, amendments to the Fair Trade Act established concrete legal grounds for the programme, along with detailed provisions for evaluation and incentives. These amendments were set to take effect in June 2024. Under the revised framework, incentives such as reductions in corrective measures or fines are provided to companies that demonstrate exemplary compliance performance.

Separately, the ACRC issued the Integrity and Ethics Compliance Program Guideline for State-Owned Enterprises (commonly referred to as “K-CP”) in 2022. This guideline aims to encourage public institutions to autonomously prevent corruption and to foster a culture of integrity and ethical management. The K-CP and the Fair Trade CP differ in scope and focus, as the K-CP targets domestic public enterprises, addressing ethical and anti-corruption risks, while the Fair Trade CP applies to all enterprises, focusing on managing risks related to fair trade practices.

Non-trial resolution, such as deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, are not available in South Korea. Hence, enforcement bodies do not have the option of seeking a compliance monitor as part of corporate resolutions.

As a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, South Korea’s implementation and enforcement of the Convention is subject to comprehensive peer-review monitoring, co-ordinated by the OECD Working Group on Bribery across multiple phases.

Among other matters, in June 2021 Korea submitted its two-year written follow-up report to the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB), detailing the actions taken to address the 36 recommendations and follow-up issues from its December 2018 Phase 4 evaluation. Based on this report, the Working Group concluded that Korea had fully implemented ten recommendations, partially implemented 12 and not implemented 14.

The Working Group acknowledged Korea’s efforts to strengthen its framework for investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery. This includes clarifying certain aspects of the foreign bribery offence as per Article 1 of the Convention, improving co-operation between the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office and the National Police Agency, allowing telecommunications interception and enhancing mutual legal assistance use in foreign bribery investigations. Additionally, several Korean agencies (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, Eximbank, KOICA and National Taxation Service) have provided training and guidance to their staff on foreign bribery red flags to ensure suspected foreign bribery is reported to law enforcement. These efforts are promising, and the Working Group hopes they will lead to improved detection and enforcement of foreign bribery.

However, the Working Group also expressed concern over the large number of recommendations that are only partially implemented or that remain unaddressed. In particular, Korea must intensify efforts to provide sufficient training and guidance to law enforcement on foreign bribery investigations to ensure proactive information-gathering during the pre-investigative stage, and to ensure that cases proceed to formal investigations and result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (including confiscation of bribery proceeds).

Additionally, Korea must address key unimplemented recommendations, particularly regarding the statute of limitations for legal persons, legislation and enforcement on false accounting offences and its anti-money laundering reporting framework. The Working Group also stressed that Korea needs to substantially increase its foreign bribery enforcement efforts. At the time of the Phase 4 review, the Working Group noted with concern the decline in Korea’s foreign bribery enforcement, with only two ongoing investigations and one trial. Two and a half years later, the Working Group observed limited progress.

Overall, it was understood that Korea must intensify its enforcement efforts, ensure cases progress to formal investigation and implement sanctions that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

As explained in the foregoing sections, there have been recent developments to enhance control over bribery and corrupt activities, including:

• amendments to the ACRC Act and strengthening of the functions of the ACRC;
• the enactment and amendment of the Graft Act (see 1.4 Recent Key Amendments to National Legislation); and
• the establishment of the Corruption Investigation Office (see 7.2 Enforcement Bodies).

Given that these changes are currently being implemented and put into practice, there are no specific discussions regarding the reform or development of bribery and anti-corruption laws.