Indian Competition Law at an Inflection Point: Evolving Standards of Intervention, Regulatory Power and Remedies

Indian competition law is entering a new phase of institutional and jurisprudential development. As competition law enforcement under the Competition Act 2002 (“the Act”) has evolved and expanded, courts and appellate tribunals have increasingly been called upon to establish not only the scope of the Competition Commission of India (CCI)’s jurisdiction, but also the legal principles that determine the contours of when, how, and to what extent regulatory intervention is warranted.

These contours become increasingly more important because competition law operates in the intersection of commercial freedom and regulatory oversight. Although the Act seeks to prevent practices having an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC), it does not prohibit the creation of (or the legitimate use of) market power or the achievement of commercial success per se or the exercise of IP rights, nor reasonable commercial conduct merely because the conduct affects competitors. At the same time, the CCI’s enforcement powers are constrained by statutory limits, procedural fairness, and the need for regulatory certainty.

This evolutionary aspect is best demonstrated in three of the recent appellate decisions involving competition law enforcement in India. In Competition Commission of India v Schott Glass India Private Limited & Another with Kapoor Glass India Private Limited v Schott Glass India Private Limited (the “Schott Glass Judgment”), the Supreme Court of India (the “Supreme Court”) emphasised effects-based analysis, objective commercial justifications, evidentiary rigour, and procedural fairness in abuse-of-dominance cases.

In Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v Competition Commission of India & Ors (the “Ericsson Judgment”), the High Court of Delhi addressed the limits of competition law jurisdiction where conduct is also governed in parallel by a specialised statutory regime, such as standard essential patents.

In Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v Competition Commission of India & Ors (the “Amazon Judgment”), the Supreme Court clarified the limits of the CCI’s power to review mergers and reaffirmed the importance of certainty and finality in the merger approval of notified transactions.

This article examines these developments in three areas of recent judicial scrutiny:

• approach towards analysis of abuse of dominance;
• jurisdictional overlap; and
• the CCI’s powers in relation to merger control.

Taken together, these decisions reflect a noticeable shift in the standards of regulatory intervention, insofar as they require such intervention to be supported by clear legal standards, grounded in evidence, and exercised within the limits of the statutory framework – as well as reflecting a more settled, principled and disciplined approach to competition law enforcement in India.

Approach to analysis of abuse-of-dominance allegations after Schott Glass: the shift towards an effects-based approach

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Schott Glass Judgment is one of the most significant recent decisions pertaining to abuse of dominance. It arose from the CCI’s appeal against the order of the erstwhile appellate tribunal, the Competition Appellate Tribunal (“COMPAT”). The COMPAT’s order set aside the CCI’s findings on abuse in relation to discount schemes and benefits offered by Schott Glass India Private Limited (“Schott Glass”), a dominant upstream supplier of glass tubes, to downstream customers who competed with its 50-50 joint venture, Schott Kaisha Private Limited (“Schott Kaisha”).

The key issues in this case were:

• whether the discount schemes offered by Schott Glass were unfair, discriminatory and loyalty-inducing in nature; and
• whether Schott Glass was leveraging its dominant position in the upstream market for glass tubes to protect its joint venture, Schott Kaisha, in the downstream market of glass ampoules, vials and containers.

In its order, the CCI concluded that Schott Glass abused its dominant position and infringed Section 4 of the Act. The COMPAT, on appeal, agreed with the findings of the CCI on the issue of dominance but set aside the CCI’s findings on abuse of dominance. On appeal, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the COMPAT’s order and dismissed the CCI’s appeal.

The decision is particularly notable for the following guidance provided for the assessment of abuse-of-dominance allegations.

Effects-based analysis is an essential component for an inquiry under Section 4 of the Act 

The Supreme Court noted that Section 4 of the Act does not prohibit dominance per se but only prohibits the abuse of dominance. An alleged contravention of Section 4 of the Act involves two distinct questions:

• whether the conduct falls within one of the categories in Section 4(2)(a) to (e) of the Act; and
• whether it results in or is likely to result in an AAEC.

The Supreme Court endorsed an effects-based approach and rejected a purely form-based assessment of the alleged abusive conduct. The Supreme Court noted that the requirement to establish competitive harm is embedded in the scheme and structure of the Act itself, drawing support from the preamble of the Act, the definition of “dominant position” under the explanation to Section 4 of the Act, and the broader statutory objective of protecting the competitive process rather than penalising market power as such. 

Relevance of commercial justifications and competition on merits

The Schott Glass Judgment treats objective commercial justification as an integral component of the effects-based inquiry, rather than merely as a mitigating factor considered after a finding of abuse. The court recognised that conduct falling within the categories enumerated under Section 4(2) of the Act is not necessarily abusive if it is supported by a legitimate business or commercial rationale, particularly considerations of cost, efficiency, or product quality.

The Supreme Court accepted Schott Glass’s explanation that volume-based rebates were commercially expedient because borosilicate glass production requires continuous, high-volume output, making stable demand economically important. Similarly, functional rebates linked to objective business considerations would not be abusive if they were not selectively or arbitrarily granted.

The Schott Glass Judgment reinforces that competition law does not penalise efficient business conduct merely because it is undertaken by a dominant firm and that objective justifications and efficiency-related considerations must be properly assessed before arriving at a finding of abuse.

Evidentiary standard and procedural fairness

The Schott Glass Judgment is equally important for procedural fairness and the evidentiary standard. The Supreme Court endorsed the COMPAT’s criticism that the CCI had relied heavily on witness statements that were not tested through cross-examination. Denial of cross-examination, where adverse oral evidence forms the basis of a finding, was treated as inconsistent with principles of natural justice and deemed to constitute procedural impropriety capable of undermining the fairness of the investigation.

It was further noted that the January 2024 amendment to Regulation 41(5) of the CCI (General) Regulations 2009 expressly required the CCI’s investigative arm, the Director-General, to provide the opposite party an opportunity to cross-examine if it seeks to rely on oral evidence. 

Importantly, the judgment underscores that findings of abuse must be supported by credible evidence of discriminatory treatment, foreclosure effects, or competitive harm, and not mere speculation.

Implications of the Schott Glass Judgment for businesses and future cases that fall under Section 4 inquiry

The Schott Glass Judgment has important implications for dominant enterprises as well as the CCI’s enforcement practices, as follows.

• Rebates, discounts and incentive schemes are not inherently abusive merely because they are offered by a dominant enterprise. Where such arrangements are based on objective, transparent and commercially justified criteria, they are less likely to attract liability.
• The judgment underscores the importance of legitimate business justifications underlying pricing, rebate and supply practices.
• The decision will influence future Section 4 investigations by requiring the CCI to establish not only the existence of the impugned conduct but also its actual or likely anti-competitive effects.
• The decision reinforces procedural safeguards such as the opportunity to challenge adverse statements/evidence through cross-examination.

Competition law, patent rights and jurisdictional boundaries

The judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in the Ericsson Judgment is one of the most important decisions discussing the intersection of competition law and IP laws.

The Ericsson Judgment arose from a series of appeals challenging the decisions of a single judge of the High Court of Delhi concerning the jurisdictional overlap between the Act and the Patents Act 1970 (the “Patent Act”). The appeals stemmed from investigations initiated by the CCI against Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) (“Ericsson”) and Monsanto Holdings Private Limited (“Monsanto”) based on complaints alleging abuse in the licensing of patented technologies.

The CCI’s jurisdiction was challenged by Ericsson, which contended that disputes relating to the exercise of patent rights must be governed exclusively by the Patents Act. The central issue in the Ericsson Judgment was therefore not whether these two statutes pursue conflicting goals but, rather, which regulatory framework should govern allegations relating to the exercise of patent rights.

General versus special legislation

The Delhi High Court acknowledged that both the Act and the Patents Act are special legislations in their respective fields but held that, insofar as allegations concern anti-competitive conduct by a patentee in the exercise of patent rights, the Patents Act constitutes the more specific statutory framework. The court noted that Chapter XVI of the Patents Act contains a detailed mechanism addressing abuse of patent rights, unreasonable licensing conditions, compulsory licensing, royalty-related concerns, and anti-competitive practices by patentees.

The Delhi High Court reasoned that the inquiry proposed by the CCI into allegedly anti-competitive patent licensing practices substantially overlapped with the inquiry that the Controller of Patents is empowered to undertake under Chapter XVI of the Patents Act. However, given that the Patents Act addresses abuse of patent rights, unreasonable licensing conditions and certain anti-competitive consequences in relation to patents, the Delhi High Court held that the Patents Act − being the special law − would prevail over the Act, especially in disputes concerning patent licensing and royalty determination. As such, the Delhi High Court quashed the CCI’s investigation. 

Implications for future competition disputes

The significance of the decision extends well beyond standard essential patents licensing disputes. The Ericsson Judgment suggests that the mere possession or exercise of patent rights would not automatically attract competition law scrutiny where a specialised statutory framework already governs the conduct in question. The court reaffirmed the principle that, where the legislature has created a specialised statutory framework addressing a particular subject matter, that framework may take precedence over the Act with regard to issues specifically regulated therein. 

The reasoning adopted by the court could influence future jurisdictional disputes involving the Act and other sector-specific statutes. Parties operating in regulated sectors may rely on the Ericsson Judgment to argue that, where a specialised regulator or statutory mechanism is expressly empowered to address the impugned conduct, competition law jurisdiction should yield to that specialised framework. 

In the context of IP law, the Ericsson Judgment may also encourage rights-holders to contend that disputes concerning licensing terms, exploitation of statutory rights, and allegations of abuse should primarily be addressed through the remedies and procedures provided under the relevant IP legislation.

Merger control and the boundaries of the CCI’s regulatory power: the Amazon/Future decision

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Amazon Judgment raised fundamental questions regarding the scope of the CCI’s power to review mergers. This case dealt with the question of whether the CCI can reopen, suspend or effectively revoke its approval order on the ground that the notice filed with it earlier was incomplete, inaccurate, or failed to adequately disclose the true scope of the transaction.

The dispute arose from an investment made in 2019, whereby Amazon acquired a 49% stake in Future Coupons Private Limited (FCPL), a promoter entity of Future Retail Limited (FRL), and notified the transaction to the CCI. The transaction was approved by the CCI on 28 November 2019 and thereafter consummated. Subsequently, disputes arose between Amazon and the Future group, and FCPL complained to the CCI.

The CCI found that Amazon had failed to notify certain interconnected agreements and had misrepresented or suppressed material facts regarding the true scope of the transaction. The CCI directed Amazon to file a fresh notice (in Form II), kept the earlier approval in abeyance, and imposed penalties under Sections 43A, 44 and 45 of the Act. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) substantially upheld the CCI’s findings − following which, Amazon appealed to the Supreme Court.

In May 2026, the Supreme Court passed the final order, setting aside the CCI order and the NCLAT judgment, and directed refund of the amount deposited pursuant to the penalty order (if any). The following key principles emerged from this decision.

Finality and certainty of merger approvals

The Supreme Court emphasised that India’s merger control regime is ex ante in nature and is intended to provide certainty once a transaction has been notified, reviewed and approved. The Act provides a timeline for merger review and does not confer open-ended power on the CCI to revisit approved and consummated transactions. Any intervention affecting an approved combination must therefore be traceable to an express statutory provision and exercised within the limits prescribed under the proviso to Section 20(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court also held that allegations of fraud cannot override the proviso to Section 20(1) of the Act, as it would defeat a statutory prohibition designed to protect transactional certainty. 

Distinction between non-notification and incomplete disclosure in a notification

The Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between failure to notify a combination, which may attract Section 43A of the Act, and alleged deficiencies in the description or characterisation of information in a notice filed with the CCI, which − if established − may fall within Sections 44 and 45 of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that Regulations 9(4) and 9(5) of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations 2011 (the “Combination Regulations 2011”) require parties to file a single notice covering all interconnected steps and agreements but do not make the validity of a notification dependent upon the notifying party adopting the CCI’s preferred legal characterisation of such agreements. Once the relevant agreements, rights, linkages, and transaction structure were placed before the CCI and subjected to review, the requirement of a composite notification stood substantially satisfied. 

Accordingly, non-notification cannot be equated with incomplete, under-emphasised or differently characterised disclosures when a notice disclosing the material agreements, rights and interconnected steps is filed, scrutinised and approved by the CCI.

Limitations on the CCI’s statutory powers

The most significant jurisprudential contribution of the Amazon Judgment is its reaffirmation that the CCI, as a statutory authority, can exercise its powers only within the confines of the Act. The Supreme Court held that neither the Act nor the Combination Regulations 2011 confer a general power on the CCI to keep an approval in abeyance, reopen a notification that has already been approved, or compel the parties to file a fresh notice two years after the approval was granted.

The Supreme Court held that none of Section 45(2) of the Act, Regulation 5(5) of the Combination Regulations 2011, Section 21A of the Act, or a revocation condition in the approval order could be used to create a substantive power to suspend an approval or require a fresh notification. Section 45(2) of the Act is ancillary to the penal framework, Regulation 5(5) of the Combination Regulations 2011 forms part of the ex ante process, and subordinate legislation or approval conditions cannot expand the CCI’s statutory powers. Even if a limited recall power exists, it cannot override the time-bound finality of merger approvals or reopen a consummated transaction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that once a combination has been approved, any subsequent action must remain firmly grounded within the powers and timelines provided in the Act. 

Importance of complete and accurate disclosures

While ruling in Amazon’s favour, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that merger control is a disclosure-based, ex ante regime and that parties must disclose the transaction structure, interconnected steps, rights, and commercial rationale in a manner that enables the CCI to undertake an informed assessment. However, the Supreme Court clarified that a latter disagreement with the notifying party’s characterisation of disclosed arrangements does not − by itself − convert a disclosure into a non-disclosure or justify penalties, unless the specific statutory requirements under Sections 43A, 44 or 45 of the Act are satisfied. 

The decision, therefore, strikes a balance between emphasising disclosure obligations while preserving legal certainty of approved transactions. 

Procedural fairness while exercising CCI’s statutory powers

The Supreme Court emphasised that the exercise of the CCI’s powers must comply with principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court found that the CCI’s findings and directions went beyond the case set out in the show cause notice. It was noted that a party must have clear notice of the allegations, material relied upon and potential consequences, and that the CCI cannot base adverse findings on a materially different case without affording the concerned party a further opportunity to respond. 

Implications of the Amazon Judgment on transaction planning

The Supreme Court’s judgment has significant practical implications for businesses, investors, and transaction counsels, including the following.

• Parties must devote greater attention to identifying and disclosing all interconnected agreements, rights and arrangements forming part of a transaction. The Amazon Judgment reinforces the importance of clearly explaining the linkages between transaction documents.
• The decision also highlights the importance of documenting a transaction’s commercial rationale. Although internal documents may be scrutinised in assessing disclosure obligations, pre-execution negotiations/materials cannot − by themselves − establish liability under Sections 44 and 45 of the Act.
• Parties should seek consistency across transaction documents, merger notifications, investor communications, and regulatory submissions. The litigation illustrates how inconsistencies between internal documents and regulatory filings may trigger regulatory scrutiny.
• At the same time, the Amazon Judgment provides comfort to businesses by clarifying that a notice that was filed, scrutinised and approved cannot subsequently be treated as gun-jumping merely because the CCI prefers a different characterisation of the disclosed arrangements. The Supreme Court further emphasised that the CCI’s ability to reopen an approved transaction is constrained by the statutory framework and legal certainty.

Three decisions – three boundaries

Viewed together, the Schott Glass Judgment, the Ericsson Judgment and the Amazon Judgment addressed three related questions of the CCI’s regulatory powers: when regulatory intervention is justified, who may intervene, and how far regulatory powers may extend.

• The Schott Glass Judgment clarifies that intervention against dominant enterprises must rest on demonstrable competitive harm, credible evidence, and procedurally fair processes.
• The Ericsson Judgment emphasises that competition enforcement is subject to jurisdictional boundaries where a specialised statutory framework governs the conduct in question.
• The Amazon Judgment reaffirms that even broad regulatory powers must remain confined by the statutory framework governing merger control, disclosure obligations, and legal certainty.

Collectively, these decisions − all within the past 12 months − suggest that the evolution of competition regulation lies not in the extent of intervention but in clearer standards governing the contours of such intervention, as well as a disciplined approach to enforcement within the specific powers conferred by the Act.