International Arbitration 2026 Comparisons

Last Updated August 20, 2026

Contributed By Jeremiah Tladi & Co

Law and Practice

Authors



Jeremiah Tladi & Co is a Gaborone-headquartered law firm with a branch office in Francistown, advising boards, financiers, sponsors and government across Botswana. Arbitration work is led jointly by the firm's two partners: Thembani Jeremiah and Tebogo Edison Tladi. The practice sits alongside related banking and finance, competition, procurement and infrastructure and PPP expertise. Recent instructions include collaborating with Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer on a Botswana PPP opportunity and advising a Botswana parastatal on a major infrastructure project, for clients spanning government, regulated financial institutions and state-owned entities including First National Bank Botswana, Botswana Power Corporation, Choppies Enterprises Limited and Botswana Unified Revenue Services.

Domestic Use

Litigation before the High Court and Magistrates' Courts remains the default route for most domestic disputes in Botswana, and many local parties still have limited familiarity with arbitration procedure. Arbitration is nonetheless well entrenched as the preferred mechanism in commercial, construction and shareholder disputes, where confidentiality, the ability to select a technically qualified decision-maker, and the wish to avoid the court backlog make it attractive.

Basis of Use

Domestic parties resort to arbitration principally because it is written into their contracts as the agreed method of dispute resolution, particularly in construction agreements using Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (International Federation of Consulting Engineers, FIDIC), New Engineering Contract (NEC) or Joint Building Contracts Committee (JBCC) forms, and in corporate and commercial agreements. Cross-border users typically encounter Botswana-seated arbitration through contracts with government-linked or state entities, mining and natural resource agreements, and investment contracts, where a written arbitration clause is the norm and enforcement of the resulting award, rather than litigation of a fresh claim, is the ultimate objective.

Cross-border Dimension

Genuinely international arbitrations connected to Botswana are still relatively few, and disputes with a significant international element are often seated outside the jurisdiction (for example, in Johannesburg or under regional rules) even where a Botswana party or Botswana assets are involved. This is changing gradually following Botswana's 2024 accession to the Southern African Development Community (SADC)-Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa (AFSA) Alliance Charter, which is intended to route more regional disputes into locally accessible arbitration.

Mining and Natural Resources

Botswana's economy is built substantially on diamond mining (through the Debswana joint venture and other operators) and broader minerals extraction, and contracts in this sector, together with related joint ventures, offtake and supply agreements, are a significant generator of arbitration activity. Disputes in this space tend to be technically complex and commercially sensitive, both of which favour a confidential, expert-led arbitral process over public litigation.

Construction and Infrastructure

Construction and infrastructure projects, including roads, airports and public buildings, are another major source of arbitration referrals, reflected in the standing of construction-claims practitioners within the Botswana Institute of Arbitrators. These disputes typically involve valuation, delay and defects claims that benefit from an arbitrator with engineering or quantity-surveying expertise, which the Botswana Institute of Arbitrators (BIArb) Rules expressly accommodate by permitting technically qualified non-lawyer representatives in simplified proceedings under Rule 1.6.

Emerging Areas

Increased foreign investment in manufacturing, energy, tourism and financial services, combined with a cautious approach to new bilateral investment treaties, is gradually widening the range of contracts that specify arbitration, though mining and construction remain the clearest concentrations of activity.

Domestic Institution

The Botswana Institute of Arbitrators (BIArb), established in 1987 and registered as a society under the Botswana Societies Act, is the principal domestic body administering arbitrations and promoting arbitration and ADR generally. It publishes its own Rules for the Conduct of Arbitrations (last revised in February 2011), based on the rules of the Association of Arbitrators (Southern Africa) as adapted to Botswana, and it appoints arbitrators, hears arbitrator-challenge applications and, where agreed, constitutes appeal tribunals.

Regional Development

In April 2024, Botswana became a signatory to the SADC-AFSA Alliance Charter, under which the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa's rules are to be applied across signatory states and a dedicated SADC division of AFSA has been created; there are stated plans to establish an AFSA-governed arbitration centre within Botswana itself. This is the most significant institutional development of recent years, signalling a shift toward regionally administered, internationally recognised rules sitting alongside the long-standing BIArb framework, although it had not, as of the past year, displaced BIArb as the day-to-day domestic administering body.

No Specialised Arbitration Court

Botswana has no separate international commercial court or High Court division dedicated to arbitration matters. The Arbitration Act (Cap 06:01) defines “Court” simply as the High Court, and it is the High Court’s general civil jurisdiction, rather than any specialist bench, that hears applications to stay proceedings, appoint or remove arbitrators, grant interlocutory relief in support of arbitration, and give leave to enforce awards.

Practical Effect

Arbitration-related applications are accordingly filed and heard through the ordinary High Court process, before whichever judge is assigned the matter in the normal course, with no dedicated arbitration list or expedited track distinct from other High Court civil applications.

Source of Law

International and domestic arbitration in Botswana is governed by the Arbitration Act (Cap 06:01), which came into force on 27 November 1959. The Act is not based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration; it follows instead the structure of the mid-twentieth-century English Arbitration Act model, built around the concepts of a “submission”, “arbitrator” and “umpire”, court-ordered stays of litigation, and enforcement of awards “by leave of the Court” as if they were a judgment.

Divergence From the Model Law

Because it predates the UNCITRAL Model Law by over a quarter of a century, the Arbitration Act diverges from it in several material respects: it contains no express competence-competence provision, no statutory separability doctrine, no default mechanism for interim measures or emergency arbitrators, and no modern statutory arbitrator-disclosure regime. These gaps have, in practice, been filled at the institutional level by the Botswana Institute of Arbitrators’ Rules for the Conduct of Arbitrations, which do provide for the arbitrator to rule on his own jurisdiction, treat the arbitration clause as separable from the underlying contract, and impose a continuing independence and impartiality disclosure obligation on arbitrators, but only where the parties have agreed to adopt those rules.

Interaction Between Statute and Rules

As per Rule 2, where the BIArb Rules are adopted, the Arbitration Act continues to apply save to the extent the rules validly vary it, or except in so far as the Act’s provisions are mandatory, meaning the statute remains the ultimate legal backbone even for institutionally administered references.

The Arbitration Act itself has not been amended in the past year and remains in its 1959 form.

Formal Requirement

Under Section 2 of the Arbitration Act, a “submission” is defined as a written agreement, however made, to submit present or future disputes to arbitration, whether or not an arbitrator is named in it; an oral agreement to arbitrate therefore falls outside the Act’s protection. The BIArb Rules mirror this, defining “agreement” as the written arbitration agreement entered into between the parties.

Irrevocability and Enforcement

Section 3 of the Arbitration Act provides that the authority of an arbitrator or umpire appointed under a submission is irrevocable unless the submission expresses a contrary intention and may only be revoked with the leave of the court. Where a party commences court proceedings in breach of a written arbitration agreement, Section 6 allows the other party to apply, after appearance but before delivering pleadings or taking any other step, for a stay of those proceedings, which the court will grant if satisfied there is no sufficient reason not to refer the matter to arbitration and that the applicant remains ready and willing to arbitrate. The stay is therefore discretionary rather than automatic, and the right to seek it can be lost by delay.

Excluded Subject Matters

Section 7 of the Arbitration Act expressly removes criminal matters from arbitration altogether (so far as prosecution or punishment is concerned) and provides that, without the special leave of the court, none of the following may be submitted to arbitration either: matters relating to status, matrimonial causes, and matters in which minors or other persons under legal disability may be interested.

General Test

Beyond these express statutory carve-outs, Botswana applies the general common-law approach of asking whether the subject matter is one the parties could lawfully settle or compromise between themselves by private agreement; if it is, and it does not fall within one of the Section 7 categories, it is arbitrable.

Law Governing the Arbitration Agreement

The Arbitration Act does not itself set out a choice-of-law rule for the arbitration agreement as distinct from the substantive contract. The BIArb Rules address the closely related question of seat under Rule 20. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the seat of the arbitration is Botswana, and even where hearings, meetings or the award take place outside the country, the arbitration is deemed to be conducted in, and the award made in, Botswana if the parties have not otherwise agreed the proper law of the arbitration; this creates a strong default towards Botswana law absorbing both the seat and, in practice, the arbitration agreement absent contrary agreement.

Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements

Botswana’s courts have generally been characterised in recent regional commentary as supportive of arbitration, and the Section 6 stay mechanism gives a party a real, if discretionary, remedy where litigation is commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement. That said, the right to a stay depends on the applicant acting promptly (before pleading or taking other steps) and on the court being satisfied that the applicant remains ready and willing to arbitrate, so an arbitration agreement will not automatically defeat litigation if the applicant has delayed or engaged with the merits of the court process.

Separability Under the Rules

The BIArb Rules expressly adopt the doctrine of separability under Rule 11.4, an arbitration clause forming part of a contract is treated as an agreement independent of the contract’s other terms, and a ruling by the arbitrator that the underlying contract is null and void does not, of itself, invalidate the arbitration clause.

Position Under the Act

The Arbitration Act itself does not contain an express separability provision, reflecting its 1959 vintage, so where the BIArb Rules have not been adopted the position rests on general common-law principles rather than a specific statutory rule; in practice, Botswana’s courts and arbitral tribunals are understood to apply the separability doctrine consistent with the approach in comparable common-law jurisdictions in the region.

General Party Autonomy

The Arbitration Act permits parties broad freedom to choose their own arbitrator or arbitrators, and the Act’s Schedule (implied terms) only supplies default mechanisms (a sole arbitrator or majority decision among multiple arbitrators) where the submission is silent, rather than restricting the parties’ choice.

Default Under the Act

If the parties’ submission is silent on the method of appointment, the Schedule to the Arbitration Act provides that the reference is to a single arbitrator by default. Where two arbitrators are appointed and one refuses to act, is incapable, or dies, Section 8 allows the appointing party to name a replacement or, if the other party defaults on its own appointment after seven clear days’ notice, to have its own arbitrator act as sole arbitrator, subject to the Court’s power to set aside that appointment.

Court-Supervised Fallback

Section 11 gives the court a broader fallback power to appoint an arbitrator, umpire or third arbitrator in a defined set of default scenarios (failure to concur in a sole arbitrator, an arbitrator’s refusal, incapacity or death where the vacancy is not filled, or failure to appoint an umpire or third arbitrator), triggered by a seven-day written notice procedure before any court application. Under the BIArb Rules, if the parties’ agreement calls for the rules to apply but does not identify the arbitrator or the appointment method, the Chairman (or Vice-Chairman) of the Institute will appoint the arbitrator on application by either party.

Multiparty Arbitrations

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules contain a bespoke default procedure for multiparty arbitrations; this is a gap consistent with the Act’s age, and multiparty appointment issues would in practice fall back on the general court-appointment powers in Section 11 or on ad hoc agreement between the parties.

Grounds for Intervention

The court can intervene in the selection or continuation of an arbitrator in several defined circumstances under the Arbitration Act, appointing an arbitrator, umpire or third arbitrator where the parties fail to do so themselves under Section 11; setting aside an appointment made under the default mechanism in Section 8; and removing an arbitrator or umpire, at any time on motion, where a just ground of recusation exists or the arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings under Section 13, including removal for failing to proceed with reasonable dispatch under Section 17(3).

Limits on That Power

These powers are all reactive and ground-specific rather than a general discretion to interfere: the court acts only on application, only in the listed default or misconduct scenarios, and, for the Section 11 fallback appointment, only after a party has first given seven clear days’ notice affording the other side or the arbitrators an opportunity to act. There is no free-standing power for the court to substitute its own choice of arbitrator simply because it disagrees with the parties’ selection.

Statutory Ground

Section 13 of the Arbitration Act allows the court, on motion, to remove an arbitrator or umpire against whom a just ground of recusation exists, or who has misconducted the arbitral proceedings, and separately to set aside an award and award costs personally against the arbitrator or umpire where the proceedings were misconducted or the award improperly procured.

Institutional Procedure

Where the BIArb Rules apply, they provide, under Rule 8 a detailed, self-contained challenge process. The grounds include serious illness or incapacity, lack of independence, or any other reason the arbitrator ought not to continue (for example, a lack of impartiality). A challenging party must apply in writing to the Chairman of the Institute within ten days of becoming aware of the relevant circumstances, setting out full reasons, failing which the right to challenge is forfeited; the other party may respond within ten days, the challenged arbitrator may reply within ten days, and a committee of at least three institute members decides the challenge (unless the arbitrator simply withdraws by consent), with power to direct the costs of the challenge and, if it succeeds, the fees payable to the outgoing arbitrator. Where a new arbitrator is appointed, the proceedings continue as though that arbitrator had been in place from the outset, unless the arbitrator decides otherwise.

Statutory Standard

The Arbitration Act’s requirement is a general one, under Section 12, arbitrators and umpires must be, and remain, disinterested with reference to the matters referred and the parties, and any party may require a sworn declaration to that effect before the arbitrator begins or continues to act, though this right of objection may be expressly waived.

Institutional Disclosure Regime

The BIArb Rules go further and impose a positive, continuing disclosure obligation under Rule 7.2. Before appointment, a prospective arbitrator must sign a statement confirming there are no grounds known to them likely to give rise to justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality and must disclose in writing any facts or circumstances that could call these into question, with that statement due to the parties no later than the first preliminary meeting. Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules impose formal qualification requirements (such as a legal degree) on arbitrators generally, reflecting the practice, particularly in construction and technical disputes, of appointing engineers, quantity surveyors or other subject-matter experts as arbitrators.

Competence-Competence

The Arbitration Act does not itself expressly codify the competence-competence principle, but the BIArb Rules do, under Rule 11.1 the arbitrator may decide any dispute regarding the existence, validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement and, unless the agreement provides otherwise, may rule on his own jurisdiction to act. The Rules reinforce this by treating the arbitration clause as an agreement independent of the rest of the contract, so that a ruling that the contract is null and void does not itself invalidate the clause conferring jurisdiction.

Waiver of Objection

Under Rule 11.2 of the BIArb Rules, a party who wishes to challenge the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, or who believes the arbitrator is exceeding it, must raise the point at the first available opportunity in the arbitration itself; failing that, the party is deemed to have consented to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.

Deferred Review

Under BIArb Rule 11.3, where the arbitrator makes a jurisdictional ruling otherwise than in a final award, a party wishing to contest that ruling in court may generally only do so after the award has been rendered, absent exceptional circumstances. This reflects a generally non-interventionist judicial posture during the currency of the reference, consistent with the wider characterisation of Botswana’s courts as supportive of arbitration.

Negative Rulings

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules contain a distinct fast-track mechanism for reviewing a negative jurisdictional ruling (where the arbitrator declines jurisdiction); such a ruling would, in principle, only be capable of challenge through the ordinary avenues available once an award (or a decision having the character of one) has been made, or through the court’s general Section 13 power to intervene for misconduct or improper procurement, which is a narrow supervisory jurisdiction rather than a merits review of jurisdiction.

Sequence Required

BIArb Rules 11.2 and 11.3 require a jurisdictional objection to be raised within the arbitration at the first available opportunity, not reserved until later in the proceedings. Recourse to the courts is, in turn, generally deferred until after the arbitrator has made the award, save in exceptional circumstances; parties therefore do not have an unqualified right to go to court to challenge jurisdiction as soon as a case is filed, nor immediately after the tribunal is constituted, but only once a final award has been rendered (or, exceptionally, in extreme cases before that point).

Deferential in Substance

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules articulate an explicit standard of review (such as “deferential” or “de novo”) for jurisdiction or admissibility questions. However, the structure of the Act, in particular the narrow Section 13 grounds for court intervention (misconduct of the proceedings or an award improperly procured) and the Rules’ policy of deferring jurisdictional challenges until after the award, point to an effectively deferential standard in practice, with the court declining to substitute its own view of jurisdiction for the arbitrator’s except in the narrow circumstances the legislation and BIArb Rules allow.

Statutory Stay Mechanism

Section 6 of the Arbitration Act allows a party to apply to stay court proceedings commenced in breach of a written arbitration agreement, provided the application is made after appearance but before delivering any pleadings or taking any other step in the proceedings. The court will grant a stay if satisfied there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration, and that the applicant was, and remains, ready and willing to do what is necessary for the arbitration to proceed properly.

Judicial Attitude

This is a discretionary rather than automatic remedy, but Botswana’s courts have generally been described as willing to support arbitration agreements and grant stays where the statutory conditions are met. The practical constraint on parties is procedural rather than attitudinal because the stay application must be made promptly, a party who engages with the merits of the litigation, or delays too long before applying, risks losing the right to enforce the arbitration agreement for that dispute.

No General Basis

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules provide a mechanism for an arbitral tribunal to assume jurisdiction over individuals or entities that are not party to, or signatories of, the relevant arbitration agreement. The Act’s “submission” is, by definition, a written agreement between the parties to it, and the BIArb Rules are built on the same claimant/defendant privity model, so joinder of non-signatories generally requires their own separate consent.

Narrow Set-off Exception

The one qualification is a rule giving the arbitrator jurisdiction to determine a defence of set-off even where the relationship from which the set-off arises falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause, or is subject to a different arbitration agreement. This operates between the existing parties to the reference, however, rather than as a basis for binding an outside third party, and there is no separate rule distinguishing foreign from domestic non-signatories.

Interim Awards

Section 18 of the Arbitration Act provides that, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the submission, the arbitrator or umpire may, if he thinks fit, make an interim award, and any reference in the Act to an award includes an interim award, such an award is enforceable in the same way as a final award, by leave of the Court under Section 20.

Institutional Examples

BIArb Rule 33.3.1, illustrate this power in practice, for example allowing a party to apply for an award, or an interim award, ordering payment where an accepted settlement tender is not honoured within the stipulated period. Beyond payment-type interim awards, neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules expressly enumerate a broader range of interim measures (such as anti-suit or preservation orders) available directly from the arbitrator; broader interim protective relief of that kind is instead channelled through the court’s own powers described below.

Court-Ordered Interlocutory Relief

Section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act gives any party to a submission the right to apply to the court for a range of interlocutory orders in aid of the arbitration, including the examination of witnesses before a special examiner, discovery of documents and interrogatories, evidence by affidavit, security for costs, the inspection, interim preservation or sale of goods or property that are the subject matter of the arbitration, an interim injunction or similar relief, directions for interpleader and substituted service.

Gaps in the Framework

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules expressly address the grant of interim relief by Botswana’s courts in aid of arbitrations seated outside the jurisdiction, and there is no statutory recognition of emergency arbitrators. A party seeking urgent protective measures for a foreign-seated arbitration would need to rely on the court’s general civil interdict powers rather than any arbitration-specific provision, and the concept of an emergency arbitrator (or subsequent court intervention once one is appointed) simply does not feature in either instrument.

Court Power

Section 16(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act entitles a party to a submission to obtain a court order requiring another party to give security for costs in the same way as a litigant in ordinary proceedings.

Tribunal Power

The BIArb Rule 21, gives the arbitrator an equivalent power directly, unless the parties agree otherwise. On the application of the defending party (in convention or reconvention), the arbitrator may order the claiming party to provide appropriate security for costs, including additional security, and may stay the arbitration pending compliance. If the party ordered to provide security fails to do so without sufficient cause within the time allowed, the arbitrator must terminate the arbitration in relation to that party’s claim, while permitting the arbitration to proceed on the other party’s claim if appropriate.

Statutory Layer

Procedure is governed at the base level by the Arbitration Act (Cap 06:01), which applies to a submission save to the extent the parties validly vary it, or in so far as its provisions are mandatory.

Institutional Layer

Where the parties agree, the Botswana Institute of Arbitrators’ Rules for the Conduct of Arbitrations supply the detailed procedural framework, offered in three tiers:

  • the Standard Procedure Rules, the default, designed for represented parties in most disputes;
  • the Summary Procedure Rules, for smaller, simpler disputes, typically involving unrepresented parties and a more interventionist arbitrator; and
  • the Small Claims Arbitration Tribunal (SCAT) Rules, for claims below a prescribed monetary threshold, which exclude legal representation and apply a fixed arbitrator’s fee.

None of these institutional rules apply automatically; the parties must have agreed, in their arbitration agreement or otherwise in writing, to adopt them.

Under the Arbitration Act Itself

The Arbitration Act imposes very few mandatory procedural steps of its own beyond the implied schedule terms (for example, that witnesses may be examined on oath if the arbitrator thinks fit, and that documents relevant to the dispute must be produced), leaving most procedural content to be supplied by the parties’ agreement or institutional rules rather than the statute.

Under the Standard Procedure Rules

Where adopted, the BIArb Standard Procedure Rules prescribe a defined sequence: a preliminary meeting to confirm the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and the applicable procedural track; exchange of a joint statement of issues or, failing agreement, a statement of claim, statement of defence, any counterclaim and a claimant’s reply within specified time limits; and, on receipt of those submissions, a second preliminary meeting to deal with discovery, witness statements, time-tabling and any agreement to allow an appeal. An award must, unless the parties agree otherwise, be delivered as soon as practicable and in any event within 90 days of the conclusion of the hearing (or of the last document submitted, if there is no hearing).

Statutory Powers

Section 15 of the Arbitration Act gives an arbitrator or umpire the power to administer oaths or take affirmations, to correct clerical mistakes or accidental slips in an award, and, on a party’s application, to appoint a commissioner to take the evidence of a person residing outside Botswana. Sections 17 and 19 impose corresponding duties to proceed with reasonable dispatch (on pain of removal), and, where a case is remitted by the court, to make a fresh award, ordinarily within three months, unless the court directs otherwise.

Institutional Expansion

The BIArb Rules considerably expand this toolkit for arbitrators who adopt them, including the power to give procedural directions, rule on the arbitrator’s own jurisdiction, strike out a claim or debar evidence for serious non-compliance, order discovery, appoint expert assessors, conduct site inspections, settle or direct the taxation of costs, and correct, clarify or supplement an award after delivery. All such power are exercised subject to the overriding duty to treat the parties equally and afford each a right to be heard.

Standard Procedure

Under the BIArb Standard Procedure Rules, there is no restriction on who may represent a party; a “representative” is defined broadly to include an advocate, an attorney, a claims consultant, or any other person who, by training and experience, is able to present the case, with no requirement of local qualification.

Summary Procedure and SCAT

The position is markedly different under the Summary Procedure Rules and the SCAT Rules, both designed for unrepresented, smaller disputes: representation is confined to the party itself (or a partner, director, close corporation member or trustee, as applicable), a bona fide full-time employee or officer of the party, or, under the Summary Procedure Rules only, a technically qualified person other than a practising lawyer where the arbitrator considers this reasonably necessary (for example, an engineer, architect or quantity surveyor in a construction dispute). Practising lawyers and advocates are therefore expressly excluded from acting as representatives in these two simplified tracks, though they remain free to represent parties under the Standard Procedure Rules, including where they hold foreign rather than Botswana qualifications.

Documents

Under the BIArb Standard Procedure Rules, documents relied upon must generally be attached to the parties’ statements of claim, defence, counterclaim or reply, and such documents are admitted in evidence without formal proof, though either party may still lead evidence on their origin, accuracy, meaning or relevance. Additional documents not already exchanged require 15 days’ notice before the hearing, and the arbitrator may also order discovery of documents and other material (including electronic recordings) on application or of his own motion.

Witness Evidence and Cross-Examination

Before the hearing, parties must disclose the identity of witnesses they wish to call and the subject matter of their testimony, and the arbitrator may direct the exchange of full witness statements or summaries; however, a written statement or summary only becomes evidence in the arbitration if the witness is actually called to testify, preserving space for oral examination and cross-examination at the hearing. Neither privilege nor a formal discovery regime is legislated in the Arbitration Act itself, the Act’s main contribution is the availability of court-ordered discovery, interrogatories and evidence by affidavit as an aid to the arbitration under Section 16.

Flexible, Non-Technical Standard

The Arbitration Act does not impose the formal rules of evidence that apply in Botswana’s civil courts on arbitral proceedings. Where the BIArb Rules apply, this flexibility is made explicit: the arbitrator may rely on his own expert knowledge (provided he discloses it to the parties) and may attribute such weight to any evidence as he considers appropriate, whether or not it is given under oath and whether or not it would be admissible in civil court proceedings.

Simplified Tracks

Under the Summary Procedure and SCAT Rules, this flexibility is stated even more directly, expressly empowering the arbitrator or tribunal to depart from statutory or common-law rules of evidence, subject only to the requirements of natural justice. Arbitral evidence in Botswana is therefore materially less formal than the rules of evidence applicable to domestic litigation before the ordinary courts.

Compulsion is Court Mediated

An arbitrator in Botswana has no independent coercive power to compel evidence, compulsion runs through the High Court. Section 16(1) of the Arbitration Act allows a party to a submission to take out court process for the attendance of witnesses (though no one can be compelled to produce a document that would not be compellable at trial). Section 28 of the Act allows a subpoena or summons compelling attendance and production of documents before an arbitrator to be procured in the same way, and on the same conditions, as if the matter were a pending court action; this right is available to any party to the submission, or to the arbitrator or umpire directly.

Reach and Consequences

Section 29 of the Arbitration Act additionally allows the court to order its process to issue compelling the attendance of a witness before an arbitrator anywhere within the court’s jurisdiction (including, in an extreme case, arranging for a prisoner to be brought up for examination), and Section 32 makes wilfully or corruptly giving false evidence before an arbitrator a criminal offence, prosecuted and punished as perjury. These compulsion mechanisms are framed generally around “witnesses” and are not expressed to differentiate between party and non-party witnesses, both are reached through the same court-mediated subpoena process rather than any distinct regime for non-parties.

Default Confidentiality by Rule, Not Statute

The Arbitration Act itself contains no confidentiality provision, confidentiality in Botswana arbitration is a creature of institutional rules and party agreement. Under the BIArb Rules, unless the parties agree otherwise, the proceedings and any award are confidential, save to the extent disclosure is required to protect or pursue a legal right, or to enforce or challenge an award in legal proceedings. The SCAT Rules contain a closely equivalent default, extending to information about the arbitration or the award generally, again subject to what is necessary for the arbitration itself, related court proceedings, or another legal obligation.

Practical Limits

Because this protection stems from the BIArb Rules (or the parties’ own agreement) rather than the statute, arbitrations that do not adopt the Rules and do not otherwise address confidentiality fall back on general common-law principles, which do not guarantee the same blanket protection. In particular, information from the arbitration can become public where a party refers to it in a subsequent court application, whether to enforce, challenge or otherwise engage with the award.

Form and Finality

Under the schedule to the Arbitration Act, an award must be in writing and, if made in terms of the submission, is final and binding on the parties and those claiming under them. Section 20 allows the award to be enforced, by leave of the court, in the same manner as a judgment. Under the BIArb Rules, the award must similarly be in writing and is published by delivering a copy to each party, with reasons to be given at the same time unless the parties agree otherwise or the award is a consent award recording a settlement.

Time Limits

The Arbitration Act itself imposes no fixed statutory deadline for delivery of an award. Section 17 gives the arbitrator power to award at any time, and Section 17(2) allows the court to enlarge any time limit that does apply. The 90-day default (running from the conclusion of the hearing, or from the last document submitted if there is no hearing) is instead an institutional creation under the BIArb Rules, extendable by the parties’ written agreement.

No Express Statutory Limits

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules impose express substantive limits on the remedies an arbitral tribunal may award, both instruments are concerned primarily with procedure and enforcement rather than with prescribing or restricting the content of an award. The tribunal’s remedial powers are, in practice, coextensive with what the parties’ arbitration agreement empowers it to decide and with what the substantive law governing the underlying contract permits.

Practical Constraints

Any real limitation therefore derives from the applicable substantive law rather than arbitration-specific legislation. For example, Botswana’s contract law, in common with other common-law systems in the region, does not generally recognise punitive damages as an available remedy for breach of contract, and an arbitrator applying that law would be bound by the same constraint as a court would be.

Costs Discretion

Under the BIArb Rules, unless the arbitration agreement or the parties provide otherwise, the award of costs is at the arbitrator’s discretion. The arbitrator may direct that costs be taxed or may settle them himself, engaging a professional taxing consultant if he wishes, and is not obliged to apply the High Court’s own costs tariff unless the parties agree that he should. Disbursements incurred by a successful party are recoverable on a scale agreed between the parties or, failing agreement, as determined by the arbitrator, who may direct taxation by reference to the relevant costs’ provisions of the Arbitration Act.

Costs Follow the Event, Tempered by Settlement Conduct

The BIArb Rules embed a broadly “costs follow the event” starting point, but this is expressly moderated by the settlement mechanisms in the Rules: an unaccepted settlement tender is withheld from the arbitrator until after the merits award, then taken into account specifically in the award of costs, which can result in a costs penalty against a party that unreasonably rejected a tender. Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules create a standalone statutory entitlement to interest. This entitlement is left to the parties’ contract and the substantive law, consistent with ordinary civil procedure in Botswana.

No Automatic Merits Appeal

There is no general right under the Arbitration Act to appeal an award on its merits, Section 13 confines the Court’s power to set an award aside to cases where the arbitrator or umpire has misconducted the proceedings, or the arbitration or award has been improperly procured, which is a narrow supervisory jurisdiction rather than a review of the correctness of the decision.

Opt-in Appeal Under the BIArb Rules

The BIArb Rules, under Rule 39, create an appeal mechanism, but only where the parties have agreed, by written and signed agreement, that the award is to be subject to appeal. Where adopted, a party has 15 days from publication of the award to give notice of appeal specifying the findings and grounds challenged, the Chairman of the Institute then appoints an Appeal Tribunal of at least three members. The appellant must lodge security for the costs of the appeal, and the tribunal may dismiss the appeal, vary the award, substitute its own award, or refer the matter back to the original arbitrator, with its decision being final, binding, and itself constituting an award under the Arbitration Act.

Expanding Scope

Because no merits appeal exists by default, parties can only expand the available scope of review by expressly agreeing, in writing, to adopt the BIArb appeal mechanism described in 11.1 Grounds for Appeal. Absent such agreement, no appeal on the merits is available at all.

Excluding the Narrow Statutory Ground

The position on excluding the court’s own narrow Section 13 supervisory jurisdiction (misconduct or improper procurement) is less clear, as that is framed as a power of the court rather than a right the parties confer, and neither the Act nor the BIArb Rules expressly address whether it can be contracted out of; in the absence of an agreed appeal mechanism, Section 13 remains the only route to challenge an award.

Deferential on the Merits

The Arbitration Act’s Section 13 jurisdiction is inherently deferential; the court may only intervene for misconduct of the proceedings or improper procurement of the award, and does not re-examine the substantive correctness of the arbitrator’s factual findings or legal conclusions. Where a case is stated under Section 30 on a specific question of law referred by the arbitrator (or on the court’s direction), the court’s consideration of that isolated legal question is necessarily closer to a fresh, de novo determination, but this is a narrow, directed procedure rather than a general standard of review applicable to the merits of an award as a whole.

Botswana is a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, having deposited its instrument of accession on 20 December 1971, with the Convention entering into force for Botswana on 19 March 1972. Botswana made both reservations permitted under Article I(3) of the Convention: it applies the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships considered “commercial” under Botswana law, and it applies the Convention only to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another contracting state.

Domestic Mechanism

Enforcement under the Arbitration Act proceeds by way of leave; Section 20 allows an award to be enforced, by leave of the court or a judge, in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect, with judgment then entered in terms of the award once leave is granted. Neither the Act nor the BIArb Rules contain a separate, dedicated chapter for foreign (New York Convention) awards of the kind found in model law jurisdictions; convention awards are given effect through Botswana’s accession to the Convention (subject to its commercial and reciprocity reservations) applied alongside this general leave-to-enforce mechanism.

Unaddressed Scenarios

The documents disclose no specific rule addressing an award that has been set aside at the seat, nor any prescribed approach to enforcement proceedings running in parallel with ongoing set-aside proceedings at the seat; these questions would fall to be worked out under general common-law and comity principles on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, neither instrument addresses a defence of sovereign immunity at the enforcement stage, which would be determined under Botswana’s general law on state immunity rather than under the Arbitration Act itself.

Generally Supportive, Narrowly Framed

The Arbitration Act’s narrow Section 13 grounds for interference (misconduct or improper procurement), together with its leave-based enforcement mechanism under section 20, point to a policy of limited judicial interference with awards, consistent with the description of Botswana’s courts in recent regional commentary as friendly towards arbitration.

No Codified Public Policy Ground

Unlike the Model Law or the New York Convention’s own Article V framework, the Arbitration Act does not itself articulate a public-policy ground for refusing enforcement of a domestic award. The court’s leave-stage discretion under Section 20 is comparatively open-textured and undefined by the statute. Where the New York Convention applies to a foreign award (subject to Botswana’s commercial and reciprocity reservations), the Convention’s own Article V grounds, including public policy, would govern that award’s recognition and enforcement, operating alongside rather than as part of the domestic Act.

No Provision for Class or Group Arbitration

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules make any provision for class or representative arbitration. The Act’s “submission” concept and the Rules’ claimant/defendant structure are both built around a bilateral (or, at most, a jointly agreed multi-party) model, and there is no institutional or statutory mechanism in Botswana permitting representative claims to be arbitrated on behalf of an undefined or unascertained class.

Institutional Code Embedded in the Rules

The BIArb Rules themselves function as a practical ethical code for arbitrators acting under them. They impose pre-appointment and continuing independence and impartiality disclosure obligations, a good-faith obligation on the parties, and a disciplinary-style challenge and removal procedure administered by an institute-appointed Committee. BIArb’s own constitution additionally governs admission to its two classes of membership (fellow and associate), operating as a professional standards gateway for those who act as arbitrators under its auspices.

Legal Practitioners Generally

Counsel appearing in arbitrations who are admitted legal practitioners remain separately bound by the ordinary professional conduct rules applicable to the legal profession in Botswana. There is no distinct arbitration-specific statutory code of ethics under the Arbitration Act itself. The applicable standards are a combination of the institutional rules (where BIArb Rules are adopted) and the practitioner’s ordinary professional obligations.

No Dedicated Regulation

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules address third-party funding of arbitration in any way; there is accordingly no domestic statutory or institutional disclosure obligation, licensing regime, or restriction specific to funded arbitrations in Botswana. Any constraints on such arrangements would need to be assessed against Botswana’s general common-law doctrines historically applicable to third-party funding of litigation, which fall outside the scope of the arbitration-specific instruments reviewed here.

Consolidation by Agreement Only

Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules give a tribunal or a court a unilateral power to consolidate separate arbitral proceedings. The BIArb Rules address consolidation only as a topic the parties may voluntarily agree at a pre-hearing conference, where it is listed among the matters (alongside admissions of fact, discovery, and quantum) that the parties may resolve to curtail the length of the hearing; consolidation in Botswana arbitration is therefore achievable in practice only by the parties’ own agreement and recorded in the pre-hearing minute, rather than by tribunal or court order.

Privity-Based Framework

Because the Arbitration Act defines a “submission” as a written agreement between the parties to it, and the BIArb Rules are similarly structured around claimant/defendant privity, neither instrument provides a general basis for binding a non-signatory third party to an arbitration agreement or the resulting award.

Narrow Exception, No Distinction for Foreign Parties

The one qualification is the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, under the BIArb Rules, to determine a defence of set-off even where it arises from a relationship outside the scope of the arbitration clause or under a different arbitration agreement; this operates as between the existing parties to the reference rather than as a mechanism for joining or binding an outsider. Neither the Arbitration Act nor the BIArb Rules draw any distinction between domestic and foreign third parties in this respect, since the underlying limitation is one of privity and consent rather than nationality or domicile.

Jeremiah Tladi & Co

Plot 50363, Unit 3 & 4
Gaborone Business Park
Fairgrounds
P O Box 70269
Gaborone (UB)
Botswana

+267 393 2043

+267 393 2044

attorneys@jtco.co.bw www.jtco.co.bw
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Law and Practice in Botswana

Authors



Jeremiah Tladi & Co is a Gaborone-headquartered law firm with a branch office in Francistown, advising boards, financiers, sponsors and government across Botswana. Arbitration work is led jointly by the firm's two partners: Thembani Jeremiah and Tebogo Edison Tladi. The practice sits alongside related banking and finance, competition, procurement and infrastructure and PPP expertise. Recent instructions include collaborating with Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer on a Botswana PPP opportunity and advising a Botswana parastatal on a major infrastructure project, for clients spanning government, regulated financial institutions and state-owned entities including First National Bank Botswana, Botswana Power Corporation, Choppies Enterprises Limited and Botswana Unified Revenue Services.