The following contribution featured in Chambers International Arbitration 2025 and is awaiting update from the firm.
Prevalence of International Arbitration in Mexico
International arbitration is now the preferred method for resolving complex or cross-border commercial disputes in Mexico. This has not always been the case. While Mexico has been a party to the New York Convention since 1971, arbitration was seldom used before the 1990s due to the absence of a modern legal framework.
The use of arbitration increased significantly with the signing of NAFTA in 1994. Article 2022 of NAFTA encouraged member states to promote arbitration for international commercial disputes. In response, Mexico adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law with minimal modifications, integrating it into the Commerce Code in 1993. A notable feature of Mexico’s arbitration law is its monistic approach: the same rules apply to both domestic and international arbitrations.
Since adopting the Model Law, arbitration in Mexico has grown steadily. According to the ICC’s 2024 dispute resolution statistics, Mexico City ranks as the sixth most frequently chosen seat in ICC arbitrations worldwide. Mexican parties and arbitrators are also among the most active in Latin America.
This growth can be attributed to:
Historically, Mexican courts have been arbitration-friendly. However, a major judicial reform passed in 2024 is expected to further shift preferences toward arbitration. This reform mandates the direct election of all judges, eliminating prior requirements for competitive examinations. Many in the legal community fear this may affect the quality and independence of the judiciary, prompting more parties to avoid litigation and opt for arbitration. It remains to be seen whether the new Mexican courts will uphold the pro-arbitration approach of their predecessors.
In recent years, certain industries in Mexico have stood out for their high level of international arbitration activity. These include energy, mining, infrastructure, and, more recently, renewable energy. What these sectors have in common is a strong presence of foreign investment and frequent interaction with public authorities, which often leads to the inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts and, at times, to investor-state disputes.
The energy sector – particularly oil, gas, and electricity – has traditionally been one of the most active areas for arbitration in Mexico. This is due, in large part, to the involvement of state-owned enterprises such as PEMEX and CFE, which regularly include arbitration clauses in their contracts with foreign suppliers and partners. In recent years, regulatory changes and government interventions have triggered a number of high-profile disputes, both in commercial and investment arbitration.
The mining industry has also seen a notable increase in arbitration cases, especially in investor-state proceedings. Legal reforms adopted in 2023 created uncertainty around the granting and renewal of mining concessions, prompting several foreign investors to initiate claims. These disputes often concern changes in environmental regulations, permit revocations, or measures perceived as expropriatory.
Large-scale infrastructure projects – such as highways, railways, ports, and energy facilities – frequently lead to arbitration. These projects are complex, involve substantial capital, and often include cross-border elements or public-private partnerships. Arbitration has become the preferred method of dispute resolution in these contexts due to its perceived neutrality and efficiency.
Renewable energy is an emerging sector in Mexican arbitration. As the country has attempted to transition toward cleaner energy sources, foreign investors have faced shifting regulations and delays in government approvals. Several disputes have already arisen, particularly in relation to solar and wind energy projects, and this trend is expected to continue.
Looking ahead, the 2024 judicial reform – which introduces the direct election of all judges – may lead to further growth in arbitration beyond these traditional sectors. There is growing concern among investors and legal professionals that the reform could undermine judicial independence and predictability. As a result, arbitration may become increasingly attractive in other sectors, particularly manufacturing and nearshoring-related industries, where foreign investment is expanding rapidly. Companies entering into supply chain, construction, or service agreements in this context may be more inclined to include arbitration clauses to mitigate legal uncertainty.
In commercial arbitration involving Mexican parties, both international and domestic arbitral institutions are widely used. The most frequently chosen institutions are the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), and, to a lesser extent, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA).
On the domestic side, the Centro de Arbitraje de México (CAM) and the Centro de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de México (CANACO) are the leading arbitral institutions. These centres have played an important role in promoting arbitration locally, and they continue to attract parties looking for cost-effective and efficient resolution of commercial disputes under Mexican law.
Mexico does not have designated or specialised courts for arbitration-related matters. Instead, when judicial intervention is required – whether in support of arbitration proceedings or for enforcement purposes – the competent courts are determined in accordance with the rules set out in Article 1422 of the Commerce Code. Accordingly, both local and federal courts have concurrent competence regarding arbitration matters.
In Mexico, international arbitration is governed by Title IV, Book Five of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio). This section of the Code incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration almost in its entirety.
While Mexico’s legislation is based on the original 1985 version of the Model Law, it has not adopted the 2006 amendments. Nevertheless, the core structure and guiding principles of the Model Law – such as party autonomy, competence-competence, and limited grounds for setting aside awards – are fully preserved in Mexican law.
There are very few differences between the 1985 Model Law and Mexico’s arbitration provisions. One of the few differences is the number of arbitrators in case there is no agreement. Article 10 of the Model Law provides for three arbitrators while Article 1426 of the Commerce Code provides for a sole arbitrator.
There have been no amendments to the arbitration provisions contained in Title IV, Book Five of the Mexican Commerce Code in the past year. The core legal framework governing commercial arbitration in Mexico remains unchanged and continues to reflect the original UNCITRAL Model Law.
In 2024, Mexico enacted the General Law on Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (Ley General de Mecanismos Alternativos de Solución de Controversias). While this law introduces national definitions and standards for various forms of alternative dispute resolution, its impact on arbitration is limited.
Another legal development to monitor is the gradual implementation of the National Code of Civil and Family Procedure (Código Nacional de Procedimientos Civiles y Familiares), which is expected to be fully in force by 2027.
While this new procedural code is not specifically aimed at commercial arbitration, it may have indirect effects on certain aspects of judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings. For example, the enforcement of noncommercial domestic awards.
However, at this stage, the impact remains speculative, as the relevant provisions are not yet fully operational, and their interaction with the Commerce Code has not been tested in practice.
In Mexico, the requirements for a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement are set out in Articles 1416 and 1423 of the Commerce Code, which are based on Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. These provisions apply equally to both domestic and international commercial arbitration.
Article 1416 defines an arbitration agreement as an agreement by which the parties submit to arbitration all or certain disputes that have arisen or may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. The agreement may take the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or a separate agreement.
Under Article 1423, an arbitration agreement must be in writing. This requirement is broadly interpreted and can be satisfied in various ways:
Arbitration is broadly permitted under Mexican law for commercial disputes. However, not all matters can be submitted to arbitration. The general rule is that only disputes involving rights that the parties may freely dispose of (derechos de libre disposición) are arbitrable. This foundational principle is recognised across Mexican legislation and has been consistently applied by courts.
Matters that involve public policy, the status of individuals, or the exercise of state authority are generally considered non-arbitrable. These include, for example, criminal, labour, and family law issues, where individual rights or broader public interests are at stake.
Additionally, Mexican law provides several statutory references identifying matters that may not be referred to arbitration:
In addition to the general framework, sector-specific laws also impose limitations. For instance:
In conclusion, interpreters must adopt a case-by-case approach to determine arbitrability, guided by the nature of the rights at issue and whether public policy is involved. While the law provides examples and general exclusions, courts tend to interpret restrictions narrowly in commercial contexts. As a result, arbitration agreements are generally upheld unless the subject matter clearly falls within one of the categories deemed non-arbitrable by law.
Mexican courts have consistently adopted a pro-arbitration approach, grounded in both statutory law and constitutional principles. The legal framework strongly favours the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards, and judicial practice reflects this commitment.
One of the guiding principles is that of minimal judicial intervention (principio de mínima intervención judicial). Courts recognise that their role in arbitration is limited to what the law expressly allows. This principle, alongside party autonomy, has been expressly upheld in court decisions, such as in the judgment of the Pleno en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito – “JUICIO ARBITRAL. SE RIGE POR LOS PRINCIPIOS DE AUTONOMÍA DE LA VOLUNTAD O VOLUNTARIEDAD Y DE MÍNIMA INTERVENCIÓN JUDICIAL” (Registro digital: 2022901).
Courts also give full effect to the binding nature of arbitration agreements, recognising both their positive and negative effects. That is, parties are obliged to resolve disputes through arbitration (positive effect) and are barred from pursuing the same dispute in court (negative effect), except in narrowly defined circumstances. This approach is reflected in decisions such as “NULIDAD DE ACTOS DENTRO DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ARBITRAL MERCANTIL. NO CORRESPONDE SU CONOCIMIENTO A UN TRIBUNAL JUDICIAL” (Registro digital: 172973).
When determining the law governing the arbitration agreement, Mexican courts prioritise party autonomy. If the parties have expressly chosen the applicable law, courts will respect that choice. In the absence of an express agreement, courts typically consider factors such as the law governing the underlying contract or the law of the seat of arbitration. This approach aligns with international standards under the UNCITRAL Model Law, which forms the basis of Mexico’s arbitration framework.
On the issue of enforcement, Mexican courts view arbitral awards as final and binding, granting them the effect of res judicata. Judicial review is limited to procedural grounds, such as due process violations or conflicts with public policy, and does not extend to the substance of the award. Key decisions reaffirming this position include “ARBITRAJE. LOS LAUDOS FIRMES ADQUIEREN LA CATEGORÍA DE COSA JUZGADA” (Registro digital: 187010), and “LAUDO ARBITRAL. SU HOMOLOGACIÓN POR AUTORIDAD JUDICIAL ORDINARIA…” (Registro digital: 186229).
Courts also uphold procedural protections for parties invoking arbitration agreements. A party may request referral to arbitration at any stage before final judgment, and the court must rule on the request without delay, ensuring the right to be heard and deferring to arbitration unless the agreement is clearly invalid or unenforceable. This has been recognised in “REMISIÓN AL ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL. EL PROCEDIMIENTO PREVISTO…” (Registro digital: 2021255), and “REMISIÓN AL ARBITRAJE. PUEDE SOLICITARSE EN CUALQUIER ETAPA…” (Registro digital: 2021586).
In summary, arbitration agreements are routinely enforced by Mexican courts, and the judiciary has played a central role in making Mexico a reliable, arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.
Under Mexican law, an arbitration clause may still be considered valid even if the contract in which it is contained is invalid. This is because Mexican arbitration law expressly recognises the principle of separability of the arbitration agreement.
Article 1432 of the Commerce Code, which largely mirrors Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, provides that an arbitration clause is legally independent from the rest of the contract. This means that the tribunal’s jurisdiction does not automatically fall away if the contract is alleged to be void, illegal, or terminated.
In practical terms, even if a party argues that the main contract is invalid or has no legal effect, the arbitration clause can survive and remain enforceable. This allows arbitrators to determine the validity of the underlying contract as part of their jurisdiction, without needing prior judicial confirmation.
There are no statutory limits on the parties’ autonomy to select arbitrators under Mexican law. Article 1427 of the Commerce Code, which corresponds to Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, expressly recognises the parties’ freedom to determine the number of arbitrators and the procedure for their appointment.
This autonomy allows parties to agree not only on the number of arbitrators but also on the method of selection, including qualifications, nationality, or specific expertise.
Mexican law provides a default procedure for the appointment of arbitrators when the parties’ agreed method fails. These rules are found in Articles 1426 and 1427 of the Commerce Code.
If the parties have not agreed on the method of appointment, the following apply.
Mexican law does not contain specific provisions addressing the appointment of arbitrators in multiparty arbitrations. In the absence of agreement among all parties, the default rules under Article 1427 apply. However, these rules assume a bilateral structure and may be difficult to apply directly in multiparty scenarios.
Courts can intervene in the selection of arbitrators, but only in limited circumstances and in accordance with the rules set out in Article 1427 of the Commerce Code. Intervention is allowed when the parties’ agreed method fails – for example, if a party does not appoint an arbitrator within the designated time, or if the two party-appointed arbitrators cannot agree on the third arbitrator. In such cases, either party may request a state court to make the necessary appointment.
The Mexican Commerce Code provides specific rules for challenging and removing arbitrators in Articles 1428 and 1429, which closely follow Articles 12 and 13 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
An arbitrator may be challenged if there are justifiable doubts about their impartiality or independence, or if they lack the qualifications agreed by the parties (Article 1428). Arbitrators must disclose any relevant circumstances that could affect their impartiality.
If the parties have not agreed on a procedure, Article 1429 establishes that challenges must be submitted in writing within 15 days of becoming aware of the appointment or the grounds for challenge. If the tribunal rejects the challenge, the party may request that a state court decide the matter.
Mexican law requires that arbitrators be independent and impartial, and that they disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts about their impartiality or independence. These obligations are set out in Article 1428 of the Commerce Code.
Arbitrators must make such disclosures at the time of their appointment and must continue to disclose any relevant developments during the proceedings. If a party believes that an arbitrator does not meet these standards, they may challenge the appointment under the procedure provided in Article 1429.
The principle of competence-competence is fully recognised under Mexican law. Arbitral tribunals have the power to rule on their own jurisdiction, including on objections to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.
This principle is codified in Article 1432 of the Commerce Code, which mirrors Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. It is also widely upheld in judicial precedents, reflecting Mexico’s consistent support for arbitration and the autonomy of arbitral tribunals.
Mexican courts may address issues of an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction in two procedural stages, as set out in Articles 1424 and 1432 of the Commerce Code and confirmed by Tesis 162932. First, when a party requests referral to arbitration, the court may assess whether the arbitration agreement is valid, enforceable, and applicable. Second, after an award is issued, courts may review jurisdiction in the context of a set-aside or enforcement proceeding.
This approach reflects the principle of competence-competence, allowing arbitral tribunals to rule on their own jurisdiction, while also preserving limited judicial oversight. Once a court has ruled on jurisdiction, it may not revisit the issue at a later stage, ensuring procedural efficiency and legal certainty.
Mexican courts have traditionally been supportive of arbitration, generally showing deference to valid arbitration agreements. However, with the recent 2024 judicial reform, which introduces the election of judges, there is growing uncertainty about how future courts will handle arbitration-related matters with prior precedents.
Under Mexican law, there is no single, clear-cut rule as to when a party may go to court to challenge an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. The answer may vary depending on the procedural context and the nature of the objection. However, the general framework provides two defined procedural windows where judicial review of jurisdiction is allowed:
This structure was confirmed by the federal judiciary in Tesis digital registry: 162932, which held that judicial review of arbitral jurisdiction may occur only once – either before or after the award, but not at both stages. This aims to preserve procedural economy and respect the autonomy of the arbitral process.
That said, the way this rule applies in practice may depend on the specific procedural circumstances and the timing or substance of the jurisdictional objection. Courts may analyse the issue on a case-by-case basis, particularly in complex cases involving multi-tiered clauses or parallel proceedings.
Mexican law does not expressly define the standard of judicial review for questions of jurisdiction or admissibility. The Commerce Code provides the procedural framework, but it does not clarify whether courts should apply a de novo or deferential standard in reviewing arbitral rulings on these issues.
In practice, the approach appears to be case-specific. Courts have recognised the principle of competence-competence, allowing arbitral tribunals to rule on their own jurisdiction. However, the extent to which courts defer to those determinations – particularly in annulment or enforcement proceedings – may vary depending on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the objection raised, and the procedural stage at which it arises.
For questions of admissibility, such as compliance with pre-arbitration steps or timing of claims, there is even less clarity, and Mexican courts have not established a uniform standard. These issues are often treated as falling within the tribunal’s discretion, but judicial review cannot be ruled out entirely, especially where public policy concerns are raised.
As a result, there is no settled rule, and the standard of review remains largely undefined in statutory terms, leaving room for judicial discretion and interpretation on a case-by-case basis.
Mexican courts do not act ex officio to enforce arbitration agreements. If a party initiates court proceedings in breach of an arbitration clause, the court will generally proceed with the case unless the opposing party formally requests referral to arbitration.
This approach is consistent with Article 1424 of the Commerce Code, as well as Article II of the New York Convention and Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Under these provisions, the court must refer the matter to arbitration only if a party so requests, and only if the arbitration agreement is found to be valid, enforceable, and applicable to the dispute.
There is no strong judicial culture of reluctance or willingness in allowing such proceedings to continue. The system is structured around party initiative: courts generally do not question jurisdiction on their own, and will only halt proceedings when a timely and substantiated request for referral is made.
Mexican law does not expressly authorise arbitral tribunals to assume jurisdiction over individuals or entities that are not signatories to the arbitration agreement. The general principle, as consistently recognised by the courts, is that arbitration is based on consent and is binding only between the parties to the agreement.
In certain cases, the judiciary has suggested that when rights governed by an arbitration clause are transferred – such as through succession or assignment – the arbitration agreement may follow those rights. A party stepping into the legal position of another might, under this reasoning, be treated as bound by the same dispute resolution mechanism.
Elsewhere, courts have reaffirmed the general principle that arbitration agreements apply strictly between the contracting parties. However, they have also acknowledged that in intricate commercial scenarios – particularly those involving layered contracts or co-ordinated transactions – the strict inter partes rule may warrant careful contextual analysis.
In a separate line of reasoning, courts have declined to annul arbitration awards solely on the basis that some participants in a broader contractual scheme were not formal signatories to the agreement containing the arbitration clause. This suggests that the enforceability of such awards may, in some circumstances, survive challenges grounded in lack of formal consent.
Ultimately, whether an arbitration agreement binds a non-signatory is a matter that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific legal relationships and factual context.
Arbitral tribunals are permitted to grant interim or precautionary relief, and such measures are considered binding. This is established in Article 1479 of the Commerce Code, which provides that interim measures ordered by an arbitral tribunal must be recognised and enforced by the courts, regardless of the state in which they were issued, unless an exception under Article 1480 applies.
Tribunals may order a wide range of interim measures, including:
Courts may refuse to enforce a tribunal’s interim measure only in limited circumstances, such as:
Importantly, courts may not review the substance of the measure, and are only permitted to assess compliance with formal grounds for enforcement. Interim measures are therefore mandatory and enforceable, unless one of the specific exceptions is met.
Mexican courts may play an active role in granting interim relief in support of arbitration, both before the arbitral tribunal is constituted and during the arbitral proceedings. This power is granted under Article 1425 of the Commerce Code, which allows parties to request interim measures from the judiciary despite the existence of an arbitration agreement.
While the Code does not specify which types of measures can be granted in this context, courts enjoy broad discretion and often look to the general rules on precautionary relief in commercial matters. Common forms of relief include asset freezes, injunctions, and orders to preserve evidence, often subject to the posting of a bond or guarantee by the applicant.
Mexican courts can also grant interim measures in support of foreign-seated arbitrations, particularly when the respondent is domiciled in Mexico or when assets are located within the country. In such cases, jurisdiction may be exercised under Article 1422 of the Commerce Code.
As for emergency arbitrators, Mexican law does not include specific provisions addressing their use. The Commerce Code draws no distinction between relief ordered by a tribunal and that granted by an emergency arbitrator. As a result, it remains uncertain whether national courts would intervene once an emergency arbitrator has been appointed, as this issue has not yet been addressed in case law.
Arbitral tribunals are authorised to order security for costs when requested by a party. Article 1456 of the Commerce Code allows the tribunal to fix the amount of required deposits or additional deposits related to the costs of the arbitration.
If the parties have agreed that a judge will oversee this function, or if the court consents to do so, the tribunal must consult with the judge before determining the amount. The court may then issue comments or observations regarding the appropriate level of security.
Commercial arbitration procedure in Mexico is governed by the Commerce Code, specifically Title IV, Book Five, which incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with minimal modifications.
This legal framework applies to both domestic and international commercial arbitrations seated in Mexico and provides comprehensive rules on all procedural aspects, including the constitution of the tribunal, conduct of proceedings, interim measures, and setting aside of awards.
Because the Commerce Code is based on the original 1985 version of the Model Law, it does not incorporate the 2006 amendments. However, Mexican courts interpret its provisions in line with international standards and best practices.
Mexican arbitration law allows for significant procedural flexibility, and there are no rigid procedural steps that must be followed in every case. Under Article 1435 of the Commerce Code, the procedure is generally governed by the parties’ agreement, or, in the absence of such agreement, by the decisions of the arbitral tribunal.
That said, a few basic procedural safeguards are required by law:
These provisions provide a basic procedural framework while preserving party autonomy and flexibility in designing the arbitral process.
While the Mexican Commerce Code does not provide an exhaustive list of arbitrators’ powers and duties, several core principles and obligations can be drawn from its provisions, particularly Articles 1435 and 1448.
Powers of Arbitrators
Under Article 1435, arbitrators have broad authority to conduct the proceedings as they consider appropriate, subject to party agreement. Their key powers include:
These powers reflect the principle of party autonomy and are exercised within a flexible framework designed to respect the parties’ procedural choices.
Duties of Arbitrators
Arbitrators are also bound by a set of fundamental duties, including:
Although not codified in detail, arbitrators are expected to act with independence, impartiality, and diligence, in line with general principles of international arbitration and Mexican judicial expectations.
There are no specific qualifications or licensing requirements imposed on legal representatives in arbitration proceedings seated in Mexico. This applies equally to domestic and international arbitrations.
Parties are free to appoint any person – regardless of nationality, professional background, or bar admission – to represent them in arbitral proceedings. Legal counsel need not be licensed to practice law in Mexico, nor are they required to hold domestic legal qualifications.
The general approach to evidence in arbitral proceedings seated in Mexico is governed by the principle of party autonomy. Under Article 1435 of the Commerce Code, parties are free to agree on the procedural rules that will govern the arbitration, including those relating to the collection and submission of evidence. In the absence of such an agreement, the arbitral tribunal has discretion to conduct the proceedings as it deems appropriate, including determining the admissibility, relevance, and weight of evidence.
In practice, Mexican-seated arbitrations often draw upon international soft law instruments, particularly the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, especially in complex or cross-border disputes. These may include the use of witness statements, expert reports, cross-examination, and limited document production mechanisms, rather than full discovery.
There are no domestic rules mandating procedures such as discovery or pre-trial disclosure. These matters are generally addressed through party agreement or by reference to international best practices, often influenced by the procedural traditions of the parties or the applicable institutional rules.
Ultimately, tribunals seated in Mexico have significant flexibility to tailor the evidentiary process to the needs of the dispute, while respecting the principles of equal treatment and due process.
There are no codified rules of evidence that apply by default to arbitral proceedings seated in Mexico. The Commerce Code does not require arbitral tribunals to follow the evidentiary rules applicable to domestic court proceedings.
Instead, parties are free to agree on the evidentiary framework to be applied. In the absence of such agreement, Article 1435 of the Commerce Code grants the arbitral tribunal broad discretion to conduct the proceedings as it considers appropriate, including determining the admissibility, relevance, and weight of evidence.
In practice, tribunals and parties frequently rely on the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration as a point of reference, especially in cross-border or complex disputes. These soft-law guidelines help structure document production, witness statements, expert testimony, and the handling of privileged information.
Arbitral tribunals seated in Mexico do not possess coercive powers to compel the production of documents or the appearance of witnesses. However, Article 1444 of the Commerce Code provides that either the arbitral tribunal or a party – with the tribunal’s approval – may request assistance from a competent court to facilitate the taking of evidence.
This includes ordering the production of documents, summoning witnesses, or compelling the enforcement of evidentiary measures. Courts may exercise such powers in accordance with domestic procedural rules.
There is a practical distinction between parties and non-parties. While tribunals may expect parties to comply voluntarily with evidentiary orders as part of their procedural obligations, non-parties cannot be compelled without judicial intervention. In such cases, the tribunal or a party must formally request assistance from the judiciary.
Mexican law does not provide a general rule establishing the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. The Commerce Code does not impose confidentiality obligations on the parties, arbitrators, or any other participants in arbitration by default. As a result, disclosure of pleadings, documents, or even the award is not prohibited under national law, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.
In practice, however, confidentiality is commonly agreed upon by the parties – either through explicit clauses in the arbitration agreement or by adopting institutional rules that include confidentiality provisions. Arbitrators may also issue confidentiality orders when authorised by the parties or applicable rules.
As for disclosure in subsequent proceedings, such as enforcement or annulment actions before national courts, certain information from the arbitration may become part of the public record, particularly when attached to judicial filings. Nevertheless, Mexican courts may take measures to protect sensitive information when appropriate.
In short, unless confidentiality is contractually agreed or provided for by the applicable arbitral rules, arbitral proceedings in Mexico are not inherently confidential.
Arbitral awards must meet certain formal requirements under Article 1448 of the Mexican Commerce Code.
Specifically, the award must:
There are no express statutory limits on the types of remedies an arbitral tribunal may award under Mexican law. In principle, the tribunal may grant the same types of remedies that a court could, including damages, specific performance, rectification, or injunctive relief – provided that such remedies are not contrary to public policy and that the dispute is arbitrable.
That said, party autonomy plays a central role: if the parties have contractually excluded certain remedies (such as punitive damages, which are generally not recognised under Mexican law), the tribunal must respect those limitations.
In any case, an award granting non-arbitrable remedies or remedies that contravene Mexican public policy could be set aside or refused recognition or enforcement under the grounds listed in Articles 1457 and 1462 of the Mexican Commerce Code (based on Articles V(2)(a) and (b) of the New York Convention).
Under Mexican law, parties are entitled to recover interest and legal costs, subject to the terms of the arbitration agreement and the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.
Legal Basis
Articles 1452 to 1455 of the Mexican Commerce Code govern the allocation of costs in arbitration. These provisions mirror the “costs follow the event” principle but also give the tribunal broad discretion to adapt that principle based on the circumstances.
Legal Costs and Interest
The tribunal is empowered to award:
Under Mexican law, arbitral awards are not subject to appeal. The only available remedies are:
Both remedies are pursued through the special commercial proceeding for settlement agreements and arbitration, governed by the Mexican Commerce Code. Once that process concludes, the losing party may seek constitutional relief (amparo indirecto).
There is ongoing debate regarding the correct form of amparo, since the Amparo Law establishes that final decisions in judicial proceedings should be reviewed through amparo directo. Nonetheless, a binding precedent currently allows amparo indirecto, despite significant criticism regarding its consistency with the Amparo Law and the fact that amparo indirecto has two instances while amparo directo only has one, thus generating lengthier proceedings.
The grounds for annulment or refusal of recognition mirror those found in Article V of the New York Convention and Articles 1457 and 1462 of the Mexican Commerce Code.
Under Mexican law, judicial appeals of arbitral awards are not permitted, and the parties cannot expand judicial review by agreement. Courts have no jurisdiction to hear appeals against arbitral awards, as such a mechanism is simply not contemplated in the legal framework.
However, parties could theoretically agree to an internal appeal mechanism within the arbitral process by providing that an award may be reviewed by a second arbitral tribunal constituted for that purpose. This type of contractual arbitral appeal would be valid and enforceable.
In any case, regardless of such internal mechanisms, the only recourse available before national courts remains annulment or refusal of recognition/enforcement, under the grounds set out in Articles 1457 and 1462 of the Commerce Code and Article V of the New York Convention.
Mexican courts apply a highly deferential standard of review to arbitral awards. The Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN) has made clear that judicial scrutiny is strictly limited to procedural violations and does not extend to revisiting the merits of the case.
In particular, the Court has emphasised that the grounds for setting aside an award – such as those found in Article 1457(I)(b) in connection with Article 1434 of the Mexican Commerce Code – refer exclusively to violations of procedural fairness, such as inequality of treatment or denial of the opportunity to present one’s case during the arbitration proceedings. They do not cover dissatisfaction with how arbitrators assessed the evidence or interpreted the law.
Mexico acceded to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1971, without making any reservations.
The standard for enforcing an arbitral award in Mexico essentially mirrors the grounds for annulment, but applied inversely. That is, enforcement will be denied only if one of the grounds listed in Article 1462 of the Mexican Commerce Code or Article V of the New York Convention is met.
To date, there are no known judicial precedents in Mexico where a foreign arbitral award annulled at the seat was nevertheless enforced by Mexican courts. Similarly, there is no clear judicial guidance on the treatment of awards undergoing set-aside proceedings at the seat. The approach will likely vary depending on the particular circumstances – especially whether the Mexican courts and the courts at the seat are within the same legal system – and will require a case-by-case analysis.
As for state or state-owned entities, there is no blanket immunity at the enforcement stage. Although Mexico has acceded to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, which has not yet entered into force, Mexican courts may consider its principles as persuasive guidance. In practice, Mexican courts tend to assess sovereign immunity claims based on the nature of the acts in question and whether the state entity acted in a commercial or sovereign capacity.
Mexican courts are generally arbitration-friendly and tend to recognise and enforce both domestic and foreign arbitral awards, including those rendered abroad under the New York Convention, to which Mexico acceded in 1971 without reservations. However, it remains to be seen how this pro-arbitration stance may evolve in light of the ongoing judicial reform and potential shifts in institutional posture.
Enforcement may be refused on limited grounds under Article 1462 of the Mexican Commerce Code, which mirrors Article V of the New York Convention. One such ground is public policy. While Mexican law does not expressly distinguish between domestic and international public policy, courts have typically applied a narrow construction aligned with international standards, reserving this defence for exceptional cases where enforcement would seriously violate Mexico’s fundamental principles of justice.
For instance, in the Commisa v PEMEX case, the Mexican courts initially annulled a domestic award on public policy grounds. However, a US court later enforced that same award under the New York Convention, holding that the annulment had been based on retroactive legislation inconsistent with fundamental notions of due process. This case has since been cited as an example of the nuanced and evolving nature of public policy review in international arbitration.
Overall, while the public policy exception remains a possible bar to enforcement, Mexican courts have shown restraint and an overall willingness to uphold the finality of arbitral awards.
Mexican law does not provide for class action arbitration or group arbitration. There is no statutory framework recognising collective arbitration proceedings, nor are there established procedural rules addressing the consolidation of claims on a class or group basis in arbitration.
While class actions do exist in the judicial context under certain consumer protection and environmental laws, these mechanisms have not been extended to the arbitral sphere. As a result, any attempt to bring collective claims in arbitration would face significant legal uncertainty and would likely require express party agreement and careful structuring to be considered arbitrable.
Mexican arbitration law does not impose a mandatory or comprehensive ethical code for counsel or arbitrators. The only express legal requirement is that arbitrators must be independent and impartial, as set out in Article 1428 of the Mexican Commerce Code.
In practice, however, both counsel and arbitrators commonly adhere to internationally recognised standards of ethics and conduct. These often include soft law instruments such as the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration and the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation, which are frequently used as reference points, even if not binding.
Overall, ethical standards in Mexican-seated arbitrations are shaped more by international practice and party autonomy than by domestic regulation.
There are currently no specific rules or restrictions on third-party funding in arbitration under Mexican law. The Mexican Commerce Code does not regulate the use of third-party funders, and there is no official guidance or case law addressing their involvement in arbitral proceedings.
That said, parties are generally free to arrange their own financing, subject to disclosure obligations that may arise under applicable ethical standards or institutional rules. In practice, issues related to third-party funding – such as disclosure or conflicts of interest – are typically addressed through reference to international soft law instruments, such as the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest.
Mexican law does not expressly regulate the consolidation of arbitral proceedings. Therefore, consolidation is only possible to the extent that the applicable arbitration rules (agreed upon by the parties) allow it. For arbitrations administered under institutional rules that provide for consolidation, such as the ICC or LCIA, tribunals may consolidate proceedings if the conditions set forth in those rules are met.
In ad hoc arbitrations, however, consolidation would be significantly more complex and uncertain, as there is no procedural framework or precedent in Mexico to guide such efforts. Without party agreements or express procedural rules, it is unclear how or whether consolidation could be implemented effectively.
Whether a third party may be bound by an arbitration agreement or an arbitral award under Mexican law is a highly fact-specific issue, generally determined on a case-by-case basis. While Mexican courts have recognised that arbitration agreements may, in limited circumstances, extend to third parties – such as successors-in-interest or those involved in complex contractual structures – they have not developed a clear, comprehensive doctrine on this point.
When it comes to arbitral awards, the situation is even less defined. In theory, general principles of contractual succession (eg, assignment, inheritance) could support extending the effects of an award to certain non-signatories, but there is no settled jurisprudence confirming this approach. As of now, there are no known judicial decisions in Mexico expressly binding third parties to an award on the basis of such principles.
Regarding foreign third parties, Mexican courts do not have a specific legal framework empowering them to bind individuals or entities outside the jurisdiction who were not party to the arbitration. Any such determination would depend on private international law principles and the particular facts of the case.
Juan Salvador Agraz 73-piso 17
Santa Fe
Contadero
Cuajimalpa de Morelos
05348 Ciudad de México
CDMX
+55 5281 1300
rodrigo.macin@bufeteasali.com bufeteasali.com/
State Planning, Mixed Investment and Arbitration in Mexico’s Electricity Sector After the 2024–2025 Reforms
Mexico’s constitutional reforms of 2024 and secondary legislation of 2025 established a state-directed mixed electricity model rather than a restored monopoly. This article makes three claims about the reform.
Introduction
Mexico has rewritten the constitutional foundations of its electricity sector twice in 12 years, and in opposite directions. The reform of 2013 organised the system around competition and opened generation to private participants, while the reforms of 2024 and 2025 restored the primacy of the State and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). The temptation is to read the second movement as the undoing of the first. It is not. The State now plans, yet it also invites capital; it claims exclusive control of the system, yet contemplates projects built jointly with private investors; and it sends the disputes those projects generate, in defined circumstances, to arbitration. Public direction, private participation, and consensual adjudication sit together in a single design that the familiar opposition between monopoly and market cannot describe. What has changed is not who invests, but what tells them to invest: where price signals once guided capital, a binding plan now does – and the contract, not the market, has become the place where public purpose and private money must be reconciled.
Those foundations were laid in quick succession. Constitutional reforms were published on 31 October and 20 December 2024, followed by a package of secondary legislation on 18 March 2025; the administration had signalled its intentions earlier still, in the National Electricity Sector Strategy presented in November 2024. The framework now in force comprises the Electricity Sector Law, the Law of the State Public Enterprise Federal Electricity Commission, the Law on Energy Planning and Transition, their implementing regulations, and the Electricity Sector Development Plan 2025–2039. Together, these instruments displace competition as the system’s organising principle and put binding public planning in its place – without closing the several routes through which private capital may still participate.
Which routes remain open, and on what terms, is the question this article pursues. The administration has described an indicative balance in which CFE accounts for at least 54% of the electricity injected into the national grid, with private participants supplying the remainder. Official project information identifies three principal modalities:
Each modality rests on a contract, and every contract must anticipate disagreement. Dispute resolution therefore belongs at the centre of the analysis.
Three claims organise what follows.
The analysis that follows is doctrinal. It draws on constitutional provisions, secondary legislation, planning instruments, official policy documents and the general legal framework governing commercial arbitration. Because much of the model remains in implementation, the discussion separates rules already in force from programme estimates, administrative announcements and project modalities whose practical operation awaits later contracts and regulatory decisions.
From market co-ordination to binding state planning
The new framework places the planning and control of the National Electricity System within the State’s exclusive constitutional sphere and recasts CFE as a state public enterprise rather than a state productive enterprise. Investment decisions, permits, interconnection and system expansion now answer to a planning hierarchy directed by the Ministry of Energy, with the Electricity Sector Development Plan 2025–2039 supplying the long-term horizon and successive calls matching proposed capacity to identified regional, technological and network requirements. The institutional map was redrawn to match: regulatory functions once exercised by an autonomous body passed to the National Energy Commission within the executive branch, and the independent system operator was reconstituted as a state public enterprise. Planning, regulation, dispatch and the principal generating enterprise are no longer distributed among institutions designed to check one another; whether that is read as coherence or as concentration, they now answer to a common centre.
What makes the plan binding is the set of decisions made to depend on it. Permits and interconnection are assessed against the capacity, technology and location that the planning instruments identify, so a project’s legal viability turns on its fit with the programme rather than on its ability to compete once built; the 54% floor operates in the same register, as a statutory instruction addressed to the planners rather than a market outcome observed after the fact. Even the calls through which private participants are invited originate in needs the State has already defined, so capital enters at a point where the essential questions – how much capacity, of what kind, and where – have been settled elsewhere. Economic regulation and the wholesale market survive, but within a public planning framework directed at reliability, continuity, affordability, energy security and the transition toward cleaner generation. The market has not been abolished; it has been subordinated to an instrument that now performs the co-ordinating work it once did.
Mixed public-private ivestment in electricity generation
If planning now supplies the system’s organising principle, the question becomes what space it leaves for private capital, and on what terms. The Plan for Strengthening and Expanding the National Electricity System 2025–2030 initially announced 51 CFE projects, public investment estimated at more than USD22 billion and 22,674 MW of additional CFE generation capacity, alongside some 6,400 MW expected from private investment; later public information expanded the portfolio and separated capacity developed with CFE’s own resources, capacity under mixed schemes and wholly private capacity. These figures have shifted as planning and procurement have advanced, and are best read as programme estimates rather than fixed legal commitments. Materials published through the Energy Window in 2026 indicate that mixed development has since passed from a general policy modality into project-selection and registration procedures, including calls addressed to specified generation needs and regions.
Under that modality, CFE retains majority participation (consistent with the 54% benchmark identified in policy and implementation materials), while private investors may contribute capital, technology, construction capacity or operational expertise. Mixed development is therefore narrower than the sector-wide coexistence of public and private generation: it is designed to distribute financing and project risk while preserving public direction. How it performs will depend on the transparency of project selection, the bankability of revenue arrangements, the objectivity of interconnection criteria, the adequacy of guarantees, and the allocation of construction, dispatch, curtailment, regulatory change and payment risks. Majority public participation may ease co-ordination with system planning; it may equally place project governance where corporate decision-making, public budgeting, sector regulation and administrative oversight converge. It is that convergence which gives dispute resolution clauses their analytical interest and invites closer attention to their functions and legal limits.
Arbitration and the architecture of consent
Where public direction and private capital converge in this way, the contract becomes the instrument through which their relationship is governed – —and the dispute resolution clause becomes the point at which tensions are anticipated. Arbitration clauses may offer a neutral and technically specialised forum for disputes arising from mixed electricity projects, particularly where financing is international, performance obligations are intricate, or the parties seek procedural confidentiality and an enforceable award. The 2025 Law of the State Public Enterprise Federal Electricity Commission recognises a special contracting regime for CFE, and Mexico’s Commercial Code and the National Code of Civil and Family Procedures supply the general legal framework for arbitration: party autonomy, competence-competence, interim measures, judicial referral to arbitration, and the recognition and enforcement of awards. Subject to the applicable statutory and contractual requirements, project contracts may accordingly refer controversies to domestic or international arbitration.
The interest of arbitration, however, extends beyond the availability of a private adjudicatory forum. In mixed generation projects, the design of dispute resolution shapes how regulatory, contractual and financing risk is distributed among CFE, private investors, lenders, contractors and operators. Its institutional function can be assessed through three questions:
All three questions are shaped at the drafting stage, where consent takes its concrete form. The design of arbitration clauses in mixed generation projects ordinarily turns on a familiar set of elements:
Electricity projects add two further concerns:
These choices define the reach of the parties’ agreement; what they cannot do is extend that reach beyond the limits imposed by the legal order itself.
The limits of arbitral jurisdiction
Those limits begin with arbitrability. An arbitration clause does not turn every disagreement involving a public enterprise into an arbitrable dispute. Mexican law distinguishes acts performed by a state entity in a commercial capacity from exercises of public authority. Administrative rescission, permit decisions, sanctions, system-planning determinations and other regulatory measures may fall under special jurisdictional rules or judicial review outside the contractual arbitral forum. The applicable statute, the legal character of the contract and the nature of the challenged conduct together mark the boundary of arbitral jurisdiction.
That boundary is easier to state than to draft. A clause covering disputes “arising out of or relating to” the contract may leave uncertainty where the agreement identifies no exclusions for acts of authority; an exclusion drawn too broadly may hollow out the arbitration it accompanies. The analytical line runs between ordinary contractual controversies – payment, delay, performance standards, price adjustment, termination for breach – and challenges to permits, sanctions, compulsory planning decisions or other measures governed by public law.
A second limit concerns the law the tribunal must apply. Arbitral jurisdiction should be kept distinct from the substantive law governing the dispute: consent may authorise a tribunal to decide contractual claims without displacing the mandatory rules of Mexican public law that bear on the validity, performance or termination of the underlying arrangement. The distinction matters most where contractual rights depend on permits, planning determinations, interconnection decisions, or other regulatory acts whose legal effects originate outside the contract.
A third limit is structural rather than jurisdictional. Mixed generation projects frequently spread obligations across several contracts, concluded by different entities and governed by distinct dispute resolution provisions. Such fragmentation invites parallel proceedings, inconsistent findings and uncertainty over which tribunal may decide a common question of fact or law. The effectiveness of arbitration here rests less on the wording of any single clause than on the compatibility of consent, joinder, consolidation and confidentiality provisions across the project’s contractual structure.
A final distinction binds the foregoing from outside the contract altogether. The consent examined so far governs contract arbitration, which does not exhaust the remedies potentially available to a foreign investor in a mixed project. Contract arbitration and investment arbitration remain distinct mechanisms: the first derives from consent given in the project agreement, while the second depends on an applicable treaty, a protected investor and investment, and the treaty’s jurisdictional conditions.
Conclusion
The Sheinbaum administration’s electricity policy constitutes a state-directed mixed model rather than a restored monopoly: CFE’s institutional prevalence and the State’s binding planning authority define a framework within which private capital continues to participate through the wholesale market, long-term contractual arrangements, and mixed projects under majority public participation. The 54% benchmark is its most visible expression, but not its most consequential feature. What distinguishes the model is the relocation of the co-ordinating function itself: investment that once responded to price signals now responds to a plan, and the contract has replaced the market as the principal instrument through which public direction and private capital are reconciled.
That displacement assigns arbitration to a defined and comparatively modest role: it reaches the commercial dimension of public-private co-operation, not the exercise of public authority, and its practical value depends on the coherence of that boundary across interdependent project contracts. Arbitration is therefore neither a guarantee against regulatory risk nor a peripheral formality, and accounts that treat it as either misdescribe its function. Whether the wider framework performs as intended remains genuinely open. Binding planning may narrow the gap between generation projects and transmission capacity, and mixed investment may mobilise capital and expertise; working in the other direction are the concentration of planning authority, CFE’s dual position as market participant and state public enterprise, implementation rules still in movement, and the uncertain legal boundary between contractual conduct and public authority. The evidence that would settle the question – the final distribution of capacity among CFE-owned, mixed and private projects, the governance rights adopted in mixed-development vehicles, the consistency of permitting decisions with binding planning, and the wording of dispute resolution provisions in executed contracts – is not yet public.
The wider implication is methodological. A state that plans while inviting capital, and that submits the resulting contracts to consensual adjudication within limits it continues to define, is doing something more particular than reversing the reform of 2013; assessments that ask only whether the framework favours investment will miss what is at stake, because its coherence will be tested not at the level of ownership percentages but at the points where planning, contract and public authority meet. Those are the points at which the framework has placed its dispute resolution provisions. The arrangement’s durability is not something the present evidence can settle; the terms on which it should be judged, however, can be fixed in advance – and this article has sought to design a path to fix them.
Avenida Insurgentes Sur 1261
Interior 302
Colonia Insurgentes
Alcaldía Benito Juárez
Ciudad de México
Mexico
+525 51510 8910
mtv@litredi.legal www.litredi.legal