Arbitration and litigation are both popular modes of dispute resolution used by domestic parties. Other modes of alternative dispute resolution (including mediation) are also increasing in importance.

International arbitration is a prevalent method of dispute resolution in Singapore, and its use continues to increase. In 2025, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) registered its second highest annual case load of 886 cases with a total sum in dispute of approximately USD14.53 billion, compared to 479 new cases with a total sum in dispute of approximately USD8.09 billion in 2019. Parties from 79 jurisdictions engaged the SIAC’s services in 2025, compared to the 65 jurisdictions that were represented in the SIAC in 2022, reinforcing the SIAC’s growing international footprint.

Notably, based on the 2025 International Arbitration Survey conducted by White & Case and Queen Mary University of London, Singapore ranks as the second most preferred seat for arbitration in the world (behind only London), and the SIAC’s Arbitration Rules are the third most preferred set of arbitration rules in the world (only behind the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre).

The prevalence of international arbitration in Singapore is driven by various factors, including the perception of Singapore as a neutral forum and the support of the Singapore courts towards the arbitration process, with an emphasis on minimal judicial intervention and party autonomy as well as upholding confidentiality in arbitration.

Based on the SIAC’s 2025 Annual Report, in 2025, parties filed claims before the SIAC across a wide range of sectors, including:

• trade (39%);
• commercial (20%);
• corporate (10%);
• maritime/shipping (10%); and
• construction/infrastructure/engineering (9%).

The substantial portion of cases dealing with trade and commercial matters might be attributable to trade being a substantial pillar of Singapore’s economy.

It is also worth highlighting that, based on recent cases involving setting-aside proceedings heard before the Singapore courts, there appears to be an increasing trend in investor-State arbitrations that are seated in Singapore (with recent notable examples including DNZ v DOA [2026] SGHC(I) 1 and Republic of Korea v Mason Capital LP and Another [2025] 4 SLR 308). This is likely driven by Singapore’s reputation as a neutral seat, and that of the Singapore judiciary for its efficiency, integrity and ability to grapple with complex issues of investment treaty law.

The SIAC is the most popular arbitral institution in Singapore, with favoured alternatives including the ICC (which has had an office in Singapore since 2018) and the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration (for maritime-related disputes). The Permanent Court of Arbitration has also established an office in Singapore since 2017, further augmenting Singapore’s position as an international hub for investment dispute resolution. No new arbitral institutions have been established in Singapore in the last 12 months.

There is no specific court in Singapore designated to hear arbitration-related disputes. However, matters relating to arbitration will be assigned to judges in the Companies, Insolvency, Equity and Trust, and Arbitration docket of the High Court.

Parties may also agree to submit their arbitration-related disputes to the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), a division of the General Division of the High Court designed to deal with transnational commercial disputes. Where proceedings are commenced in the General Division of the High Court, counsel may be directed to take instructions on the potential transfer of such proceedings to the SICC where:

• none of the parties is from Singapore (or, if there are three or more parties, not more than one is from Singapore); and
• the value of the subject matter in the underlying dispute/award (whichever is less) is at least SGD10 million.

Notable arbitration-related proceedings that have recently been heard before the SICC include Korea v Mason, Deutsche Telekom AG v The Republic of India [2024] 3 SLR 1, Hulley Enterprises Ltd and Others v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19 and DNZ v DOA and another [2026] SGHC(I) 1.

The International Arbitration Act 1994 (IAA) governs international arbitration in Singapore. A separate piece of legislation, the Arbitration Act 2001 (AA) applies to any arbitration where the place of arbitration is Singapore and Part II of the IAA does not apply – typically, “domestic” arbitrations. Parties may select the IAA or AA by agreement.

The IAA gives the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 (hereinafter, the ML) the force of law in Singapore, with certain modifications including (among others) the following.

• Chapter VIII of the ML (which addresses enforcement of arbitral awards) is excluded, to avoid inconsistency with Part 3 of the IAA, which applies to enforcement of awards under the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”).
• Article 16(3) ML prescribes that, if the tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, a party may request the relevant court to decide the matter (and that such decision shall be subject to no appeal). Section 10(3) IAA expands on this to allow for applications to be made to the High Court to decide the matter where the tribunal rules at any stage of the proceedings that it does not have jurisdiction. Section 10(4) IAA further provides for the possibility of appeals against jurisdictional rulings of the High Court, albeit only with permission of the appellate court.
• The IAA introduces provisions relating to the appointment of conciliators.
• Section 24 IAA introduces two further grounds (in addition to the grounds in Article 34(2) ML) where an arbitral award may be set aside, namely where the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or where a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.

The AA was enacted to align the domestic arbitration regime with the ML, but is not based on the ML and does not give the ML the force of law.

Singapore has not yet fully adopted the 2006 amendments to the ML.

There were no significant changes to national arbitration law in 2025. In 2024, the Ministry of Law commissioned the Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy (SIDRA) to conduct a study of Singapore’s international arbitration regime and the IAA. SIDRA published a report on 21 March 2025, making various recommendations, including:

• giving courts the discretion to make costs orders in respect of only the costs of the arbitration;
• introducing a straightforward rule where parties must obtain the appellate court’s permission to appeal against any decision of the High Court in applications for setting aside and resisting enforcement of awards; and
• enacting a new statutory choice-of-law approach for determining the governing law of an arbitration.

On 21 March 2025, the Ministry of Law launched a public consultation on the IAA, inviting members of the public to provide views on the issues considered by SIDRA. The feedback received may be taken into account in any future amendments to the relevant legislation, including the IAA.

Under Section 2A IAA and Section 4 AA, for an arbitration agreement to be enforceable in Singapore, it must be in writing; this requirement is satisfied if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct or any other means.

In addition, where in any arbitral or legal proceedings the existence of an arbitration agreement is asserted by a party in a pleading, statement of case or any document in circumstances that call for a reply, and this assertion is not denied, there is deemed to be an effective arbitration agreement as between parties to the proceedings.

Under Singapore law, any dispute that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration under an arbitration agreement may be determined by arbitration unless it is contrary to public policy to do so.

In Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] 1 SLR 349, the Court of Appeal held that the arbitrability of a dispute is determined in the first instance by the law governing the arbitration agreement, and, where it is a foreign governing law and such law provides that the subject matter of the dispute is non-arbitrable, the court will not allow the arbitration to proceed because it would be contrary to public policy (albeit foreign public policy) to enforce such an arbitration agreement. Further, even if a dispute may be arbitrable under the law of the arbitration agreement, where Singapore is the seat and the dispute is non-arbitrable under Singapore law, the arbitration would not be able to proceed (see at [55]).

There is no exhaustive list of matters that are non-arbitrable, but courts have noted that issues which “may have public interest elements” – such as citizenship or legitimacy of marriage, grants of statutory licences, or validity of registration of trade marks or patents, copyrights, winding-up of companies, bankruptcies of debtors or administration of estates – may not be arbitrable (see Larsen Oil and Gas Pte Ltd v Petroprod Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 414 at [29]). In BAZ v BBA and Others [2020] 5 SLR 266, the court held that the principle of protecting the interests of minors in commercial transactions is part of the public policy of Singapore.

The Singapore courts will apply a three-stage test to determine the law governing the arbitration agreement (see Anupam Mittal at [62]):

• stage 1 – whether parties expressly chose the proper law of the arbitration agreement;
• stage 2 – in the absence of an express choice, whether parties made an implied choice of the proper law to govern the arbitration agreement, with the starting point for determining the implied choice of law being the law of the contract; and
• stage 3 – if neither an express nor implied choice can be discerned, the system of law with which the arbitration agreement has its closest and most real connection will be applied.

The courts have indicated that, given the inherently private and consensual nature of arbitration, the courts will ordinarily respect the principle of party autonomy and give effect to and enforce (workable) arbitration agreements, subject only to any public policy considerations to the contrary (see Insigma Technology Co Ltd v Alstom Technology Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 936 at [34]).

The separability doctrine has the force of law in Singapore – ie, that an arbitration clause forming part of a contract is to be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract, and a decision by the tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause (Article 16 ML, Section 23(2) and (3) AA).

However, the courts have also commented that the principle of separability cannot guarantee the survival of the arbitration clause in all circumstances, and, where a challenge to the validity of the underlying contract is raised, it is crucial to determine whether this is an attack on the arbitration agreement. For example, if the allegation is that the entire contract was entered into without authority, this may well be an attack on the validity of both the underlying contract and the arbitration agreement. On the other hand, if the challenge is that the underlying contract is void or voidable for misrepresentation, the arbitration agreement may survive where the parties’ intention to arbitrate is not affected by the misrepresentation (see Founder Group (Hong Kong) Ltd v Singapore JHC Co Pte Ltd [2023] 2 SLR 554 (CA) at [58]).

Parties are generally free to agree on the number of arbitrators and the method for their selection and appointment. Article 11(1) ML and Section 13(1) AA both provide that no person shall be precluded by reason of their nationality from acting as an arbitrator unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

Under the IAA

In an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties are unable to agree on the arbitrator, the arbitrator shall be appointed, upon request of a party, by the President of the Court of Arbitration of the SIAC (the “SIAC Court”) (Article 11(3)(b) ML, Section 8(2) IAA).

In an arbitration with two parties and three arbitrators, each party must appoint one arbitrator, and the parties must by agreement appoint the third arbitrator. If the parties fail to agree on the appointment of the third arbitrator within 30 days after the receipt of the first request by either party to do so, the appointment must be made, upon the request of a party, by the President of the SIAC Court (Section 9A and Section 8(2) IAA).

In an arbitration with three or more parties and three arbitrators, the claimant (or all the claimants if there is more than one, by agreement) must appoint an arbitrator and inform the respondent/respondents of the appointment when the request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration is sent. The respondent (or all the respondents if there is more than one, by agreement) must appoint an arbitrator and inform the claimant/claimants within 30 days after receipt of the aforementioned request, or by the last respondent to receive the request if there is more than one respondent. The two arbitrators appointed above must by agreement appoint the third (and presiding) arbitrator. If either side fails to appoint an arbitrator or inform the other side of such appointment within the specified duration, the President of the SIAC Court must, upon the request of any party, appoint all three arbitrators and designate one as the presiding arbitrator (Section 9B and Section 8(2) IAA).

Under Section 13 AA

In an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, the default procedure is the same as that under the IAA (see Under the IAA above).

In an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party must appoint one arbitrator, and the parties must by agreement appoint the third arbitrator. If a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days from receipt of a request to do so, or if the two parties fail to agree, the President of the SIAC Court would make the appointment. Notably, these provisions appear to assume an arbitration with two parties, and it is not stated how this might apply to an arbitration with three or more parties.

The IAA and the AA do not provide any mechanism for the court to intervene in the selection of arbitrators.

Under Articles 12–14 ML and Sections 14–16 AA, an arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence, or if they do not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties (“Challenge Grounds”).

In the absence of an agreed challenge procedure by the parties, a party intending to challenge an arbitrator must, within 15 days after becoming aware of the constitution of the tribunal or after becoming aware of any Challenge Ground, send a written statement for the reasons for the challenge to the tribunal. Unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws or the other party agrees to the challenge, the tribunal shall decide on the challenge. If the challenge is unsuccessful, the challenging party may, within 30 days after having received notice of the decision, request the General Division of the High Court to decide on the challenge – such decision shall not be subject to appeal.

Where an arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform their functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay, their mandate terminates if they withdraw from office or if the other parties agree on the termination; otherwise, if a controversy remains, any party may request the courts to decide on the termination of the mandate.

In addition to the matters set out in 4.4 Challenge and Removal of Arbitrators, under Article 12 ML and Section 14(1) AA, when a person is approached in connection with their possible appointment as an arbitrator, they should disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence. This obligation of disclosure continues from the time of appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings.

An arbitrator’s non-disclosure of circumstances may be raised in support of a setting-aside application under Section 24(b) IAA (eg, in DLS v DLT [2025] SGHC 61, where it was argued that there was apparent bias on the part of the arbitrator and, hence, a breach of natural justice). That said, if there is no apparent bias from the circumstances that were not disclosed, a failure to disclose would not in and of itself justify an inference of apparent bias (DLS v DLT [2025] SGHC 61 at [127]). Arbitrators are also generally subject to their own Bar rules, including the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR), which apply to Singapore lawyers and registered foreign lawyers in Singapore.

The SIAC has issued a Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, which SIAC-appointed arbitrators are required to sign prior to their appointment, confirming (among various other matters) that they are, and shall remain, independent and impartial for the duration of the arbitration.

Under Article 16 ML and Section 21(1) AA, a tribunal has the power to rule on a party’s challenge to its own jurisdiction. The competence-competence principle applies to all arbitrations seated in Singapore.

Under Section 10 IAA and Section 21(9) and 21A AA, if the tribunal rules on a plea as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, or on a plea at any stage of the proceedings that it has no jurisdiction, any party may, within 30 days after having received notice of that ruling, apply to the General Division of the High Court to decide the matter.

The courts will undertake a de novo review of matters relating to the tribunal’s jurisdiction (see BNA v BNB and Another [2019] SGHC 142 at [10], which concerned an application under Section 10 IAA to challenge the tribunal’s ruling that it had jurisdiction on the basis that the arbitration agreement was invalid under the law governing the arbitration agreement).

An appeal against the decision of the General Division on jurisdiction may be brought only with permission of the appellate court.

Where the tribunal makes a jurisdictional ruling as part of its final award, this can also be reviewed by the court in the context of an application brought to set aside the award in Singapore, as well as in an application brought to resist enforcement of the award in Singapore (see generally 11. Review of an Award and 12. Enforcement of an Award). The courts will similarly undertake a de novo review of such jurisdictional rulings (see CBX and Another v CBZ and Others [2022] 1 SLR 47 at [11]).

Parties have the right to go to court to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction within 30 days after the tribunal rules on a plea as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction or on a plea at any stage of the arbitral proceedings that it has no jurisdiction. Where the tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction is made in its final award (rather than as a preliminary ruling), as indicated previously, this can also be challenged in:

• an application to set aside the award (which, under Article 34(4) ML and Section 48(3) AA, may not be made after three months from the date that the set-aside applicant had received the award, or, if a request has been made for correction/interpretation of the award, from the date on which the request is disposed of by the tribunal); or
• an application to resist enforcement of the award.

Under Singapore law, a distinction is drawn between matters going to the tribunal’s jurisdiction (ie, “the power of the tribunal to hear a case”), and admissibility (ie, “whether it is appropriate for the tribunal to hear it”). For example, issues relating to the interpretation and application of the arbitration clause would be jurisdictional, while the issue of time-bar and non-compliance with pre-arbitral procedures would go towards admissibility. (See CYY v CYZ [2023] SGHC 101 at [41]; BBA and Others v BAZ [2020] 2 SLR 453 at [76]–[78]; DSQ v DSR [2026] SGHC 67 at [95]).

The courts will undertake a de novo review for questions of jurisdiction (see CBX at [11]). On the other hand, the courts will not intervene in the tribunal’s admissibility determinations (even if they are, in the court’s view, wrong) as such determinations engage the merits of the case and are within the sole purview of the tribunal (see CYY at [53]).

Under Section 6 IAA, parties may apply to stay court proceedings in Singapore that are commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement, at any time after filing and serving a notice of intention to contest or not contest, and before delivering any pleading (other than a pleading asserting that the court does not have jurisdiction in the proceedings) or taking any other step in the proceedings. The IAA requires that upon such application the court “is to make an order” staying the proceedings unless it is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”.

Generally, the courts tend to take a supportive approach, and will uphold arbitration agreements that are workable and clearly evince the intention of parties to resolve a dispute by arbitration (see HKL Group Co Ltd v Rizq International Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] SGHCR 5).

Notably, a different standard applies to arbitration agreements that fall under the scope of the AA. Under Section 6 AA, the court “may” (rather than “is to”) make an order staying the proceedings, if satisfied that:

• there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement; and
• the applicant was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration.

Non-signatories to an arbitration agreement may be regarded as parties to the arbitration agreement in certain situations. For example, in Jiang Haiying v Tan Lim Hui [2009] 3 SLR(R) 13, the court appeared to accept that, in situations where the non-signatory is a party to a collateral contract (ie, an agreement distinct from the main contract) and the claim against the non-signatory is based on the collateral contract, the non-signatory might be bound by the arbitration agreement (see at [50]–[55]). A third party may be treated as a party to the arbitration agreement by statute under Section 9 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 2001, if:

• the contract clearly intends to confer the third party a unilateral right to arbitrate; or
• the contract expressly provides that the third party may enforce a contractual term or if the contractual term purports to confer a benefit on the third party, and the enforcement of that substantive term is subject to the submission of the dispute to arbitration (Low Jun Hong and five Others v Hong Qi Yu and Another [2026] SGHCR 11 at [34]–[36]).

Also, in Aloe Vera of America, Inc v Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd and Another [2006] 3 SLR(R) 174, the court appeared to accept that a non-signatory could be bound by an arbitration agreement on the basis of theories such as alter ego and agency (see at [76]).

In these scenarios, the law does not appear to have drawn a distinction between domestic and foreign non-signatories.

Under Section 12(1) IAA and Section 28(2) AA, a tribunal has powers to make orders for (among others):

• security for costs;
• discovery of documents and discovery of facts;
• giving of evidence by affidavit;
• preservation and interim custody of any evidence for the purposes of the proceedings; and
• taking of samples and conducting of experiments on property that is the subject matter of the dispute.

In addition, under Section 12(1) IAA (but not the AA where such matters are only in the court’s purview, unless otherwise agreed by the parties), a tribunal also has powers to make orders for securing the amount in dispute (ensuring that any award which may be made is not rendered ineffectual by the dissipation of assets by any party) or for an interim injunction or other interim measure; the tribunal is empowered to enforce any obligation of confidentiality that parties have agreed to in writing, under any written law or under the applicable arbitration rules.

Such relief is binding on the parties. Under Section 12(6) IAA and Section 28(4) AA, all orders or directions made or given by a tribunal are, by permission of the court, enforceable in the same manner as if they were orders made by the court; where permission is given, judgment may be entered in terms of the order or direction.

As indicated in 6.1 Types of Relief, under the IAA and AA, all orders/directions made or given by a tribunal are, by permission of the court, enforceable in the same manner as if they were orders made by the court, and where permission is given judgment may be entered in terms of the order/direction.

In addition, under Section 12A IAA, irrespective of whether the seat of the arbitration is Singapore, the courts have the power to grant the same interim relief as the tribunal may grant, save for orders for security for costs, discovery of documents and discovery of facts. However, the court will not grant interim relief if it is of the opinion that the fact that the place of arbitration is outside Singapore or likely to be outside Singapore makes it inappropriate to make the order.

If the case is one of urgency, the court may order interim relief on the application of a party or proposed party to the arbitral proceedings, as the court thinks necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets. If the case is not one of urgency, such relief may only be ordered where the application is made with the tribunal’s permission or with the agreement in writing of the other parties. In every case, the interim relief ordered will only be to the extent that the tribunal has no power in that regard, or is unable for the time being to act effectively.

Under Section 31 AA, the court has the same power to make orders in respect of the orders that can be made by a tribunal as set out in the AA as it has for the purpose of and in relation to an action or matter in the court, as well as powers for securing the amount in dispute (ensuring that any award which may be made in the arbitral proceedings is not rendered ineffectual by the dissipation of assets by a party) and for an interim injunction or any other interim measure.

The IAA and AA expressly allow the use of emergency arbitrators. Under Section 2 IAA and Section 2 AA, the term “arbitral tribunal” is defined as including an emergency arbitrator appointed pursuant to the rules of arbitration agreed to or adopted by the parties. In this regard, a decision by an emergency arbitrator in relation to interim relief is binding in the same way as a decision by a duly constituted tribunal, and the type of interim relief that may be granted by such emergency arbitrator is the same as the type of interim relief that may be granted by a duly constituted tribunal, as set out previously.

The court may intervene even after an emergency arbitrator is appointed, but will do so only in limited circumstances, including where the emergency arbitrator is for the time being unable to act effectively (as set out previously).

Under Section 12 IAA, the tribunal (but not the courts) may make orders or give directions for security for costs in relation to the arbitration proceedings. Under Sections 28(2) and 31(1) AA, both the tribunal and courts may order security for costs in relation to the arbitration proceedings.

Parties are free to agree on the procedure for their arbitration proceedings, subject to the provisions of the IAA and AA (Article 19(1) ML, Section 23(1) AA).

Within the period of time agreed by parties or determined by the tribunal, the claimant is required to state the facts supporting their claim, the points at issue and the relief or remedy sought, and the respondent is to state their defence in respect of these particulars, unless the parties have agreed otherwise (Article 23 ML, Section 24 AA).

Subject to any contrary agreement between the parties, the tribunal will decide whether to hold oral hearings for presentation of evidence or oral arguments, or whether the arbitration proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of documents only (Article 24 ML, Section 25(1) AA).

An arbitrator has (among various powers) the power to order interim measures (see 6. Preliminary and Interim Relief), and the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence (Article 19(2) ML, Section 23(3) AA).

Arbitrators are expected to be fair and impartial (see 4.4 Challenge and Removal of Arbitrators and 4.5 Arbitrator Requirements). They are expected to provide parties with a reasonable opportunity to present their case, address disputes falling within the terms of the parties’ submission (and not decide on matters beyond the scope of arbitration) and conduct the arbitration in accordance with the arbitral procedure agreed by parties and in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions; otherwise, the arbitral award may be set aside.

There are no particular requirements for legal representatives acting as counsel in arbitrations in Singapore. The Legal Profession Act 1966 expressly permits foreign lawyers to represent parties in arbitrations governed by the IAA and AA. The SICC Rules 2021 also permit registered foreign lawyers to appear and represent parties in stipulated relevant proceedings.

However, for court applications relating to arbitration, a party may only engage counsel qualified to practise in Singapore. In exceptional situations, the court may admit a King’s Counsel or person holding an appointment of equivalent distinction in another jurisdiction with special qualifications or experience, where the court is satisfied that there is a special reason to do so.

Arbitrators have broad discretion to determine the approach to collection and submission of evidence; however, they will commonly refer to (and recommend that parties agree to the use of) the International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (the “IBA Rules”), which address (among other matters) the procedures for discovery and disclosure, privilege and use of witness statements.

As Singapore is a common law jurisdiction, cross-examination of witnesses is typically (although not always) a feature of arbitrations in Singapore, although parties are free to agree to a documents-only arbitration. Under Section 12(3) IAA, a tribunal also has the power to adopt inquisitorial processes if it thinks fit (unless the parties have agreed to the contrary).

Although there are no mandatory rules of evidence applicable to arbitral proceedings seated in Singapore, arbitrators will commonly refer to (and recommend that parties agree to the use of) the IBA Rules.

The rules of evidence in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Evidence Act 1893 (which are applicable to all judicial proceedings in Singapore) do not apply to Singapore arbitrations.

Unless otherwise agreed, where a party fails to appear at the hearing or produce documentary evidence, the arbitrator may continue the proceedings and make the award on the evidence before it.

Apart from the above, the IAA and AA do not provide the tribunal with powers to compel the attendance of witnesses, but under Section 13 IAA and Section 30 AA, a party to an arbitration agreement may request the issuance of an order to attend or to produce documents. If a witness is in Singapore, the court may order that the witness be compelled to attend before a tribunal, give evidence and/or produce specified documents; however, a person must not be compelled under such order to produce any document which they could not be compelled to produce on the trial of an action in Singapore.

It is generally accepted that arbitral proceedings (and their constituent parts, including the pleadings, documents and award) are confidential. This may be provided for in the relevant rules applicable to the arbitration proceedings. For example, Rule 59 SIAC Rules 2025 provides that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or as otherwise provided in the Rules, the parties, witnesses and members of the tribunal are under a continuing obligation to treat all matters relating to the proceedings as confidential. Also, under the IAA, the tribunal is expressly empowered to enforce any obligation of confidentiality that the parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to in writing, under any written law, or under the rules of arbitration agreed to or adopted by parties.

Independent of any rules, there is an implied obligation of confidence in arbitral proceedings under Singapore law, which requires parties not to disclose or use for any other purpose any documents prepared for and used (or disclosed or produced in the course of the arbitration), transcripts or notes of the evidence in the arbitration or the award, save with the consent of the other party (see AAY v AAZ [2011] 1 SLR 1093 at [33]). Recognised exceptions to the aforementioned implied obligation include, for example, where the party who produced the material provides express or implied consent, by order of the court, or where the interests of justice require disclosure (see AAY at [59]).

Arbitration rules typically stipulate situations in which disclosure may be permitted – for example, for the purpose of making a court application to challenge or enforce the award. Where the IAA or AA applies to the arbitration, court proceedings in relation to such arbitration are to be heard in private, unless the court orders otherwise. In such private proceedings, although applications may be made to the court for directions on the publishing of information relating to the arbitral proceedings, the court will not give a direction permitting information to be published unless all the parties agree that the information may be published, or unless the court is satisfied that such publishing of information would not reveal any matter that any party to the proceedings reasonably wishes to remain confidential (Sections 22 and 23 IAA, Sections 56 and 57 AA).

An arbitral award must be made in writing and signed by the arbitrator(s). If there is more than one arbitrator, it suffices that the award be signed by a majority of the arbitrators provided that the reason for any omitted signature(s) is stated. The award must state the reasons upon which it is based unless parties have agreed otherwise or it is an award by consent. Additionally, the date of the award and the place of arbitration must be stated. A signed copy of the award must then be delivered to each party (Article 31 ML, Section 38 AA).

There are no statutory time limits on the delivery of the award under the IAA and AA. Arbitration rules may prescribe time limits. Under Rule 53.2 SIAC Rules 2025 (save where the Expedited or Streamlined Procedures apply), the tribunal must submit the draft award to the SIAC Secretariat within 90 days from the date of submission of the last directed submissions in the proceedings.

The tribunal may award any remedy or relief that could have been made by the General Division of the High Court if the dispute had been the subject of civil proceedings in that court (Section 12(5)(a) IAA, Section 34(1) AA). Such powers exercisable by the General Division (which are set out in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969) include, among others, the power to grant all reliefs and remedies at law and in equity (including damages, injunctions and specific performance).

There is no rule in Singapore law preventing arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. However, under Singapore law, such damages are exceptional and have only been granted for claims in tort. This is because Singapore courts have taken the view that under Singapore law damages primarily serve a compensatory function, in order to place the aggrieved party, as far as possible, in the position it would have been in had the agreement not been breached (see PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd and Another Appeal [2017] 2 SLR 129 (CA) at [62]). Accordingly, punitive damages are rarely awarded in arbitrations governed by Singapore law.

The tribunal may award (among others):

• simple or compound interest on the whole or any part of any sum awarded by the tribunal;
• any sum that is in issue in the proceedings but is paid before the date of the award; and
• costs awarded by the tribunal in the proceedings.

Where an award directs a sum to be paid, that sum – unless the award directs otherwise – carries interest as from the date of the award and at the same rate as a judgment debt (5.33% simple interest per annum) (Section 20 IAA and Section 35(1) AA). The basis for awards of interest (eg, simple or compound) is at the tribunal’s discretion, and will depend on the circumstances of the case.

Tribunals generally have broad discretion to allocate and award legal costs. Under Rule 58.1 SIAC Rules 2025, the tribunal has the power to order that all or a part of a party’s legal or other costs are to be paid by the other party. Although it is typical for tribunals to apply the principle that costs follow the event as a starting point, they are likely to take into account all relevant circumstances, including the conduct of the parties during the proceedings.

Parties to arbitrations falling under the ambit of the IAA are not entitled to appeal an arbitral award; a mechanism for appeal exists only for arbitrations under the AA. Under Section 49 AA, parties may appeal to the court only on a question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings. A “question of law” must be a finding of law disputed by the parties, and a mere erroneous application of the law does not entitle an aggrieved party to appeal (see Northern Elevator Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 494 at [17]–[19]).

Appeals must be brought within 28 days of the date of the award. The appellant must first exhaust any available arbitral process of appeal or review and any available recourse for the correction/interpretation of the award (Section 50(2) and (3) AA).

An appeal under the AA may not be brought unless all other parties to the proceedings have given their consent, or the court’s permission has been obtained (Section 49(3) AA). Under Section 49(5) AA, the court will only grant permission to appeal if satisfied that all the following conditions are satisfied.

• The determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties.
• The question is one that the tribunal was asked to determine.
• On the basis of the findings of fact in the award:
1. the tribunal’s decision on the question is obviously wrong; or
2. the question is one of general public importance and the tribunal’s decision is at least open to serious doubt.
• Despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question.

An application for permission to appeal must identify the question of law to be determined and state the grounds on which it is alleged that permission to appeal should be granted (Section 49(6) AA).

Apart from the aforementioned appeal procedure for arbitrations under the AA, parties to arbitrations under the IAA and AA may also seek to apply to the court to set aside the arbitral award on the grounds set out in the IAA and ML, as well as the AA (as applicable). Under Article 34(1) and (2) ML and Section 24 IAA, an award may be set aside by the court in the following instances.

• If the applicant furnishes proof that:
1. a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity, or said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under Singapore law;
2. the applicant was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present their case;
3. the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
4. the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of the IAA and/or ML from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the IAA and/or ML.
• If the court finds that:
1. the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Singapore;
2. the award is in conflict with the public policy of Singapore;
3. the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption (“Fraud Ground”); or
4. a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced (“Natural Justice Ground”).

The grounds for setting aside an award in Section 48 AA mirror the above, save that the Fraud Ground and Natural Justice Ground are not grounds on which the court would, of its own accord, set aside the award – rather, the applicant will have to prove these grounds to the satisfaction of the court.

For the appeal procedure under the AA, parties may agree to exclude the jurisdiction of the court to hear appeals. An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal’s award is also treated as such an agreement (Section 49(2) AA). The AA does not permit parties to expand on the scope of the appeal.

The IAA and AA do not provide any provisions permitting parties to exclude or expand the scope of the grounds on which an award may be set aside.

The courts have opined that, in determining whether permission should be granted for an appeal on a question of law under the AA, the approach depends on the issue to be considered (see Permasteelisa Pacific Holdings Ltd v Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 270 at [10]–[11]).

If the question of law is as regards the interpretation of a written document, where the contract is a “one-off” contract, permission to appeal will only be given if “it is apparent upon a perusal of the reasoned award that the meaning ascribed to the clause by the arbitrator is obviously wrong”. If the contract is a standard-form contract, permission will be given only if the court considers that “the resolution of the question of construction would add significantly to the clarity, certainty and comprehensiveness of Singapore commercial law”, and “that a strong prima facie case has been made out that the arbitrator has been wrong in his construction”.

If the question of law is whether the facts proved in evidence lead to a particular legal conclusion, the court should not look to whether the court agrees with the arbitrator’s conclusion, but rather whether it appears upon perusal of the award either that the arbitrator misdirected themselves in law or that their decision was such that no reasonable arbitrator could reach.

For appeals on the tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction, the court will undertake a de novo review (see 5.2 Circumstances for Court Intervention).

For applications to set aside an arbitral award in an international arbitration, the courts have held that errors of law or fact made are final and binding on the parties, and may not be appealed or set aside except on the exhaustive grounds prescribed under the IAA and ML (see AJU v AJT [2011] 4 SLR 739 at [66]).

Singapore has ratified the New York Convention, with the reciprocity reservation (whereby Singapore courts will enforce only awards under the New York Convention that are made in another signatory state of the New York Convention).

Both Singapore awards and foreign awards issued in New York Convention contracting states may, with permission of the court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court. Where permission of the court has been granted, judgment may be entered in the terms of the award (Section 19 IAA, Section 46 AA).

Enforcement of Foreign Awards

For foreign awards issued in a New York Convention contracting state, enforcement is a two-stage process. At the first stage, an application without notice is filed by the application for permission to enforce an award, supported by an affidavit exhibiting the arbitration agreement (or a record of its content) and the duly authenticated original award (or duly certified copies of the above). Where the award is not in English, a duly certified translation in English must be provided. The affidavit must also state the name and the usual/last known places of residence/business of the award creditor and award debtor, and, as the case may require, the extent to which the award has not been complied with at the date of the application (Order 48, Rule 6(1) and (2) Rules of Court 2021 (ROC)).

Once the formal requirements above are met, the court would grant permission to enforce. This must then be served on the award debtor (Order 48, Rule 6(3) ROC).

At the second stage, enforcement may be refused only if the award debtor applies to set aside the order granting permission to enforce on any of the exhaustive grounds set out in Section 31(2) and (4) of the IAA (for arbitral awards made pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the territory of a New York Convention contracting state other than Singapore). These grounds mirror the grounds in Article V New York Convention and Article 36 ML. The court has no residual discretion to refuse enforcement of the award outside these grounds (South of England Protection and Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Ltd (in liquidation) v Pacmar Shipping Pte Ltd [2026] SGHC 8 at [32]).

An application to resist enforcement must be brought within 14 days after service of the order granting permission to enforce on the award debtor (or within such other period as the court may fix where the order is to be served out of Singapore). The award must not be enforced until after the expiry of that period or, if the award debtor applies within that period to set aside the order, until after the application is finally disposed of (Order 48, Rule 6(5) ROC).

Where an award has been set aside by the court at the seat, the court may refuse to enforce the award under Section 31(2)(f) IAA. The courts have generally considered that, where an award has been set aside by a foreign seat court, the enforcement court may be reluctant to recognise or enforce the award, as the contemplated erga omnes effect of a successful application to set aside would generally lead to the conclusion that there is simply no award to enforce. Also, if the seat court has set aside the award, such decision may be given preclusive effect (see The Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG [2024] 1 SLR 56 at [77], [96]).

Where the award is subject to ongoing setting-aside proceedings at the courts of its seat, under Section 31(5) IAA, the Singapore court may, if it considers proper to do so, adjourn the enforcement proceedings, and on the application of the party seeking to enforce the award may order the other party to give suitable security.

Enforcement of Singapore Awards

The procedure for enforcement of Singapore awards under the IAA and AA follows a similar two-stage process. While the grounds for refusal of enforcement of a Singapore award are not set out in the IAA or AA, it is generally accepted that the same grounds which apply to refusal of enforcement of foreign awards also apply to Singapore awards (see EFG Bank AG, Singapore Branch v Surewin Worldwide Ltd and Others [2022] 5 SLR 915 at [76]).

Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is not, by itself, a ground for resisting the enforcement of an award against a state in Singapore. Where a state has agreed in writing to submit a dispute to arbitration, Section 11 of the State Immunity Act 1979 (SIA) provides that the state is not immune as regards proceedings in the Singapore courts relating to the arbitration, subject to any contrary provision in the arbitration agreement (although this does not apply to any arbitration agreement between states). Section 4(1) SIA further provides that a state is not immune as regards proceedings in respect of which it has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. In NextEra Energy Global Holdings BV and another v Kingdom of Spain [2026] SGHC 43, the High Court held that Spain had, by entering into the ICSID Convention, submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of other contracting states for ICSID recognition and enforcement proceedings. Section 4(1) SIA thus applied, precluding Spain from invoking state immunity to resist enforcement of the award. The High Court further held that Spain had in any case agreed in writing to arbitrate pursuant to Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, thereby engaging Section 11 SIA.

In another notable decision (Hulley Enterprises Ltd and Others v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19), the SICC held that the principle of transnational issue estoppel applied to prevent a party from raising arguments relating to sovereign immunity in enforcement proceedings in Singapore which had already been addressed by the court of the seat.

The courts will generally enforce arbitration awards, unless one of the exhaustive grounds for challenge clearly exists. As indicated previously, one of the grounds for refusal of enforcement is where it would be contrary to the public policy of Singapore.

The Singapore courts have indicated that the scope of the public policy ground is to be narrowly construed, and this ground would only operate such that enforcement would be refused in instances where the upholding of the arbitral award would “shock the conscience”, is “clearly injurious to the public good”, is “wholly offensive to the ordinary, reasonable and fully informed member of the public” or “where it violates the forum’s most basic notion of morality and justice” (see DOI v DOJ and Others and Another Matter [2025] SGHC(I) 15 at [162]).

Singapore’s laws do not provide any mechanism or regime for class action or group arbitration in general.

In relation to counsel, the PCR imposes certain ethical and professional duties on Singapore lawyers and registered foreign lawyers in Singapore.

In relation to arbitrators, various institutions have published codes/guidelines, including:

• the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators published by the SIAC;
• the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Code of Professional and Ethical Conduct for Members by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators; and
• the Guidelines on Party-Representative Ethics by the Singapore Institute of Arbitrators.

There are rules and restrictions in place on third-party funders. These include the Civil Law Act (CLA), the Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) Regulations (CLTPFR) and the PCR.

Under Section 5B CLA and Reg 4 CLTPFR, contracts providing for third-party funding in relation to prescribed dispute resolution proceedings (which include, among others, arbitration proceedings and court proceedings connected with arbitration proceedings) are not contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal, provided that the third-party funder satisfies the following criteria:

• the funder carries on the principal business of the funding of the costs of dispute resolution proceedings to which it is not a party; and
• the funder has a paid-up share capital of not less than SGD5 million (or equivalent in foreign currency), or the equivalent in managed assets.

Under Rule 49A PCR, counsel must disclose the existence of any third-party funding arrangement, as well as the identity and address of the funder, to the court or tribunal and all other parties in the proceedings.

Where the SIAC Rules 2025 apply, under Rule 38, parties are obliged to:

• notify the tribunal, parties and registrar of any changes to any disclosed third-party funding agreement; and
• disclose details of the funder’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings and whether the funder has committed to undertake adverse costs liability, if ordered by the tribunal.

Section 26 AA provides that, unless parties agree that arbitration proceedings are to be consolidated with other arbitration proceedings, the tribunal has no power to order consolidation. The IAA does not contain a similar provision, but also does not provide for a general power to consolidate separate proceedings without the parties’ consent.

Under Rule 16 SIAC Rules 2025, prior to the constitution of the tribunal, a party may file an application with the registrar to consolidate two or more arbitrations into a single arbitration on the basis of any of the following grounds (in which case, the SIAC Court would decide on the application).

• All parties have agreed to the consolidation.
• All the claims, counterclaims and cross-claims in the arbitrations are made under the same arbitration agreement.
• The arbitration agreements are compatible, and either:
1. the disputes arise out of or in connection with the same legal relationship(s);
2. the disputes arise out of or in connection with contracts consisting of a principal contract and its ancillary contract(s); or
3. the disputes arise out of or in connection with the same transaction or series of transactions.

After the tribunal is constituted, a party may apply to the tribunal for consolidation on the basis of similar grounds to the above (in which case, the tribunal would decide on the application), save that for the second and third points above there is an additional requirement that either the same tribunal has been constituted in both arbitrations or no tribunal has been constituted in the other arbitration.

As indicated in 5.6 Jurisdiction Over Third Parties, Singapore courts have appeared to accept that in certain situations (eg, where there is a collateral contract, or based on theories of alter ego or agency) non-signatories may be considered a party to an arbitration agreement. The courts do not appear to have drawn a distinction between Singapore and foreign third parties, for the purposes of such principles.