International arbitration is firmly established and growing in Uganda, although litigation before the courts remains the default route for routine domestic disputes. Arbitration is now the standard dispute resolution mechanism in high-value commercial contracts, particularly those with a cross-border element, and domestic parties routinely include arbitration clauses in construction, energy, banking, infrastructure and public procurement contracts.

The growing use of international arbitration in Uganda as a forum of dispute resolution is attributable to the increased selection of Kampala as a seat of arbitration for domestic and regional parties and the selection of the International Centre for Arbitration and Mediation in Kampala (ICAMEK) as an institution administering arbitrations.

Additionally, the pro-arbitration stance adopted by the High Court Commercial Division has led to an increase in applications for enforcement of foreign awards and for interim relief in support of arbitrations seated in other jurisdictions being made before the court.

The industries that have generated the most significant arbitration activity in recent years are the following:

• Construction and infrastructure: Roads, energy and building projects are commonly let on FIDIC and other standard forms containing multi-tiered dispute resolution clauses, and payment, delay and termination disputes are frequent.
• Energy and natural resources: The Lake Albert oil and gas development, power purchase and generation agreements, and mining projects involve international sponsors and lenders that insist on arbitration,
• Banking and finance: Facility, mezzanine and security-related disputes involving foreign lenders have produced several of the leading recent court decisions on arbitration.
• Telecommunications, insurance and commercial real estate: In these sectors, standard-form contracts increasingly refer disputes to arbitration.

These sectors dominate because they are capital-intensive, involve foreign investors and financiers that require a neutral, confidential and internationally enforceable process, and use international standard-form contracts in which arbitration is the market norm.

The most used institutions are the following:

• ICAMEK: This is a private sector-led, not-for-profit centre established in 2018 and gazetted as an appointing authority under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2000 (ACA), by ministerial instrument of 23 April 2019. It administers arbitrations under its own Arbitration Rules (which include emergency arbitrator provisions), maintains arbitrator panels and has a steadily growing caseload, including cross-border matters.
• CADER: The statutory Centre for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (CADER) was historically the default appointing authority. Following the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2024, its functions have been mainstreamed into a department of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.
• Foreign institutions: The International Chambers of Commerce (ICC) and the London Court of Arbitration (LCIA) are commonly selected in large cross-border contracts involving Ugandan parties, usually with a foreign seat.

No new arbitral institution has been established in the last 12 months; the significant institutional development has been the restructuring of CADER described in 2.2 Changes to National Law.

There is no specialised arbitration court. In practice, the Commercial Division of the High Court at Kampala is the designated forum for arbitration-related applications – including applications for references back to arbitration, for interim measures, to set aside awards, and for the registration, recognition and enforcement of domestic and foreign awards – under the ACA and the Arbitration Rules in Schedule 1 thereto.

The Commercial Division maintains a dedicated arbitration cause list, and its judges are experienced in arbitration matters. Appeals lie to the Court of Appeal only in the narrow circumstances expressly permitted by the ACA (see 11.1 Grounds for Appeal).

Arbitration is governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2000 (ACA), Cap 5. The ACA governs both domestic and international arbitrations seated in Uganda. The ACA is substantially based on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”) (it does not incorporate the 2006 revisions), and Parts III and IV give the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention force of law for enforcement purposes.

The principal divergences from the Model Law are as follows:

• The default number of arbitrators is one, not three (Section 10).
• Appointment and challenge functions are performed by an “appointing authority” designated by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (currently ICAMEK and the CADER department in the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs), rather than by the courts, and the appointing authority’s decisions are final.
• An application to set aside an award must be made within one month of receipt of the award (Section 34(3)), rather than three months.
• Section 34 contains additional setting-aside grounds, notably that the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means, or that there was evident partiality or corruption in an arbitrator (Section 34(2)(a)(vi)).
• Section 38 provides an opt-in appeal to the courts on questions of law where the parties have so agreed.
• Section 9 contains an emphatic bar on court intervention except as provided in the ACA.

The most consequential recent change is the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2024 (Act 44 of 2024), assented to and commencing in December 2024 as part of the government-wide rationalisation of agencies and public expenditure (RAPEX). The amendment dissolved CADER as an autonomous statutory body and mainstreamed its functions, including its role as an appointing authority, into a department of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Implementation continued through 2025, and the courts bridged transitional gaps by upholding appointments made through ICAMEK as a gazetted appointing authority (LABX Scientific Ltd v Katakwi District Local Government and Another, Miscellaneous Cause No 2 of 2025).

Separately, the Uganda Law Reform Commission has completed a comprehensive review of the ACA and submitted a study report and draft Bill to the Attorney-General proposing a modernised framework, including arbitrator immunity, strengthened interim measures, a clearer approach to arbitrability, and a sharper distinction between domestic and international arbitration. That Bill remains pending and, if enacted, would materially update the arbitration landscape.

Under Section 3 of the ACA, an arbitration agreement must be in writing and must relate to disputes arising out of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. It may take the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or a separate agreement, and the writing requirement is satisfied by:

• a document signed by the parties;
• an exchange of letters, telex, telegram or other means of telecommunication providing a record of the agreement;
• an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other; or
• a reference in a written contract to a document containing an arbitration clause, where the reference makes the clause part of the contract.

The courts adopt a validating approach: even a “bare” arbitration clause that omits the seat, rules or appointment mechanism is enforceable if the parties’ intention to arbitrate is clear, with the ACA’s default provisions filling the gaps (Lakeside Dairy Ltd v International Centre for Arbitration and Mediation in Kampala and Another). Gaps are cured by default rules such as having one arbitrator if the parties have not agreed a number (Section 10), statutory default appointment machinery (Section 11) and determination of the place of arbitration by the arbitral tribunal where the parties have not agreed one (Section 20). What matters is that the clause is operative such that it discloses a genuine, workable intention to arbitrate rather than a merely permissive option to consider arbitration.

The ACA does not contain a list of non-arbitrable matters; Section 34(2)(b)(i) simply permits an award to be set aside where the subject matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration under Ugandan law. In general, any dispute concerning rights that the parties may freely dispose of by agreement is arbitrable.

Case law treats as non-arbitrable those disputes whose resolution the legislature has reserved to exclusive public fora or that engage rights and interests beyond the parties, including criminal liability, matters of personal status such as matrimonial causes, tax assessments, insolvency and winding-up petitions, and the validity of registered rights operating against the whole world. The general approach is therefore twofold: the courts ask whether a statute confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or arbitral tribunal, and whether the remedy sought operates in rem or affects third parties or a broader public interest rather than merely the parties’ private rights (see Smile Communications Uganda Ltd v ATC Uganda Ltd [2023] UGCommC 30).

Law Governing the Arbitration Agreement

There is little direct authority on the choice of law governing the arbitration agreement as distinct from the main contract. In practice, the courts apply the law chosen by the parties and, in the absence of an express or implied choice, the law of Uganda where Uganda is the seat, consistent with Section 34(2)(a)(ii) of the ACA, which tests the validity of the agreement by the law to which the parties subjected it or, failing any indication, Ugandan law.

Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements

The courts consistently enforce arbitration agreements. Section 5 of the ACA obliges a judge or magistrate, on a party’s application, to refer the matter to arbitration unless the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, or there is in fact no dispute between the parties. The leading authorities, from East African Development Bank v Ziwa Horticultural Exporters Ltd to the recent restrictive appellate decisions discussed in 11.1 Grounds for Appeal, reflect a strong “hands-off” judicial policy anchored in Section 9, and arbitration agreements are usually enforced.

Section 16(1) of the ACA codifies the doctrine of separability: an arbitration clause forming part of a contract is treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract, and a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void does not of itself invalidate the arbitration clause. The tribunal may therefore rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and the Ugandan courts consistently apply the rule so that allegations that the main contract is void, voidable or terminated do not defeat the reference to arbitration. The principle has been applied in a number of judicial decisions, for example, Kibo Media Ltd v Nile Breweries Ltd [2026] UGCommC 325. The same premise underlies the jurisdictional analyses in Bemuga Forwarders Ltd v Sany International [2024] UGCommC 104 and Smile Communications Uganda Ltd v ATC Uganda Ltd [2023] UGCommC 30.

Party autonomy in the selection of arbitrators is virtually unlimited. The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators (Section 10 of the ACA) and to agree on the appointment procedure (Section 11). There are no nationality, residency, gender, religious or professional qualification requirements: an arbitrator need not be a Ugandan national or a lawyer. The only mandatory constraints are that arbitrators must be independent and impartial and must possess any qualifications the parties have agreed (Section 12); an appointing authority making a default appointment must have due regard to those agreed qualifications and to considerations likely to secure an independent and impartial arbitrator.

If the parties have not agreed on the number of arbitrators, the default under Section 10(2) of the ACA is a sole arbitrator. Under Section 11, failing an agreed appointment procedure:

• in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party appoints one arbitrator, and the two party-appointed arbitrators appoint the presiding arbitrator; if a party or the co-arbitrators’ default, the appointment is made by the appointing authority on the application of a party; and
• in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties cannot agree, the arbitrator is appointed by the appointing authority on the application of a party.

The gazetted appointing authorities are ICAMEK and the CADER department within the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The ACA contains no bespoke default procedure for multiparty arbitrations; in practice, the gap is filled by the applicable institutional rules.

The default appointment function is vested in the appointing authority rather than the courts, and Section 9 of the ACA bars court intervention except as provided therein. The courts therefore do not ordinarily select arbitrators. They have, however, intervened to keep the appointment machinery working where it would otherwise fail: during the transition following the 2024 abolition of CADER as an autonomous body, the High Court upheld and gave effect to appointments through ICAMEK as a gazetted appointing authority (LABX Scientific Ltd v Katakwi District Local Government, 2025), preventing the institutional reform from being used to frustrate arbitration agreements. Any such intervention is limited: the court cannot override a valid appointment procedure agreed by the parties, and decisions of the appointing authority on appointments and challenges are final and not subject to appeal.

Sections 12 to 14 of the ACA govern the challenge or removal of arbitrators. An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence, or if they do not possess qualifications agreed by the parties (Section 12(3)). A party may challenge an arbitrator it appointed only for reasons of which it became aware after the appointment.

As to procedure (Section 13), the parties are free to agree a challenge procedure. Failing agreement, the challenging party must submit a written statement of the reasons to the appointing authority within 15 days of becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or of the relevant circumstances. Unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws or the other party agrees, the appointing authority decides the challenge within 30 days from the date of receipt of the challenge. Under Section 14, an arbitrator’s mandate terminates where they become de jure or de facto unable to perform their functions or where they fail to act or act with undue delay.

Section 12(1) and (2) of the ACA imposes a continuing duty of disclosure: from first approach and throughout the proceedings, an arbitrator must disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence. Recent case law applies these duties strictly:

• In China Railway 18th Bureau (Group) Co. Ltd v Tumo Technical Services Limited (Miscellaneous Cause No 72 of 2025) [2025] UGCommC 393 (23 October 2025), the High Court held that an arbitrator has an absolute, continuing duty to disclose any past, present or prospective relationship, professional connection or financial interest involving the parties, their counsel or the subject matter.
• In Kenlloyd Logistics (U) Ltd v Fratch AG (Miscellaneous Cause No 78 of 2023), an award was set aside where the arbitrator’s conduct raised a reasonable suspicion of partiality – actual bias need not be proved; an appearance of bias suffices.

Under the ICAMEK Arbitration Rules, prospective arbitrators must sign statements of independence and impartiality, and the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration are routinely used as persuasive guidance.

Section 16 of the ACA codifies the principle of competence-competence: the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. This is reinforced by the separability rule in Section 16(1) (see 3.4 Validity) and by Section 5, under which the merits of jurisdictional objections are, in the first instance, for the tribunal rather than the court. In TMA Architects v Prome Consultants, Miscellaneous Cause No 80 of 2023 [2023] UGCommC 44, the Commercial Division held that the tribunal rules first on its own jurisdiction and that a court should so far as possible avoid anticipating that decision.

The courts show a pronounced reluctance to intervene, anchored in Section 9 of the ACA, and the Court of Appeal has confirmed that no appeal lies against interlocutory court orders in arbitration proceedings unless expressly provided by law (Simba Properties Investment Co Ltd v Vantage Mezzanine Fund II Partnership, Civil Application No 1295 of 2023).

In relation to issues of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, the courts address the tribunal’s jurisdiction only through the ACA’s defined gateways:

• on an application under Section 5 to refer court proceedings to arbitration, where the court considers whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of performance;
• where the tribunal rules on jurisdiction as a preliminary question, a party may apply to the High Court within 30 days to decide the matter; the court’s decision is final and not subject to appeal, and the arbitration may continue in the meantime;
• after the award, on a setting-aside application under Section 34 (invalid agreement, excess of scope); or
• at the recognition and enforcement stage under Sections 35 and 36.

The ACA makes no express provision for judicial review of negative jurisdictional rulings, and the point remains largely untested; a claimant’s practical remedy is to commence fresh proceedings in the appropriate forum.

A jurisdictional objection must first be raised before the arbitral tribunal itself, not later than the submission of the statement of defence (or, for excess-of-scope objections, as soon as the matter allegedly beyond the tribunal’s authority is raised). A party cannot go to court merely because a case has been filed. Court recourse arises only:

• within 30 days of a tribunal ruling on jurisdiction as a preliminary question; or
• after the award, by a setting-aside application under Section 34 of the ACA (within one month of receipt of the award) or by resisting recognition and enforcement.

Participation in the proceedings without timely objection risks waiver under Section 4.

On the gateways described in 5.2 Circumstances for Court Intervention, questions regarding the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, or the existence, validity and scope of the arbitration agreement, are decided by the court for itself, effectively de novo, since the ACA directs the court to “decide the matter”. By contrast, questions regarding admissibility (such as compliance with pre-arbitration procedural steps or time bars within the agreement) are treated as matters for the tribunal, and the court will not review the tribunal’s determinations on them. The merits of the dispute are never reviewed under a jurisdictional guise.

The courts are willing, indeed obliged, to hold parties to their bargain. Under Section 5 of the ACA, where proceedings are brought in a matter subject to an arbitration agreement, the judge or magistrate must, on a party’s application and after hearing the parties, refer the matter back to arbitration unless the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, or there is in fact no dispute. The language is mandatory, and the courts have long applied it robustly (East African Development Bank v Ziwa Horticultural Exporters Ltd). Notably, the ACA expressly provides that arbitral proceedings may be commenced or continued, and an award made, even while such a court application is pending, which deprives tactical court filings of much of their disruptive effect.

The High Court Commercial Division has, in its decisions in Kom Consults Limited v M/s Nambale Enterprises Ltd & Anor, Miscellaneous Application No 1144 of 2025, and Kibo Media Limited v Nile Breweries Limited, Miscellaneous Application No 1931 of 2025, stated that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may be bound by an arbitration agreement under the following doctrines:

• under the “group of companies” doctrine;
• piercing of the corporate veil; and
• implied consent through active participation in the proceedings.

Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at a party’s request, order a party to take such interim measures of protection as the tribunal considers necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute, and may require appropriate security in connection with such a measure (Section 17 of the ACA). Such orders are binding on the parties as a matter of their agreement to arbitrate. Typical measures include the preservation, custody or sale of goods, preservation of the status quo, and orders restraining dissipation of assets. Reflecting its Model Law origins, however, the ACA contains no express mechanism for court enforcement of tribunal-ordered interim measures, a gap widely identified as the priority for legislative reform (see 2.2 Changes to National Law).

Under Section 6 of the ACA, a party may apply to the court before or during arbitral proceedings for an interim measure of protection, and such an application is not incompatible with the arbitration agreement. The courts can grant injunctions, orders preserving property or evidence, freezing-type relief and security. Where the arbitral tribunal has already ruled on a matter relevant to the application, the court must treat that ruling, and any findings of fact within it, as conclusive.

The power to grant interim relief under Section 6 of the ACA extends to foreign-seated arbitration as well. The High Court, in Great Lakes Energy Company NV v MSS Xsabo Power Limited and 2 Others, Miscellaneous Application No 1041 of 2023, decided that parties to an international arbitration agreement may in exceptional circumstances seek interim measures of protection from national courts without thereby either waiving their rights to arbitrate or violating their agreement to arbitrate, especially where the tribunal does not have power and practical ability to grant relief within the relevant timescale.

The ACA does not itself provide for emergency arbitrators, but the ICAMEK Arbitration Rules do. The High Court has treated an emergency arbitrator’s decision as an award amenable to (and surviving) a setting-aside application under Section 34 (Quality Uganda Ltd v Bata Shoe Co, Miscellaneous Cause No 53 of 2025), which indicates that such decisions are binding rather than merely recommendatory. The courts’ concurrent power under Section 6 remains available after an emergency arbitrator has been appointed, subject to the conclusiveness rule described above.

The national law of Uganda allows for the courts and/or the arbitral tribunal to order security for costs. The tribunal may require a party to provide appropriate security in connection with an interim measure of protection under Section 17 of the ACA, and security for costs is generally regarded as available under the tribunal’s broad procedural discretion and applicable institutional rules. The courts may order security in arbitration-related proceedings in the exercise of their ordinary powers, and, specifically, where recognition or enforcement of an award is resisted pending a setting-aside application at the seat, the court may adjourn its decision and order the resisting party to provide suitable security pursuant to Section 34(5).

The ACA governs all arbitrations seated in Uganda. Its procedural framework is, however, deliberately light-touch: under Section 19, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal and, failing agreement, the tribunal may conduct the arbitration in the manner it considers appropriate, including determining the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence. Institutional rules (those of ICAMEK, the ICC, the LCIA, UNCITRAL and others) apply where chosen by the parties. Court proceedings connected with arbitration, referral applications, interim measures, setting aside, and the filing and enforcement of awards are governed by the Arbitration Rules in Schedule 1 to the ACA, supplemented by the Civil Procedure Rules.

Very few procedural steps are mandated by law, consistent with party autonomy. The mandatory core comprises:

• equal treatment – the parties must be treated with equality and each given a fair opportunity to present their case (Section 18 of the ACA);
• proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator, of the arbitral proceedings and of hearings, breach of which is a setting-aside ground;
• exchange of statements of claim and defence within the agreed or determined periods, unless otherwise agreed; and
• compliance with the formal requirements for the award in Section 31 (see 10.1 Legal Requirements).

Everything else – hearings or documents-only procedure, seat, language, timetable and evidence – is left to the parties’ agreement or the tribunal’s discretion.

Powers

The arbitral tribunal’s statutory powers include ruling on its own jurisdiction (Section 16 of the ACA); determining the procedure, and the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence (Section 19); determining the place and language of the arbitration in the absence of agreement; ordering interim measures and security (Section 17); appointing experts; deciding the dispute in accordance with the law and rules chosen by the parties (Section 28); awarding interest and costs; and correcting or interpreting the award or making an additional award (Section 33).

Duties

The arbitral tribunal must be and remain independent and impartial, with a continuing duty of disclosure (Section 12); treat the parties equally and give each a fair opportunity to present its case (Section 18); conduct the reference without undue delay; deliver a written, signed and (unless otherwise agreed) reasoned award; and maintain a fair and complete record of the proceedings – the High Court in Kenlloyd Logistics (U) Ltd v Fratch AG set aside an award where the arbitrator abdicated that duty.

There are no statutory qualification requirements for representatives appearing in arbitral proceedings seated in Uganda. Parties may be represented by any person of their choice, including foreign-qualified counsel, in-house lawyers or non-lawyers; the restrictions in the Advocates Act (which requires enrolment and a current practising certificate) apply to appearances before the courts, not to arbitration (Section 24 (7)). Foreign counsel therefore regularly appear in Uganda-seated international arbitrations. Court proceedings connected with the arbitration, such as referral, setting-aside and enforcement applications, must however, be conducted by advocates enrolled in Uganda.

Practice reflects Uganda’s common-law, adversarial tradition, adapted to international norms:

• Pleading stage: Parties exchange statements of claim and defence accompanied by the documents relied upon. There is no US-style discovery, and document production is by targeted, specific requests, with arbitral tribunals frequently adopting the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence as guidance (Redfern schedules are common in larger cases);
• Witness evidence: Written witness statements ordinarily stand as evidence-in-chief, with oral cross-examination at the hearing. Expert evidence is presented through party-appointed experts (with reports, joint statements and, increasingly, concurrent evidence), and the tribunal may appoint its own expert.
• Privilege: Legal professional privilege and without-prejudice protection are recognised and applied.

There are no rigid statutory rules governing these categories in arbitration; the tribunal controls the process under Section 19 of the ACA.

The strict rules of evidence applicable in court proceedings under the Evidence Act do not bind arbitral tribunals seated in Uganda. Under Section 19 of the ACA, the power conferred on the tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence, freeing it from technical objections based on the Evidence Act. Because a single statute governs both domestic and international arbitration, the position is the same for both; in practice, tribunals in domestic references are sometimes guided by Evidence Act principles by analogy, while international tribunals tend to apply the IBA Rules or similar soft law.

The arbitral tribunal itself has no coercive powers over non-parties; compulsion is achieved through court assistance. Under Section 27 of the ACA, the tribunal, or a party with the approval of the tribunal, may request assistance from the High Court in taking evidence, and the court may execute the request within its competence and according to its rules on taking evidence. This enables witness summonses compelling attendance and the production of documents, and it extends to non-parties, who can be compelled only through this route. As between the parties, the tribunal may order disclosure and draw adverse inferences from non-compliance, and failure to comply may also have costs consequences.

The ACA does not impose an express duty of confidentiality on arbitral proceedings (in contrast to conciliation proceedings, which Part V makes expressly confidential). Confidentiality in arbitration therefore rests on the parties’ agreement, applicable institutional rules (the ICAMEK Arbitration Rules provide for confidentiality) and the implied obligation of confidence recognised in common-law jurisdictions, which Ugandan arbitral tribunals and practitioners generally observe as covering pleadings, documents produced, the hearing and the award.

Two important qualifications apply. First, court proceedings relating to arbitration, referral, interim measures, setting aside and enforcement are public, and judgments (often quoting the award) are published by the Uganda Legal Information Institute, so material entering the court record loses confidentiality. Second, disclosure of information from arbitral proceedings in subsequent proceedings is permissible where reasonably necessary to establish or protect a party’s legal rights, to enforce or challenge the award, or where compelled by law.

Under Section 31 of the ACA, the award must be in writing and signed by the arbitrator or arbitrators (in multi-arbitrator tribunals, the signatures of the majority suffice, provided the reason for any omitted signature is stated). It must state the reasons on which it is based, unless the parties have agreed otherwise or it is an award on agreed terms; it must state its date and the place of arbitration, where it is deemed made; and a signed copy must be delivered to each party. The arbitral tribunal may also make interim awards and, unless otherwise agreed, award interest and costs.

The tribunal must render its award within two months after entering on the reference. The tribunal is, however, empowered to extend this time by any writing signed by the arbitrator (Section 31(1)).

The ACA does not prescribe or limit the remedies an arbitral tribunal may award. Subject to the scope of the submission and the applicable substantive law chosen under Section 28, tribunals may award damages, sums due in debt, declarations, specific performance, injunctions, rectification, interest and costs. The practical limits are that:

• the tribunal cannot grant relief affecting non-parties or remedies operating in rem or reserved to public authorities (see 3.2 Arbitrability);
• punitive or exemplary damages are not expressly prohibited, but they are exceptional under Ugandan law and an award of them would invite scrutiny under the public policy ground in Section 34; and
• any remedy must fall within the terms of the reference, since decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission are severable and liable to be set aside.

Interest

Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal may award interest on sums awarded, both for the period up to the award and for the post-award period until payment, at a rate it considers reasonable, and the courts have confirmed that interest on a decretal sum arising from a registered award continues to run until satisfaction. Costs (including legal fees, tribunal fees and institutional charges) are in the tribunal’s discretion, subject to any agreement of the parties.

Legal Costs

The prevailing practice is that costs follow the event. The unsuccessful party bears the reasonable costs of the successful party, adjusted to reflect relative success on discrete issues, offers of settlement and the parties’ conduct in the proceedings. A pure costs-sharing approach is the exception rather than the rule and is usually the product of party agreement or mixed outcomes.

There is no appeal on the merits of an award as of right. Recourse takes two forms, as follows.

Setting Aside (Section 34 of the ACA)

An application to the High Court within one month of receipt of the award, on exhaustive grounds mirroring the Model Law: incapacity; invalidity of the arbitration agreement; lack of proper notice or inability to present one’s case; the award exceeding the scope of the reference (with severance of offending parts); improper composition of the arbitral tribunal or procedure; that the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means, or evident partiality or corruption of an arbitrator; that the award is not in accordance with the ACA; non-arbitrability; and conflict with the public policy of Uganda.

Opt-In Appeal on Questions of Law (Section 38 of the ACA)

Where the parties have so agreed, a party may apply to the court to determine a question of law arising in the course of the arbitration, or appeal on a question of law arising out of the award; a further appeal lies to the Court of Appeal on certified questions of law of general importance. This option is limited to domestic arbitrations.

The appellate courts police these limits strictly: no appeal lies against interlocutory orders in arbitration, reinforcing the finality of the arbitral process.

The default position under the ACA is already one of exclusion: there is no merits appeal unless the parties opt in. The parties may expand the scope of recourse only in the manner permitted by Section 38, by agreeing that questions of law arising in the arbitration or out of the award may be referred or appealed to the court; they cannot confer a broader appellate jurisdiction (for example, on questions of fact) on the courts by contract. Conversely, the parties cannot contract out of the setting-aside regime in Section 34, whose grounds protect due process, arbitrability and public policy; an advance waiver of the right to apply to set aside an award would not be given effect.

There is no judicial review of the merits. The consistent judicial refrain is that parties take their arbitrator “for better or worse”, as to both decisions of fact and decisions of law, and that a setting-aside application must not be a disguised appeal. Review is therefore highly deferential: the court examines the integrity of the process (notice, opportunity to be heard, composition, scope, impartiality) rather than the correctness of the outcome. Questions the court decides for itself, effectively de novo, are confined to the statutory gateways: the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, arbitrability, and whether recognition or enforcement of the award would conflict with public policy, and, where the parties have opted in under Section 38 of the ACA, questions of law.

Uganda acceded to the New York Convention on 12 February 1992, subject to the reciprocity reservation (the Convention applies to awards made in the territory of another contracting state), and Part III of the ACA gives the Convention the force of law in Uganda. Uganda has also been a party to the ICSID Convention since 1966, and Part IV of the ACA provides for the enforcement of ICSID Convention awards as if they were decrees of the High Court. In addition, Uganda is a member of the East African Community and COMESA, whose treaties recognise arbitration, and is party to bilateral investment treaties that provide for ICSID and other institutional arbitration.

Procedure and Standards

A domestic or foreign award is enforced by filing or registering the award in the High Court (in practice, the Commercial Division) under Sections 35 and 36 of the ACA and the Arbitration Rules in Schedule 1 thereto, supported by the duly authenticated or certified award and the arbitration agreement (with a certified translation where necessary). Once the one-month setting-aside window has expired, or an application to set aside has been rejected, the award is enforced in the same manner as a decree of the court (see, recently, Karim Somani v Isaac Isanga Musumba, Arbitration Cause No 3 of 2025). Recognition or enforcement of a foreign award may be refused only on the grounds in Section 35, which mirror Article V of the New York Convention.

Awards Set Aside or Challenged at the Seat

An award that has been set aside by the courts of the seat will not be enforced in Uganda: the High Court has held that an award can only be set aside at the seat and that, once set aside there, it becomes unenforceable in Uganda (Aya Investments (U) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd, Court of Appeal Civil Application No 410 of 2023, and Aya Investments (U) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd, Court of Appeal Civil Reference No 20 of 2023; Great Lakes Energy Company NV v MSS Xsabo Power Ltd, Consolidated Arbitration Causes No 2 and 5 of 2023). Where setting-aside proceedings are still pending at the seat, the court may adjourn its decision on enforcement and, on the award creditor’s application, order the resisting party to provide suitable security.

Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is not, in practice, a bar to recognition: by agreeing to arbitrate, a state or state entity is taken to have waived immunity from the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction and from recognition proceedings. Execution is the real constraint. Uganda has no comprehensive state immunity statute, and the courts apply the common law, under which the restrictive theory of immunity now prevails: a foreign state is immune in respect of its sovereign acts but not in respect of its commercial transactions.

An agreement to arbitrate does not of itself waive immunity from execution; in the absence of an express waiver in the contract, execution will only be available against property of the state in Uganda that is in use, or intended for use, for commercial rather than sovereign purposes. A sovereign state’s property in Uganda is immune from execution irrespective of the merits of the award. The premises of the diplomatic mission of the sovereign state in Uganda, their furnishings and other property thereon, and the mission’s means of transport are immune from attachment and execution under Article 22(3) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which has the force of law in Uganda under the Diplomatic Privileges Act. The mission’s ordinary bank accounts are presumptively immune on the same footing, unless it can be proved that an account is earmarked solely for commercial transactions. Property of the Central Bank of the sovereign state, if any is held in Uganda, would attract similar protection under customary international law.

The courts are strongly pro-enforcement and construe the defences to recognition narrowly. The High Court’s decision in Kampala International University v Housing Finance Company Ltd (Arbitration Causes No 38 and 46 of 2024, consolidated) stated that the public policy defence is reserved for cases where enforcement would violate Uganda’s most fundamental principles of justice and morality, its constitutional principles or national interests; the court cannot review the merits; and the award creditor was permitted to enforce in Uganda notwithstanding prior recognition of the award as a judgment in Kenya, so long as the debt remained unpaid (parallel enforcement).

The standard applied is formally the domestic public policy of Uganda, encompassing conflict with the Constitution or laws of Uganda, injury to the national interest, and repugnance to justice and morality. However, it is applied with a restraint akin to international public policy, and confined to fundamental illegality, fraud and corruption rather than mere error. The older authority of National Social Security Fund v Alcon International Ltd, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No 15 of 2009, remains the reference point for refusing effect to awards tainted by illegality.

Ugandan law makes no provision for class or group arbitration, and no local institutional rules provide for it. Arbitration remains strictly consent-based: multiple claimants may proceed together only where all of them are parties to the same arbitration agreement (or to compatible agreements and all parties consent), and an award cannot bind absent members of a class. Representative and public interest litigation exists in the courts under the Constitution and the Civil Procedure Rules, but those mechanisms do not transfer to arbitration.

Counsel

Ugandan advocates are governed by the Advocates Act and the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations, enforced by the Law Council, whether they act in court or in arbitration. Foreign counsel appearing in Uganda-seated arbitrations remain subject to the professional rules of their home Bars.

Arbitrators

Arbitrators are bound by the ACA’s requirements of independence, impartiality and continuing disclosure (Section 12), as strictly enforced in recent case law (see 4.5 Arbitrator Requirements). Members of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) – a large proportion of the local arbitration community – are subject to the CIArb Code of Professional and Ethical Conduct, and ICAMEK panel arbitrators are subject to the Centre’s standards and required declarations. The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration are widely used as persuasive soft law.

There is no legislation or regulation in Uganda that addresses, restricts or prohibits third-party funding of arbitration, and no disclosure obligation is imposed by the ACA or local institutional rules. The market is nascent, and funding is beginning to appear in larger commercial and treaty disputes involving Ugandan parties. The common-law doctrines of maintenance and champerty have not been applied by the Ugandan courts to invalidate the funding of arbitration, although they have not been formally abolished, so funding arrangements should be structured with them in mind. The restrictions on contingency arrangements in the Advocates (Remuneration and Taxation of Costs) Rules bind advocates, not professional funders. Funded parties are well advised to disclose the existence of funding voluntarily to protect against arbitrator conflicts.

The ACA is silent on consolidation, so neither an arbitral tribunal nor a court can compel the consolidation of separate arbitral proceedings without the consent of all parties across the references. Consolidation is therefore available only where the parties’ arbitration agreements or chosen institutional rules provide for it, or where all parties agree ad hoc; tribunals may otherwise co-ordinate related references through concurrent hearings with consent. The courts do, in contrast, routinely consolidate related arbitration applications pending before them, as in Kampala International University v Housing Finance Company Ltd, where two arbitration causes were consolidated, but that is a case management measure in the court proceedings, not a consolidation of the arbitrations themselves.

Third parties are bound only through recognised legal relationships with a party, principally:

• persons “claiming through or under” a party within Section 2 of the ACA – assignees of the contract, successors-in-title and subrogated insurers;
• personal representatives of a deceased party, since an arbitration agreement is not discharged by death;
• a trustee in bankruptcy that adopts a contract containing an arbitration clause (Section 37); and
• principals bound by agreements concluded on their behalf by agents.

The High Court Commercial Division has also stated that a non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration agreement under the following doctrines:

• under the “group of companies” doctrine;
• piercing of the corporate veil; and
• implied consent through active participation in the proceedings (see Kom Consults Limited v M/s Nambale Enterprises Ltd & Anor, Miscellaneous Application No 1144 of 2025).

An award creates rights and obligations only between the parties to the reference and those claiming through or under them; it cannot be enforced against strangers.