Australia was both a founding member of the WTO and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Australia is a member of the following plurilateral agreements:
Australia is also an observer to the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft.
Australia is party to the following free trade agreements (FTAs):
Australia participates in the Generalised System of Preferences schemes for some developing countries, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Chinese Taipei, in addition to providing preferential rules of origin for least-developed countries. Since July 2022, Australia has provided Ukraine with a preferential duty rate, which will apply until July 2026. Australia also participates in the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement and provides preferential duty rates for Pacific Islands Forum members.
Australia is presently negotiating the following FTAs, with varying degrees of progress:
Negotiations in the Australia–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement were concluded in September 2024, but this has not yet come into force.
While, strictly speaking, not an FTA, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) Supply Chain Agreement came into force on 24 February 2024. Then, in June 2024, the IPEF negotiating parties signed the following agreements:
Australia has initiated the domestic treaty-making processes necessary for ratification, with ratification expected to occur in 2025.
On 3 April 2024, the parties to China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Wine from Australia (DS602) circulated notification of a mutually agreed solution in accordance with Article 3.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
The Panel Report in Australia – Anti-Dumping Measures and Countervailing Measures on Certain Products from China (DS603) was adopted in April 2024, with the panel finding that Australia had acted inconsistently with several obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, with respect to measures it had imposed on railway wheels, stainless-steel sinks and wind towers from China.
Reportedly, negotiations on the IPEF Trade Agreement have progressed significantly, and may conclude in 2025.
The Australian Border Force (ABF) governs customs matters. It is an “operationally independent body” within the Home Affairs portfolio. The ABF Commissioner is also Comptroller-General of Customs.
Key legislation governing customs matters include:
There are also several relevant regulations, including Customs Regulations 2015, Customs (International Obligations) 2015, the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Prohibited Export Regulations), and the Customs Prohibited Import Regulations 1956.
The ABF has prime responsibility for administering and enforcing Australian customs law. More serious breaches of customs laws will be enforced by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP).
Australia has no similar law to the European Union’s Trade Barriers Regulation or Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. However, Australian businesses can report non-tariff trade barriers via email to the federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
In June 2024, the Excise and Customs Legislation Amendment (Streamlining Administration) Act 2024 was enacted. The amendment act intended to remove the regulatory burden associated with applying for, and holding, licences to manufacture or store alcohol and fuel.
In addition, the Customs Legislation Amendment (Vaping Goods) Regulation 2023 amended the Import Regulations to prohibit what are referred to as “vaping goods” as part of a broader policy to control and restrict the use and sale of vapes. Roll-out of the reforms began in 2024 and will continue into 2025.
Finally, the Customs Tariff Act 1995 was amended very slightly. Headline changes were:
There were no pending changes at the time of publication.
Australia imposes two forms of sanctions – autonomous sanctions and those made by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
UNSC Sanctions
International legal instruments are not binding in Australia unless they have been implemented through domestic legislation. Australia implements its UN obligations via the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) (UNCA). The UNCA gives the governor-general power to create regulations giving effect to UNSC decisions. Each sanctions regime is generally applied in distinct regulatory instruments. By way of example, UNSC Resolution 1493 (2003) regarding the Democratic Republic of Congo is primarily implemented through the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic Republic of Congo) Regulations 2008. The complexity of Australian regulations varies considerably, depending on the complexity of the specific sanctions regime being implemented.
The prohibitions in each regime have been specified by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to be UN Sanctions Enforcement Laws. Legally, this is important, because the main proscription under the UNCA is engaging in conduct which contravenes a UN Sanctions Law.
Autonomous Sanctions
Australia’s autonomous sanctions regime is imposed in a similar fashion to UNSC sanctions. The Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (ASA) empowers the governor-general to create regulations that impose autonomous sanctions. These regulations may prohibit the following:
These prohibitions are compiled into the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (ASR), with relevant designations provided in additional instruments. For example, the ASR covers prohibitions against making assets available to designated Russian persons and entities, with specific designated persons/entities listed in the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Russia and Ukraine) List 2014.
Finally, the ASA allows for the designation of individuals and entities involved in various acts under Australia’s “thematic sanctions” regimes.
The governor-general is empowered to make UNSC and autonomous sanctions regulations. This is a ceremonial function, as the governor-general is the king’s representative and nominally the head of the executive government. The delegation of regulation power to the governor-general represents the delegation by parliament of its legislative power to the executive government – allowing the executive government to create legal instruments without going through the lengthy legislative process.
In practice, it is the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) that are responsible for the content, implementation and facilitation of sanctions.
The Australian Sanctions Office (ASO) in the DFAT is responsible for administering and regulating Australia’s sanctions regimes. The ASO works with several agencies – including the ABF, the AFP and the Department of Home Affairs – to enforce sanctions. By way of example, the ABF is responsible for stopping exports to and from sanctioned countries, where a breach of a sanctions law is expected to occur. The ASO may also refer breaches of sanctions laws to the ABF and the AFP for investigation, which can lead to criminal prosecution.
Generally, Section 15.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 applies to autonomous sanctions regimes, so the prohibitions extend to entities/persons (wherever located) that engage in “conduct” connected with Australia. Conduct constituting a contravention of a sanctions law will be an offence where that conduct occurs:
UNSC sanctions are more bespoke, with their application to “conduct” of entities and persons being dependent on the requirements of the relevant UNSC Resolution. Frequently, Section 15.1 of the Criminal Code will apply to a contravention of a UNSC Resolution; however, this needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The ASO maintains a Consolidated List of “designated” individuals/entities. These are individuals/entities who have been sanctioned under Australia’s various sanctions regimes.
Australia currently maintains sanction measures against several countries and regions, including:
Australia has supplemented the UNSC regimes against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria with additional autonomous sanctions.
Finally, Australia’s thematic sanctions can be imposed on persons/entities considered responsible for ‒ or as contributors to ‒ the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, significant cyber-incidents, serious violations/abuses of human rights, or serious corruption.
In 4.1 Export Controls, the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (the “WMD Act”) is discussed. The WMD Act prevents trade with certain entities that are not otherwise subject to Australia’s sanctions regimes.
Australia does not apply secondary sanctions. See 3.4 Persons Subject to Sanctions Laws and Regulations regarding the jurisdictional reach of the sanctions regimes.
The UNCA outlines the penalties for contravening UN Sanctions Enforcement Laws and the ASA outlines the penalties for contravening an autonomous sanctions law.
An individual engaging in conduct that contravenes a sanctions law may be liable for imprisonment for up to ten years and/or a fine that is the greater of 2,500 penalty units (AUD782,500) or three times the value of the transaction per contravention. This means that the minimum penalty for an individual who contravenes a sanctions law is AUD782,500.
A body corporate that contravenes a sanctions law will be liable for a fine of 10,000 penalty units (AUD3.13 million) or three times the value of the transaction (whichever is greater) per contravention.
There is a range of other penalties that may arise from breaching a sanctions law, depending on the circumstances. By way of example, a person may be penalised where they provide false or misleading information in connection with the administration of a sanctions law.
A party can apply to the ASO for a permit to authorise an activity that would otherwise be prohibited under Australia’s sanctions regimes. The criteria to be met and the conditions on which a permit will be granted depend on the sanctions measures to which the proposed conduct relates.
For UNSC sanctions, the Minister for Foreign Affairs will need to notify and/or seek approval from the UNSC before granting the permit.
Violations of sanctions laws by bodies corporate are strict liability offences. No “intent” needs to be proved for the offence to be established. However, if a body corporate proves it took reasonable precautions – and exercised due diligence – to avoid contravening a sanctions law, the offence is not considered to have been committed. There are no legislative criteria addressing what amounts to “reasonable precautions” or the appropriate levels of “due diligence”, but the ASO advises that the following should be undertaken at a minimum:
It is also prudent for parties to seek independent legal advice as soon as they consider that their activities could be subject to Australian sanctions.
Parties that apply for a sanctions permit are required to keep records and documentation relating to that application for five years. The ASO can issue notices compelling persons to provide information of any kind for the purpose of determining whether a sanctions law has been complied with. Failure to comply with a notice can result in imprisonment for 12 months.
Australia has no blocking statutes or anti-boycott laws that prohibit adherence to other jurisdictions’ sanctions.
Firstly, in 2024, the Federal Court of Australia released three judgments concerning the operation of the ASA. These are:
It is difficult to summarise the entirety of these judgments in the available space. One significant clarification arises from the last of the above judgments, in which the court found that designated parties may indirectly benefit from transactions with corporations in which they hold an effective financial interest as low as 12.58%.
Secondly, the ASA was amended by the Autonomous Sanctions Amendment Act 2024. The overall purpose of this amendment was to legally “validate” prior actions taken under the ASA which were arguably infected with legal error, thus guarding against adverse judgments in pending and potential judicial review proceedings.
The Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade are due to deliver a report concerning their review of Australia’s sanctions regime on 11 February 2025.
Australia’s export controls generally relate to the goods, software and technology listed in the Defence Strategic Goods List (DSGL). The DSGL is a legislative instrument, created under the Customs Act, which reflects the controls imposed under the four multilateral export control regimes to which Australia is a party (the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime), along with other non-proliferation treaties and certain Australian-specific controls.
The source of control on DSGL-listed items differs, depending on whether the DSGL item is an actual physical good or technology and software (collectively, “DSGL technology”).
Controlled Goods
Physical exports fall under the Customs Act and the Prohibited Export Regulations 1958. Regulation 13E of the latter prohibits goods listed on the DSGL – as well as goods containing DSGL technology – from being exported from Australia, unless the Defence Minister has granted permission for the export.
Controlled Technology
The movement of DSGL technology is controlled by the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (DTCA). Subject to certain exceptions and permissions, the DTCA restricts the:
Non-Controlled Goods
Items not listed on the DSGL may nevertheless be subject to Australia’s “catch-all” export controls:
In each case, a transaction will only be prohibited when the Defence Minister publishes a notice to that effect. That noted, the WMD Act also generally prohibits the supply of goods or services if the supplier believes or suspects that they will (or may) be used in a WMD programme, even if no notice has been issued.
Defence Export Controls (DEC) regulate the exportation of DSGL goods and technologies, as well as the application of the Defence Minister’s catch-all provisions. The DEC are responsible for assessing whether a particular good or technology falls within the DSGL, whether there is a basis to publish a catch-all notice, and reviewing permit applications; the Defence Minister is ultimately empowered to grant permits.
Self-assessment is fundamental to Australia’s export system. Exporters must lodge an export declaration with the ABF, which contains information on the good, its intended export destination, and other relevant details about the export transaction itself. Any permit obtained for the export will also need to be identified to the ABF. If the proposed export is consistent with the conditions of the permit, and other requirements are met, then the ABF will issue an approval to export (known as an “authority to deal”). The ABF can vet export consignments to ensure permit requirements are met and to assess whether there is a basis to publish a catch-all notice. If the ABF has concerns, it will delay issuing an authority to deal and will refer the consignment to the DEC for assessment.
When an exporter fails to comply with Australia’s export controls regime, it may be subject to a range of consequences/penalties depending on the severity of its non-compliance. Less serious breaches will be enforced by the ABF; responses may include exporter education, warnings, administrative sanctions, or prosecution. Criminal offences would generally fall to the AFP and the CDPP for enforcement and prosecution.
The DEC are responsible for enforcement of the controls imposed on the transfer, publication and brokering of DSGL goods and technology under the DTCA. In this regard, the DEC have discretion to respond to instances of non-compliance and may choose to counsel the entity to ensure it understands its obligations, or impose stringent compliance conditions on the entity’s permit. The majority of offences for non-compliance with the DTCA are “indictable offences”, so serious cases of non-compliance can be referred to the CDPP for prosecution.
See 4.1 Export Controls and 4.8 Penalties for further details.
Australia does not maintain a restricted persons list.
The DSGL includes a “sensitive list of dual‑use goods and technologies” and a “very sensitive list of dual‑use goods and technologies”. Goods and technologies included on these lists are subject to more stringent permit requirements.
The Prohibited Export Regulations include prohibitions relating to non-DSGL goods, such as asbestos, human substances, and cat and dog fur.
Each of the acts discussed in 4.1 Export Controls contains penalties for non-compliance. The most relevant are discussed here.
Penalties Under the Customs Act
A range of penalties can apply for different types of non-compliance with export controls under the Customs Act. Less serious violations of export controls may be treated as either:
The penalty upon conviction for these offences is a fine of three times the value of the goods or 1,000 penalty units (AUD313,000).
Conduct which contravenes a condition of a licence or permit is punishable by a fine of 100 penalty units (AUD31,300). The Defence Minister may also decide to revoke the licence or permit.
The ABF has the discretion to issue an “infringement notice” for such offences where there are “reasonable grounds” to do so. Where an infringement notice is issued, the penalty will be either one-quarter of the maximum fine a court could impose or 15 penalty units for an individual (AUD4,695) or 75 penalty units for a corporation (AUD23,475). Payment of an infringement notice penalty by a person discharges any liability and prevents that person from being prosecuted in a court for the alleged contravention. Significantly, the person will not be regarded as having admitted guilt or liability for the alleged contravention, nor as having been convicted of the alleged offence.
More serious violations of export controls may be treated as the exportation of DSGL goods without a permit. This is an indictable offence, which can result in imprisonment for ten years, or a fine of 2,500 penalty units (AUD782,500), or both.
The Customs Act also provides provision for the forfeiture of any goods whose export is prohibited.
Penalties Under the DTCA
The key offences in the DTCA relate to the contravention of any of the controls listed in Part 4.1 above unless a permit has been granted, or a statutory exemption applies. Similarly, it is an offence to engage in a supply which contravenes a condition of a permit. Penalties arising in relation to these offences are a maximum of imprisonment for ten years, a fine of 2,500 penalties units (AUD782,500), or both. Additionally, there is a more general offence relating to conduct that breaches a permit condition, the penalty for which is 60 penalty units (AUD18,780).
The Defence Minister also has the power to issue a notice to prevent the publication of DSGL technology. Non-compliance with such notices is punishable by imprisonment for ten years, a fine of 2,500 penalty units (AUD782,500), or both. Additionally, the DTCA contains offences in relation to dealings under the Australia–US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty.
Finally, a host of offences arises under the “monitoring powers”, “information-gathering powers” and “record-keeping” provisions of the DTCA. Penalties for these offences vary.
Maximum Penalties Under the WMD Act
The three main penalties imposed under the WMD Act are for:
Each of these offences is punishable by imprisonment for up to eight years if the Attorney-General consents to prosecution.
There are a range of export controls licences and permits available. These include Australian General Export Licences (AUSGELs), which are available for a range of pre-approved activities to pre-approved destinations. This allows an exporter to supply goods and technology to specific destinations and for specific purposes for a defined period. However, goods and technology listed on the “Sensitive List” of the DSGL may or may not be covered by an AUSGEL, and goods and technology listed under the “Very Sensitive List” in the DSGL cannot be covered by an AUSGEL. The complexity and fine differences underline the need for an exporter to properly word its application and understand the scope of any permission granted.
The DEC are aware that Australia’s export controls are complex and so exporters/persons may unintentionally breach their obligations. To this end, the DEC’s approach is to facilitate understanding of Australia’s export controls and encourage exporters to rectify any mistakes, as and when they arise. However, repeated non-compliance can result in permits being subject to more stringent compliance conditions, the revocation of the permits, or referral for criminal prosecution.
The DEC offer some tools that may assist exporters, including an online self-assessment tool and the ability to seek an official pre-assessment. The DEC’s website also includes a range of resources that can be used by exporters and persons for this purpose.
A person who considers that they may have breached Australia’s export controls can voluntarily disclose details of their non-compliance to the DEC. The DEC will then work with the person to rectify the breach. Depending on the severity of the breach, the DEC may also assist the person to identify gaps in their systems, improve compliance processes or enforce penalties for non-compliance.
The DTCA requires permit-holders to retain records regarding the activities conducted under the permit for five years. The Customs Act includes similar requirements. Both Acts also allow the relevant authority to require permit-holders to produce such records, as and when necessary.
The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 became effective in April 2024. This Act amended the DTCA to add new controls with respect to supply to foreign persons within Australia, supplies outside of Australia and supply of DSGL services. These amendments were driven by the security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) and are widely understood to be an attempt to make Australia’s export controls equivalent to those used by the United States.
See 4.12 Key Developments Regarding Exports. Although enacted, the amendments discussed do not become operative until 1 March 2025.
The authority governing the imposition of anti-dumping/countervailing duties (AD/CVD) is the Anti-Dumping Commission (ADC), headed by the Commissioner of the Anti-Dumping Commission (“the Commissioner”). The ADC undertakes the investigatory functions necessary for the imposition of AD/CVD. If the investigation finds a basis to impose AD/CVD, then the Commissioner will recommend their imposition to the relevant minister (currently the Minister for Industry, Science and Technology). The minister is legally empowered to impose such measures.
AD/CVD investigations are undertaken in accordance with the requirements of Part XVB of the Customs Act. This is supplemented by the Customs (International Obligations) Regulations 2015, which include several relevant provisions – including specifying how exporters’ costs of production and selling costs are determined in an anti-dumping investigation. Finally, the power to impose such measures is provided to the minister pursuant to the Customs (Anti-Dumping Tariff) Act 1975.
Safeguards investigations are undertaken by the Productivity Commission. Safeguard investigations are infrequently initiated; the last one was concluded in 2013. Since the start of the new millennium, there have only been three safeguard investigations, concerning imports of pig meat, processed fruit products and tinned tomatoes – none of which resulted in the imposition of safeguard measures. These investigations were undertaken under the Productivity Commission Act 1998, which broadly allows the Productivity Commission to undertake “inquiries” requested by the government. In undertaking a request for a safeguard inquiry, the Productivity Commission follows procedures set out in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No S 297.
The ABF is responsible for the application of all import duties, including interim AD/CVD, and hypothetically the administration of safeguard measures. Australia’s customs system is a “self-assessment” system – however, the ABF undertakes several compliance exercises, such as data-matching and audits, in order to ensure compliance with importers’ duty obligations.
The ADC also undertakes “anti-circumvention” inquiries, which consider whether any “circumvention activities” have occurred, namely:
The minister has broad powers to alter the existing dumping measures to ensure the circumvention is addressed.
Any “affected party” can apply for a review of measures: this includes a person representing the Australian industry producing like goods, a person directly concerned with the export or import of like goods, and the government of a country from which like goods are exported. The minister may also write to the Commissioner to request that a review is initiated.
The scope of a review may vary. By way of example, an exporter may apply for a review of its individual measures, rather than a broad review of all measures applicable to its own country of export. Exporters and importers usually request narrow reviews, but the minister will usually broaden them to encompass all exporters.
There are also “accelerated reviews”, which are open to “new exporters” who did not export to Australia during the period in which dumping was found to have occurred. Exporters who do not undertake this kind of review are subject to the “others’” rate of duty, which is generally prohibitively high. An accelerated review allows the new exporter to receive its own dumping margin.
Reviews are ad hoc and initiated based on either an application from an affected party or parties or at the request of the minister. Affected parties cannot apply for a review within 12 months of the outcome of an investigation or the last review of the measures.
Provided a non-domestic company is an “interested party”, it may participate in a review. Interested parties encompass “any person who is or is likely to be directly concerned with the importation or exportation into Australia of the goods that are the subject of the application”.
In practice, an exporter subject to a review will need to complete an exporter questionnaire within 37 days of initiation. The exporter questionnaire is intended to elicit all information necessary to determine the export price, normal value, and non-injurious price (where relevant) for the responding exporter.
Anti-dumping and countervailing investigations follow the procedure and timelines as set out in the Customs Act 1901. The statutory timelines are as follows:
The SEF and reporting dates are extended as a matter of course. Investigations presently take between 12 and 16 months.
The first round of interested party submissions includes questionnaire responses. An exporter who needs more time to complete questionnaire responses needs to write to the ADC to request an extension – these are complex documents, so that is often the case. The Commissioner’s consideration of a request is guided by the Customs (Extensions of Time and Non‑cooperation) Direction 2015. The ADC may accept other submissions throughout the investigation. This reflects Australian administrative review principles and is particularly important for injury and causation-focused submissions. The ADC may consider such submissions, provided doing so will not prevent the timely publication of the SEF or the timely preparation of the report to the minister.
The ADC will usually seek to verify information submitted by interested parties. This occurs prior to the SEF’s publication. The ADC also publishes verification reports outlining its initial findings for each entity following verification.
The ADC maintains a public record that includes all official reports and the application for an investigation and submissions and correspondence from interested parties, subject to certain requirements around confidentiality.
The authorities will not impose AD duties on goods originating from New Zealand.
See 5.4 Ad Hoc and Regular Reviews.
The review process is like that outlined with regard to AD/CVD investigations.
The Anti-Dumping Review Panel (ADRP) is an administrative review body that can hear merits appeals of certain AD/CVD decisions. Procedures adopted depend on the decision appealed. However, in general, the following applies:
This timeline will usually be extended substantially. The ADRP has the power to ask the ADC to reinvestigate certain findings and then report back to the ADRP. If that occurs, the ADC’s practice is to publish preliminary reinvestigation reports, to allow interested parties to make submissions, before reporting back to the ADRP. The ADRP may also hold interested party conferences throughout the appeal and require interested parties to make submissions regarding these conferences.
The other form of appeal is an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia under either or both the Anti-Dumping (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or Section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1901 (“judicial review”). Judicial review is focused on the legality of a decision, rather than its factual merit – although unreasonableness of epic proportions can substantiate legal relief.
Judicial review litigation is initiated via an originating application lodged with the Federal Court. This needs to occur within 28 days of the making of the challenged decision. The timeline for each matter is set pursuant to orders made by the relevant judge. While it will depend on the circumstances, judicial review litigation could be completed within 12 to 18 months of initiation.
As discussed in 1.6 Pending Changes to Trade Agreements, the Panel Report in Australia – Anti-Dumping Measures and Countervailing Measures on Certain Products from China (DS603) was adopted in April 2024, with the panel finding a number of inconsistencies between its obligations under the Ant-Dumping Agreement and measures imposed on railway wheels, stainless-steel sinks and wind towers from China.
There were no pending changes at the time of publication.
Australia’s foreign investment laws are primarily contained in the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (FIA), the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulation 2015, and the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Fees Imposition Act 2015.
The FIA allows the Treasurer to review foreign investment proposals that meet certain criteria. In practice, this assessment is undertaken by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), a non-statutory body that then advises the Treasurer whether the proposed investment should be allowed to go ahead.
The Treasury administers this framework in relation to foreign investment proposals for entities, businesses, agricultural and commercial land. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) reviews investment proposals relating to residential real estate and administers vacancy fees and the Register of Foreign Ownership of Australian Assets.
Foreign investment amounting to a notifiable action (or a notifiable national security action) requires the submission of an application to the FIRB via the foreign investment website. The latest Treasury report indicates that timeframes for reviewing applications are sitting at a median of approximately 42 days, varying up to more than three months.
The key question when assessing a notified investment is whether it passes a national interest test or a national security test. The Treasurer has the power to block a foreign investment proposal or to apply conditions on the implementation of the proposal to ensure it is not contrary to the national interest or national security.
The Treasurer is the ultimate decision-maker for foreign investment into Australia. The FIRB is the key responsible entity, as described in 6.1 Investment Security Mechanisms.
The application of the FIRB regime depends on whether an action is a “significant action”, “notifiable action”, “notifiable national security action” or a “reviewable national security action”. Whether the action falls within these descriptions will determine whether it triggers the requirement to notify the Treasurer of the intended action, whether it will be reviewable at the discretion of the Treasurer based on national security concerns, and/or whether the action must be notified to the registrar. A requirement to notify also arises where a foreign individual investor acquires an interest in Australian residential land of any value – in short, an otherwise ordinary real-estate transaction.
“Notifiable Actions” and “Notifiable National Security Actions”
Whether or not a proposed action is a notifiable action can be a matter of some complexity, depending on the identity of the investor, the nature of the proposed investment and the value of the proposed investment and the target asset. As an example, the acquisition of a substantial interest in an Australian entity is a “notifiable action” where the value of the Australian entity exceeds a monetary threshold. A substantial interest is generally 20% of the value of the entity – although this varies in certain circumstances. The monetary threshold also differs, depending on where the acquirer is from (eg, a country with which Australia has certain FTAs, such as the CPTPP) and whether the acquired business is a “sensitive” business (including businesses in the media, telecommunications, transportation and certain defence-adjacent industries). Further, if the acquirer is a “government investor” then the threshold value is AUD0, meaning that the acquisition of a substantial interest in any entity, irrespective of the value of the entity, is notifiable.
A “notifiable national security action” includes any of the following:
What constitutes a national security business or national security land requires a significant amount of explanation. Indicatively, it is broad, encompassing everything from businesses that store personal information of defence and intelligence personnel through to manufacturers of critical goods for military use. Essentially, these types of “national security” enterprises involve instances where defence, intelligence or national security risks or interests are deemed to exist. The threshold for any of these actions is AUD0.
If a proposed action is a notifiable action or a notifiable security action, then it needs to be approved by the FIRB before it occurs.
“Significant Actions” and “Reviewable National Security Actions”
Where actions fall outside the definitions of “notifiable action” or “notifiable national security action”, the terms “significant action” and “reviewable national security action” serve to capture these. The Treasurer is empowered to review these actions at their discretion. If a foreign investor chooses to notify the Treasurer of such actions despite not being required to do so, they must not proceed with the action until certain timeframes or events transpire.
So, complexity abounds.
See 6.3 Transactions Subject to Investment Security Measures about “notifiable actions” and “notifiable national security actions”.
Further, notices must generally be given to the Register of Foreign Ownership of Australian Assets (“the Register”) within 30 days of the day on which:
There are several exemptions, which are provided under Part 3 of the Foreign Investment Regulation.
The consequences of failing to notify or meet conditional requirements for investment approval can be severe.
For an individual, failure to give notice of a notifiable action or a notifiable national security action, while prohibited by the FIA, or contravening conditions of a notice or exemption can result in a penalty of up to AUD4.69 million and ten years of imprisonment. For a corporation, the total amount increases tenfold to AUD46.9 million.
There are additional and significant penalties relating to residential real investment and other non-compliances with the FIRB regime. Such transactions are best approached with caution and with independent legal advice.
Fees are applicable for various actions required or permitted under the FIA, including for making applications to the FIRB, giving notices, and variations on certain notifications, notices or exemption certificates. The fee generally depends on the value of the transaction, but is capped at a maximum of AUD1,119,100.
By way of example, for commercial land and tenements, fees for notifiable actions start at AUD14,100 for acquisitions of AUD50 million or less; rise to AUD28,200 for transactions between AUD50 million and AUD100 million; and then generally increase by AUD28,200 with every AUD50 million of consideration. For residential land, fee tiers increase with every AUD1 million of consideration ‒ starting at AUD14,100, increasing to AUD28,200, and then again increasing by AUD28,200 for every AUD1 million of consideration.
Each action incurs a separate fee, unless multiple actions are taken together under a “single agreement”. In such cases, the fees are generally applied based on the aggregate consideration for each type of action.
Fees for foreign investment applications and notices are indexed each financial year from the averages of the Australian Bureau of Statistics Consumer Price Index. New fees apply from 1 July each year and are calculated using the appropriate indexation factor. The statutory timeframe of 30 days for deciding will not commence until the relevant fee has been paid.
In addition, all states and territories charge additional stamp duty surcharges on foreign purchasers of property and certain states and territories charge higher rates of land tax on foreign owners where the property is not their principal place of residence.
As of July 2023, all notification obligations go to a singular register (the Register of Foreign Ownership of Australian Assets) rather than distinct registers for foreign ownership of residential land, agricultural land and water entitlements.
Notification obligations can “double up” in the sense that a foreign person may be required to notify the Treasurer under Sections 98C, 98D or 98E of the FIA and may be required to give a notice in relation to the same action. Where this arises, notification only to the register is permitted. However, if notification obligations only arise under Sections 98C, 98D or 98E, those notification obligations must be separately met.
There are no significant pending changes on the horizon in the next 12 months pertaining to investment security in Australia.
The key restriction on imports relates to the prohibition of parallel imports of books under Section 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). It persists despite Australia’s Productivity Commission recommending it be abolished in 2009, which was later reiterated by the Harper Competition Policy Review in 2015.
There are several ways in which the Australian government, both at the federal and the state level, offers industry assistance. These include – but are not limited to – small business capital gains tax concessions, R&D tax concessions and government financing vehicles. Arguably, such schemes facilitate and encourage domestic production.
“Future Made in Australia”
A significant area of interest for the federal government has been improving Australia’s in-country manufacturing capabilities – essentially shifting it down the supply chain. Much of this has been under the “Future Made in Australia” banner. Examples of these kinds of incentives and spending include the establishment of the National Reconstruction Fund, which commits AUD15 billion to finance industries that support “national sovereign capability” (ie, renewables and low-emission technologies), medical manufacturing, value-adding in resources, critical technologies, advanced manufacturing, and value-adding in other areas.
Australian Critical Minerals Research and Development Hub
Similarly, the government has invested AUD50.5 million to establish the Australian Critical Minerals Research and Development Hub. This is intended to build research capabilities, increase commercialisation and invest in industry engagement. Including via “co-investment between Australia and like-minded international partners” and “critical minerals projects that can help develop end-to-end critical minerals supply chains between Australia and partner countries”. Australia intends to offer tax incentives to encourage the production of critical minerals and hydrogen in Australia.
The primary body is Standards Australia, a non-government entity that develops relevant Australian standards. Government policy is set by the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science.
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade oversee Australia’s sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) obligations. In particular, the Department of Agriculture is responsible for setting and administering Australia’s SPS measures, and for maintaining and improving technical market access for Australia’s agricultural and other food exports.
There are no measures of which the authors are aware that are specifically aimed at reducing imports or encouraging domestic production. That said, measures for the protection of Australia’s unique biodiversity are often claimed to be disguised trade measures, and Australia is no stranger to being a respondent in WTO disputes under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. In the authors’ experience, clients’ primary concern regarding the SPS system is its administration – particularly how it responds to new and emerging information regarding potential phytosanitary risks. The risk assessment process is often prolonged, with limited transparency, during which time imports are blocked from entry or treated in ways that destroy or degrade their food or floral quality.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is the national regulatory body for competition, consumer rights, fair trading and product safety.
There are no specific competition policies or price controls employed in Australia that are aimed at reducing imports or encouraging domestic production.
Australia has imposed a price cap on “uncontracted” liquefied natural gas (LNG) (ie, gas that is not committed under export contracts) of AUD12 per gigajoule until 2025. This is predicted to apply to less than 4% of LNG production. Australia justifies this as a way to reduce the cost of gas for Australian consumers.
In the 1990s, Australia went through a wave of privatisation. At present, most government business enterprises tend to be services or utilities-based, or entities that facilitate government policies – for example, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation.
Australia’s government is multi-layered – from the Commonwealth government to the state and territory governments, and to local governments. At each level of bureaucratic strata, there can be multiple different procurement requirements.
Australia has acceded to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and has reciprocal procurement access requirements under several FTAs. These are obviously caveated – for example, they may exclude defence procurement and procurement for health and education services. However, generally, at least at the Commonwealth level, the trend has been toward opening government procurement.
Commonwealth Procurement
Commonwealth procurement is undertaken in accordance with the Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) and the Commonwealth Procurement Rules. Consistent with Australia’s GPA obligations, there are no express laws or rules that are aimed at reducing imports.
That said, there are certain policies that could promote domestic economic growth in the Commonwealth Procurement Rules 2024, including:
Further, the Australian Industry Participation National Framework applies to “major Commonwealth government procurements” (ie, generally those valued above AUD20 million) and encourages tenderers for certain Commonwealth procurements to prepare and implement an Australian Industry Participation (AIP) Plan.
Similarly, the Australian Jobs Act 2013 applies to major projects for certain facilities (such as railways and roads, solar or hydro, and telecommunications) with an estimated capital expenditure of AUD500 million or more. Project proponents must notify the Australian Industry Participation of the project, submit a draft AIP Plan for approval and then implement the plan.
Defence procurement has additional requirements, set out in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual and other guidelines.
State-Level Procurement
At the state level, there are more explicit rules. By way of example, the Victorian Industry Participation Policy sets a minimum local content requirement for government procurement of strategic projects valued at AUD50 million or more that is binding on all project tenderers. The practical effect of this mandate has been that tenderers for strategic projects have refused to use foreign products to avoid non-compliance with tender conditions. Similarly, South Australia has a South Australia Industry Participation Policy 2021, which incorporates an “industry participation weighting”; the Western Australian government’s Buy Local Policy 2020 includes an “imported content impost”; and the Australian Capital Territory has a Canberra Region Local Industry Participation Policy, which encourages “Territory Entities to seek at least three quotations with at least one quote from a respondent located in the Canberra Region and one quote from an SME for procurements with a total estimated value between AUD25,000 and AUD200,000 (Goods and Services Tax-inclusive)”.
Australia has two systems for geographical indication registration:
Geographical indicators have reportedly been a stumbling block in the Australia-EU FTA negotiations.
There are no other significant issues pertaining to Australia and international trade at present.
6/2 Brindabella Circuit
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Australia
+61 261 631 000
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info@moulislegal.com www.moulislegal.comIntroduction
Looking at the high-level figures, Australia’s exports to date have been remarkably predictable. The status quo since approximately 2008–09 is that each year the largest exports are of iron ore (and concentrates) and coal, and each year Australia’s largest trading partner is China. There are deviations to this trend – for example, exports of natural gas once represented just 3% of exports and now these are the third largest export at around the 13–16% mark – but despite ongoing tensions and challenges, this status quo has remained remarkably stable.
But stability is out of step with global trends. Old ideas about opening up, extending concessions, and freeing trade seem to have given way to preferential and exclusionary deals on critical minerals and energy, bans on foreign products vital to the energy transition (encouraging home-grown versions instead) and a general disregard for the trade rules of decades past. Coal has lost value, and high oil prices driven both by conflict in the Middle East as well as peak oil, are a further incentive to move to different energy sources. In a world of seismic geopolitical shifts, sclerotic international institutions and the generational challenges posed by climate change, as well as a newly perceived opportunity to re-write traditional trade power concentrations, Australia is making significant changes that may set the parameters for future flows of trade.
Trade Developments by Numbers
A comforting trade theme for governments has been the announcement of a good old-fashioned free trade agreement (FTA), with plenty of estimates of the welcome trade and investment flows to come. But Australia’s recent fervour for traditional FTAs seems to be cooling – or perhaps it is just running out of willing new partners. Between 2020 and 2023, Australia entered into seven bilateral or multilateral FTAs. In 2024, negotiations with the UAE were concluded, a not insignificant achievement, and an upgrade of the 2022 interim agreement with India remains under way. But that could be it for FTA “announceables” for a while. Australia’s other major FTA – with the lucrative EU market – which is technically still “under negotiation”, effectively collapsed in 2023 over geographical indications and what was perceived as inadequate agriculture concessions, with Australia’s Trade Minister expressing only vague “hopes” that “one day” a deal will be signed. The EU, for its part, has a terse “No further meetings scheduled for the moment” under its official “Next Steps” in relation to the proposed pact. Lastly, there remains a possibility that negotiations for an FTA between Australia and the Gulf Cooperation Council could resume, but considerations in that respect have been lumped in with the UAE FTA process.
A key part of the rhetoric around the Australia–UAE FTA has been that it will open up two-way investment in sectors that underpin the energy transition – including Australia’s critical minerals. This ties in with the themes of other non-FTA level compacts and agreements, as well as incentives and policy and regulatory shifts that will characterise the landscape in 2025 and beyond.
The easing of COVID-19 restrictions and the entry into force of the 2022 interim India–Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) – which reduced tariffs on over 90% of Australia’s goods exports to India by value (including tariffs on coal) – have coincided with a large boost to two-way trade, which effectively doubled between 2020 and 2023. This reflects a degree of complementarity and lack of direct competition between Australia’s raw material strengths (coal, gold, gas) and India’s industrial ambitions and output (machinery, chemicals), as well as a two-way services trade. However, even in the uptick of this bilateral trading environment, the value of Australia’s coal exports to India has dropped, in the context of a fall in global prices. It remains to be seen what additional value can be derived from the upgrade to a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, currently under negotiation.
Other agreements that are not quite, or not technically, trade agreements may (or may not) have an effect on relationships with trading partners and traditional trade flows. The Australia–United States Climate, Critical Minerals and Energy Transformation Compact seeks to co-ordinate policies and investments in support of the clean energy transition and diversification of critical minerals supply chains, towards the “development of a shared energy industrial base”. While this could be too high level and dialogue-based to amount to much, it could also see Australia and the US favour one another where others are deliberately shut out of the partners’ respective markets.
In 2023 and 2024, Australia participated in negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) Agreement, which includes the United States, India and other Pacific Rim partners, and aimed for agreements in four core “pillars” linked to trade and the energy transition:
These are to be overseen and monitored by a council and joint commission established under the IPEF Agreement on the Indo-Pacific Economic Partnership for Prosperity. Australia ratified the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement on 12 September 2024 and commenced the ratification process for the other agreements on 19 September 2024. The Trade Pillar negotiations may possibly continue in 2025, but may also never be finalised (under a second Trump presidency, and due to differences in levels of development).
Of note is the easing (for now) of the tensions that have marred the Australia/China trade relationship. The clearest sign of this was the resolution of the two remaining WTO disputes between the countries. In April 2024 the WTO Panel Report in Australia – Anti-Dumping Measures and Countervailing Measures on Certain Products from China (DS603) was adopted, with the panel finding that Australia had acted inconsistently with a number of obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, with respect to measures it had imposed on railway wheels, stainless-steel sinks and wind towers from China. In March, the Australian Anti-Dumping Commission published the final outcome of the continuation inquiry concerning the anti-dumping measure on wind towers, confirming that the duty will expire after 16 April 2024, after being in place for ten years. Subsequently, at the conclusion of the continuation inquiry regarding the measures on stainless-steel sinks, the Minister for Industry elected to allow the measures to expire after a decade of operation. Consequently, stainless-steel sinks from China can be imported free of anti-dumping and countervailing duties as of 25 March 2025. Out of the three anti-dumping measures that were the subject of DS 603, only the anti-dumping measure on railway wheels remains in place, which is presently subject to a domestic administrative review proceeding before the Anti-Dumping Review Panel.
Similarly, the Chinese government completed its review of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Australian wine in March 2024, assessing that there was no longer a need to impose the measures. Subsequently, the related WTO dispute, China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Wine from Australia (DS602), was concluded with the parties circulating a notification of a mutually agreed solution in April. Further, in October, the two governments agreed a timetable for the full resumption of Australian live rock lobster exports to China in time for the Chinese New Year celebration in 2025.
China remains Australia’s largest trading partner. In the five years up until 2023, the value of two-way trade grew at an annual rate of 8.2%, despite the trade tensions that characterised the pandemic era. If 2024 represents an end to those tensions, then one may expect even stronger growth in the coming years. On the other hand, Australia’s geo-economic machinations, coupled with the devaluing of traditional major exports, may have a different effect. As China moves towards a greener economy itself, Australia may need to evaluate whether China may be a good market for energy transition raw materials after all, bearing in mind all the geostrategic issues that come with trade relationships.
The Old Trade/Security Dichotomy
One of the notable developments in Australian trade policy in 2024 relates to the expansion of Australia’s export controls laws. There had been little in the way of reform in this area since 2012, when the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 expanded export controls to encompass technology and software, whereas previously they only related to physical exports.
The 2024 amendments came about quite rapidly, in comparison to the usual speed of parliament. On 10 November 2023, the government quietly released a draft amendment bill with a narrow window (a week) for public comment; that bill – substantially unchanged – was introduced to parliament on 30 November 2024, where it was promptly referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. The committee released its report early on 15 March 2024 and the bill was passed by both houses on 27 March 2024.
The driving animus to both the content and the speed of the reforms was AUKUS, the three-party agreement between Australia, the UK and the US, which will see Australia eventually receiving nuclear-powered submarines. The projected costs for Australia are approximately AUD268 billion to AUD368 billion between now and the mid 2050s, representing the largest government procurements in Australian history. Given the size and subject matter, the project has a significant gravity to it.
The new controls are not, in and of themselves, grotesquely out of step with other jurisdictions. The amendments introduced controls on transfers of controlled technology to a “foreign person” within Australia, controls on secondary transfers of certain controlled goods and technology once they have left Australia, and controls on what are termed “DSGL services” (Defence Strategic Goods List services, similar to the US concept of “defence services”).
The amendments are to some degree liberalising. In part, they set up the Australian leg of the AUKUS permit free zone, so certain exports or supplies from Australia to the US or UK do not need a permit (albeit there are still reporting requirements that need to be made prior to said export/supply). In terms of two-way trade, the US is Australia’s third biggest partner while the UK is only the 11th biggest trade partner, but respectively, they are the first and second largest sources of investment within Australia and destinations for Australian investment. It is entirely possible that the frictionless transfer of dual-use software and technology could consolidate these relationships.
Implicitly, Australia treats export controls as a defence matter – the laws are administered by the Department of Defence; applications for permits are assessed against the same high standard, irrespective of the form of good/technology/software involved (based on whether the proposed export or supply would prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia); and the Minister for Defence wields the personal power to deny applications. The fact that many dual-use items have common everyday uses and the technologies they relate to may be decades old, are obscured by this approach. For an Australian company that is not involved in “defence” or “exports” there is a real dearth in official communications regarding the potential implication of these new controls.
Take, for example, the controls on the supply of controlled technology to a “foreign person” within Australia. The DSGL implements the Wassenaar Arrangement among other multi-lateral arms agreements, and so includes controls that can cover encryption software based on the 1970s Data Encryption Standard. The amended Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (DTCA) confirms that controls on the supply of DSGL technology cover supplies within Australia between an entity and its employees. So a small Australian tech business that works with relatively basic encryption technology may find itself subject to export controls, even if it does not make sales outside of Australia. The business will need to assess whether, in providing its employees with access to the technology, (i) it is undertaking a constitutional supply; (ii) which is a relevant supply; and (iii) which is to a foreign person and so requires a permit to be granted.
Then there are the ongoing implications. Can the Defence Export Controls’ (DEC’s) somewhat arthritic processes action permit applications quickly enough to match commercial needs? And what are the broader implications for hiring? Will the added transaction costs start to factor into hiring decisions, and will that have an adverse impact on foreign students enrolling in higher education in Australia?
To the extent it is officially acknowledged, the answer given by the DEC is that the new controls support economic prosperity and research collaboration “...by narrowing the scope of the Act to those items and activities that could prejudice Australia’s security, defence or international relations”.
But this is, and always has been, the basis for judging whether a permit should be granted under the DTCA. It does not lessen the scope of the controls, nor mitigate their regulatory burden. Yes, a permit will only be rejected in the small percentage of cases where Australian security, defence or international relations are at risk, but in all cases the permit needs to be applied for.
One source of relief may be via the regulations. These are what is termed “delegated legislation” – essentially, an instrument with legislative force that does not need to be passed by parliament. The DTCA allows for the creation of exemptions via regulations. Of course, given the focus on defence and controls, such relief may be some way off. As things stand, the offence provisions become operative on 1 March 2025, so anyone who may be impacted has limited time to ensure compliance.
Manufacturing Supply Chains and Fostering Comparative Advantage
The Chinese phrase for “crisis” consists of the character for “danger” and the character for “opportunity”. The Australian government appears to have taken this to heart and is enthusiastically seeking to address the climate opportunity. For example, the Future Made in Australia programme is intended to facilitate not only the energy transition, but also, according to the explanatory memorandum for the Future Made in Australia Bill 2024 (FMA), to weather “heightened geostrategic competition”. The FMA seeks to establish a framework through which public investment can be made in the “national interest” and through which various forms of support can be made. With respect to the “geostrategic competition” aspect of it all, the bill seems interested in the resilience of supply chains and manufacturing comparative advantage.
For example, the FMA seeks to establish a National Interest Framework through which the government can assess potential significant public investments. As drafted, there can be two different “streams” towards which such public investment can be targeted:
In the case of the first stream, the government has already identified renewable hydrogen, green metals and low-carbon liquid fuels as relevant industries. In the case of the “economic security and resilience” stream, the government has identified critical minerals and clean energy manufacturing. This is where the more trade-related aspects of the policy lie. For example, with respect to critical minerals, the present Future Made in Australia Brochure states as follows:
“Refining and processing critical minerals here will allow us to move along global supply chains to capture more of the value and contribute to creating more diverse, resilient and sustainable global supply chains.”
The pertinent background to this is that Australia has, on some measures, among the largest recoverable critical mineral deposits, including of high-quality cobalt, lithium, manganese, tungsten, vanadium and rare earth minerals. However, these have traditionally been mined and shipped to other places for processing. Indeed, “crude minerals”, the high-level export classification for many of these resources, including lithium concentrates, rose to be Australia’s sixth export category by value in 2023. But what the government seems to envisage is something of an on-shoring, or at least a friend-shoring, exercise, whereby those minerals are refined and/or processed in, or near, Australia. This goes hand in hand with the Critical Minerals Strategy 2023–2030, which aims to grow Australia’s critical minerals sector.
Seemingly as a result of COVID-19, there has been an increasing emphasis on supply chain security. The IPEF Supply Chain Agreement is targeted at achieving resilient supply chains. This intent appears to infuse the FMA as well, as the government’s policy brochure points outs:
“Clean energy technologies are critical inputs to Australia’s energy transition. Global supply chains for certain clean energy technologies are highly concentrated, especially for solar panels and batteries. This increases Australia’s vulnerability to a disruption in supply, which could pose significant risks to Australia’s economic resilience.”
If this all sounds very familiar to those coming from other large jurisdictions, let us hope that there is no global review process focusing on the originality of geostrategic trade and energy transition policies. (But as it does not seem likely that consistency, or otherwise, with international trade rules appears to be a pressing concern, policy plagiarism is unlikely to garner much attention as a cause for contrition.)
And it should not be forgotten that at the same time that Australia seeks to capitalise on its newly relevant supply chain role, it continues to provide large fuel tax breaks that help the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to operate in the more traditional energy consumption manner– and so extend reliance on imports for the time being in that regard.
Conclusion
Australia’s international trade outlook for 2025 will continue to pit traditional, stable trends and trade flows against new global developments. Its trade-related geostrategic efforts are seeing it look to great and powerful friends (with reforms to export controls as part of its AUKUS deal, critical minerals mini-deals with the United States, and supply chain co-operation as part of the IPEF), as well as new markets (India and the Middle East). Australia is cheerfully embarking on a spending and incentive spree to encourage downstream manufacturing in areas that are part of – at least plausibly – the energy transition. However, Australia’s trade policy developments could be the start of changes to what has been a fairly predictable, stable set of trade trends in recent times.
To rephrase a popular saying – “the more things stay the same, the more things change” could be used to describe Australia’s international trade outlook for 2025.
6/2 Brindabella Circuit
Brindabella Business Park
Canberra International Airport
ACT 2609
Australia
+61 261 631 000
+61 261 620 606
info@moulislegal.com www.moulislegal.com