The Cayman Islands is a common law jurisdiction. Litigation is primarily adversarial and is conducted through both written submissions and oral arguments.
Sources of Law
Sources of law include primary legislation passed by the Parliament of the Cayman Islands, secondary legislation made on the basis of authority found in primary legislation, and residual common law found in judicial precedent.
The Cayman Islands is a British Overseas Territory and, as such, the UK may, by Order in Council, extend certain laws to have effect in the Cayman Islands.
Judicial Precedent
Where there is no binding Cayman Islands judicial precedent, decisions of the English courts, as well as decisions of the courts of other common law jurisdictions, are persuasive. In practice, except in areas where there is a difference in the underlying legislation or public policy, it would be unusual for the Cayman Islands courts to take a different view of the common law than the UK Supreme Court. Decisions of the UK’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeals from the Cayman Islands courts are binding.
As a consequence, there are extensive areas of substantive Cayman Islands law that are identical or very similar to English law, especially in fundamental areas such as contract, tort, equitable principles, basic trust concepts, foundations of company law, and general concepts of corporate insolvency. However, there are also numerous important areas where, notwithstanding the overall kinship of the two legal systems, substantive Cayman Islands law differs materially from that of England, including, in particular, in certain specialist aspects of company and insolvency law that have developed independently to help make the Cayman Islands a leading jurisdiction for international financial services and investment funds.
Procedure
The Grand Court Rules, which govern the conduct of most high-value litigation in the Cayman Islands, mirror closely the Rules of the Supreme Court that governed High Court litigation in England prior to the introduction there in 1999 of the Civil Procedure Rules. However, the Grand Court Rules also incorporate a statement of governing principles – the Overriding Objective – which is in some respects similar to the Overriding Objective adopted in the English Civil Procedure Rules after 1999.
Insolvency proceedings are governed by their own bespoke set of Companies Winding Up Rules, which displace most of the provisions of the Grand Court Rules.
There are also separate rules for probate, matrimonial, personal bankruptcy, and small claims.
First Instance
Civil matters up to the value of KYD20,000 are heard by the Summary Court, which also hears certain other matters such as affiliation, maintenance and domestic violence applications. However, the principal court of first instance for all civil matters is the Grand Court, which also hears appeals from the Summary Court and certain quasi-judicial tribunals.
The Grand Court’s civil case load is broadly divided between the Civil Division, the Family Division, the Admiralty Division, and the Financial Services Division. The overwhelming majority of litigation concerned with international financial services takes place in the specialist Financial Services Division. Among other things, the Financial Services Division is the mandatory division for:
A particular feature of proceedings in the Financial Services Division of the Grand Court is that, ordinarily, the judge who is assigned to a matter at the outset remains assigned to it all the way until trial. Therefore, the same judge will hear all the interlocutory applications and will preside over the trial. This facilitates a high level of familiarity with the case.
Judges of the Grand Court are appointed from amongst individuals who must have the same qualifications as are required for appointment to the English High Court of Justice or courts of equivalent jurisdiction throughout the Commonwealth. They are eminently qualified and, in the Financial Services Division, possess extensive experience in financial services, corporate, and insolvency disputes.
Appeal
The Cayman Islands Court of Appeal hears appeals from the Grand Court. Unlike the Grand Court, which sits throughout the year, the Court of Appeal generally sits three sessions of three weeks, approximately in April, September, and November each year, although it is possible, in certain limited circumstances and where practicable and necessary in the interests of justice, for parties to apply for a special sitting.
All judges of the Court of Appeal have previously held high judicial office for many years in the Cayman Islands, England, or elsewhere in the Commonwealth.
Appeals from the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal are heard by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London.
All originating process documents filed with the Grand Court – such as writs, originating summonses, originating motions and petitions – are placed on a public register.
Other documents filed by the parties in court proceedings – such as summonses, pleadings, affidavits, witness statements, and skeleton arguments – are placed on the court file relating to the relevant proceeding. This file is not open to public inspection by default. However, any member of the public may apply to the court for permission to inspect or take a copy of any document on the court file.
A party to proceedings may apply to the court for an order that any document or part thereof filed with the court should be sealed from the public. Such sealing orders are not made lightly and require proper justification. However, in appropriate circumstances, the court can and does seal sensitive documents, and the court is highly experienced in dealing with sealing applications.
Insolvency Proceedings
In respect of documents filed with the court in insolvency proceedings, the default position is that, in addition to the company’s liquidator, the entire court file may be inspected by:
Any other person may inspect the court file by special leave of the court.
The court may, having regard to the overriding principle that justice should be done, order the sealing of a document on the court file of an insolvency proceeding for a specific period of time or until the happening of a specified event (usually the final dissolution of the company). However, it must be shown that the information in question is confidential and will not enter the public domain unless the document is filed with the court and the publication of this information will harm the economic interests of the creditors or contributories of the company. Any document sealed on this basis may be unsealed on the application of the liquidator, creditor, or contributory.
Trials and winding-up petitions are generally heard in open court, unless the court directs, for some special reason, that they should be heard in chambers. Interlocutory summonses, both in insolvency proceedings and in general litigation, are usually heard in chambers, unless the court directs a hearing in open court. Proceedings in chambers are generally considered private, although the judge may allow members of the public to attend.
The courts are guided by the principle of open justice but are also prepared to conduct hearings (or parts of hearings) in private where this is properly justified.
Natural persons may represent themselves and conduct court proceedings as litigants in person. However, save in exceptional circumstances, companies must always be represented by an attorney-at-law.
Only persons admitted to practice as attorneys-at-law in the Cayman Islands have unrestricted rights of audience before the courts. The legal profession in the Cayman Islands is not divided between solicitors and barristers in terms of rights of audience, as is the case in England. All local attorneys have equal rights of audience.
Foreign Lawyers
Foreign lawyers have no rights of audience and cannot conduct cases before the Cayman Islands courts. To the extent that foreign lawyers are engaged to act in connection with Cayman Islands proceedings, their fees will not generally be recoverable from the losing party as disbursements (save where they are engaged to give an opinion on a point of foreign law) or as part of an award in respect of attorney fees, save where costs have been awarded on the indemnity basis (see 11.2 Factors Considered When Awarding Costs). However, this is only a rule of thumb: the court has a wide discretion, when it comes to the taxation of costs, to direct that any item of work be allowed, disallowed, restricted or qualified.
However, a foreign lawyer may be granted “limited admission” to appear before the Cayman Islands courts for the purposes of a specific proceeding, if instructed to do so by a local attorney. In principle, such limited admission may be granted to any suitably qualified overseas senior advocate and, in practice, it is regularly granted to English King’s Counsel in proceedings that are sufficiently complex or high value to justify the appointment of such expert advocates. Junior counsel and solicitors might be granted “limited admission” in only very unusual circumstances.
On 1 May 2021, the Private Funding of Legal Services Act, 2020 (the Act) came into force in the Cayman Islands. The Act repealed any distinct offences under the common law of champerty and maintenance and provided for third-party funding agreements to be used in civil litigation without court sanction, subject only to a small number of formalities and well-defined conditions.
The law on third-party funding had previously developed incrementally to a point where it was fairly common outside of winding up proceedings; however, placing funding agreements on a statutory footing is a welcome development.
Even prior to the introduction of the Act, third-party funding of liquidations (with court sanction) had been fairly common for some time, and third-party funding of non-insolvency proceedings was gradually becoming more common. It is anticipated that large institutional funders will become much more active in the jurisdiction over the coming years.
There is no specific rule of law preventing a defendant from obtaining third-party funding. However, third-party funders normally seek to fund claims rather than defences, since claims are most likely to offer opportunities to make a profit. Defendants are therefore unlikely to be able to procure third-party funding without a counterclaim of sufficient merit and value to justify investment by a third party.
This depends on the particular third-party funder.
In principle, funding may be secured for any type of costs.
Save in certain limited circumstances, the Act also permits contingency agreements between clients and attorneys. This is true whether or not the contingency fee agreement includes a success fee, and a success fee can (subject to relevant caps on recovery discussed below) be a function of either costs incurred or recoveries in the action.
Where a contingency fee agreement provides that an attorney is entitled to a success fee, the success fee must not exceed more than 100% of the attorney’s normal fees. In addition, in the case of claims sounding in money, the total of any success fee payable by the client to the attorney must not exceed one third (33.3%) of the total amount awarded or any amount obtained by the client as a consequence of the proceedings (excluding costs).
Where a contingency fee agreement involves a percentage of the amount or of the value of the property recovered, the amount to be paid to the attorney must not exceed one third (33.3%) of the value of the property (save where a joint application is made to the court.
These caps may be varied by joint application to the court, depending on factors such as the nature and complexity of the proceedings, the expense or risk involved or any other relevant factors. The court will not, however, approve any contingency fee exceeding 40% of the total amount awarded, of any amount obtained by the client or of the value of any property recovered.
There are no formal time limits. In practice, it is wise to consider the possibility of third-party funding from the outset. However, a third-party funder is unlikely to commit until the case is developed to a stage where a meaningful assessment of merits and prospects of recovery can be undertaken. In appropriate cases, some funders will agree to advance “seed capital” required to progress investigations and/or the legal analysis to the point where a meaningful assessment of the merits and prospects of recovery can be undertaken.
Save in judicial review proceedings (in respect of which there is a pre-action protocol), the court does not impose any rules of pre-action conduct on the parties. The Grand Court has indicated that pre-action protocols in respect of personal injury, clinical negligence, defamation and repossession proceedings will be published in due course.
However, the parties should remember that the court has considerable discretion on the issue of costs and may well take pre-action conduct into consideration.
Limitation periods are prescribed by statute (Limitation Act (1996 Revision)) and vary depending on the nature of the claim. Claims under contract expire six years after the date of breach. Claims under a specialty (including a deed) expire 12 years after the cause of action arises, unless a shorter period of limitation is otherwise applicable. Tort claims have a six-year limitation period, which usually commences on the date the damage is incurred. However, for personal injury, libel and slander, the time limit is three years. Actions for sums recoverable under a legislative provision must be started within six years from the date when the sum became due. Claims for recovery of land can be commenced up to 12 years from the date when the right accrued (or 30 years if the claim is against the Crown).
In certain circumstances, limitation periods can be extended or abrogated altogether. For example, if the right of action has been deliberately concealed from the claimant by the defendant or if there has been acknowledgment of the debt or part payment, the limitation period may be extended.
Limitation periods do not apply at all in claims by a beneficiary against a trustee for fraudulent breach of trust or the recovery for trust property. In all cases, aside from limitation, claims might also become barred through delay (“laches”). In claims against companies, limitation stops running if a winding-up order is made in respect of the company. Special limitation rules apply to some claims available to company liquidators. It is also possible for parties to enter into standstill agreements to pause limitation periods while settlement negotiations are ongoing.
The basis of jurisdiction is primarily territorial and is generally founded on valid service of proceedings within the jurisdiction. As such, a person residing in the Cayman Islands or a company incorporated there may generally be sued in the Cayman Islands courts as of right, provided service of process is duly effected. However, it is potentially open for such a defendant to argue that the Cayman Islands courts should decline to exercise their jurisdiction over the claim in favour of a foreign court that is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum (forum non conveniens).
Jurisdiction Agreements and Service Outside the Cayman Islands
The Cayman Islands courts will also generally accept jurisdiction over disputes that fall within an express jurisdiction agreement between the parties designating the Cayman Islands courts as the forum. Jurisdiction may also be established if a defendant voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Cayman Islands courts by other means, for example by taking a substantive step in the proceedings (other than by disputing jurisdiction).
Jurisdiction may also be established over defendants residing or registered outside of the Cayman Islands if the court grants leave to serve the originating process outside of the Cayman Islands (see 3.5 Rules of Service).
Writ of Summons
Generally, a civil lawsuit is commenced by filing and serving a writ of summons. The writ may be indorsed with the full statement of claim from the outset. However, this is not mandatory and the writ may also be issued indorsed with a concise statement of the nature of the claim and the relief sought. In the latter case, the statement of claim must be filed as a separate pleading at a later date.
Originating Summons
Other specialist modes of commencing proceedings are also available, and, in some cases, they are mandatory.
For example, proceedings that are not expected to involve any substantial dispute of fact, such as where the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in relation to issues of pure contractual interpretation or interpretation of law, may be commenced by an originating summons, which invokes a simplified procedure to trial. The originating summons must set out the statements or questions on which the plaintiff seeks determination or the relief sought. It must also identify the causes of action.
Insolvency Proceedings
Insolvency proceedings must be begun by petition. The petition must set out:
Form and Procedure
In all cases – writ of summons, originating summons, or petition – the relevant court rules prescribe standard forms that serve as a template.
Both a writ of summons and an originating summons have an “expiry date” in that, having been filed, they must then be served upon the defendant within a certain period. This period is six months from the date of issue where leave for service out of jurisdiction is required and four months in all other cases. Unless served within these time periods (or unless validity of the document is extended by order of the court), validity of the originating process document will expire, necessitating the filing of a fresh writ or originating summons. This could have significant consequences if a limitation period expires in the meantime.
In general, originating process documents may be amended. A writ may be amended without leave of the court before it is served on the defendant. After service, a writ may be amended without leave once at any time before the pleadings are deemed to be closed, provided the amendment does not consist of adding, omitting, or substituting a party, altering the capacity in which a party is sued, or adding or substituting a new cause of action (these types of amendments require leave).
Once pleadings have closed (or, before pleadings have closed, if the plaintiff wishes to amend for a second time), the plaintiff requires leave of the court to amend the writ. The court has wide discretion over all such amendments. The same rule applies to originating summonses or other originating processes.
Service of originating process is the responsibility of the plaintiff.
Within the jurisdiction, natural persons must generally be served by personal service. Companies registered in the Cayman Islands may be served by delivery to their registered offices in the Cayman Islands. If proceedings are brought under a contract which specifies how originating process is to be served, then service can be effected in accordance with those provisions.
In cases where genuine difficulties arise in effecting service, a plaintiff may apply to the court for leave to serve by an alternative method, which may include by email, fax, or newspaper advertisement. Permission to serve by alternative means is not given lightly, but it can be obtained in appropriate cases.
Service Outside the Cayman Islands
Subject to limited exceptions, leave of the court is required to serve proceedings outside the Cayman Islands. To obtain leave, the plaintiff must:
Order 11, Rule 1 of the Grand Court Rules specifies a number of potential jurisdictional gateways for service outside of the Cayman Islands. Given the international nature of the businesses formed in the Cayman Islands, arguably the most pertinent of these gateways is the one that permits service out where the claim is against a current or former director, officer or member of a Cayman Islands company or a partner of a Cayman Islands partnership and concerns that company or partnership or the status, rights or duties of the relevant director, officer, member or partner in relation to that company or partnership.
Other significant gateways permit service out on a defendant who is a necessary or proper party to a suit already commenced or to be commenced, or where:
The defendant has 14 days from service of the writ (longer if service is outside of the Cayman Islands) to file an acknowledgment of service with the court. If the statement of claim was indorsed on the writ, the defendant then has another 14 days from the time limited for acknowledging service of the writ to file and serve a defence. If the statement of claim was not indorsed on the writ, then it must be filed and served within 14 days of the filing of the acknowledgment of service and the defendant has a further 14 days from service of the statement of claim to file its defence.
The consequences of failing to file an acknowledgment of service vary depending on the nature of the claim.
If the writ is indorsed with a liquidated demand only, failure by the defendant to acknowledge service of the writ and state an intention to defend will entitle the plaintiff to enter final judgment for the principal amount claimed, interest, and fixed costs.
If the claim is for unliquidated damages, the plaintiff may enter an interlocutory judgment against the defendant for damages to be assessed.
Other consequences apply for specialist proceedings, such as claims in detinue, possession of land, and mixed claims.
Similar consequences flow where the defendant does acknowledge service of the writ and indicates an intention to defend, but fails to file a defence on time.
Judgments entered against the defendant in default of acknowledgment of service or in default of defence are liable to be set aside or varied by the court. In practice, this is only likely to occur if the defendant re-engages in the proceedings and satisfies the court that setting aside or varying the judgment is appropriate.
In general, the defendant’s failure to engage with the legal process will not prevent a plaintiff from obtaining relief. Such failure may, however, have consequences for the enforceability of any resulting judgment in other jurisdictions, but that is a matter of the local law of the relevant foreign jurisdiction.
There is no formal class action process of the sort that is common in the USA. However, if a number of plaintiffs all wish to bring the same claim, a representative action by one plaintiff on behalf of the group is possible where all members of the group share a common interest and grievance (though there is currently no concept of a Group Litigation Order as envisaged under the English CPR 19).
Orders made in such proceedings are binding on all members of the group. However, they cannot be enforced against non-parties, unless the court orders otherwise.
There is no requirement to provide clients with a cost estimate.
The courts have wide powers to make a variety of interim orders and the parties often make a wide variety of interim applications. These include but are not restricted to case management issues.
Examples of interim applications and orders that might be made include:
Summary Judgment
Both the plaintiff and the defendant can apply for summary judgment on the other party’s case under the provisions of Order 14 of the Grand Court Rules. For the plaintiff, this can be a way of securing early final judgment on the merits. For the defendant, this can be a means of disposing quickly of a weak claim.
The court must be satisfied that the claim or the defence has no real prospect of success and there is no other reason why the case should go to trial. The application may relate to the whole or only a particular part of the claim or defence, and in the latter case, if successful, that part will be struck out.
In the case of an application by the claimant, it is possible to secure summary judgment on liability, with the claim for damages proceeding to trial. In the case of an application by the defendant, summary judgment may also be obtained if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has no prospect of recovering more than nominal damages.
Application for summary judgment is made by summons and supported by an affidavit verifying the facts on which the claim (or the defence) is based. The affidavit must state the affiant’s belief that there is no defence to the claim or, as the case may be, no defence except as to the amount of damages. The respondent to the application must show cause against it by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the court.
Summary judgment procedure is not normally appropriate for instances where there is a substantial factual dispute between the parties. The court will not conduct a mini-trial.
Upon hearing the application, the court may strike out the claim or the defence, in full or in part, and enter judgment for plaintiff or defendant accordingly. Where the court dismisses the summary judgment application, it may allow the action to proceed either unconditionally or on such terms as it sees fit.
Striking Out a Pleading
A related but distinct jurisdiction exists under Order 18, Rule 19 of the Grand Court Rules for the court to strike out or amend the whole or part of any pleading in a case. Such strike out is possible if the court is satisfied that the pleading:
Such strike out may have the consequence of the action being stayed, dismissed, or judgment being entered accordingly.
Disposal of a Case on a Point of Law
Finally, under Order 14A of the Grand Court Rules, the court has the power to dispose of the case on a point of law or construction of a document. The court may do so where the question is suitable for determination without a full trial and such determination will fully determine (subject only to any possible appeal) the entire claim or any issue within it.
There is a variety of dispositive motions that can be made before trial. They include applications for:
A defendant must launch any jurisdictional challenge within the time limited for service of defence (Order 12, Rule 8 of the Grand Court Rules). If the challenge succeeds, the court will decline jurisdiction and the proceedings will end. If the challenge fails, the claim will proceed, but the defendant will be granted further time to file a further acknowledgment of service and to serve a defence in due course.
There are a variety of potential grounds for challenging jurisdiction, including:
Interested parties not named in a lawsuit may intervene in it with leave of the court. The party wishing to join must apply for joinder and support its application by an affidavit explaining its interest in the matters in dispute (Order 15, Rule 6 of the Grand Court Rules).
The court may grant the application if:
A defendant (including a defendant to a counterclaim) can apply for an order that the plaintiff must pay a sum of money as security for the defendant’s costs. Security may be ordered, if the court thinks it just to do so, in a variety of circumstances, including where the plaintiff:
If one of the criteria is met, the court may make an order for security. There could be a variety of circumstances and reasons why the court might refuse to do so. For example:
The usual rule on costs is that they follow the event; ie, the loser pays. However, the court has wide discretion on the question of costs and can make a variety of alternative orders.
In general, the rule is no different in relation to the costs of interim applications. However, there are some exceptions. For example, the costs of any application for an extension of time are normally borne by the applicant, unless the court orders otherwise.
Further, there are some procedural applications and hearings, such as case management hearings and pre-trial reviews, where the usual court practice is not to identify “winners” and “losers” but to order costs to be in the cause.
The standard position on when interim application costs will fall to be paid is that all such costs will, unless they are agreed earlier by the parties, be assessed and become payable after the conclusion of the case. However, the court does have jurisdiction to order interim payment on account of costs in an amount to be assessed summarily, in which case such payment may be due within a reasonable time after the order is made.
The timeframe for the court to deal with a particular application will depend on the complexity of the application and the availability of court time.
The parties are required to indicate a time estimate for the hearing of their applications when filing them with the court. In light of the time estimate, the court fixes the hearing of the application based on judicial availability as well as the availability of the parties’ respective counsel.
Depending on the indicated hearing time estimate, different schedules for the filing of evidence and submissions will apply. Applications estimated to take no more than three hours of hearing time are known as “ordinary” applications and the standard timetable for their disposal envisages evidence in answer within 14 days of the application, evidence in reply within seven days of that, and the filing of skeleton arguments and hearing bundles not later than three business days before hearing. This implies a lead time to hearing of at least 24 days from application. Applications with a longer estimated hearing time are deemed “lengthy” and have a more extended timetable.
In practice, the timetable may be abridged by agreement of the parties. Furthermore, while these timetables should always be followed (and failure to do so may well incur, at the very least, the disapprobation of the judge), strictly speaking, they have the force of guidance and settled practice rather than the force of court rules and they may be departed from in cases where a more urgent hearing of the matter is properly justified. In principle, an application may be issued and served on the respondent with as little as four days’ notice of the hearing (Order 32, Rule 3(2) of the Grand Court Rules), while an application for an extension of time may be served with just one day’s notice (Order 32, Rule 3(1) of the Grand Court Rules). However, while strictly within the rules, the party making an application on such short notice may need to be prepared to justify the urgency and the need to depart from the guideline timetables for exchange of evidence. In those circumstances, adjournment of the hearing at the request of the respondent (and cost consequences) is a risk.
Therefore, the timeframe for hearing can vary very widely. A simple application on a discrete issue, for example for extension of time, might be heard within a matter of days. A complex application, such as a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction or for strike-out or summary judgment on a significant case, may well require several days’ worth of hearing time and might not be heard for several months.
However, the court always strives to accommodate truly urgent ex parte applications for freezing orders, injunctions, appointment of provisional liquidators and the like on an expedited basis. Such truly urgent applications can be heard within a matter of days or, in exceptional cases, even hours, provided the court is satisfied of the urgency.
Documentary Discovery
The parties have an ongoing discovery obligation, which arises at the close of pleadings. At that point, each party must serve on the other a list of all documents that are or have been in the party’s possession, custody or power and are relevant to any issue in the proceedings.
The test of relevance in the Cayman Islands is wider than standard disclosure in England and includes any document that tends to support or undermine either party’s case, including “train of enquiry” documents (this is sometimes referred to as the Peruvian Guano test). Documents are understood to include anything that is capable of recording or storing information. After lists are exchanged, each party can inspect and take copies of the documents on the other party’s list (save for documents over which privilege is asserted).
If a party is dissatisfied with the level of discovery given, it can make specific discovery applications seeking particular documents or categories of documents.
Outside of specific discovery applications, request-based conceptions of discovery found in, for example, arbitrations and under England & Wales Practice Direction 51U, are not recognised in the Cayman Islands.
Discovery by Oral Examination
In principle, discovery is also available by oral examination, although this is a tool that is seldom used. The court may order such discovery, on the application by a party, if the court is of the opinion that discovery by oral examination is necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.
Oral examination takes the form of a cross-examination under oath, which is transcribed by the court reporter. The transcript can be used at trial, including during cross-examination of witnesses.
Discovery against third parties is available under the well-known Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction in respect of third parties innocently or otherwise mixed up in the wrongdoing by the defendant (or potential defendant).
For the general approach to discovery and the applicable rules see 5.1 Discovery and Civil Cases.
A particular aspect of discovery in the Cayman Islands is that financial services litigation, in particular, often calls for discovery of documents that might be said to contain information confidential to the disclosing party’s clients or former clients. This can make the process of reviewing documents for discovery particularly time-consuming and might also require the disclosing party to make applications under the Confidential Information Disclosure Act, 2016, so as to ensure that the giving of discovery does not constitute an actionable breach of confidence.
This is not applicable in this jurisdiction.
Cayman Islands law on legal privilege mirrors English law in this area and recognises the following main categories of privilege.
In addition to the heads of privilege outlined above, “without prejudice” privilege may arise in the context of communications created in a bona fide effort to settle a dispute.
If the party considers a document to be relevant but privileged, it must still list it in its list of documents (albeit listing by category description is generally accepted), but it is not required to allow the other party to inspect the document or take copies of it. Documents may be redacted where they are partially privileged. In principle, a claim to privilege over a particular document may be challenged in court, but this is not a straightforward undertaking.
A party is not required to disclose a document if it would tend to incriminate that party or if disclosure of the document would be detrimental to the public interest.
A wide variety of injunctive relief may be obtained from the Cayman Islands courts, including the following.
In certain circumstances, injunctive relief may be granted without notice to the respondent. However, the respondent always has a right to have the matter heard inter partes at the earliest convenient date.
If the urgency is genuine and properly explained to the court, an application for injunctive relief may be heard and granted the same day.
Injunctive relief is available on an ex parte basis. Indeed, this is the usual basis on which freezing injunctions are granted. However, once the relief is granted ex parte, the respondent will have an opportunity to challenge the order at an inter partes hearing.
Whenever injunctive relief is granted ex parte the applicant is under the strict duty of full and frank disclosure to the court. This is an obligation to disclose to the court fully and fairly all matters, whether factual or legal, that are material to the applicant’s position (including adverse matters). Failure to give full and frank disclosure at the ex parte hearing may lead to the injunction being discharged inter partes regardless of the substantive merits.
It is a condition of obtaining a freezing injunction that the applicant must undertake to compensate any losses suffered by the respondent if it is later ruled that the injunction should not have been made.
In certain circumstances, the court may order for this undertaking to be fortified by the applicant providing security. In any event, the applicant should expect to have to disclose to the court information relevant to its ability to honour the undertaking in damages.
Injunctive relief is available against the assets of the respondent both in the Cayman Islands and worldwide.
A worldwide freezing order may be granted where the value of respondent’s assets in the Cayman Islands is unlikely to meet the value of the applicant’s claim. However, the court will often require the applicant to come back to obtain permission before enforcing the freezing order in a foreign jurisdiction.
A freezing order may be effective against third parties, depending on its terms. For example, an “extended definition” freezing order, which encompasses the respondent’s assets held on its behalf by third parties.
Moreover, third parties who knowingly assist the respondent in violating the freezing injunction will be in breach of the freezing injunction.
A respondent who breaches a freezing injunction is at risk of being found in contempt of court. This can have a variety of consequences that are prejudicial to the respondent, including, in the most serious cases, committal of a natural person to prison.
Trials are adversarial in nature. The role of the judge is to adjudicate on the parties’ competing factual and legal cases, rather than to conduct an inquisitorial procedure on the judge’s own account. This is not to say, however, that the judge is restricted to the role of a passive observer (see 7.7 Level of Intervention by a Judge).
Trials are conducted orally, with each side presenting oral arguments and cross-examining witnesses live in front of the presiding judge. It is usual to have opening and closing oral submissions summarising the case.
However, trials are preceded by the submissions of extensive written pleadings, witness statements, and expert reports, upon which subsequent oral arguments and cross-examinations are based. Sometimes, trials might begin with the filing of written opening submissions and end with the filing of written closings, but this depends on directions agreed by the parties or ordered by the judge in each case. The exact procedure is flexible and will be influenced by the complexity and volume of the issues.
Typically, there are at least two procedural hearings in a civil claim of any complexity.
Unless the parties agree directions to trial, in every proceeding there will be a directions hearing (usually after close of pleadings) at which the court can consider and set down the directions (including as to timing) for the subsequent conduct of proceedings until trial. This may include a variety of matters, such as:
In most cases of any complexity, there will also be a further procedural hearing called the “pre-trial review”. This is usually set for a date four to eight weeks before the trial itself and is intended to ensure that all preparations for trial are on track.
Civil cases are decided by a single judge sitting alone. In theory, a defendant in a civil case may request trial by jury under Section 21 of the Judicature Act (2021 Revision). However, the court will only order such trial where it considers the matter to be one that may be properly tried in that way. That would be an exceptional case.
Rules on admissibility of evidence are found in Sections 42–56 of the Evidence Act (2021 Revision) and in Order 38 of the Grand Court Rules. The approach in the Cayman Islands is similar to the approach in England pre-1999 and the guidance notes in the UK Rules of the Supreme Court 1999 (White Book) are a useful reference point. In general, the approach is inclusive. In particular, hearsay evidence is admissible, subject to appropriate notice being given. However, the nature of the evidence and the circumstances under which it was obtained will be relevant to the weight (if any) that the court attaches to it at trial.
Expert testimony may be presented at trial by the parties if the court so directs or all the parties agree. Directions for preparation and exchange of expert reports are usually made as part of directions to trial (whether agreed or made at a directions hearing). Those directions may also set out the questions on which the expert is to report. The parties will usually cross-examine each other’s experts at trial.
The court also has the power to appoint its own expert on the application of any party. If appointed, the court expert provides their report to the court and the parties and may then be cross-examined by the parties with leave of the court. Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties are jointly and severally responsible for the fees of the court expert.
In practice, it is usually the parties rather than the court that appoint the experts. Whether appointed by the court or by the parties, an expert’s overriding duty is to help the court on matters of their expertise and this overrides any obligation the expert might have to the party instructing or paying them.
Trials are typically held in open court and are open to the public. Interlocutory hearings are typically held in chambers, but the court has the discretion to admit members of the public. See 1.3 Court Filings and Proceedings.
The judge does not have an inquisitorial function. The judge listens to the oral submissions of the parties, and to the testimony of witnesses and experts, considers all the relevant written materials, documents, and legal arguments and renders a judgment on that basis.
This does not mean that a judge is required to be passive during the trial. The level of intervention depends on the individual preferences of a given judge. Many judges do intervene to ask questions of advocates and even of witnesses and experts. However, while there are always exceptions to the rule, those interventions are normally aimed at clarifying a particular point of evidence or argument rather than at pursuing a self-standing train of enquiry.
Many of the procedural steps, such as the filing of pleadings and the giving of discovery have standard time limits prescribed in the Grand Court Rules. However, in practice, in cases of any real complexity, those time limits are almost invariably extended by agreement of the parties. In any event, there are many other procedural steps, such as exchange of witness statements, expert reports, and the like which do not have any deadlines prescribed in the Grand Court Rules.
As such, there is no one-size-fits-all timeframe for proceedings. Everything hinges on the complexity of the issues, the volume of discovery, the number of witnesses, the need for expert evidence, the availability of the judge, and, indeed, on the parties’ respective strategies in terms of expediting or delaying resolution.
The most that can be said is that, even under a best-case scenario, any financial services or commercial claim of reasonable complexity and value that is commenced by writ is unlikely to get from issue of proceedings to trial quicker than nine months. A timeframe of up to two years would not be unusual for more complex claims. In extreme cases, proceedings can last for many years, but this is not common.
In terms of the duration of the trial itself, again, there is no standard trial length. It depends on the number of witnesses and experts who need to be cross-examined. It also depends on how much time the parties need to present their case in oral submissions and to sum up at the end, which in turn depends on the complexity of the legal and factual issues.
That said, few trials would last less than a week. Any commercial trial of any complexity, and especially trials involving allegations of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, are unlikely to take less than three weeks. In particularly complex cases, trials lasting for many weeks and sometimes months are not unusual. A recent major fraud trial in the Grand Court lasted over a year and resulted in a judgment running to over 1,000 pages.
Except in the context of insolvency proceedings (where liquidators sometimes require court sanction for settlement), or in cases where one of the parties is not of full capacity, court approval is not needed to settle a lawsuit.
There is no difficulty with keeping the terms of the settlement confidential.
Keeping the fact of the settlement confidential could be difficult if, as is usually the case, one of the parties wishes to have an order dismissing proceedings entered on the court file. Such an order would usually be publicly accessible.
As a matter of Cayman Islands law, settlement agreements are contracts like any other and are enforced accordingly.
To the extent the parties might have chosen to embody the terms of settlement in a court order, they can be enforced in the same way as any other order of the court.
As with any other contract, a party seeking to set aside a settlement agreement will need to seek this relief on one of the usual bases on which contracts can be avoided or declared void, such as misrepresentation, mistake, illegality, duress or other applicable doctrine.
The plaintiff specifies the relief it seeks in its writ and statement of claim. Following a full trial, the court may award a variety of relief, ranging from damages to a final injunction or an order for specific performance. Declaratory rulings may also be issued. Equitable remedies of rescission and rectification are also available. Account of profits, restitutionary remedies, and proprietary remedies (including any necessary tracing) are also available.
In the context of insolvency litigation, winding-up orders are available and, where the petition is presented by contributories on a just and equitable basis, also a variety of alternative remedies, such as a buy-out of shares or directions as to the future conduct of the company’s affairs.
In general, the approach to damages is compensatory rather than punitive. In principle, aggravated or exemplary damages might be available, for example in certain patent or tort claims, but this is rare. There is no statutory limit on damages.
Interest may be awarded both before and after judgment pursuant to Section 34 of the Judicature Act (2021 Revision) and the Judgment Debts (Rates of Interest) Rules (as revised from time to time). The applicable rates of interest vary depending on the currency of the judgment debt.
The most common forms of enforcement are:
Except for Australian judgments, which are subject to a statutory enforcement regime under the Foreign Judgments Reciprocal Enforcement Act (1996 Revision), foreign in personam judgments are enforced under the common law.
In order to be enforced, the foreign judgment:
Although most judgments that are enforced are money judgments, certain non-money judgments may also be enforced in appropriate circumstances.
The foreign judgment is enforced by issuing a writ suing on the judgment debt. The court will not typically re-hear the substantive dispute behind the foreign judgment and, accordingly, the enforcement claim is usually suitable for expedited determination by summary judgment. Once a Cayman Islands judgment is entered on the enforcement claim, it is enforceable by the same means as any other domestic judgment.
Appeals from the Grand Court lie to the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal. Further appeals lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the UK.
Appeals from final judgments of the Grand Court generally lie as of right. Appeals from most interlocutory decisions require permission, which may be obtained from the Grand Court or, if refused, from the Court of Appeal. To obtain permission, the would-be appellant must show that the appeal has a realistic (as opposed to fanciful) chance of success.
If leave to appeal is not required, a notice of appeal must be filed and served within 14 days of the date on which the judgment or order being appealed from was filed.
In cases where leave to appeal is required, leave should be sought orally at the handing down of the judgment in the Grand Court. Failing that, leave can be sought from the Grand Court in writing within 14 days of the decision. If leave is then granted by the Grand Court, a notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the date on which the judgment or order being appealed from was filed. If the Grand Court refuses leave, it can be sought from the Court of Appeal ex parte within seven days from the date of the Grand Court’s refusal and the application is usually decided by a single judge of appeal.
Appeals from the Court of Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council may be brought: (i) as of right; (ii) with leave of the Court of Appeal; or (iii) with special leave from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council itself. Where leave is sought from the Court of Appeal, it should be sought, on notice to the other parties, within 21 days of the date on which the Court of Appeal’s decision was filed.
The appeal court has jurisdiction to consider appeals on matters of law, fact, and the exercise of discretion by the first instance judge. However, the appeal court will be slow to overturn a judge’s findings of fact (especially if they were made following a trial where witnesses were cross-examined). The appeal court is also reluctant to interfere with the judge’s exercise of discretion, unless it:
The court may impose conditions such as the payment of security.
The appeal court may affirm, set aside, or vary any order of the lower court. It may also order a new trial. The appeal court may make orders as to costs and interest.
See 4.6 Costs of Interim Applications/Motions.
The court has wide discretion when awarding costs. The parties’ conduct in the litigation, including any payments into court or offers of settlement may be taken into account.
The usual costs award is on the standard basis, which means that costs will only be allowed to the extent they are proportionate to the issues involved, were reasonably incurred, and were reasonable in amount, with any doubts that the taxing officer may have on these issues resolved in favour of the paying party.
If costs are awarded on an indemnity basis, all costs shall be allowed except insofar as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred (and any doubts which the taxing officer may have as to whether the costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount shall be resolved in favour of the receiving party). This tends to lead to a higher proportion of cost recovery. However, indemnity basis costs are rarely awarded and usually require a finding that a party behaved improperly.
Interest is payable on costs and runs from the date of the costs order. It is calculated according to the rates set out in the Judgment Debts (Rate of Interest) Rules.
Mediation is gaining traction as a method of ADR in the Cayman Islands. However, it remains relatively uncommon for large commercial disputes to be resolved by ADR.
Save in respect of certain proceedings issued in the Family Division of the Grand Court, ADR is not made compulsory by the court system. There are no prescribed sanctions for unreasonably refusing ADR. However, as the court has a wide discretion in considering cost awards, it is conceivable that it might be persuaded to take unreasonable refusal of ADR into account in appropriate circumstances.
Further, in a recent development in August 2022, the Grand Court introduced Practice Direction No 3 of 2022, which provides that a matter, including a Financial Services Division matter, may be referred to judicial mediation by the Court at any stage in the proceeding. It remains to be seen how this new Practice Direction is implemented in practice, but it underlines the increasing importance that ADR is likely to play in the future.
The Cayman Islands Association of Mediators and Arbitrators (CIAMA) promotes the use of mediation (and ADR generally) in the Cayman Islands.
For a detailed treatment of the subject of arbitration in the Cayman Islands, please see the Cayman Islands Law & Practice chapter in the Chambers International Arbitration Guide 2023.
Domestic arbitration is governed by the Arbitration Act, 2012. Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is governed by the Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement Act (1997 Revision).
Most matters are arbitrable. One significant exception is matters related to insolvency.
The award may be appealed on a point of law. In addition, the award may be set aside on the basis that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction as well as on the basis of certain serious procedural irregularities and on the basis that the award is contrary to public policy.
Both domestic and foreign arbitration awards must be converted into a Grand Court judgment before then being enforced like any other judgment of the court. In either case, the enforcement application is made ex parte by originating summons. The respondent will have 14 days after being served with the enforcement order to challenge it and, if the respondent does so, enforcement will not be possible until the challenge is determined.
An August 2022 amendment to the Companies Act and Companies Winding Up Rules introduced changes to the restructuring regime in the Cayman Islands. Directors of companies can now apply for a restructuring officer to be appointed without the need for the presentation of a winding-up petition. This has the benefit of helping the company restructure more expediently whilst avoiding any negative press associated with the appointment of a provisional liquidator.
The commencement of Parts 1 and 2 and Sections 99 and 101 of the Legal Services Act came into force on 14 October 2022. Broadly, these sections encompass the establishment of a legal council that will be responsible for the regulation of attorneys-at-law in the Cayman Islands and the enabling of Cabinet to make regulations. This will pave the way for the eventual repeal of the Legal Practitioners’ Act, which is due to be replaced by the Legal Services Act.
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cayman@careyolsen.com www.careyolsen.comSecurity for Costs – Costs Recovery Protection for Litigants in the Cayman Islands
In Cayman Islands litigation the general rule is that costs “follow the event”. In other words, the losing party is obligated to pay not only their own legal costs, but a portion of the costs of the successful party as well. The portion of the successful party’s costs that is payable is determined by way of taxation, conducted based on the type of costs order awarded to the successful litigant by the court. Taxation on an indemnity basis would result in the successful party being entitled to 100% of their recoverable costs, whilst a standard taxation would normally lead to a recovery by the successful party of approximately 60-70% of their costs.
Therefore, a defendant to legal proceedings in the Cayman Islands may need to expend substantial resources in defending a claim brought against them but, if they are ultimately successful, they would be entitled to recover a significant portion of those costs from the plaintiff. However, if there is reason to believe that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy an adverse costs award, the defendant is left in the unenviable position of being required to pay to defend a claim with little to no prospect of costs recovery.
A security for costs order can provide defendants (including counterclaim defendants) with some comfort in such a situation. However, there is no guarantee that security for costs will be awarded to either party in any given case.
Whether, how much, and in what form security is awarded is entirely at the discretion of the court based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case at bar. The Cayman Islands Grand Court (the “Court”) is most concerned with ensuring the promotion of justice between litigants when considering whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction to make a security for costs order in the defendant’s favour.
Commercial Litigation
Order 23, rule 1 of the Grand Court Rules (GCR) provides that where one of the stipulated preconditions (or jurisdictional thresholds) is met, the Court may in its discretion, and having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, order the plaintiff to give such security for the defendant’s costs of the action or other proceedings as it thinks just.
The most commonly relevant jurisdictional threshold is that the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside of the jurisdiction. Importantly, there is no presumption that the Court will ordinarily require a foreign plaintiff to give security for costs; rather the Court’s discretion will be exercised on a case-by-case basis (Re Cybervest Fund [2006 CILR 80], per Smellie CJ at [23]).
Just in the circumstances
The relevant circumstances, and the respective weight given to them by the Court, will turn on the particular facts of any given case. Issues previously identified by the Court as being important in an assessment of whether it is “just” for a security for costs order to be made, include the following.
Assets of the plaintiff
The Court will often look at the extent to which the plaintiff provides information about the nature, value and location of assets that could potentially be enforced against when determining whether to order security for costs (In the Matter of Jafar v Abraaj Holdings and others, Justice Segal, Unreported, 10 August 2021).
Obstacles to enforcement
The Court would need to be satisfied that if a costs order is made against the plaintiff, enforcement of that order would not be an unduly onerous process for the defendant. In this regard, the Court will first consider whether the plaintiff has substantial assets within the jurisdiction to satisfy a costs award. Security will not normally be awarded against a foreign plaintiff with substantial assets in the jurisdiction. If there is no evidence that substantial assets are available in the jurisdiction, the Court will then consider how difficult it would be for the defendants to enforce the award in the relevant foreign country and, in particular, whether there is a real and serious risk that the defendant would ultimately not be able to enforce the award (Kuwait Ports Authority and ors v Port Link GP Ltd and ors (Unreported, Justice Parker, 25 November 2021)).
Balance of prejudice
The key question here would be whether it would be more prejudicial to the plaintiff if a security for costs order were made, than it would be to the defendant if no security was granted. This consideration also informs the quantum of security awarded (In the Matter of Jafar v Abraaj Holdings and others, Justice Segal, Unreported, 10 August 2021).
Potential for stifling the claim
Here the Court will look at whether the plaintiff is unable to afford a security for costs payment such that making the order would stifle or inhibit the conduct of the proceedings. It is incumbent on a plaintiff that raises this argument in opposition to the application to establish in the evidence that a security for costs order would stifle its claim (Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd v Triplan Ltd [1973] QB 609 as applied in In the Matter of Jafar v Abraaj Holdings and others, Justice Segal, Unreported, 10 August 2021).
Alternative protections/security
It may be that instead of a security for costs order, the plaintiff could feasibly provide comfort to the defendant by entering into a contractual undertaking for the settlement of a costs order. A key factor in whether this type of arrangement would be appropriate, and provide “good security” is the ease of enforceability of the proposed undertaking or contractual arrangement (Caribbean Islands Developments Limited v First Caribbean International Bank [2014 (2) CILR 220]).
Merits of the claim
The Court will have regard to the relative strength and weakness of each party’s case when determining whether or not to make an award for security, but it will not undertake a detailed assessment of the merits of the claim unless it can clearly be demonstrated that there is a high probability of success or failure as regards the plaintiff’s case (Chernukhin and others v Danilina [2018] EWCA Civ 1802).
Affiliation with a foreign state
Connection of the plaintiff to “a foreign state or foreign state agency that enjoys good standing in the international community” has been held to be a factor indicating that the plaintiff would be able, and indeed incentivised by comity, to honour its obligations if a costs award is made against it (Kuwait Ports Authority and ors v Port Link GP Ltd and ors (Unreported, Cayman Islands Court of Appeal (CICA), 20 January 2023)).
The above is by no means an exhaustive list of potentially relevant factors in the exercise of the Court’s discretion but provides a roadmap to the Court’s analysis when determining whether or not to award security to a defendant.
Insolvency Litigation
In the context of insolvency litigation, security for costs applications are generally made in circumstances where claims are brought on behalf of or against a company in liquidation. As a matter of law, liquidators are entitled to bring proceedings on behalf of an insolvent company to recover losses incurred by that company before the commencement of the liquidation.
The jurisdiction for security for costs in a liquidation context is found in Section 74 of the Companies Act (as revised) (Companies Act). That provision states that where a company is the plaintiff and the defendant has reason to believe that the assets of the company will be insufficient to pay the defendant’s costs, the Court may require sufficient security to be given by the company for those costs. As in the case of commercial litigation, the Court’s power to order security under Section 74 is discretionary and will be exercised in light of all of the relevant circumstances of the matter.
As the Cayman Islands Bill of Rights prohibits discrimination on the grounds of, among other things, national origin, the Court is required to avoid discriminatory treatment in the application of Section 74. Accordingly, notwithstanding that the Companies Act defines a “company” as a company registered in the Cayman Islands, Section 74 has been held to apply to foreign (petitioner) companies as well as Cayman companies (In the Matter of Dyxnet Holdings Limited (Cayman Islands Court of Appeal, 20 February 2015)).
Impecuniosity
The threshold consideration in applying Section 74 is whether or not there is reason to believe that the corporate plaintiff would be unable to satisfy an adverse costs award made against it. At this initial stage of the assessment, the Court will evaluate whether there is a real risk that the defendant’s costs will not be paid were they to successfully defend the claim against them.
In this regard, the fact that the plaintiff company is the subject of an insolvent liquidation is important, but not determinative. That the plaintiff company is in insolvent liquidation is prima facie evidence that it would be unable to satisfy an adverse costs order. However, it is possible for the liquidator bringing the claim to illustrate to the Court that the company does, or will, have the ability to satisfy an adverse costs order awarded against it (with reference to detailed evidence on the financial state of the company). It should be borne in mind that the Cayman Islands test for insolvency is the cash-flow test. Consequently, a company could theoretically be balance sheet solvent but, insolvent as a matter of Cayman law because it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. In such instances, the Court may well be persuaded that the Company’s illiquid assets are sufficient to negate the need for a security for costs award.
It is trite that impecuniosity is only the first stage of the security for costs analysis in the insolvency context. If satisfied as to the company’s impecuniosity, the Court has discretion as to whether to order security for costs in light of all the circumstances of the case (Traded Life Policies Fund and anor v Jeremy Leach et al, (Unreported, CICA, 21 December 2021). If this were not so, claims brought by liquidators on behalf of insolvent companies would almost always be stifled by security for costs orders on the grounds of impecuniosity.
Exercise of discretion
GCR Order 23 does not apply in the context of a liquidation but, as might be expected, once the Court has found that the plaintiff company is impecunious, similar considerations apply when determining whether a security for costs order should be made.
These include, but are not limited to, the following, which were set out in the English case of Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. V Triplan Ltd. (1973 Q.B. 609) and applied by the Court in Traded Life Policies Fund and anor v Jeremy Leach et al (Unreported, Justice Richards, 19 January 2021):
A balancing exercise
This includes, on the one hand, weighing up the injustice to the plaintiff if it is prevented from pursuing a proper claim, and on the other hand, the injustice to the defendant if the claim fails and the defendant is unable to recover its costs. The Court will be concerned that security for costs is not used as an instrument of oppression whereby a genuine claim is stifled, or a weapon whereby an impecunious company can put pressure on a more prosperous company.
Prospects of success
The strength of the Plaintiff’s claim will be considered but this, generally, will not include a detailed analysis of the merits of the claim.
Stifling the claim
Before refusing an application for security for costs on the grounds that granting the relief would stifle the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff must satisfy the Court that it is probable, in all the circumstances, that the claim would in fact be stifled if a security for costs order were made. In this regard, the Court will explore whether the plaintiff company might be able to raise money to pay security from another source.
Timing
The Court will consider the lateness of the application for security for costs in determining whether the relief should be granted.
Causation
Insolvency litigation often involves liquidators advancing breach of duty claims against former directors of an insolvent company to recover losses incurred by the company as a result of those directors’ conduct. It would be patently unjust for the defendant directors to use the fact that the plaintiff is impecunious to demand payment of security in circumstances where the company’s financial state is alleged to be a direct result of the actions of the defendant directors. Insolvent plaintiff companies often make this argument when defending against a security for costs application brought by a company’s former service providers.
The Court has historically found it challenging to make a finding with respect to causation of the plaintiff’s impecuniosity without making a determination as to the merits of the claim and by extension, the liability of the defendant, which are matters that should be reserved for trial. Generally, where the Court has found it difficult to separate causation and liability, it has given more weight to the impecuniosity argument of the defendant. The result of this has been that security for costs is generally granted in favour of the defendant directors in order to avoid a causation analysis that could lead to an inappropriate assessment on the merits of the claim, at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings.
However, the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal in Traded Life (Unreported, CICA, 21 December 2021) has helpfully clarified that it is possible to distinguish responsibility (causation) from liability of the defendants. Depending on the facts of the case, it is open to the Court to determine that security for costs should be refused because the defendant caused the impecuniosity of the claimant, without there being any “prejudgment of the substantive issues raised in the proceedings”.
Quantum
Once the Court has determined that an Order for security for costs should be made, the next question is, naturally – how much?
The Court recently confirmed in the case of Abdulhameed Dhia Jafar v Abraaj Holdings (In official liquidation) and ors (Unreported, Justice Segal, 2 October 2023) that it has a discretion to award security in an amount which it considers just, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. The appropriate amount will generally be the sum which the Court considers, having reviewed the evidence, the defendant applicant would be likely to recover following a detailed costs assessment on the standard basis. Taxation on the standard basis allows for the recovery of costs that were reasonably incurred and proportionate having regard to (i) the amount of money involved (value of the claim); (ii) the importance of the case; and (iii) the complexity of the issues.
The objective of the Court when determining quantum is to arrive at “a fair and realistic but not necessarily precise or generous” estimate of costs recoverable on a standard taxation. To enable the Court to arrive at this estimate, the applicant for security must provide sufficient detail regarding the anticipated total costs in respect of which security is sought (whether those costs have already been incurred, or are estimates of costs yet to be incurred).
The Court has also indicated that, as it is likely that the full amount claimed by the defendant will not be recovered on taxation, a discount will normally be applied. There is no “hard and fast rule”, but the discount applied will depend on the view that the Court forms as to the categories of work and associated time costs as set out by the applicant in their evidence. The extent to which the costs identified are likely to be discounted on taxation will also inform the level of discount.
Applicants can be given liberty to apply for further security to provide additional protection as the litigation develops.
Form of Security
Where an Order for security for costs is made, the manner in which security shall be given will be directed by the Court. The Court has found that the key consideration in deciding what form of security is appropriate is whether what is proposed does in fact provide “real security” to the defendant.
The usual form the security takes is a cash deposit into an escrow account under the control of the Court, but another form of security may be acceptable if it amounts to “real” security. In this regard, the Court in the case of Caribbean Islands Development Ltd v First Caribbean International Bank ([2014] (2) CILR 220) explained that, outside of a payment into Court, real security is "a promise which would in all likelihood be honoured, given [by] an entity with the wherewithal to pay and against whom enforcement can be readily obtained; in short, if given [by] a truly creditworthy entity”.
In determining whether the proposed security would be real security, the Court will consider whether the security is offered from an entity in the jurisdiction, and/or is to be enforced against assets available in the jurisdiction.
Conclusion
It is clear that the Court has been, and will continue to be, flexible in the exercise of its inherent discretion to order security for the defendant’s costs of defending litigation in the Cayman Islands. Impecuniosity of the plaintiff is only one of several considerations in the Court’s analysis. The primary objective is to do justice between the litigants in applying the principles that have been established by precedent.
Given the approach adopted by the Court in this area, security for costs can operate as a form of insurance for defendants who consider that they have a good chance of defeating the claim brought against them. At the same time, the Court is clearly concerned to ensure that vulnerable plaintiffs with valid claims are not prohibited from pursuing those claims simply because they are unable to establish, often at the outset of the litigation, an ability to satisfy what might ultimately be a substantial adverse costs order.
In our view, the Court should be slow to award security for costs against a plaintiff liquidator of an insolvent company. It should always be borne in mind that Cayman Islands liquidators are first and foremost officers of the Court. As such, they owe a duty to the Court to exercise their own discretion judiciously when electing whether or not to bring claims on behalf of an insolvent company. In our experience, that decision to exercise their discretion to bring claims on behalf of a company will not be made lightly and, usually, is made with the benefit of legal advice. Bad actors should not be able to avail themselves of the ability to stifle a proper claim with reasonable prospects of success, purely by virtue of the plaintiff’s insolvency.
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