The primary statute governing cartel conduct in Indonesia is Law No 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, as amended by Law No 6 of 2023 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation No 2 of 2022 in Lieu of Law No 11 of 2020 on Job Creation into Law (ICL). While the ICL does not expressly define “cartel”, cartel conduct under ICL generally refers to any form of agreement or co-ordination, whether written or unwritten, between two or more competing business actors, either in or for the market, where such conduct hampers, restricts or distorts competition.

Consistent with these frameworks, the ICL prohibits various forms of cartel conduct with the implementing guideline by the KPPU, including price fixing (Article 5), market allocation (Article 9), output or supply restrictions (Article 11), group boycott (Article 10) and bid rigging (Article 22). These prohibitions apply across all industries and both domestic and foreign entities, whether acting directly or through any form of association, thereby also capturing hub-and-spoke cartels arrangements. To support the implementation of these prohibitions, the Indonesian Competition Commission (ICC) has issued several implementing guidelines for price fixing (Article 5), supply restrictions (Article 11) and bid rigging (Article 22).

Beyond the existing statutory and regulatory framework, by late 2025, discussions on a further amendment to the ICL had progressed and indicated a clear direction towards the introduction of a leniency programme for cartel cases. However, it should be noted that no such amendment has been enacted to date. Accordingly, any leniency framework remains at the proposal stage, and its scope, procedures and timing of implementation will depend on the content of the bill as ultimately approved through the legislative process.

The ICC is the sole authority responsible for enforcing competition laws in Indonesia, including the prohibitions of cartels. It has jurisdiction to investigate, adjudicate and impose administrative sanctions for violations of the ICL across all sectors. Its jurisdiction extends to domestic and foreign business actors whose conduct has anti‑competitive effects in the Indonesian market.

Substantive violations of the ICL, including cartel conduct, are subject only to administrative sanctions and do not incur criminal or civil liability. The ICC holds administrative authority in adjudicating competition cases. It may impose administrative sanctions comprising a fine of at least IDR1 billion, with a maximum of 50% of the company’s net profit or 10% of its turnover in the relevant market during the violation period; cancellation of agreements; and/or compensation or damages.

Civil liability is not enforced by the ICC, and parties suffering losses from competition law violations may pursue civil claims for damages before the general courts in accordance with general civil law principles. While criminal sanctions apply solely in cases of obstruction of a ICC investigation or examination, which may result in a fine of up to IDR5 billion or imprisonment for a maximum of one year, the ICC has no direct criminal enforcement powers, and criminal proceedings fall under the jurisdiction of the National Police.

A notable recent development is the ICC’s intensified enforcement against alleged cartel conduct, particularly in the fintech P2P lending sector, where 97 companies were found to have violated Article 5 of the ICL (price fixing) through co-ordinated interest rate setting. Aggregate fines in this case reached IDR755 billion, making it the largest cartel enforcement action in ICC history (Case No 05/KPPU-I/2025) (the “Fintech P2P Lending Case”). This development reflects an escalation in enforcement practice rather than a change in the substantive legal framework.

A private right of action to challenge cartel behaviour exists, but it is strictly limited and operates only on a follow-on basis. Under Article 47 of the ICL, the ICC is authorised to impose administrative sanctions on business actors, including orders to pay compensation to parties that have suffered losses as a result of ICL violations, including cartel conduct. In practice, however, although compensation may be stated in a ICC decision, the ICL does not specifically regulate the mechanism for enforcing such compensation, nor does it allow for automatic recovery. As a result, compensation should be pursued through a civil lawsuit. In addition, affected consumers and other business actors may seek compensation either individually or through a class action by filing a civil claim before the District Court.

One notable case was a 2019 class action related to an alleged automatic motorcycle cartel, which was denied certification, citing a lack of sufficient commonality among the proposed class members. The proposed amendments to the ICL may bring further developments in this area, potentially clarifying or expanding the scope of private enforcement.

Cartel conduct under the ICL is defined broadly and captures both explicit and implicit co-ordination between competitors. Under the ICL, a cartel is understood as any form of agreement or concerted practice, whether written or unwritten, between two or more competing business actors operating at the same level of the market, where such conduct has the purpose or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. A formal contract is not required, and tacit co-ordination or may qualify as cartel conduct where anti-competitive effects can be established.

The ICL expressly prohibits several forms of cartel behaviour, including the following.

• Price fixing (Article 5), where competitors agree to set or maintain prices at an artificial level. By eliminating price competition, consumers face higher costs and fewer affordable choices.
• Market allocation which divides territories (Article 9), customer groups or product categories among competitors so that each firm can dominate its assigned area without facing direct rivalry.
• Collective boycotts (Article 10), where businesses jointly refuse to deal with certain suppliers, buyers or new entrants, effectively shutting them out of the market.
• Establishment of production quotas or output restrictions (Article 11). In this form, firms agree to limit the quantity of goods they produce in order to keep supply low and price high.
• Bid rigging (Article 22), a practice in which firms collude to pre-determine the outcome of tenders. This often involves rotating winning bids among cartel members, ensuring that all participants benefit at the expense of buyers.

The ICL applies across all industries and to both domestic and foreign business actors whose conduct affects competition in the Indonesian market. There is no blanket statutory exemption for specific industries from cartel prohibitions.

Nevertheless, the ICL recognises limited statutory exemptions, including:

• acts intended to implement mandatory laws or regulations, where cartel-like conduct is expressly required or authorised by government policy;
• certain agreements related to intellectual property rights, standards or joint ventures, provided they do not result in anti-competitive effects; and
• certain agreements related to joint ventures.

In regulated or state-influenced sectors, such as energy, telecommunications or essential commodities, competition law operates alongside sector-specific regulation. Regulatory oversight does not automatically exempt business actors from cartel liability, and enforcement practice indicates that cartel prohibitions may still apply where co-ordination exceeds what is legally mandated.

The ICL does not prescribe specific limitation periods for the initiation for enforcement proceedings by the ICC. The ICC may investigate and pursue alleged anti-competitive conduct provided that the conduct occurred after the ICL entered into force on 6 March 2000. Reports may therefore be submitted irrespective of the timing of the alleged conduct, subject to the reporting party’s ability to present sufficient evidence to justify further investigation by the ICC.

Cartel conduct occurring entirely outside Indonesia may still fall within the scope of enforcement where it produces effects on competition in the Indonesian market. In practice, the ICL may assert enforcement where a cartel’s participants are established, domiciled or operate in Indonesia, including through subsidiaries or affiliated entities in Indonesia, thereby establishing nexus with the domestic market.

Consistent with this approach, the ICC has pursued enforcement against foreign business groups through their Indonesian entities, including the imposition of administrative sanctions and, in a non-cartel case, divestment orders. To address residual jurisdictional uncertainty, the draft third amendment to the ICL seeks to expressly clarify the ICC’s authority to apply competition law to business actors incorporated or located outside Indonesia, provided that their conduct affects competition within the Indonesian market.

The ICL does not contain explicit provisions recognising principles of comity. In practice, however, elements of comity may be reflected through the international engagement of the ICC.

According to information published on ICC’s official website, its international relations are not merely ceremonial, but are aimed at knowledge exchange, capacity building and the harmonisation of competition policy and enforcement approaches. The ICC participates in international and regional fora, including the OECD, UNCTAD, APEC, the International Competition Network (ICN) and the ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC). The ICC has also entered bilateral memoranda of understanding focusing on technical co‑operation and the exchange of non‑confidential information.

The legal framework under the ICL limits the sharing of confidential investigation materials; accordingly, cross‑border enforcement co‑operation remains informal and non‑binding.

Based on the ICC’s five-year report from 2018 to 2023, cartel enforcement in Indonesia have been overwhelmingly dominated by bid rigging, particularly in relation to public procurement and government-related infrastructure projects. Tender-related collusion represents the most frequently pursued form of cartel conduct and constitutes a significant portion of the ICC’s enforcement activity during that period.

Price-fixing cases are also enforced but are comparatively fewer and typically arise in consumer goods, essential commodities and services sectors. Such cases tend to be more complex and often rely on indirect evidence and economic analysis. Other forms of cartel conduct, including market allocation or output restriction, have been pursued far less frequently as standalone cases.

While bid rigging has historically dominated enforcement, recent developments indicate a broader enforcement focus. Most notably, on 26 March 2026, the ICC concluded a major case against fintech peer‑to‑peer lending companies, finding large‑scale horizontal price fixing in relation to interest rates and fees, and imposing substantial administrative fines totalling IDR755 billion. This decision signals increasing scrutiny of non‑procurement‑related cartels, particularly in the digital and financial services sectors.

To date, cartel enforcement has almost exclusively targeted domestic conducts. There have been no cartel cases involving purely foreign cartel participants or enforcement action based solely on offshore conduct without an Indonesian presence.

Indonesia does not operate a formal cartel leniency programme. Accordingly, cartel investigations are not leniency‑driven and are initiated ex officio by the ICC, including on the basis of complaints from third parties or public institutions, market monitoring activities, and information uncovered in related investigations, particularly in procurement matters.

The ICC has published several written guidelines relating to cartel conduct and enforcement, which are publicly accessible on the ICC’s official website. These include:

• Implementation Guideline of Article 5 regarding Price Fixing;
• Implementation Guideline of Article 11 regarding Cartel (Output or Supply Restrictions); and
• Implementation Guideline of Article 22 regarding Bid Rigging.

While the ICC has issued guidelines addressing different forms of cartel conduct, it has not adopted separate guidelines for each prohibited category. Market allocation and group boycott, for instance, lack dedicated guidelines.

Cartel investigations in Indonesia may be initiated either through the ICC’s own initiative or based on a third-party report. At the initial stage, the relevant ICC working unit conducts a preliminary investigation of the alleged cartel conduct, either by commencing the review itself or by evaluating a third‑party complaint. Based on its findings, the working unit will present its report in the ICC Commissioners’ meeting, which will then determine whether the case should proceed to the investigation stage. If the case is incomplete or fails to satisfy the ICC’s absolute competence, it will be terminated.

In conducting its investigation, the ICC bears the burden of proving the existence of cartel conduct through admissible evidence. Such evidence may consist of direct evidence (observable elements indicating the existence of price fixing agreements, such as recorded telephone conversations, e-mails, video communications and other tangible materials) and indirect evidence (circumstantial evidence comprising communication evidence and economic analysis, including entry barriers, facilitating tools and market structure). In practice, the ICC frequently relies on indirect evidence to establish the existence of cartel conduct.

The ICC does not currently have the power to conduct dawn raids or obtain search warrants. Its investigative powers are limited to summoning parties and requesting documents and information from reported parties, witnesses and other relevant individuals. Where parties fail to comply with such request, the ICC may refer the matter to enforcement agencies, such as the National Police. However, to date, there is no publicly available precedent on the enforcement of this authority being exercised in practice.

Given these limitations, the ICC does not undertake home or office raids, and there is no established practice of dawn raids in Indonesian competition enforcement. Companies are therefore not subject to obligations to assist in a search in the dawn-raid sense, as no such process exists. The ICC’s approach is confined to formal requests for information and documents, together with the summoning of relevant parties. However, there have been instances whereby ICC officials may step in to businesses’ premises, either on an announced or unannounced basis, typically in connection with information-gathering activities rather than the execution of formal search-and-seizure powers.

This position is expected to change. The draft third amendment to the ICL introduces search-and-seizure authority for the ICC, representing a significant departure from current practice. These powers are intended to address practical challenges in evidence collection, particularly in cartel and covert arrangement cases.

The ICL does not contain specific provisions addressing the spoliation of evidence in competition cases. However, under general principles of Indonesian laws, once a party becomes aware of an ICC investigation or receives a summons, it is expected to preserve relevant documents and information.

Failure to provide requested documents or information may be treated as obstruction of an ICC investigation, which under Law 6/2023 may result in criminal sanctions, including a fine of up to IDR5 billion or imprisonment for a maximum of one year. These obligations commence once the party has been made aware of the investigation or has received a formal summons from the ICC. The ICC has not issued specific guidance on document preservation obligations.

The right to legal representation is protected under Indonesian law and parties involved in ICC proceedings may be represented by legal counsel. Defence counsel may participate as early as possible, such as right from the preliminary investigation to further examination stages, which resemble court proceedings.

The ICL does not prescribe specific limitations on counsel’s ability to speak or give advice during interviews, although the Commissioners Panel retains direction over procedural matters. At the initial stage of investigation, defence counsel should advise on compliance with ICC requests; review and prepare relevant documents; assess potential exposure; and consider proposing behaviour remedies where applicable.

The ICC gathers evidence by summoning reported parties, witnesses and experts, and by requesting relevant documents and information. Admissible evidence includes witnesses, experts and parties’ testimony; written documents; and indirect evidence or circumstantial evidence. At the investigation stage, the ICC task force must secure at least two items of evidence, typically through witnesses and experts’ examination and the collection of market data to clarify industry characteristics.

During the preliminary and further examination stages, both the investigator and the reported party may submit lists of witnesses, experts and documentary evidence. The Cartel Guidelines recognise economic evidence as admissible, including analysis of entry barriers, facilitating tools and market structure, while communication evidence, such as recordings or correspondence may also be relied upon.

The Fintech P2P Lending Case illustrates this evidentiary approach. Investigators relied on documentary evidence (the Indonesian Joint Funding Fintech Association (AFPI) Code of Conduct and related circulars), testimony from 97 respondents confirming their awareness of and compliance with the interest rate cap, and expert input from competition law academics and economists. The ICC applied concepts of tacit co-ordination and parallel conduct, supported by Thomas C. Schelling’s focal point theory, which explains how competitors may converge on a common price point as a rational response to shared information, thereby reducing competitive uncertainty. Nevertheless, this case remains pending before the Commercial Court, and there is not yet a final and binding (inkracht) judgment.

Under the ICL, parties are generally obliged to comply with requests for documents and information issued by the ICC. Failure to comply may be treated as obstruction of justice, potentially triggering a criminal investigation by the National Police.

Legal privilege may be invoked to withhold certain documents, particularly confidential communications between a client and their legal counsel made for the purpose of seeking or providing legal advice. Although the ICL does not expressly codify privilege, protection derives from broader legal principles, including the right to legal counsel guaranteed under Law No 18 of 2003 on Advocates (the “Advocate Law”). Under this statute, advocates are bound to maintain the confidentiality of communications with their clients. Privilege may only be asserted where the ICC directs its request to the legal counsel, in which case the advocate is legally and ethically bound to refuse disclosure. If the request is directed to the client, privilege does not automatically apply, as it is rooted in the lawyer’s professional duty rather than a substantive right of the client.

Communications with in-house counsel are not accorded a distinct or separate privilege under either the ICL or the Advocate Law. Nor is there an express privilege against self-incrimination in ICC proceedings, although the right to be represented by counsel applies throughout the process.

Where parties refuse to provide documents or information requested by the ICC during the investigative stage, the ICC may report such non-compliance to enforcement agencies, including the National Police. Under Law 6/2023, obstruction of an ICC investigation or examination may attract criminal sanctions, including a fine of up to IDR5 billion or imprisonment for a maximum of one year. This framework underscores that failure to co-operate carries not only administrative consequences but also potential criminal liability.

In practice, non-cooperation has been observed. For example, in the Fintech P2P Lending Case, certain (reported) parties failed to attend summonses or to submit the data and documents requested by the investigation team. Such conduct was treated as an aggravating factor in the ICC’s assessment when determining sanctions. The ICC has authority to issue repeated summonses, and persistent refusal to provide information or attend hearings may further aggravate the position of the parties concerned.

To date, however, there is no publicly available precedent on criminal prosecution for non-cooperation in ICC proceedings.

Parties subject to ICC proceedings may request confidential treatment for sensitive or commercially valuable information, such as financial data, strategic business plans or internal documents. Such requests are typically made at the time of submission. The ICC retains discretion to determine whether the claim should be upheld, balancing the asserted confidentiality against the public interest in effective enforcement. In practice, the ICC generally restricts access to information designated as confidential, limiting its availability to other parties in the proceedings.

The ICL does not contain specific provisions granting protection to third parties or witnesses. Nevertheless, the general principles of confidential treatment apply equally to any party submitting sensitive information. Accordingly, third parties and witnesses may also seek protection, although the ultimate decision rests with the ICC.

Defence against the allegation can be submitted at any stage of the investigation. At the preliminary investigation stage, counsel typically conduct internal fact finding, manage responses to information requests, and provide explanations and documents to demonstrate that the client’s conduct does not involve collusion and should not be escalated into formal proceedings.

The most significant opportunity arises during the preliminary examination stage, where the reported party responds to the investigator’s alleged violation report. If the allegations are rejected, the matter proceeds to the further examination stage, where counsel present comprehensive arguments through documentary evidence, witness and expert testimony, and the examination or cross-examination of investigators and experts. Procedural or due process concerns may also be raised.

In addition, during the investigation and preliminary examination stages, the reported party may also propose a change of behaviour to the ICC. However, this mechanism is not available for hard-core cartel violations, including price fixing, market allocation, output restriction and bid rigging. Defence arguments commonly include challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, procedural irregularities, the absence of anti-competitive effects under a rule of reason analysis, justification defences under the Cartel Guidelines (reasonable restraint) and jurisdictional objections.

At present, Indonesia does not have a formal leniency regime under the ICL. However, the ICC has occasionally taken co-operation into account as a mitigating factor during investigations or when determining sanctions, but this remains discretionary and does not amount to a structured leniency programme. As a result, there are no formal requirements, no automatic benefits, no marker process, and no record of leniency being sought or granted – because the mechanism simply does not exist yet.

That said, significant changes are anticipated. Under the draft third amendment to the ICL, a formal leniency programme is proposed. This programme would allow businesses that voluntarily admit or report their involvement in cartel activities to receive reduced or even eliminated penalties. The aim is to expose secretive arrangements, including cartels formed through verbal or concealed agreements.

During the November 2025 public hearing, the ICC indicated that it is looking to models used in the United States, European Union, United Kingdom and Japan. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives has emphasised the need for clear procedures, particularly for leniency. Detailed implementation of the leniency programme will be addressed in implementing regulations once the amendment is enacted. Until then, co-operation can only be recognised as a mitigating factor under the ICC’s fines guidelines, without the certainty or structure of a formal leniency regime.

In short, Indonesia’s leniency framework is still in the planning stage: currently discretionary and limited, but moving toward a formal, transparent system modelled on international best practices.

At present, Indonesia does not have an amnesty or immunity regime under the existing ICL. The ICC has not established any conditions, evidentiary requirements or formal admission procedures that would apply to an immunity application, and there are no records of amnesty or immunity ever being granted.

Similar to leniency, the ongoing amendments process to the ICL has opened to door to discussion about introducing formal immunity provisions. While the current draft amendment does not yet include antitrust immunity rules, the legislative debate has highlighted the strategic opportunity to formalise such a mechanism in the future. If adopted, this would mark a significant shift toward aligning Indonesia’s competition enforcement framework with international practice.

At present, Indonesia does not have a specific whistle-blower regime for cartel conduct under the ICL. The ICC does not provide formal rewards or protections for individuals who report cartel activities. Investigations are primarily initiated either by the ICC’s own initiative or based on third-party reports. While the reporting mechanism is open to anyone, it does not provide the structured incentives or safeguards that are common in whistle-blower programmes in other jurisdictions.

That said, the ICC has been increasingly promoting compliance through its Competition Compliance Programme (CCP). This initiative may indirectly support internal reporting mechanisms within companies that choose to participate, since the setting up of a whistle-blowing system is among the requirements in the CCP.

The ICC may seek information or testimony directly from company employees, including current and former employees, as part of its investigation. The ICC is entitled to summon and request information from any party it considers relevant, including witnesses.

During the preliminary examination and further examination stages, both the ICC investigator and the reported party may submit lists of witnesses, which may include current or former employees. Summonses are issued in writing by the ICC and there is no distinction in the ICC’s authority between current and former employees.

Refusal to attend or provide testimony may be treated as an aggravating factor in the ICC’s assessment and may constitute obstruction of an investigation. Such conduct can therefore adversely affect the position of the reported party in the proceedings.

The ICC is authorised to seek documentary evidence directly from subject or target companies. It may summon and request documents and information from reported parties and other relevant parties it considers pertinent to the investigation. Admissible evidence includes letters, documents and indirect evidence.

Where the parties fail to provide the required documents, the ICC may report such non-compliance to enforcement agencies, including the National Police. Under Law 6/2023, obstruction of a ICC investigation may result in criminal sanctions, including a fine of up to IDR5 billion or imprisonment for a maximum of one year.

There is no formal discovery process or compulsory production mechanism equivalent to those found in common-law jurisdictions. The ICC’s powers are exercised through summonses and requests, with compliance enforced by the threat of administrative or criminal consequences rather than through structured discovery procedures.

The ICL does not contain specific provisions governing the ICC’s authority to obtain evidence directly from entities located outside Indonesia. In practice, the ICC may seek evidence through bilateral and multilateral co-operation mechanisms, including MoUs with foreign competition authorities. However, Indonesian law limits formal cross-border sharing of confidential investigation data.

The ICC may assert jurisdiction over foreign entities that have subsidiaries or affiliates in Indonesia and summon those local entities to provide relevant documents and information. A company or person located in Indonesia would be required to produce documents within its possession or control, even if the documents are physically located abroad.

The ICL does not specifically address the dynamics of cloud storage; however, the general principle that Indonesian-based entities must comply with ICC information requests would apply to documents within their control, regardless of physical location. In practice, therefore, the reach of the ICC is defined less by the physical location of documents and more by the principle of possession and control.

Inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination in Indonesia are well institutionalised, particularly in the enforcement of competition law and the handling of complex cartel-related matters. ICC engages in structured coordination with the National Police and the Prosecutor’s Office, especially where competition law issues overlap with criminal conduct. It also works closely with the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK) and the Directorate General of Customs and Excise, pursuant to statutory mandates and formal memoranda of understanding. This includes co-ordination with PPATK to detect and mitigate money laundering risks arising from merger and acquisition transactions.

In practice, such co-ordination has been critical in major cartel and corruption-related matters with significant economic impact, such as the electronic identity card (e-KTP) procurement cartel case (ICC Decision No 03/KPPU L/2012), where competition law issues intersected with broader criminal investigations. Co-ordination enables information exchange, joint analysis and aligned enforcement strategies in complex cases. Information sharing remains subject to confidentiality obligations, criminal procedure requirements and personal data protection rules, ensuring that co-operation is formal, purpose driven and within each authority’s statutory mandate.

The ICC maintains both formal and informal co-operation mechanisms with foreign competition authorities and international organisations. It has signed memoranda of understanding with agencies in Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, around non-confidential information exchange, technical assistance and capacity building. The ICC is active within ASEAN frameworks, particularly the ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC), and participates in ICN and OECD discussions on best practice.

Cross-border sharing of confidential investigation data is restricted under Indonesian law, meaning internal co-ordination remains limited and largely informal. As a result, only a small proportion of cartel enforcement activity involves foreign co‑operation, reflecting the predominantly domestic nature of the ICC’s caseload. Where co-ordination does occur, it primarily facilitates procedural alignment and the exchange of insights, rather than direct joint enforcement.

Cartel conduct itself is not criminalised under the ICL. Criminal sanctions apply only in cases of obstruction of an ICC investigation or examination, which under Law 6/2023 may result in fines of up to IDR5 billion or imprisonment for a maximum of one year. The ICC’s role in criminal matters is purely recommendatory, with enforcement falling under the jurisdiction of the National Police and the Prosecutors. Such cases are litigated before the criminal courts, with evidence presented to the presiding judge, who acts as the finder of fact. The burden of proof follows the general Indonesian criminal procedural code. In practice, there is limited publicly available precedent on criminal prosecution arising from competition cases, and the mechanism remains largely theoretical.

There is no formal civil complaint in Indonesia for competition cases, as the ICC proceedings are administrative. Cases may be initiated ex officio or through third-party reports and adjudicated internally. Following a final and binding ICC decision, aggrieved parties may pursue damages before the district courts under Article 1365 of the ICC. The burden of proof lies with the claimant, there is no formal discovery process, and the ICC’s decisions often serve as a key evidentiary foundation.

Retained experts in ICC proceedings are typically competition law academics and economists, though sector-specific specialists may also be engaged. They provide testimony and analysis during the investigation and hearings, with economic evidence playing a central role in cartel cases. Both the ICC’s Commission and respondents may rely on expert witnesses, as illustrated in the Fintech P2P Lending Case.

Multi-defendant proceedings are a defining feature of Indonesian cartel enforcement, with all parties typically adjudicated in a single case. The Fintech P2P Lending Case (97 respondents) illustrated this practice. Evidence obtained in one proceeding may be used in related proceedings, and final ICC decisions can serve as the basis for civil or class damages claims or co-ordination with criminal authorities.

The ICC has the authority to impose administrative sanctions for cartel violations, but only after the case reaches the examination stage. At the examination stage, the Commission Panel conducts a court-like proceeding to assess evidence and determine whether a violation has occurred.

If a violation is established, the Commission Panel may impose fines of at least IDR1 billion, capped at 50% of the company’s net profit or 10% of its turnover as well as cancellation of agreements and/or provides compensations or damages. Fines are based on the effects and duration of the conduct, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the parties’ ability to pay the fine. However, in practice, the ICC does not disclose a detailed methodology for calculating fines. For bid-rigging violations specifically, the ICC has the power to order a debarment, prohibiting the sanctioned parties from participating in government or public tenders for a specified period.

The enforcement of an ICC decision, whether it has been applied through objection and/or cassation processes, can be conducted in 30 days at the latest since the receipt of the latest decision. However, the ICC has no enforcement authority, hence it must submit the application of the enforcement in the nearest commercial court of reported parties, by registering a final and binding decision, addressed to the Chairman of the Commercial Court. This enforcement has the same procedures of enforcement as court judgments. In this regard, the Commercial Court officers will assist the ICC to enforce its judgment the violating parties.

Cartel enforcement investigations/examination do not always result in administrative sanctions, although cases with no action are relatively rare in practice. The Panjang Port Case (Case No 20/KPPU-I/2023) is a notable example where no administrative fines were imposed despite a finding or cartel conduct, due to its limited competitive impact.

The ICL does not stipulate a formal mechanism for plea bargaining or settlement. However, ICC Regulation No 2 of 2023 on the ICC Case Handling Procedures (the “ICC Case Handling Procedures”) introduce a change of behaviour mechanism. This is a written commitment by reported parties to stop the prohibited agreement, cease prohibited activities and/or comply with the ICC’s order. However, the change of behaviour is not available for hard-core cartel violations.

Once an ICC decision has obtained permanent legal force, it may serve as a basis for civil lawsuits for damages under Article 1365 of the ICC. Further, an ICC decision can also serve as a basis for an application of a provisional measure (putusan provisi), where civil courts may grant initial measure for defendants for the good order of a proceeding (eg, seizing assets of defendants) and/or immediate provisional measure (putusan serta merta) (eg, forcibly take assets of defendants to be provided to applicants).

In the context of public procurement, a finding of bid rigging may have practical consequences for a company’s participation in future government tenders, as procurement authorities may take such findings into account. The Commission Panel can also impose a blacklist sanction, or a debarment, to reported parties in participating future tenders for certain period of time.

Cartel activity is not subject to criminal sanctions under the ICL. Criminal sanctions are only applicable in cases of obstruction of a ICC investigation or examination. Under Law 6/2023, obstruction of justice may result in a fine of up to IDR5 billion or imprisonment for a maximum of one year in place of criminal fines.

Cartel conduct is not subject to criminal sanctions under the ICL. Accordingly, no individuals have served custodial sentences, no Indonesian citizens have been extradited or imprisoned abroad for cartel offences, and no jail sentences have been served overseas pursuant to plea bargains.

The ICC Commission Panel may recognise an effective compliance programme as a specific mitigating factor if the programme has been formally registered to, reviewed by, and certified by the ICC under their CCP to qualify for a potential reduction in administrative fines. GR 44 and the ICC’s fines and CCP guidelines also stipulate that business actors exercising competition compliance efforts codes of ethics, training, outreach and awareness programmes under the CCP may be served as a specific mitigating factor by the ICC Commission Panel in imposing sanctions. However, none of GR 44 and the ICC’s fines guidelines stipulates the probative value of this effective compliance programme. The ICC may also take into account voluntary corrective actions and good faith co-operation during proceedings, which may overlap with elements of an effective compliance programme.

In several previous ICC decisions, a number of reported parties sought to rely on the implementation of a competition compliance programme as a mitigating factor before the Commission Panel (eg, Fintech P2P Lending Case, Panjang Port case). However, in those cases, the Commission Panel did not consider submissions by reported parties on their competition compliance programme as a mitigating factor of their violations. Accordingly, the effectivity of competition compliance programme as a mitigating factor remains unclear.

The ICC may order business actors to compensate for damages arising from anti-competitive or unfair practices, including cartel practices. However, this provision applies specifically to cases in which a report includes a claim for compensation from affected business actors, and does not extend to compensation claims from affected consumers. A recent ICC decision in the laboratories case (Case No 04/KPPU-L/2025) (the “Laboratories Case”) illustrates granting of damages to the applicant where the Commission Panel decided that solicitation of business secrets by the reported parties resulted to losses of the applicant of damages.

Private litigation for consumer redress is possible under Article 1365 of the ICC, following a final and binding ICC decision, as set out in 5.3 Effect of Liability Being Established. Class actions under Supreme Court Regulation No 1 of 2002 on the Class Action Procedures (the “Class Action Regulation”) may also provide a mechanism for collective consumer redress, although precedents remain limited. The existence of private litigation does not have a formal bearing on the ICC’s ordering of consumer redress, given the ICC’s administrative focus.

An ICC decision may be appealed to the Commercial Court within 14 calendar days of receiving the decision. To submit an appeal, the appellant must submit a bank guarantee of up to 20% of the total fines. The Commercial Court will examine the merits within three to 12 months, or less if the panel of judges has solid grounds to do so. The appellant may present witnesses or experts, provided they had previously been submitted during ICC proceedings but were not considered or were rejected by the Commission Panel, subject to the approval of the judges. A further appeal may be lodged through cassation to the Supreme Court within 14 calendar days of the Commercial Court’s decision. The Supreme Court will not consider any new evidence but will solely assess whether the lower courts correctly applied the law. The Supreme Court’s ruling is final and binding. A civil judicial review (peninjauan kembali) is no longer available for competition law cases pursuant to Supreme Court Regulation 3/2021. Appeals from ICC decisions are reasonably common. The outcomes vary, with decisions sometimes being affirmed and sometimes overturned, depending on the factual and legal merits of each case. The following list provides the number of ICC decisions being affirmed or rejected during the appeal process in the Commercial Court and the cassation process in the Supreme Court in 2025:

• Commercial Court: affirmed – seven; rejected – two; and
• Supreme Court: affirmed – five; rejected – four.

Indonesia does not have a dawn raid process but has several times conducted unannounced visits to businesses. The investigation timeline begins on the date determined by the ICC’s internal letter of assignment, marking the start of the formal enquiry. The ICC Case Handling Procedures consist of the following maximum timeframes: preliminary investigation (30 business days, extendable in 30-business-day increments), investigation (60 business days, extendable in 30-business-day increments); preliminary examination (30 business days); further examination (90 business days); and deliberations and decision (30 business days). From commencement of investigation to final ICC decision, the process may take approximately 240 or more business days, depending on extensions. An appeal to the Commercial Court adds three to 12 months, or less if the panel of judges has solid grounds to do so. Cassation to the Supreme Court adds further time, though specific timeframes for the Supreme Court’s deliberation are not prescribed. In practice, the total process from investigation to conclusion of appeal may take two to four years. If the reported party accepts the allegations at the preliminary examination stage, the process is considerably shortened, potentially reducing the timeframe to approximately 30 business days from acceptance to decision.

The private rights to seek relief can be only made through civil litigation with Article 1365 of the ICC on tort or unlawful acts serving as the basis. A civil lawsuit for cartel-related damages can only be filed after the ICC’s decision declaring a violation of the ICL has obtained permanent legal force. Claims are brought before the relevant district court. The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence of an unlawful act, fault, damages and a causal link. The standard of relief in private civil actions differs from ICC proceedings, as the claimant must independently prove all elements of the claim. The forms of relief available include material damages (financial compensation) and immaterial damages (restitution or stipulation of the illegal act). In practice, private civil litigation for competition law violations remains non-existent.

The ICL does not explicitly regulate class actions, but they are permitted under Indonesian civil procedural laws pursuant to the Class Action Regulation. This regulation allows groups of individuals with similar losses to collectively file a lawsuit through a representative party. In the context of competition law, a class action can be filed in a civil proceeding at the relevant district court, using a final and binding ICC decision as one of the legal bases for seeking damages. Consumer associations and public interest groups may have standing, subject to general civil procedural requirements. There have been limited precedents. The Temasek Case (Case No 07/KPPU-L/2007) saw the certification of a class action by nine classes of consumers. A 2019 class action related to an alleged motorcycle cartel was denied certification due to insufficient commonality among the claims.

The ICL and Indonesian civil procedural laws do not contain specific provisions addressing indirect purchasers or “passing on” defences. The burden of proving damages lies with the claimant, whether it is the ICC or a private party claimant, who must demonstrate a direct causal link between the violation and the loss suffered. Given the nascent state of private competition litigation in Indonesia, jurisprudence on these issues remains undeveloped. There is no established process for hearing and resolving such claims beyond the general civil litigation frameworks.

Evidence from governmental investigations or proceedings is admissible, so long as the evidence is obtained lawfully: (i) by authorised personnel (eg, Indonesian National Police, public prosecutor); or (ii) through information collection by relevant agencies (eg, ministries, financial services authority). The ICC may also collect market information from other agencies that may be used as a basis for its initiatives. Obtainment of evidence through unlawful measures (eg, unauthorised raids, theft) may increase the risk for the evidence to be determined inadmissible by a panel of judges.

Further, a final and binding ICC decision may be used as evidence in civil proceedings. The ICC’s findings can serve as one of the legal bases for seeking damages in a subsequent civil lawsuit. However, the ICC decision does not by itself establish the claimant’s entitlement to damages; the claimant must still prove the elements of the civil claim, including the existence and quantum of losses in civil litigation. There are no specific restrictions under the ICL on the admissibility of evidence from ICC proceedings in civil litigation.

Private civil litigation for ICL violations remains non-existent in Indonesia. The competition cases are resolved through ICC administrative proceedings. The few class action attempts have had mixed results, with limited publicly available documentation on outcomes. There is no formal discovery process akin to common law jurisdictions; parties must present their own evidence. Timeframes for civil litigation depend on the complexity of the case and the court docket, and may range from one to several years at first instance, with additional time for appeals.

Under Indonesian civil procedural laws, attorneys’ fees are not typically awarded separately to the successful party. Legal costs are generally borne by each party. There is no contingency fee regime specifically applicable to cartel-related litigation.

Indonesian civil procedural laws do not follow the “loser pays” principle. Court fees are relatively nominal. Each party generally bears its own legal costs, including attorneys’ fees. In class actions, the representative party would bear the upfront litigation costs, with recovery depending on the outcome of the case.

Decisions of the district court in private civil litigation are subject to appeal at the High Court, followed by cassation at the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s decision is final and binding. However, the Supreme Court’s decision is also subject to a civil judicial review (peninjauan kembali), which may be available in limited circumstances under Indonesian civil procedural laws. These appeals, cassation and civil review follow standard civil litigation procedures and timeframes and other relevant applicable laws. There are no specific standards or procedures applicable exclusively to competition-related civil litigation. Considering the non-existence of private competition cases, we have not seen any appeals, cassations or civil reviews for such cases.

The ICL does not expressly characterise information sharing as a standalone cartel offence. However, the ICC has taken the view that certain forms of information exchange may constitute evidence of cartel conduct, particularly where such exchanges facilitate price fixing or other forms of co-ordinated behaviour. This risk is heightened where information sharing takes place through trade associations and results in alignment among members.

The Fintech P2P Lending Case provides the most definitive illustration. The ICC found that 97 fintech lending companies, as members of the Indonesian Joint Funding Fintech Association (AFPI), entered into price fixing agreements by co-ordinating interest rates and other fees between 2019 and 2023 through the applied interest rates ceiling provided by AFPI. The Commission Panel applied the focal point theory of Thomas C. Schelling to establish that the maximum interest rate cap (0.8% per day from 2020, reduced to 0.4% from October 2021) functioned as a co-ordination device: all 97 operators “understood” that the interest rate cap was the “appropriate” price point, and rational economic behaviour led each to converge on that ceiling, with no incentive to charge less if competitors could charge the maximum.

The Cooking Oil Case 2022 (Case No 15/KPPU-I/2022) further illustrates the ICC’s analytical approach, where simultaneous price increases and price parallelism were examined using the variance test of Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe test, notwithstanding that such phenomena were due to clear government mandate. Although no infringement was ultimately found, the case confirms that co-ordinated price notifications and parallel pricing are subject to heightened scrutiny.

The Automatic Scooter Case (Case No 04/KPPU-I/2016) demonstrates that the ICC views informal meetings strongly served as evidence to cartel conduct. Meetings between senior executives and internal instructions suffice to be treated by the KPPU as evidence to cartel, without having to prove the merit and essence of the discussion  in the meeting. Further, the Laboratories Case shows that a solicitation and use of competitors’ business secrets may also be regarded as unlawful information exchange.

Under the Cartel Guidelines, communication evidence is recognised as a form of indirect evidence of cartel conduct, and information sharing through industry associations is an area of particular enforcement concern. The Fintech P2P Lending Case decision is expected to set an important precedent for applying the ICL to co-ordinated conduct facilitated through trade association platforms.

It remains unclear to what extent the ICC is concerned about the use of AI and/or pricing algorithms in cartel offences. There is no publicly available guidance from the ICC specifically addressing the use of AI or pricing algorithms in such cases. However, in the ICC Chairman Regulation 3/2023, the ICC acknowledges the practice by the Korean Fair Trade Commission to use Bid-Rigging Indicator Analysis System (BRIAS), an online system designed to collect procurement data from purchasers (frequently national and local governments) and to analyse the data by calculating a score for each bid‑rigging indicator. These scores are subsequently used in competition investigations. To date, we found no indications that the ICC has implemented a BRIAS-like system.

During the Competition Outlook 2026 held in January 2026, the ICC addressed concerns on business competition, among others, and the complex development of digital transformation and the use of AI. This statement shows that the ICC has also increased its awareness of the use of AI. However, there has been no investigation on the use of AI and/or pricing algorithms on cartel offences based on publicly available information to date.

Further, the ICC has shown increasing interest in digital markets, as evidenced by the Google Case (03/KPPU-I/2024) (imposing a record fine for abuse of dominant position) and the Fintech P2P Lending Case decision. The draft third amendment to the ICL also specifically addresses emerging challenges posed by the digital economy. The ICC has highlighted the need to redefine “relevant market” to cover digital platforms and AI-driven transactions, noting that digital markets often involve multiple layers (such as markets for online sellers and buyers) that make the traditional definition inadequate. The ICC has also flagged that market dominance can arise from misuse of user data, algorithmic discrimination or AI-based predatory pricing. Companies with exclusive access to large volumes of user data may create significant market power, limit competitors’ innovation and foster dependency on certain platforms. The ICC accordingly sees a need for closer alignment between competition law and data governance, including rules on data portability and interoperability.

The ICL distinguishes standards of a cartel offence and monopolisation. Monopolisation is addressed separately from cartel conduct under the ICL. Article 17 prohibits business actors from controlling the production and marketing of goods and services which may cause monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition.

Earlier this year, the ICC also stated that its primary enforcement focus in 2026 will be on the digital sector, as it emphasised that all economic transactions are conducted through the digital realm. The ICC also pointed out sectors with the lowest business competition index (IPU), which predominantly concentrated in natural resource-based and core infrastructure industries, including agriculture, forestry, fisheries, construction, mining, and electricity and gas supply. The consistently low IPU scores in these sectors indicate structural vulnerabilities in market competition, which may render them more susceptible to regulatory scrutiny and enforcement attention by the ICC, particularly in relation to cartel conduct, market concentration and co-ordination risks.

The sectors that have come under the greatest scrutiny include procurement, construction management and property (the largest share of ICC cases over the 2018–2023 period), household goods, electronics, automotive and the manufacturing, textiles and chemicals sectors. The financial technology sector has emerged as the principal enforcement focus, as can be seen through the Fintech P2P Lending Case. Further, the essential commodities sector has also attracted significant attention: the Cooking Oil Case 2022 (Case No 15/KPPU-I/2022), involving 27 producers and aggregate fines of approximately IDR71.28 billion, remains the largest enforcement action in that sector.

The ICC has not issued specific guidance to companies about the preservation of ephemeral communications or messaging application data. However, the ICC accepts various forms of evidence, including recorded communications, emails and video communications. The Cartel Guidelines recognise communication evidence as a form of indirect evidence. Failure to provide requested evidence may be treated as obstruction of a ICC investigation, which may result in criminal sanctions under Law 6/2023 (a fine of up to IDR5 billion or imprisonment for a maximum of one year). As digital communications become more prevalent in business dealings, including through messaging applications and chat platforms, this area may develop further, particularly with the proposed legislative amendments aimed at strengthening the ICC’s enforcement tools.

The ICL does not specifically address “no poach” agreements or labour market allocation conduct as distinct cartel offences. However, such agreements could potentially fall within the scope of the ICL’s prohibitions on agreements that restrict competition, depending on the circumstances and the degree to which they hamper, restrict, or distort competition in the market. To date, there have been no publicly reported ICC cases specifically targeting “no poach” agreements or labour market allocations. This area of enforcement remains undeveloped in Indonesia.

Formal leniency or immunity programmes are yet to exist under the ICL. Accordingly, all ICC investigations are either ex officio (initiated by the ICC on its own initiative) or based on third-party reports. Under the 2025 ICC annual report, the ICC initiated five ex-officio investigations, decreasing from eight in 2024. 

To align with the global best practices, the proposed amendments to the ICL envisage the introduction of a leniency programme modelled on the systems in the US, EU, UK and Japan. The Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) has emphasised the need for clearly defined procedures. If enacted, the leniency programme is expected to shift the balance towards leniency-generated investigations in future, particularly in sectors where cartel conduct is difficult to detect through ex officio means alone.

The overwhelming majority of ICC cartel investigations are domestic in nature, involving conduct carried out by business actors with a clear operational presence or economic activity within Indonesia. The ICC has not handled any international cartel case in recent years. The Temasek Case remains the most prominent precedent involving foreign entities.

Going forward, the ICC’s expanding interest in digital markets and multi-national platforms may lead to more cases with cross-border dimensions. The Google Case, whilst primarily an abuse of dominance matter, involved a foreign entity and demonstrates the ICC’s willingness to pursue conduct by multinational companies. The proposed legislative amendments specifically aim to address jurisdictional ambiguity involving multinational corporations, which may increase cross-border enforcement in the coming years.

The ICC has not issued specific guidance to companies about avoiding cartel behaviour whilst communicating or adopting ESG standards. There is no established framework addressing the intersection of competition law and ESG co-operation in Indonesia, where the ICL and/or other applicable competition regulations are silent on this issue. The ICC has not yet developed a dedicated approach to this topic. This remains an area that may evolve as ESG considerations become more prominent in Indonesian business and regulation.

Post‑pandemic inflationary and supply chain disruptions have been highly relevant as enforcement context, but have not diluted the ICC’s substantive cartel standards. The cooking oil crisis (2021–2022) illustrates this distinction. In Cooking Oil Case, the ICC investigated 27 producers amid global CPO price spikes, supply shortages, and government-imposed price controls. While these conditions created an environment conducive to regulatory and enforcement scrutiny, the Commission Panel cleared all respondents of the price-fixing allegation, underscoring that crisis conditions do not substitute for proof of cartel conduct. Instead, liability was limited to distribution restrictions under Article 19(c).

By contrast, in the Fintech P2P Lending Case, regulatory intervention resulted in a sustained industry-wide pricing focal point, which the ICC found sufficient to support a cartel finding under Article 5. Taken together, these cases demonstrate that while post‑pandemic market conditions in Indonesia may be conducive to coordinated behaviour and heightened investigation, the ICC continues to require clear evidence of co-ordination before imposing cartel liability.