Preliminary Note

In December 2024, a constitutional reform was approved that introduced two major changes to the competition enforcement landscape in Mexico.

• The Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) and the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) were to be dissolved, with their competition-related functions consolidated into a new single competition authority.
• All competition-related powers over telecommunications and broadcasting, previously held by the IFT, would be transferred to this new authority.

The implementation of this reform depended on the enactment of secondary legislation. The new Competition Law was published on 16 July 2025 (and entered into force the following day), which defined the institutional restructuring and introduced several substantive changes, including increased sanctions for hardcore cartels. The new authority, named the National Antitrust Commission (Comisión Nacional Antimonopolio – CNA), is an decentralised public body attached to the Ministry of Economy (no longer a constitutionally autonomous agency). It officially began operations in October 2025 once its first Board of Commissioners was appointed and ratified by the Senate. Notably, Andrea Marván Saltiel, former Chairwoman of COFECE, was reappointed as a Commissioner and designated as Chairwoman of the CNA Board.

Cartel Conduct

Cartel conduct in Mexico is primarily governed by the following legal instruments.

• The Mexican Constitution, which establishes the basis for economic competition policy.
• The new Competition Law (Mexican Competition Law), which defines and prohibits absolute monopolistic practices (hardcore cartels).
• The Regulations of the Mexican Competition Law establish the procedural framework for enforcement. New regulations are expected to be issued to align with the provisions of the updated Competition Law.
• Specific regulatory provisions governing the leniency programme were issued by COFECE and may be updated by the CNA.

Cartel conduct is now investigated and sanctioned only by the CNA (in the past two specialised agencies, the COFECE and the IFT, were in charge of enforcing the former Competition Law).

The CNA is currently responsible for investigating and sanctioning cartel conduct in Mexico.

The CNA holds exclusive authority to investigate and sanction cartel conduct through administrative proceedings. Civil actions – whether individual claims for damages and lost profits or collective (class) actions – may now be brought once the CNA’s administrative resolution becomes final in the administrative sphere, even if the decision is still under judicial review through constitutional challenges (amparo proceedings). This represents a significant change from the prior regime, under which such actions generally could only be filed after the agency’s decision had become final and unappealable following all judicial proceedings.

Criminal and Administrative Liability

Cartel conduct may also trigger criminal liability. The agency can file complaints with the Federal Attorney General’s Office, and individuals found guilty may face prison terms ranging from five to ten years, in addition to any administrative fines.

Entities involved in cartel conduct may be fined up to 15% of their annual income. In addition, individuals may be disqualified for up to five years from holding executive, managerial or decision-making roles in companies operating in related markets in addition to administrative fines.

If the conduct is repeated, the fine may be doubled due to recidivism.

Judicial Review and Compensation

Specialised courts in competition, telecommunications and broadcasting review the agencies’ decisions. Their rulings can be appealed before specialised federal courts of appeals. Claims for damages and lost profits may only be brought once the agency’s decision becomes final.

Institutional Reform and Expected Changes

As noted in 1.1 Legal Bases, a constitutional reform was approved in December 2024 and a new Competition Law was enacted in 2025, providing for the creation of a new competition authority under the Ministry of Economy of the Federal Executive Branch. New regulations are expected to be issued by the new agency.

Private enforcement in Mexico is limited to civil claims for damages and lost profits resulting from cartel conduct. These actions – either individual or collective – can be filed. This type of civil claims remains uncommon in practice.

Affected parties may bring civil claims before the specialised competition courts to seek compensation, but they cannot independently (without the CNA intervention) initiate proceedings to investigate or sanction cartel conduct before the specialised courts. Those authorities remain exclusively with the competition authority.

Definition of Cartel Conduct

Cartel conduct – legally known as absolute monopolistic practices – is strictly prohibited under Mexican law and is considered illegal per se. This means the conduct is presumed unlawful regardless of its actual effects on the market.

There are five types of conduct explicitly defined as cartel behaviour.

• Price fixing – agreements to fix, raise, co-ordinate or manipulate the sale or purchase price of goods or services.
• Output restriction – agreements to limit the production, distribution or acquisition of goods or services.
• Market allocation – dividing customers, suppliers, geographic areas or time periods among competitors.
• Bid rigging – co-ordinating bids or abstentions in tenders, auctions or similar processes.
• Information exchange – sharing information with the purpose of facilitating any of the above conduct.

These practices are null and void under the law and can lead to severe administrative and criminal sanctions.

Exemptions or Sector-Specific Exclusions

There are no statutory or jurisprudential exemptions or exclusions for cartel conduct in any industry. All sectors, including regulated ones such as energy, healthcare and telecommunications, are subject to the same prohibitions.

However, the Mexican Constitution (Article 28) establishes certain areas reserved to the state, which are not subject to competition law. These are not exceptions to cartel rules per se, but rather structural exclusions from the scope of the law. These include:

• oil and gas exploration;
• electricity transmission and distribution;
• nuclear energy and radioactive minerals;
• postal, telegraph and radiotelegraph services; and
• state-provided internet access.

In Mexico, private parties cannot bring a private lawsuit to challenge cartel conducts directly. Instead, cases must be investigated and sanctioned by the competition authority through administrative proceedings. The competition authority’s legal power to investigate and sanction cartel conduct is subject to a ten-year statute of limitations, which begins on the date the conduct ends. If this period expires without formal investigative action, the case can no longer be pursued.

The Mexican competition authority, based on the effects doctrine, has jurisdiction not only over conduct that occurs within Mexican territory, but also over conduct carried out abroad if it produces effects in Mexican markets or harms Mexican consumers.

Even if conduct among competitors takes place entirely in a foreign country, the agencies may investigate and sanction it if there is evidence that the conduct had an impact on competition conditions in Mexico.

Additionally, the agency may engage in cross-border co-operation through international agreements and treaties. They regularly collaborate with foreign competition authorities in global cartel investigations, particularly when conduct spans multiple jurisdictions or affects international supply chains.

Although the concept of comity is not explicitly codified under Mexican law, its principles are implicitly recognised and applied through international co-operation mechanisms. Mexico participates actively in bilateral and multilateral agreements that promote co-ordination in competition enforcement, including the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), and engages with global forums such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Competition Network (ICN).

In practice, the competition authorities apply principles of comity by:

• co-ordinating investigations with foreign agencies;
• exchanging non-confidential information, where permitted by law; and
• respecting the jurisdiction of other countries when conduct is being simultaneously investigated abroad.

These practices reflect a commitment to international co-operation and mutual respect among enforcement agencies, even in the absence of formal treaty obligations.

In Mexico, most cartel enforcement actions focus on price fixing, which remains the most commonly investigated and sanctioned form of absolute monopolistic practice. Bid rigging is also significant, particularly in sectors where formal procurement processes are used. Additionally, there have been cases involving market allocation and output restriction, which often appear as complementary or associated conduct within broader price-fixing schemes.

Most cartel cases are domestic in nature, with only a small number involving cross-border conduct. However, there is growing engagement in international co-operation, as seen in recent investigations into global industries such as fragrances.

In terms of detection, ex officio investigations currently outnumber leniency applications. While the leniency programme remains a key enforcement tool, its use has declined in recent years despite some rebound. As a result, the competition authorities have relied increasingly on proactive investigation strategies to detect and prosecute cartel behaviour.

The competition authority regularly publishes non-binding guidelines to help stakeholders understand cartel enforcement.

For instance, COFECE’s guidelines, which are still applicable by the CNA, include the following:

• Guidelines on information exchange between competitors;
• Guidelines for initiating an investigation;
• Guidelines on the investigation of absolute monopolistic practices; and
• Guidelines on the leniency and fine reduction programme.

These documents are available on COFECE’s website for a limited period, pending its takedown by the CNA.

These documents are key interpretative tools but are not legally binding.

Cartel investigations in Mexico may begin in four ways:

• through a complaint filed by any person or entity, even if not directly affected;
• at the request of government bodies, such as the Ministry of Economy or the Consumer Protection Agency;
• ex officio, based on the agency’s own market monitoring or suspicions; or
• from information submitted through the Leniency Programme.

To open a case, the authority must identify an objective cause – a preliminary indication of cartel conduct (eg, price alignment or suspicious co-ordination).

Once initiated, the agency has 30–120 business days, extendable up to four times, to investigate confidentially. During the first period, an initial ruling is published in the Federal Official Gazette, describing the relevant market and conduct under review, but not the parties.

If sufficient evidence is found, the agency issues a Statement of Probable Liability and begins a trial-like procedure. The accused have 45 business days to respond and offer evidence, followed by testimonial or expert submissions, closing arguments, and a hearing before the Board of Commissioners. The Board then decides whether to confirm liability or dismiss the case for lack of evidence.

Dawn raids are a common enforcement tool in cartel investigations and may occur even before the case is formally opened. Entities must fully co-operate; obstruction can trigger enforcement measures and, if supported by other evidence, lead to a presumption that the alleged facts are true.

Inspectors may access offices, devices, emails and files, take photos or videos, and copy physical or digital documents – except those protected by attorney–client privilege. They cannot seize originals. Company staff must assist by identifying relevant areas, providing requested documents, and answering questions. Two witnesses appointed by the firm must sign the official minutes, which may also include objections or comments.

Procedural Framework

Dawn raids must follow a formal process.

• The agency must issue a written order specifying the purpose, scope, duration and target of the visit.
• The order must warn the visited party of the consequences of non-cooperation.
• Inspections may occur during business hours, but authorisation can be granted for visits on non-business days or outside working hours.
• Raids may be conducted simultaneously at multiple locations.
• Company officers, employees or representatives may be asked to provide explanations, which will be recorded in the official minutes.
• The entire visit must be documented in an official record, signed by the agency officers and the two appointed witnesses.

The maximum legal duration of a dawn raid is two months, which may be extended once for an additional two months. However, in practice, the authority conducts continuous, uninterrupted visits, meaning that most dawn raids last anywhere from a few hours to several consecutive days, during which the inspection team systematically reviews documents and extracts information relevant to the investigation.

At the end of the dawn raid, the visited company receives an official record, which includes details of the visit, the information extracted, any relevant notes on the chain of custody, and the statements or observations made by the two witnesses appointed by the company.

While companies do not receive full copies of all extracted materials, the agency may grant access to, or copies of, the digital or physical information that was collected – particularly if it is relevant for the company’s defence during the subsequent administrative proceeding.

Destroying, concealing or altering relevant documents or digital files may be deemed obstruction of the competition authority’s powers. This can result in administrative fines and, if supported by other evidence, lead to a presumption that the facts being investigated are true.

If such conduct is detected – particularly during a dawn raid – it may also be treated as a criminal offence (eg, obstruction of justice), punishable with imprisonment under applicable criminal laws.

Companies and individuals have the right to legal counsel during dawn raids or interviews, but enforcement agents may proceed without waiting for the lawyer’s arrival. Once present, counsel may observe, advise and request comments be included in the official record, but cannot obstruct the process or speak on behalf of interviewees.

Counsel’s role includes helping employees navigate interviews, ensuring legal safeguards are respected, and assessing potential exposure. In cartel cases, companies often retain external antitrust lawyers and economists early on, though this is not mandatory.

Receiving a request for information or being raided signals the need to begin preparing a defence, even if the company’s role in the investigation is not yet clear.

The enforcement agency gathers key evidence through the following methods;

• dawn raids, where digital and physical records are copied and reviewed;
• formal information requests sent to companies, individuals or public entities;
• interviews or appearances of individuals involved in the market under investigation;
• whistle-blower submissions, including anonymous reports;
• information and evidence from leniency applicants, which often provides insider details on cartel operations;
• public and commercial databases, including media, financial filings and industry reports;
• economic analysis, including market studies and pricing patterns; and
• co-operation with other domestic or international authorities.

The Investigative Authority may conduct proactive intelligence through internal monitoring and sector analysis. All evidence must be collected in accordance with due process, and only material directly related to the alleged conduct is admissible. Improperly obtained evidence may be excluded.

Under the Mexican competition framework, attorney–client privilege applies to communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, provided the lawyer involved is legally authorised to practise law, regardless of whether they are external or in-house counsel.

During a dawn raid or investigation, companies may request that certain documents be treated as privileged. The request must be noted in the official minutes of the visit, and the company has up to 20 business days after the conclusion of the raid to formally submit a written request. This request must include:

• the type of document (eg, email, letter, memo);
• the author’s name and date;
• a description of the legal advice provided; and
• proof that the legal adviser is authorised to practise law in Mexico or abroad.

Once the agency determines that the information qualifies as privileged, it cannot use the content as evidence or assign it any legal value, regardless of whether or not it was labelled “Privileged and Confidential”. Labels are indicative, but not determinative.

Other Legal Protections

Individuals and companies also benefit from constitutional guarantees, including:

• due process, which prohibits searches or seizures without a duly supported legal order; and
• the presumption of innocence, which ensures that no party is presumed liable until a final administrative resolution is issued.

A key protection is the right against self-incrimination, which has been explicitly recognised by the Mexican Supreme Court (SCJN) and federal courts beyond the criminal context. Individuals involved in cartel investigations – especially during testimonial appearances – may lawfully refuse to answer questions that would expose them to liability for anti-competitive conduct. This right protects both verbal and written statements, and applies throughout the proceedings.

The SCJN has held that the investigative powers of the competition agency do not override this right, and that failure to co-operate cannot be used as an indication of guilt. Specifically, the Court stated that while economic agents are required to collaborate in investigations, the refusal to provide information that may be self-incriminating does not imply liability. Rather, the burden remains on the authority to prove its allegations using objective evidence.

These constitutional guarantees apply fully during dawn raids, interviews and formal proceedings, and must be respected by the enforcement authorities at all times.

In general, individuals and companies tend to co-operate with Mexico’s competition authority. However, there have been isolated cases in which economic agents have resisted or failed to comply with requests for information, obstructed dawn raids, or delayed responses to formal requirements.

Agencies may apply the following enforcement measures in case of non-cooperation:

• formal warning (apercibimiento);
• daily fines per day of non-compliance;
• the use of law enforcement or other public authorities; and
• administrative detention of up to 36 hours.

These sanctions are applicable even during the investigation phase and may escalate if the conduct is deemed to obstruct the agency’s legal duties. The imposition of such measures is recorded and may be considered an aggravating factor when calculating the final penalty.

Although not common, cases of non-compliance – particularly delays in producing requested information or attempts to limit access during inspections – have occurred. Companies are therefore advised to respond promptly and thoroughly to all agency communications and to consult counsel as early as possible in the process.

The competition authority may classify information obtained during investigations as public, reserved or confidential, depending on its nature and the risk posed by its disclosure.

• Public information is accessible to anyone. It includes data already published in public registries, official sources or company websites.
• Reserved information is restricted to the parties involved in the administrative procedure. It may include evidence, procedural documents or other material that is relevant to the case but not sensitive in nature.
• Confidential information is protected from disclosure to other parties and the public. Only the authority and the owner of the information may access it. This includes trade secrets, business strategies, personal data, attorney–client communications, and any information whose disclosure could cause competitive harm or violate legal provisions.

To request confidentiality, the submitting party must justify the request, provide a non-confidential summary, and show that disclosure would cause harm or breach legal protections. These protections apply to investigated parties, third parties and witnesses alike.

Classification is governed by the Mexican Competition Law and national transparency and data protection rules.

Legal and factual arguments may be raised at two procedural stages.

During the investigation phase, companies and individuals may receive official requests for information. These notices indicate whether the recipient is under investigation or simply contributing information as a third party. Even at this early point, defence counsel can submit explanations, relevant documents and supporting materials that help clarify the facts or mitigate suspicion of wrongdoing.

In the trial-like stage, once the agency issues a Statement of Probable Liability, the accused party has 45 business days to submit a formal defence. This includes:

• legal and factual arguments;
• supporting documents and expert evidence;
• economic analysis addressing the alleged conduct or its effects; and
• mitigating arguments or procedural objections.

Parties may also present closing statements and request a hearing before the agency’s decision-making body. These tools allow the defence to contest the allegations before a final resolution is issued.

Mexico operates a formal leniency programme available to companies or individuals that have participated in cartel conduct. The programme is not limited to a single applicant; several participants in the same case may request benefits depending on their position in the queue and the value of their co-operation.

To qualify, applicants must:

• provide sufficient evidence to allow the authority to presume the existence of a cartel;
• fully and continuously co-operate with the authority throughout the investigation and, if necessary, the trial phase; and
• immediately cease all participation in the alleged conduct.

If these conditions are met, the first applicant may receive full immunity or be subject only to a symbolic minimum fine, typically imposed to preserve a formal record of the sanction. This allows the authority to include the participant in the public register of sanctioned entities. Subsequent applicants may also benefit from fine reductions – typically 50%, 30% or 20% – depending on their place in line and the relevance of their evidence.

The leniency programme is discretionary: although the requirements are clearly defined, the authority evaluates each case based on the applicant’s co-operation and timeliness.

A marker process exists, allowing an applicant to secure a position in line while finalising their submission. Once a marker is granted, the applicant has a limited period to provide the required documentation and evidence.

Use and Effectiveness

The leniency programme has been an essential tool in uncovering cartels in Mexico, although its use has fluctuated significantly over the years. Filings peaked in 2016 with 26 applications, dropped to a low of just two in 2021, rose again to 15 in 2023, before falling to eight in 2024. No official figure has been published for 2025 so far. While the exact number of successful applications remains confidential, the competition authority has repeatedly stated that a significant portion of its investigations into absolute monopolistic practices (cartels) originate from leniency applications – even in cases formally initiated ex officio.

Mexican law does not provide for a standalone amnesty regime. Instead, a conditional leniency programme allows cartel participants to reduce sanctions by ceasing their conduct, submitting evidence, and fully co-operating with the authority. Full immunity – ie, exemption from administrative fines – is not guaranteed, and no total immunity or unconditional amnesty exists under Mexican law.

Mexico does not have a whistle-blower regime specific to cartel enforcement. The Competition Law provides no protection or incentives for individuals who report cartel conduct without being participants.

However, limited protections exist under anti-corruption laws for whistle-blowers in public procurement cases involving bid rigging. In the competition context, only cartel participants may benefit from the Leniency Programme, which is not a whistle-blower mechanism in the strict sense.

The competition authority may request information or testimony directly from current and former employees, regardless of seniority. This occurs through written requests or summons for interviews. Each request must specify whether the person is contacted as a suspect or third party. Statements are documented and may be used as evidence. Individuals retain the right not to self-incriminate if their involvement is under review.

The CNA is authorised to request documentary evidence directly from companies under investigation. This is typically done through formal written requests, which must specify whether the recipient is a target or a third party. The recipient must respond within ten business days, with the possibility of a single ten-day extension upon justified request.

The authority may issue multiple requests during the investigation. These often require extensive documentation, such as internal emails, contracts, pricing records, meeting minutes and market data.

Failure to comply may result in daily fines until the information is delivered. The authority may also reiterate the request or apply additional enforcement measures, such as dawn raids.

There are no limitations on the type of documents that may be requested, except those protected by attorney–client privilege, which must be claimed and justified separately.

The Mexican competition authority can request evidence from companies or individuals abroad, especially in cross-border cartel cases, but depends on co-operation agreements for enforcement. Entities in Mexico must produce documents or data stored overseas, including on cloud platforms, if they have control or access. The use of cloud storage does not limit the authority’s power to request information. Non-compliance may result in daily fines and other enforcement measures.

Co-operation among public agencies is a key element of cartel enforcement in Mexico. Competition agencies maintain formal agreements with entities such as:

• the Mexican Central Bank (Banxico);
• the Ministry of Economy (SE);
• the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP);
• the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV);
• the Tax Administration Service (SAT); and
• the Consumer Protection Agency (PROFECO).

These agreements facilitate information exchange, joint studies and co-ordinated responses to suspected anti-competitive behaviour. PROFECO and the Ministry of Economy may file cartel complaints directly. However, confidential information protected under competition law cannot be shared without legal basis or consent.

Such inter-agency co-ordination has played a critical role in investigations, particularly in sectors like energy, finance and public procurement.

Mexico’s competition authorities engage actively in international co-operation through bilateral agreements and participation in multilateral fora such as the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD and APEC. COFECE (the former competition authority) signed agreements with agencies like the European Commission, the US DOJ and the UK CMA to support information exchange, staff collaboration and co-ordinated enforcement. Although investigations remain independent, cross-border co-operation can shape priorities and scope. The CNA’s effectiveness depends on technical capabilities and alignment with global enforcement standards.

Criminal prosecution of cartel conduct in Mexico is led by the Federal Attorney General’s Office (FGR), typically following a complaint by the competition authority. Although filing can occur without a final administrative decision, it is rare before administrative proceedings conclude.

Cases are tried before a federal criminal judge (not a jury), and the FGR must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanctions are individualised and follow formal criminal procedures.

Defendants are entitled to constitutional guarantees, including due process and access to evidence used against them. However, discovery is limited, and access to third-party evidence requires court authorisation.

Mexico does not allow private civil actions to enforce competition law directly. Cartel enforcement is handled administratively by the CNA. However, parties may bring civil claims for damages or lost profits before specialised federal courts.

Third parties may also file formal complaints to trigger investigations. These must include the identity of the alleged parties, a description of the conduct and its competitive impact, and supporting evidence (eg, emails, documents or market data).

The authority may open an investigation, request more information, or reject the complaint. During the confidential investigation phase, defendants do not have access to the file. Full access is granted only after a Statement of Probable Liability is issued, enabling the defence to review evidence and present arguments.

Experts – primarily economists – play a key role in cartel defence, especially in market analysis, damages to the market and other assessments. Depending on the sector, parties may also retain specialists in digital, telecom, transport or other technical fields. Their use is not mandatory but is often essential when complex factual or economic arguments are involved. Experts play a key role in cartel investigations and defence strategies. Economists are the most frequently retained experts, especially in complex market analyses or when evaluating pricing behaviour, market shares or economic effects of the alleged conduct.

Cartel enforcement in Mexico is typically conducted through a single administrative proceeding involving all alleged participants. The Competition Law prohibits parallel investigations on the same facts by the same authority, in line with the constitutional principle of non bis in idem.

However, administrative and criminal proceedings may run in parallel, as they are distinct in purpose and legal framework. Evidence may be shared between authorities but is evaluated independently, with no binding effect across proceedings. See 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties and 4.6 Issuing Criminal Indictments.

In Mexico, sanctions for cartel conduct are imposed directly by the enforcement authorities through an administrative resolution issued at the conclusion of the trial-like procedure. These sanctions may include fines of up to 15% of the infringing party’s annual income, and additional penalties such as disqualification of individuals from holding executive or decision-making positions for up to five years.

Affected parties can challenge the resolution by filing an amparo indirecto before the Specialised Federal Courts in Competition, Telecommunications and Broadcasting, which review the legality and constitutionality of the enforcement action.

In cases where a criminal complaint is filed (see 4.6 Issuing Criminal Indictments), criminal sanctions, such as imprisonment of five to ten years, may be imposed exclusively by federal criminal courts following a separate process led by the Attorney General’s Office.

While most cartel investigations lead to formal charges and eventual sanctions, some are closed with no action if the Investigative Authority finds insufficient evidence. The competition authority does not regularly publish the exact percentage of investigations that are closed without further action, but public records suggest that a minority of investigations do not proceed to the sanctioning phase.

Mexican law does not allow plea bargaining or settlement in cartel (absolute monopolistic practices) cases. Once an investigation begins, the process follows a formal administrative path. The only available mechanism offering benefits is the Leniency Programme, which may reduce or eliminate fines if strict co-operation conditions are met (see 3.1 Leniency).

A final finding of liability for cartel conduct may trigger collateral effects, particularly in public procurement, where companies and individuals can be barred from future tenders under anti-corruption rules. Final resolutions may also support civil claims for damages. These effects are not automatic and cannot be mitigated through settlement, as no such procedure exists in cartel enforcement.

Cartel conduct is classified as a criminal offence under Article 254 Bis of the Federal Criminal Code, which provides for prison sentences ranging from five to ten years and monetary fines from 1,000 to 10,000 times the daily value of the Unidad de Medida y Actualización (UMA). The UMA is the official economic reference unit in Mexican law used to calculate the amount of fines, fees and other legal obligations. As of 2026, the daily UMA value is MXN117.31. Therefore, total fines can range from roughly USD6,600 (MXN117,310) to USD66,000 (MXN1,173,100), using an approximate exchange rate of MXN17.80 per USD1 (as of early April 2026).

Criminal sanctions are individualised by the presiding judge according to the role and degree of responsibility of each participant in the cartel. The judge applies the principle of proportionality, considering aggravating or mitigating circumstances under criminal law. These sanctions may only be imposed following a formal criminal procedure initiated by the Federal Attorney General’s Office and resolved by a criminal federal court.

The competition agency has no role in proposing criminal penalties or calculating fines during these proceedings. Their role is limited to filing the initial complaint, often based on evidence collected during the administrative investigation.

In criminal proceedings, sanctions are not pre-set or automatic. They result from a contested process, where the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and the applicable standard is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.

No individual has been imprisoned in Mexico for cartel conduct to date, and there are no known extraditions or foreign convictions. Although cartel conduct is a criminal offence under Mexican law, enforcement remains primarily administrative. At least two criminal investigations are ongoing before the Federal Attorney General’s Office, but no final convictions have been issued.

While the agencies encourage the adoption of antitrust compliance programmes, these are not considered a mitigating factor in sanctioning hard-core cartel conduct. Sanctions are imposed per se once liability is established, regardless of preventative efforts. Compliance measures may be relevant in other contexts – such as merger review – but not for reducing fines in cartel cases.

Sanctions imposed by the Mexican competition authority are administrative and do not include mandatory consumer redress. Affected consumers may only seek compensation through separate civil litigation, and only after a final agency decision. The existence of private litigation does not affect the scope of agency-imposed sanctions.

Decisions by the CNA can only be challenged through an amparo lawsuit before Mexico’s specialised federal courts. This constitutional review addresses procedural or substantive violations. Appeals may be filed before specialised appellate courts. While amparo proceedings are relatively common in cartel cases, most agency decisions are upheld, with only limited aspects modified or overturned. No other remedies exist to challenge enforcement decisions.

A full cartel enforcement case in Mexico – from the start of the investigation to a final ruling on appeal – typically takes between five and six years. However, under the new Competition Law of 2025, the maximum investigation period was shortened. Shorter overall timelines are therefore expected going forward.

• Investigation stage – this is led by the Investigative Authority and may last up to three years, considering the initial 30 to 120 business days plus up to three extensions of 120 business days each.
• Trial-like administrative procedure – if the investigation leads to a Statement of Probable Liability, this second stage generally lasts between 12 and 18 months, depending on the complexity of the case and the volume of evidence.
• Judicial review (amparo) – the constitutional review process before specialised courts may take between one and two years, particularly if the case reaches the Courts of Appeals.

These stages are sequential and cumulative, so the total duration reflects the entire enforcement timeline, including possible appeals.

Under the 2025 amendments to the Competition Law, private rights of action for damages arising from cartel conduct (absolute monopolistic practices) in Mexico may now be exercised once the administrative resolution of the CAN becomes final in the administrative sphere, even if constitutional challenges (amparos) are still pending before the courts. This represents a significant change from the previous regime, which required a final and binding judicial confirmation before damages claims could proceed.

Once the CNA issues its administrative resolution finding the existence of the cartel conduct, any third party that suffered harm may file a civil claim for damages and lost profits before the Specialised Federal Courts on Competition, Telecommunications and Broadcasting.

The threshold requirements include the following:

• proof of harm suffered by the claimant;
• a causal link between the harm and the conduct established by the competition authority; and
• the existence of a final administrative resolution finding liability.

The standards of relief in these private civil actions differ from administrative enforcement: while government proceedings focus on public sanctions (eg, fines), civil claims are centred on economic compensation for harm. Punitive damages are not available under Mexican law.

The most common forms of relief sought are monetary compensation, although collective actions may also be brought if multiple consumers are affected by the same conduct.

Collective actions – commonly referred to as class actions – are permitted under Mexican law, including for competition-related harms. These actions may be filed by consumer protection agencies, the enforcement authority or qualified non-profit organisations acting in the public interest.

In practice, class actions in antitrust matters remain rare in Mexico. In October 2024, the former competition agency (COFECE) filed its first-ever class action in history, seeking damages for alleged collusion in the supply and pricing of medicines. The case is still pending before the Specialised Federal Courts. It remains to be seen whether the CNA will actively pursue class action claims under the new regime.

While civil claims for damages are allowed after a final decision by the competition authority, Mexican law does not exclude claims by indirect purchasers. However, such actions are rare, and there is no judicial precedent addressing indirect harm or passing-on defences.

Evidence from governmental investigations is admissible in both administrative and civil proceedings. In civil cases, such evidence may support claims for damages once the competition authority’s resolution is final and upheld by the courts.

Civil claims for cartel-related damages are rare in Mexico, as they can only be filed once a competition authority’s decision becomes final and has survived judicial review. This process typically takes four to six years. Civil litigation, once initiated, may take an additional two to four years depending on complexity and appeals. As a result, cases reaching final judgment are infrequent.

Mexican law does not require losing parties to pay attorneys’ fees in cartel-related litigation. In civil claims, fees are privately agreed between clients and counsel. The competition agency and the specialised courts do not award legal fees in administrative or civil proceedings.

In administrative proceedings, there is no mechanism for cost-shifting. In civil litigation, courts may order the losing party to pay legal costs only in cases involving bad faith, procedural abuse or frivolous claims. Such rulings are exceptional, not automatic.

Civil judgments, including collective actions, can be challenged through amparo once ordinary appeals are exhausted. The amparo reviews constitutional issues, not factual findings. These reviews are rare due to the limited number of private competition claims in Mexico.

In Mexico, information exchange between competitors may constitute a cartel offence (absolute monopolistic practice) when it has the object or effect of restricting competition. This includes scenarios where the exchange leads to price fixing, output restrictions, market allocation or bid rigging. Such conduct is treated as per se illegal, regardless of whether it is achieved through formal agreements or informal co-ordination mechanisms.

The former COFECE issued the Guidelines on Information Exchange between Economic Agents, which outline the standards used to assess information exchanges between competitors. These guidelines remain applicable under the new regime by the CNA. The evaluation considers the following factors:

• the strategic value of the information;
• its level of detail or aggregation;
• whether it refers to current, historical or future conduct;
• the frequency of exchange;
• the mechanism used (eg, direct communication, intermediaries or industry associations); and
• structural characteristics of the market, including concentration and transparency.

While information exchange may have legitimate, even pro-competitive uses – such as improving efficiency or market transparency – it can raise serious competition concerns under certain conditions. These include the sharing of individualised or forward-looking data, frequent contact among competitors, or exchanges in markets with few players or low entry barriers.

The competition authority acknowledges the role that third parties can play in facilitating indirect information sharing. For example, suppliers or industry chambers may unintentionally act as conduits for anti-competitive co-ordination.

The competition authority has expressed growing concern over the risks that artificial intelligence (AI) and pricing algorithms pose to competition. These tools can facilitate both explicit and tacit collusion among competitors, especially in digital or highly automated markets.

In 2023, COFECE contributed a policy paper to the OECD titled Algorithmic Collusion: Challenges for Competition Policy in the Digital Economy. This document outlines several areas of concern.

• The risk of price alignment without formal agreements, driven by algorithmic learning and market observation.
• The potential of hub-and-spoke co-ordination through shared software providers.
• The challenge of detecting and assigning legal responsibility when collusion emerges from self-learning systems.
• The limitations of current enforcement tools and legal frameworks to effectively address algorithm-collusion.

COFECE further explored this topic in its 2014 publication Algorithms and Competition in the Digital Environment, which aims to increase awareness of algorithmic co-ordination risks and promote early detection among market participants.

Monitoring and Enforcement Limitations

Despite being proactive in policy discussions, COFECE acknowledged that investigating algorithmic collusion presents technical challenges. Many algorithms are opaque, continuously learning, and difficult to audit without specialised tools. As of today, the competition authority has not yet acquired advanced forensic capabilities to analyse algorithmic behaviour in-depth.

Current Status and Outlook

To date, the CNA has not launched any formal investigations involving algorithmic collusion or AI-based pricing tools. The absence of live cases reflects the technical complexity of such behaviour and the need for further investment in detection technologies.

Still, algorithmic collusion is recognised as a growing risk area. Competition authority’s involvement in international forums and its recent publications demonstrate a clear intention to develop enforcement capabilities in this domain over the coming years.

In Mexico, monopolisation is not treated as a cartel offence. The legal framework distinguishes between cartel conduct (absolute monopolistic practices), which involves co-ordination among competitors, and unilateral conduct by firms with market power (relative monopolistic practices).

Absolute monopolistic practices include agreements between competitors to:

• fix prices or manipulate prices;
• restrict output or supply;
• allocate customers, suppliers or territories;
• rig bids in procurement processes; and
• exchange information to facilitate any of the above.

Monopolisation – understood as the abuse of market power by a single firm – is addressed under a different legal category that covers unilateral conduct. These practices include exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, loyalty discounts, refusal to deal, or other exclusionary strategies are assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether it harms competition. This analysis considers the firm’s market power, the conduct’s effects, and whether efficiencies or objective justifications exist.

While monopolisation is not a cartel offence under Mexican law, it remains sanctionable if it constitutes abuse of dominance under the rules for relative monopolistic practices.

The competition authority prioritised cartel enforcement in sectors critical to consumers and the economy, particularly health, food and agribusiness, hydrocarbons, and transport – each accounting for over 11% of total investigations. These areas were targeted due to their impact on household budgets, supply chains and public spending.

There are eight high-risk sectors for the competition authority: food and beverages, transport and logistics, construction and real estate, energy, health, public procurement, digital markets, and financial services. These industries are structurally important and vulnerable to collusion.

Looking ahead, the CNA is expected to maintain strict oversight of food, health, transport, and public procurement sectors, given their complexity, consumer relevance, and history of anti-competitive risks.

The CNA has the authority to investigate all forms of communication, including exchanges through messaging apps and chat platforms. In past cartel cases, digital messages have been used as key evidence to demonstrate co-ordination among competitors.

For example, in a case involving the government bond market, the former authority (COFECE) relied on chat messages to uncover co-ordination among financial institutions. Similarly, in a fuel market case in Baja California, WhatsApp groups and informal meetings were used to co-ordinate discounts, with some chats even operating under code names to conceal their purpose.

However, the agency faces growing challenges in preserving digital communications. Messaging platforms often allow auto-deletion or ephemeral messages, making evidence harder to capture unless secured early. The CNA typically accesses these records through leniency applications, dawn raids or third-party co-operation.

There is currently no formal guidance from the CNA requiring companies to preserve messaging data, nor are there sanctions solely for deleting such evidence during an investigation. This legal gap creates uncertainty, particularly as chat-based communication becomes more prevalent in business practices.

While the competition agency has relied on messaging evidence in the past, the absence of preservation rules and the technical difficulties in retrieving deleted content remain significant obstacles to enforcement.

In Mexico, “no poach” agreements and labour market allocations practices may be treated as serious cartel offences, especially when they are not linked to a legitimate business transaction and have the effect of restricting worker mobility or wages.

Enforcement Approach

COFECE investigated and sanctioned this type of conduct. A landmark case involved 17 football clubs and the Mexican Football Federation, which were fined for co-ordinating to limit player mobility in the professional Liga MX. Two main practices were identified:

• a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” in which clubs agreed not to hire players from each other without prior approval, even when contracts had ended; and
• wage caps for female players, which restricted their ability to negotiate fair compensation and reinforced pay disparities.

COFECE found these practices to be illegal because they reduced bargaining power, limited job opportunities, and distorted competition in the labour market.

Acceptable Exceptions in Mergers

The CNA does allow certain “no solicitation” clauses when they are part of a legitimate merger or acquisition. These clauses may be accepted if they:

• protect know-how or human capital;
• are limited in scope (typically up to three years);
• apply only to specific staff or regions; and
• are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, similar to non-compete clauses.

Market Prevalence and Outlook

Outside of M&A contexts, “no poach” and labour market allocation agreements are not common in Mexico. However, if detected, they are likely to be investigated and penalised as unlawful conduct.

Mexico’s competition authority has made it clear that protecting labour market competition is a growing priority. This aligns with a broader international trend to treat unjustified restrictions on worker mobility as a serious antitrust issue.

In Mexico, the CNA operates a leniency programme that allows multiple participants in a cartel – not just a single applicant – to receive reduced sanctions. The extent of the benefit depends on the order in which they co-operate, and the value of the information provided. In practice, up to four or more undertakings involved in the same case may benefit from immunity or fine reductions.

Trends in Leniency Filings

Leniency applications have fluctuated over the years. Applications peaked in 2016 and then declined to their lowest point in 2021. Although there was a rebound in 2023, filings dropped again in 2024 and no public information is yet available for 2025. This suggests an overall downward trend in participation despite the advantages offered by the programme, such as full immunity for the first applicant and significant reductions for others.

The competition agency has recognised this issue and, in public forums, has cited structural challenges affecting the programme’s effectiveness. These include:

• concerns about the safety and confidentiality of whistle-blowers in small or highly connected markets;
• limited awareness of the programme’s benefits among legal professionals;
• uncertainty when multiple government bodies are involved; and
• the lack of visible success stories that might encourage more companies to come forward.

To address these concerns, the authority has proposed actions such as improving legal certainty, increasing transparency on case outcomes, and reinforcing protections for applicants.

Increase in Ex Officio Investigations

At the same time, the agency has increasingly relied on ex officio investigations. Although specific figures are confidential, the authority initiates far more cartel investigations on its own than through external complaints or formal reports.

It is worth noting that, due to the confidential nature of leniency applications, it is often impossible to determine whether some ex officio cases are later supported by information from leniency applicants. In many cases, the two mechanisms may complement each other.

Conclusion

While the leniency programme remains a cornerstone of cartel enforcement in Mexico, participation has declined in recent years. In response, the competition authority has expanded its use of ex officio investigations while continuing efforts to restore confidence in its leniency tools. Strengthening outreach, transparency and safeguards will be key to increasing the programme’s future impact.

In Mexico, cartel investigations are overwhelmingly domestic. Approximately 90% of cases handled involve conduct confined to national markets. Only around 10% have a cross-border element.

This pattern is largely due to the nature of the sectors prioritised by the agency – such as food, health, transport, energy and public procurement – which are typically composed of local players. In addition, international enforcement requires co-ordination with foreign authorities, which is more complex and resource-intensive.

Growing Role of International Co-Ordination

Despite the dominance of domestic cases, the authority has increasingly engaged in international co-operation. In 2023, the agency began investigating possible collusion in the fragrance and ingredients industry. This move followed public announcements by several competition authorities around the world regarding similar concerns in the same global market.

The agency confirmed it is co-ordinating with counterparts in the United States and the United Kingdom to determine whether the suspected conduct had effects on Mexican consumers. This case reflects a growing readiness to engage in cross-border investigations when the potential harm to local markets is significant.

Looking Ahead: Global Events and Digital Risks

The authors anticipate a gradual increase in cross-border enforcement, especially in markets shaped by digital transformation. Online platforms and global supply chains make it easier for cartel behaviour to spread beyond borders.

A key area of focus in the coming years may be the sports and entertainment sector, particularly in connection with the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which will be jointly hosted by Mexico, the United States and Canada. In preparation, a trilateral initiative with authorities in both neighbouring countries has been launched, to monitor related markets. Areas of interest include ticketing, broadcasting rights, accommodations, merchandising and sponsorships.

This type of proactive co-ordination raises the likelihood of joint or parallel investigations in the lead-up to and during the World Cup.

Conclusion

Although cartel enforcement in Mexico remains largely domestic, recent developments point to a slow but steady shift. Cross-border co-operation is expected to grow, especially in digitally connected and globally exposed markets. The success of this transition will depend on the CNA’s ability to strengthen its technical and analytical capabilities to meet the challenges of international cartel enforcement.

Mexico does not currently have specific legal provisions or regulatory guidance on how ESG-related agreements should be treated under competition law. The CNA has not issued formal instructions to companies regarding how to avoid cartel behaviour while participating in ESG-related collaborations or initiatives.

Under existing law, any co-ordination between competitors – even when justified by environmental or social objectives – would be assessed using the same standards that apply to traditional cartel conduct. If the agreement involves fixing prices, limiting supply or dividing markets, it may still be prosecuted as a serious competition offence.

Although enforcement rules have not changed, the agency has shown increasing interest in the intersection of competition and sustainability. In 2024, the agency introduced a policy initiative known as the Green Competition Strategy. The strategy presents a roadmap for exploring how competition law can support or complement broader sustainability goals.

Key elements of the strategy include:

• publishing advocacy materials to raise awareness;
• conducting market studies in sectors relevant to ESG;
• collaborating with international authorities on sustainability issues; and.
• organising forums and consultations to engage stakeholders and gather insights.

As part of this effort, the authority also launched a public consultation on the relationship between competition and sustainability. The consultation was open from December 2023 to January 2024, and the agency later published a summary of the responses and conducted interviews with selected participants.

Conclusion

While Mexico does not currently offer differentiated treatment for ESG-related co-operation, the authority is taking steps to understand how competition policy can support responsible business practices. Until new guidance is issued, agreements between competitors based on ESG goals will continue to be reviewed under the same standards as any other form of co-ordination.

In Mexico, economic disruptions such as inflation and supply chain issues following the COVID-19 pandemic have not led to the creation of exceptions or exemptions in cartel enforcement. Absolute monopolistic practices – such as price fixing, market allocation or output restrictions – are illegal regardless of market conditions, intent or crisis-related justifications.

Case Example From the Pandemic Period

During the pandemic, COFECE initiated an investigation in the market for leasing non-residential real estate, amid significant economic uncertainty. COFECE found possible evidence of co-ordination among competitors and the case moved into the trial stage. A final resolution is expected in the near future.

Current Enforcement Context

To date, the CNA has not issued any formal statements suggesting that inflationary pressures or supply chain disruptions are increasing the risk of cartel behaviour. There is also no public evidence of a rise in crisis-driven collusion across markets.

The agency has continued to monitor sensitive sectors, such as food, transportation and healthcare, which are more exposed to external shocks. However, there has been no indication that these conditions have led to changes in enforcement strategy or the adoption of new investigative tools.

Conclusion

Cartel enforcement in Mexico remains consistent and rule-based. Even in times of crisis, the legal framework does not permit co-ordination among competitors that would otherwise be prohibited. While isolated cases have emerged during periods of disruption, there is no indication that economic conditions have created a broader trend conducive to cartel behaviour.