International Arbitration 2026 Comparisons

International arbitration remains highly prevalent in England and Wales, with London confirmed as the world’s single most preferred seat in the 2025 Queen Mary University of London/White & Case International Arbitration Survey, chosen by 34% of approximately 2,400 respondents globally, ahead of Singapore and Hong Kong (31% each), Beijing (20%) and Paris (19%). 

Purely domestic disputes between English parties are more commonly litigated before the national courts, given the cost and procedural advantages of the court system, such as the availability of summary judgment. 

Where an international element exists, arbitration is used on multiple overlapping bases ‒ as the contractually agreed dispute resolution mechanism, as a neutral seat and as a forum supported by strong New York Convention enforceability ‒ as reflected in London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) data showing that London was chosen as the seat in 89% of its 2024 arbitrations even though the great majority of parties were non-UK based.

Shipping and commodities remain the leading sector, although the LCIA’s Transport and Commodities share fell from 36% of referrals in 2023 to 29% in 2024 as its caseload diversified into construction and infrastructure, technology, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, and telecoms. Banking and finance continued to generate substantial activity, rising slightly to 17% of LCIA cases in 2024, reflecting the technical complexity and high value typical of financial disputes. Energy and resources remained the third-largest sector despite its share falling from 14% to 10% amid market volatility and the ongoing energy transition. 

These sectors dominate largely because they involve high-value, cross-border transactions where parties value the confidentiality, technical arbitrator expertise and enforceability advantages that arbitration offers over traditional litigation. More recently, construction, energy-transition and sports-related disputes have also grown in prominence, driven by rising cross-border investment in infrastructure and renewables, and the increasing commercialisation of sport, a theme that featured prominently at the inaugural London Arbitration Week held in December 2025.

The LCIA and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) remain the two institutions most commonly used for international arbitration seated in England and Wales, alongside the sector-specific LMAA for maritime disputes (which operates on an ad hoc, rather than administered, basis). The LCIA received 362 referrals in 2024, with London chosen as the seat in 89% of cases and English law applied in 78%, while the ICC’s 2025 statistics confirm that London remains the second most selected seat globally with 78 cases, narrowly behind Paris (82), reflecting continued strong reliance on established institutional rules, deep pools of specialist arbitrators and the supportive supervisory role of the English courts. 

No new arbitral institution has been established in England and Wales in the past 12 months. Recent activity has instead centred on the reforms to the Arbitration Act 1996 introduced by the Arbitration Act 2025 (effective 1 August 2025), which significantly updated the legislation, bringing it into line with modern dispute resolution, instead of replacing it, and on new market events such as the inaugural London Arbitration Week held in December 2025.

The Commercial Court, part of the Business and Property Courts of the High Court, remains the principal court designated to hear applications relating to arbitrations seated in England and Wales, including challenges to awards and applications for interim relief under Section 44 of the Arbitration Act 1996. It also hears applications for anti-suit injunctions restraining parties from pursuing foreign proceedings in breach of a London-seated arbitration agreement and has exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over London-seated arbitrations, a position reaffirmed in a notable 2025 Court of Appeal decision that restrained a pre-emptive challenge to an award in a Pakistani court. There is no separate, standalone “international commercial court” in England and Wales. The Commercial Court’s specialist judges and established case law instead provide the equivalent function for both domestic and international arbitration-related matters.

International arbitration seated in England and Wales is governed by the Arbitration Act 1996, as amended by the Arbitration Act 2025, which applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland (Scotland has its own legislation). The 1996 Act applies a single regime to both domestic and international arbitration, without a separate “international” category.

The 1996 Act is not an adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, although its drafters had close regard to it and it follows the Model Law’s structure and many of its principles, including party autonomy, competence-competence, separability and limited court intervention. It diverges in significant respects: it applies to domestic and international arbitration alike; the “writing” requirement is broader; the tribunal must be impartial, but there is no free-standing requirement of independence (although the 2025 Act introduces a statutory duty of disclosure under Section 23A); the courts retain a right of appeal on a point of law under Section 69 (which parties may, and under most institutional rules do, exclude), jurisdictional review under Sections 67 (substantive jurisdiction) and 68 (serious irregularity); and, since the 2025 amendments, the Act contains a default rule on the law governing the arbitration agreement (Section 6A) and an express power of summary disposal (Section 39A), neither of which has a Model Law counterpart.

The Arbitration Act 2025, the most significant reform in a generation, received Royal Assent on 24 February 2025 and applies to arbitrations and court proceedings commenced on or after that date (regardless of when the arbitration agreement was made). Following the Law Commission’s review, it amends rather than replaces the 1996 Act.

Key changes include: a default rule that the arbitration agreement is governed by the law expressly agreed or, failing that, the law of the seat (Section 6A, reversing Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Co Chubb [2020] UKSC 38); codification of the arbitrator’s continuing duty of disclosure (Section 23A); an express, non-mandatory power of summary disposal (Section 39A); streamlined Section 67 challenges, limiting new grounds, evidence and rehearing; strengthened arbitrator immunity; express enforceability of emergency arbitrators’ orders; and extension of Section 44 powers to orders against third parties.

As to pending developments, following the Civil Justice Council’s June 2025 review, the government announced in December 2025 that it will legislate to clarify (with prospective effect) that litigation funding agreements are not damages-based agreements, mitigating the negative impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in PACCAR of R (on the application of PACCAR Inc and others) v Competition Appeal Tribunal and others [2023] UKSC 28, and to introduce proportionate regulation of litigation funding agreements. The Civil Justice Council had recommended that arbitration funding remain outside formal regulation, but the government’s statement did not expressly confirm this exclusion. The legislation is awaited.

Under English law, the formal requirements for an enforceable arbitration agreement are minimal, and the courts adopt a pro-arbitration approach.

Section 6 of the Arbitration Act 1996 defines an arbitration agreement as an agreement to submit present or future disputes to arbitration. Section 5 requires the agreement to be in writing, but this requirement is defined broadly: it includes agreements made in writing (whether or not signed), by exchange of communications, evidenced in writing or by reference to written terms. “Writing” includes anything recorded by any means. Incorporation by reference is permitted under Section 6(2). Oral agreements fall outside the Act but may be recognised at common law (Section 81(1)(b)).

No elaborate wording is required, provided there is sufficient certainty. Ordinary contract principles such as consent, capacity and authority apply. Consent may be inferred from conduct (SEA2011 Inc. v ICT Ltd [2018] EWHC 520 (Comm)). An arbitration agreement survives the death of a party (Section 8).

Although an unsigned agreement may be valid domestically, this does not eliminate cross-border risk. English law on formal validity is broader than some foreign approaches to Article II(2) of the New York Convention, so an unsigned or impliedly accepted agreement may face recognition or enforcement objections abroad.

The 1996 Act contains no list of non-arbitrable subject matters, and English courts take an inclusive view of arbitrability. Section 1(b) provides that parties should be free to decide how their disputes are resolved, limited only by safeguards necessary in the public interest. Section 6(1) provides that both contractual and non-contractual disputes are arbitrable, while Section 81 preserves the common law, so arbitrability is governed by public policy and specific statutory regimes rather than a closed code.

Recognised exclusions are narrow: criminal liability, questions of personal status and certain family matters (notably care and parenting issues), although the High Court has entered a consent order in the terms of a Beth Din award in matrimonial proceedings (AI v MT [2013] EWHC 100 (Fam)).

Consumer arbitration agreements are subject to a statutory fairness regime under Section 91 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Low-value claims are treated as unfair, while higher-value clauses remain subject to fairness review. Certain statutory employment rights (such as unfair dismissal) are reserved to the Employment Tribunal and cannot be displaced by agreement, though purely contractual employment disputes (for example, wrongful dismissal or claims under restrictive covenants) may be submitted to arbitration, the 1996 Act containing no employment-related exclusion from arbitrability.

Insolvency-related disputes are generally arbitrable, but remedies such as winding-up orders are reserved to the court. Where a debt is subject to an arbitration agreement and is genuinely disputed, the court will stay a winding-up petition in favour of arbitration. More broadly, competition claims are prima facie arbitrable. Intellectual property disputes (including validity, on an inter partes basis), shareholder unfair prejudice petitions (where relief is within the tribunal’s power), and allegations of fraud, bribery or illegality are also generally arbitrable.

For arbitrations commenced on or after 1 August 2025, Section 6A of the 1996 Act (as amended) provides that the arbitration agreement is governed by the law expressly agreed for it, or, failing that, by the law of the seat. A choice of law for the main contract does not itself amount to an express choice for the arbitration agreement. This new provision displaces Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Co Chubb [2020] UKSC 38 (which continues to apply only to earlier proceedings) and does not apply to arbitration agreements contained in treaties or enactments, which are principally relevant to investor-State arbitration.

English courts adopt a pro-arbitration stance. Under Section 9, a stay of proceedings is mandatory where there is a valid arbitration agreement covering the dispute, unless the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The tribunal has competence-competence under Section 30, while the court retains supervisory roles under Sections 32 (preliminary points), 67 (jurisdictional challenges), and 72 (relief for non-participating parties). The Enka framework was also applied at the enforcement stage in Kabab-Ji SAL v Kout Food Group [2021] UKSC 48, addressing the distinction between express and implied choice of law for the arbitration agreement.

Where foreign proceedings breach an arbitration agreement, courts grant anti-suit and anti-enforcement injunctions under Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, even before any arbitration is commenced and in support of foreign-seated arbitrations (UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2024] UKSC 30). Once the applicant establishes a strong prima facie case (or, at the interlocutory stage, a high degree of probability) that an arbitration agreement governs the dispute, relief will ordinarily be granted unless strong reasons are shown to the contrary.

Courts will decline enforcement only where the agreement is null and void, inoperative, incapable of performance or where the subject matter is non-arbitrable.

Under English law, an arbitration agreement may be valid notwithstanding the invalidity of the underlying contract. The doctrine of separability is codified in Section 7 of the 1996 Act: an arbitration agreement forming part of another agreement is not regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because the main agreement is invalid, did not come into existence or has become ineffective. The arbitration agreement is treated as a distinct agreement. Consequently, even if the underlying contract is unenforceable, the arbitration agreement will be enforceable unless circumstances directly impeach the arbitration agreement itself (Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Yuri Privalov [2007] UKHL 40).

The principal limit is where the very basis of assent to arbitrate is denied – for example, forgery, impersonation or a total absence of authority – since such a challenge strikes the arbitration agreement directly. A further limit arises where a later agreement contains a new, inconsistent dispute resolution clause that supersedes the earlier arbitration agreement (Monde Petroleum SA v WesternZagros Ltd [2015] EWHC 67 (Comm)). That, however, is an application of ordinary construction rather than a departure from separability.

Party autonomy is the starting point: parties are free to agree the number of arbitrators, any required qualifications and the appointment procedure (Sections 15 and 16). There are no nationality or professional statutory restrictions. In Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40, the Supreme Court held that arbitrators are not “employees”, so appointment criteria are not subject to employment discrimination legislation.

Autonomy is bounded by mandatory provisions: fairness and impartiality (Section 33), disclosure (Section 23A), and removal (Section 24) cannot be excluded. Agreed qualifications are respected (Sections 19 and 24(1)(b)) but construed commercially: courts will not imply exclusionary limits unless clearly expressed (Allianz Insurance Plc v Tonicstar Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 434). Highly specific criteria steering appointments from a very small pool may give rise to apparent-bias analysis (Cofely Ltd v Bingham [2016] EWHC 240 (Comm)). Where the appointment procedure fails, Section 18 empowers the court to make the necessary appointment. The applicable institutional rules may also impose their own appointment procedures.

If there is no agreement on the number of arbitrators, the tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator (Section 15(3)). Where no appointment procedure is agreed, Section 16 supplies defaults: for a sole arbitrator, joint appointment within 28 days; for a three-member tribunal, each party appoints one arbitrator within 14 days, and the two appointees appoint the chairperson. In a two-party case where one side defaults, the non-defaulting party may give notice that its arbitrator will act as sole arbitrator. If the defaulting party fails to appoint within seven clear days, the appointment stands, subject to challenge (Section 17). This mechanism applies “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”.

Where the procedure fails, Section 18 provides a residual court power: the court may make the necessary appointment itself, which takes effect as if made by agreement. Section 18 is a narrow gateway: it is engaged only where there has been a genuine failure (Silver Dry Bulk Co Ltd v Homer Hulbert Maritime Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 44 (Comm)), and a process that never validly began cannot have “failed” (Global Aerospares Ltd v Airest AS [2023] EWHC 1430 (Comm)). The court must have due regard to agreed qualifications when exercising its Section 18 powers (Section 19). Section 18 is not a mandatory provision, so parties could in principle exclude it, although this would be unusual.

There is no bespoke statutory default for multiparty appointments: Section 16(7) channels cases involving more than two parties into Section 18. In practice, institutional rules usually provide the solution. Under the LCIA Rules (Article 8), the LCIA Court appoints the tribunal without regard to party nominations. Under the ICC Rules (Article 12(8)), multiple claimants or respondents must nominate jointly, failing which the ICC Court may appoint the entire tribunal.

A court can intervene in the selection of arbitrators, but only on a defined statutory basis. Section 1(c) provides that the court should not intervene except as provided by Part I, so its role is supportive and residual. The principal route is Section 18: where the appointment procedure has failed, the court may give directions, revoke appointments or make the appointment itself. Section 18(4) provides that an appointment made by the court has effect as if made with the agreement of the parties. Under Section 18(5), the leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision under this Section. The court also has a limited role under Section 17 (setting aside a default sole-arbitrator appointment) and Section 24 (removal: see 4.4 Challenge and Removal of Arbitrators).

As for limitations: first, Section 18 is engaged only on a genuine failure of the appointment procedure, a gateway the courts scrutinise carefully. Secondly, the court must respect party autonomy: it must have due regard to agreed qualifications (Section 19), and its purpose is to get the arbitration constituted so that it may proceed, not to supervise it (Sangamneheri v The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators & Ors [2022] EWHC 886 (Comm)). Thirdly, where the parties have vested an institution with appointment or removal powers, that recourse must first be exhausted (Section 24(2)).

The 1996 Act distinguishes revocation from court removal. Under Section 23, the parties or an institution may revoke an arbitrator’s authority. Under Section 24, a party may apply to the court to remove an arbitrator on four grounds: justifiable doubts as to impartiality; lack of agreed qualifications; physical or mental incapacity to conduct the proceedings (or justifiable doubts about the ability to do so); and failure properly to conduct proceedings or use reasonable despatch, causing substantial injustice. Institutional recourse must be exhausted first (Section 24(2)), and the arbitrator has a right to be heard.

Section 24(1)(a) reflects the objective common law test for apparent bias: whether the fair-minded observer would conclude that there is a real possibility of bias (Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48). Non-disclosure is a factor – depriving the arbitrator of the “badge of impartiality” – but is not automatically disqualifying. In a close case, it may tip the balance. Cofely Ltd v Bingham [2016] EWHC 240 (Comm) is an example where removal was ordered. A party that participates without timely objection risks losing the right to object (Section 73) and a breach of Section 33 may also found a post-award challenge under Section 68.

Following the Arbitration Act 2025, an arbitrator who resigns incurs no liability unless the resignation is unreasonable, and costs orders against an arbitrator in removal proceedings may be made only in bad faith, reinforcing immunity under Section 29.

Under English law, the statutory touchstone is impartiality rather than independence. Section 33 requires the tribunal to act fairly and impartially, and justifiable doubts as to impartiality ground removal under Section 24. The 1996 Act deliberately contains no separate duty of independence – lack of independence matters only in so far as it gives rise to justifiable doubts as to impartiality (Laker Airways Inc v FLS Aerospace Ltd [1999] EWHC B3 (Comm); confirmed in Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48).

The duty of disclosure is now express. Section 23A, inserted by the Arbitration Act 2025 for proceedings commenced on or after 1 August 2025, requires a prospective or appointed arbitrator to disclose, as soon as reasonably practical, circumstances that might reasonably give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality, judged by what the individual knows or ought reasonably to know, and applying from the time they are approached about appointment. This codifies and strengthens the continuing common law duty recognised in Halliburton, which also confirmed that disclosure operates alongside the implied duty of confidentiality in English-seated arbitration.

The principle of competence-competence is firmly established in England and Wales under Section 30(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996, which provides that, unless the parties agree otherwise, the tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction, including whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, reinforced by the separability doctrine under Section 7 as applied by the House of Lords in Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 40. The Arbitration Act 2025 strengthened this principle by amending Section 32 to confirm that a party may only ask the court to determine jurisdiction as a preliminary matter where the tribunal has not already ruled on the issue, rather than treating a court application as an appeal. A tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling can still be challenged post-award under Section 67, although the 2025 Act now limits this to a review rather than a full rehearing where the objecting party has already participated in the tribunal’s jurisdictional process.

Courts may address jurisdiction under Section 32 (a preliminary point, only if the tribunal has not yet ruled, per the Arbitration Act 2025) or Section 67 (post-award challenge), generally showing marked reluctance to intervene out of respect for the tribunal’s competence-competence under Section 30(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996. An exception arises at enforcement: in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, the Supreme Court held that where enforcement of a New York Convention award is resisted under Section 103(2)(b) for want of a valid arbitration agreement, the enforcing court must determine jurisdiction afresh rather than defer to the tribunal’s finding.

Negative jurisdictional rulings can similarly be challenged in court, since Section 67 does not expressly distinguish between positive and negative jurisdictional rulings. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no directly on-point, named English judgment confirming a successful Section 67 challenge to a negative jurisdictional ruling.

An objection to substantive jurisdiction must generally be raised at the outset of arbitral proceedings, no later than the point at which the objecting party takes its first step to contest the merits, under Section 31(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996. Before the tribunal has ruled, a party may apply to the tribunal itself under Section 30 or, in limited circumstances (with the agreement of all parties or the tribunal’s permission), to the court under Section 32, as clarified by Section 5 of the Arbitration Act 2025. Once the tribunal has ruled on its own jurisdiction, any further challenge can only be brought after an award under Section 67.

For jurisdictional challenges under Sections 32 and 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996, English courts apply a de novo standard, determining the jurisdictional question for themselves rather than deferring to the tribunal’s reasoning, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46 and applied in Central Trading & Exports Ltd v Fioralba Shipping Co [2014] EWHC 2397 (Comm). This same de novo, full-rehearing standard applies at the enforcement stage under Section 103(2)(b), where a New York Convention award is resisted for want of a valid arbitration agreement, per Dallah. However, the Arbitration Act 2025 has narrowed this standard specifically for Section 67 post-award challenges, restricting new grounds and evidence and generally barring the rehearing of evidence already heard by the tribunal, where the objecting party participated in the tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling.

Under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996, a party against whom proceedings are brought in respect of a matter covered by an arbitration agreement may apply for a stay, and the court “shall grant a stay” unless satisfied that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Republic of Mozambique v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) [2023] UKSC 32. This reflects a strong general willingness of the English courts to give effect to arbitration agreements and stay competing litigation, consistent with the pro-arbitration approach to construing arbitration clauses established in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40 (also reported as Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd). Courts therefore show marked reluctance to permit proceedings commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement to continue, treating a stay under Section 9(4) as mandatory rather than discretionary once the statutory conditions are met.

English law does not recognise the “group of companies doctrine”, meaning that a non-signatory group company cannot be bound merely by corporate affiliation with a signatory, as confirmed in Peterson Farms Inc v C&M Farming Ltd [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm), where the Commercial Court held that “English law treats the issue as one subject to the chosen proper law of the Agreement and that excludes the doctrine which forms no part of English law”. This was reinforced in City of London v Sancheti [2008] EWCA Civ 1283, where the Court of Appeal held that it “would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose and structure of the Arbitration Act 1996” to stay proceedings against a party who is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement or a person claiming through or under such a party, and that “a mere legal or commercial connection was insufficient”.

Agency is one basis on which a non-signatory could in principle become bound, as considered (though rejected on the facts) in Peterson Farms, since English law determines the question by reference to the proper law of the arbitration agreement rather than the third party’s nationality or domicile. As confirmed in Peterson Farms, and as illustrated by City of London v Sancheti itself (which concerned a party of Indian nationality), these principles apply irrespective of whether the third party is domestic or foreign.

An arbitral tribunal seated in England and Wales is permitted to award preliminary and interim relief under two distinct statutory provisions. Under Section 38 of the Arbitration Act 1996, the tribunal has default powers (unless otherwise agreed) to order a claimant to provide security for the costs of the arbitration (Section 38(3)), and to order the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody or detention of property, or that samples, observations or experiments be conducted upon it (Section 38(4)). Such orders are binding on the parties. Additionally, under Section 39(1), the parties may agree to confer on the tribunal the power to make, on a provisional basis, “any relief it would be empowered to award in a final decision”. Where so conferred, a provisional award qualifies as an “award for the purposes of the 1996 Act” and is subject to the same challenge mechanisms under Sections 67–69, as confirmed in EGF v HVF and others [2022] EWHC 2470 (Comm), though the availability and binding effect of such relief depend on the terms of the parties’ agreement, including any adopted institutional rules.

Section 44(2) empowers the court to make orders on matters including the taking and preservation of evidence, orders relating to property or the sale of goods, the granting of interim injunctions and the appointment of a receiver, while Section 44(3) permits urgent, without-notice orders to preserve evidence or assets.

Section 2(3) extends these Section 44 powers to foreign-seated arbitrations, subject to the court’s discretion to refuse if it considers exercising the power would be inappropriate given the foreign seat.

National legislation does allow emergency arbitrators: the Arbitration Act 2025 inserts a new Section 41A into the 1996 Act, expressly empowering an emergency arbitrator to issue a binding peremptory order (enforceable by the court in the same way as an order of a fully constituted tribunal) where a party fails, without sufficient cause, to comply with the emergency arbitrator’s order or directions. Section 44(4), as amended, also allows the emergency arbitrator to give permission for a party to apply to the court for a Section 44 order.

The courts retain their supportive role once an emergency arbitrator is appointed, since Section 44(5) provides that the court will act only where the emergency arbitrator has no power or is unable for the time being to act effectively.

Under Section 38(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may order a claimant to provide security for the costs of the arbitration. This is a default power that the parties are free to exclude or modify by agreement under Section 38(1). The court’s express statutory powers under Section 44 to support arbitral proceedings do not specifically include security for costs of the arbitration. However, the court retains its general power to order security for costs of any court proceedings relating to the arbitration under the Civil Procedure Rules.

The procedure of arbitration seated in England and Wales is governed by Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996. The foundational principle is party autonomy: Section 34(1) provides that it is for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree otherwise on any matter. The tribunal’s overriding duty under Section 33 (which is mandatory and cannot be excluded) sets the boundaries. In practice, most institutional arbitrations are governed by the applicable rules (eg, LCIA Arbitration Rules, ICC Rules), supplemented by the Act’s default provisions.

The law does not prescribe mandatory procedural steps. Rather, the parties are free to determine by agreement the applicable procedural rules, eg, the LCIA Arbitration Rules, or to develop from scratch their own procedural rules for the case at hand.

Duties

The tribunal’s overriding mandatory duty is set out in Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1996: to act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity to put its case and deal with that of its opponent, and to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined.

Following Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48, arbitrators owe a legal duty to disclose facts and circumstances which would or might reasonably give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality. This duty is derived from the Section 33 obligation of fairness and impartiality.

Powers

The tribunal may refuse to deliver an award except upon full payment of the arbitrators’ fees and expenses (Section 56). The arbitrator’s statutory immunity under Section 29 provides that an arbitrator is not liable for anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of their functions unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith.

Tribunals hold broad procedural and evidential powers: they may rule on their own substantive jurisdiction (Section 30, unless otherwise agreed) and decide all procedural and evidential matters, including document disclosure, language and whether strict rules of evidence apply (Section 34). They also have general powers under Section 38 including ordering security for costs, directing property preservation and administering oaths. Arbitrators may make peremptory orders and dismiss claims for inordinate and inexcusable delay (Section 41).

The Arbitration Act 1996 imposes no qualification or admission requirements on legal representatives appearing before arbitral tribunals. “Rights of audience” rules under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 apply only to court proceedings, not private arbitral hearings. This applies equally regardless of whether the arbitration is domestic or international. Indeed, the Arbitration Act 2025 removes the remaining domestic/international distinction.

Accordingly, parties may be represented by foreign-qualified lawyers or non-lawyers.

In UK-seated arbitrations, the general approach to the collection and submission of evidence at the pleading stage and at the hearing is governed primarily by party autonomy and tribunal discretion under the Arbitration Act 1996. The Act’s founding principle is to resolve disputes fairly, without unnecessary delay or expense, and the parties are free to agree how procedural and evidential matters are handled. Where the parties have not agreed, the tribunal decides all such matters, including the form and timing of written statements of claim and defence, and whether those pleadings may be amended.

On disclosure, the tribunal decides whether any documents or categories of documents should be disclosed and produced, and at what stage. The tribunal also determines whether strict rules of evidence apply to the admissibility, relevance or weight of any material, so the ordinary court rules of evidence do not bind the arbitration unless adopted. With respect to privilege, a witness cannot be compelled to produce any document that could not be compelled in court proceedings, thereby preserving legal professional privilege and other recognised protections.

In relation to witness evidence and hearings, the tribunal may direct whether evidence and submissions are given orally, in writing, or both. In practice, written witness statements are commonly exchanged in advance, with cross-examination taking place at the hearing, though neither is mandated by the Act itself. The court may also assist with securing the attendance of witnesses located in the UK under Section 43, and with preserving evidence under Section 44.

In arbitrations seated in England and Wales, the strict rules of evidence that govern domestic court litigation do not automatically apply. The Arbitration Act 1996 takes a deliberately flexible approach.

Under Section 34 of the Act, it is for the arbitral tribunal to decide “all procedural and evidential matters”, subject to any agreement the parties may have reached. This includes the power to decide whether to apply the strict rules of evidence regarding admissibility, relevance or weight of evidence. The tribunal can choose to follow court-style evidence rules, adopt the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence or devise its own bespoke approach, as it considers appropriate for the case.

This flexibility sits within a framework of fairness. Section 33 requires the tribunal to act fairly and impartially, giving each party a reasonable opportunity to present its case and respond to the case presented by the other side.

The same rules of evidence apply to domestic arbitration as to international arbitration. Part I of the Act governs all arbitrations seated in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, regardless of whether the parties or the dispute are domestic or international. The Act contained separate “domestic arbitration agreement” provisions in Sections 85-87, but these have now been repealed by the Arbitration Act 2025.

The tribunal may direct which documents the parties must disclose and produce, as part of its general procedural and evidential powers (Section 34). If a party defaults, the tribunal may make peremptory orders, enforceable through the court.

For witness attendance, Section 43 allows a party to use the same court procedures available in litigation to compel a witness to attend the tribunal to give oral testimony or produce documents, but only with the tribunal’s permission or the agreement of the other party.

Under Section 44, the court has broad powers exercisable in support of arbitral proceedings, including the taking of witness evidence and the preservation of evidence. 

The tribunal can order parties to produce documents directly, but has no coercive power over non-parties. Therefore, compulsion of third-party witnesses or documents requires recourse to the court under Sections 43-44. Since the coming into force of the Arbitration Act 2025, the court’s support powers extend to orders against non-parties.

Confidentiality in arbitration is recognised as an implied term of the arbitration agreement, though it is not codified in the Arbitration Act 1996. In Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48, the Supreme Court confirmed that confidentiality is “an important and free-standing implied term” covering pleadings, written submissions, witness statements, disclosed documents, transcripts and the award.

However, the obligation is not absolute. Recognised exceptions permit disclosure where:

• the parties consent;
• a court order or legal duty compels it;
• it is reasonably necessary to protect a party’s legitimate interests; or
• the interests of justice require it.

When a party brings arbitral material before the English courts, typically to enforce an award, challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction (Section 67), or allege serious irregularity (Section 68), the court must balance two competing interests: keeping the arbitration confidential and ensuring justice is administered openly.

In practice, the court has broad case-management powers to manage this tension. It may order that hearings take place in private rather than in open court, restrict who can see particular documents through “confidentiality rings” (where only named lawyers or experts gain access), direct that sensitive passages in the award or submissions be redacted before filing, or limit inspection of court files to prevent wider publication. The court can also anonymise the parties in its published judgment, as seen in cases styled “A v B” or “P v Q”.

However, these protections are not automatic. A party seeking confidentiality must usually apply for it and demonstrate that disclosure would cause real harm. The court retains discretion and will not shield material from public view where transparency is necessary for the proper administration of justice. The result is a flexible, case-by-case approach rather than a blanket rule.

Under the Arbitration Act 1996, Section 52, the parties are free to agree on the form of an award. Absent such agreement, the award must be:

• in writing, signed by all arbitrators (or all those assenting);
• reasoned, unless it is an agreed award or the parties have dispensed with reasons;
• state the seat of arbitration and the date of the award. 

The award is treated as made at the seat, regardless of where it was signed or delivered (Section 53). Notification must be made without delay by service of copies on the parties, absent contrary agreement (Section 55).

The Act imposes no general statutory time limit for making an award. Any deadline will derive from the arbitration agreement or applicable institutional rules. Where such a contractual time limit exists, the court may extend it under Section 50 if satisfied that substantial injustice would otherwise result. 

A failure to give adequate reasons may expose the award to challenge: in Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Westzucker GmbH (No 2) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 130, the Court of Appeal stressed the tribunal’s duty to state reasons sufficient to show that it addressed the essential issues.

Under English law, there are some limits on the remedies an arbitral tribunal may award. Section 48 of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides that the parties are free to agree on the tribunal’s remedial powers. Absent such agreement, the tribunal may make declarations, order payment of money in any currency, order a party to do or refrain from doing anything (akin to injunctive relief) and order rectification, setting aside or cancellation of a deed or document. Notably, the tribunal may order specific performance but not in relation to a contract relating to land.

Regarding punitive or exemplary damages, the Act does not expressly confer such a power.

In Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, the House of Lords confined exemplary damages to narrow categories, and it is generally accepted that English-seated tribunals are unlikely to award them. An award exceeding the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be refused enforcement under Section 66 of the Act. 

Additionally, under Section 68 of the Act, awards may be challenged for serious irregularity, including where the tribunal has exceeded its powers. Thus, the parties’ agreement and the applicable substantive law together prescribe the effective limits on remedies.

Arbitral tribunals have broad discretion to award both interest and costs pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1996. General practice in English-seated arbitrations typically follows the costs-follow-the-event model rather than a costs-sharing approach.

Interest

Section 49 of the Act empowers tribunals to award simple or compound interest on sums awarded, for any period up to the date of payment. The parties may agree otherwise, but absent such agreement, the tribunal’s discretion is wide. In Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA [2005] UKHL 43, the House of Lords confirmed the tribunal’s autonomy in determining monetary remedies, including interest.

Costs

The default principle is “costs follow the event” (Section 61(2)), meaning the unsuccessful party generally bears the successful party’s reasonable legal costs. However, tribunals retain discretion to apportion costs differently based on party conduct, partial success or other relevant factors. In Fence Gate Ltd v NEL Construction Ltd [2001] EWHC 456 (TCC), the court endorsed this general approach whilst recognising the tribunal’s broad discretionary power.

Under the Arbitration Act 1996, parties may challenge or appeal an award on three grounds: substantive jurisdiction under Section 67, serious irregularity under Section 68, or (unless excluded by agreement) a question of law under Section 69. An appeal under Section 69 requires the leave of the court unless all parties agree, and leave is only granted where the tribunal’s decision is “obviously wrong” or the question is “one of general public importance” and “open to serious doubt”.

Applications and appeals must first exhaust any available arbitral process of appeal or review under Section 70(2), and must be brought within 28 days of the award under Section 70(3).

Under English law, parties may agree to exclude the right of appeal on a point of law under Section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, which is expressly non-mandatory by virtue of the opening words “unless otherwise agreed by the parties” (Section 69(1)). However, parties cannot expand the court’s appellate jurisdiction beyond questions of law. In Guangzhou Dockyards Co Ltd v ENE Aegiali I [2010] EWHC 2826 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that Section 69(1) could not be construed as conferring jurisdiction to hear an appeal on questions of fact, even where the parties had expressly agreed to such an appeal. By contrast, Sections 67 (challenge on substantive jurisdiction) and 68 (challenge for serious irregularity) are listed as mandatory provisions in Schedule 1 to the Act and cannot be excluded or expanded by party agreement. Parties may, however, establish an arbitral appellate mechanism (as recognised by the definition of “available arbitral process” in Section 82(1)) that reviews both law and fact, though this operates as an internal arbitral tier rather than an expansion of the court’s statutory supervisory jurisdiction.

An appeal on a point of law under Section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 applies a deferential standard: leave is granted only where the tribunal’s decision is “obviously wrong” or, where the question is one of general public importance and is “at least open to serious doubt” (Section 69(3)(c)), and the court proceeds on the basis of the tribunal’s findings of fact rather than conducting a full merits review. By contrast, jurisdictional challenges under Sections 32 and 67 involve the court determining the question of jurisdiction for itself on a de novo basis, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46. There is no provision under English law for judicial review of the merits of an arbitral award beyond these limited statutory routes.

The UK acceded to the 1958 New York Convention, which entered into force for the UK on 23 December 1975, and made the reciprocity reservation under Article I(3) – meaning it will only apply the Convention to awards made in the territory of another Contracting State – but did not make the commercial reservation. The Convention is given effect in domestic law by Part III of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Sections 100–103), which defines a “New York Convention award” as one made in pursuance of an arbitration agreement in the territory of a state (other than the UK) which is a party to the Convention (Section 100(1)), and provides for recognition and enforcement subject to limited refusal grounds. No separate “commercial” qualifier restricts the scope of enforcement, and the statutory regime applies to all arbitration agreements regardless of subject matter.

Under Section 101 (1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act 1996, a New York Convention award is recognised as binding and may be enforced with the court’s permission in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court, subject only to the limited refusal grounds set out in Section 103(1)–(3), which include incapacity of a party, invalidity of the arbitration agreement, denial of due process, the award exceeding the scope of the submission, improper tribunal composition, the award not yet being binding or having been set aside, non-arbitrability and public policy.

Under Section 103(2)(f), recognition or enforcement may be refused where the award “has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, it was made”, meaning that an award validly set aside at the seat will generally not be enforced in England and Wales.

Where set-aside proceedings are pending at the seat, the court may, under Section 103(5), adjourn its decision on recognition or enforcement and may order the party resisting enforcement to give suitable security.

Under Section 9(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978, a state that has agreed in writing to submit a dispute to arbitration is not immune from the jurisdiction of UK courts in proceedings relating to that arbitration. However, Section 13(2)(b) separately preserves immunity from execution against state property, meaning that a state entity may not succeed in resisting enforcement proceedings themselves but may raise sovereign immunity as a defence to any subsequent measures of execution against its assets.

The English courts adopt a strongly pro-enforcement approach: under Section 103(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996, recognition or enforcement of a New York Convention award “shall not be refused except in the following cases”, and the burden of proving a listed ground falls on the party resisting enforcement under Section 103(2), with the grounds being exhaustive.

Under Section 103(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996, recognition or enforcement of a New York Convention award may be refused “if it would be contrary to public policy to recognise or enforce the award”, and this ground is narrowly construed, consistent with the Act’s overarching principle in Section 1(c) that “the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part”. The statute does not distinguish between domestic and international public policy, referring simply to “public policy” without qualification.

There is no statutory regime for class or representative arbitration in England and Wales, and it is essentially unknown in practice. English arbitration is consent-based: proceedings bind only identified parties, and a procedure binding absent class members is difficult to reconcile with the consent, due process and confidentiality principles underpinning the 1996 Act.

Group and multiparty arbitration is, however, well recognised. Identified parties may proceed together through joinder or consolidation where all have consented (directly or via institutional rules), or in a single arbitration where one agreement is broad enough to cover related contracts or parties. Under Section 35, consolidation and concurrent hearings require party agreement and cannot be imposed on non-consenting parties.

The key requirement is consent, not subject-matter arbitrability: collective claims are not per se non-arbitrable, but consent to arbitrate is not read as consent to a representative procedure binding absent persons, and remedies designed to protect third parties or a collective body remain reserved to the courts. In the consumer context, where class-style procedures are most often proposed, arbitration clauses covering modest claims are automatically unfair under Section 91 of the 1996 Act, and collective redress (such as competition collective proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal) is court-based.

Standards come from overlapping layers: binding rules, institutional rules and non-binding soft law.

For counsel, solicitors are regulated by the SRA Standards and Code of Conduct, and barristers by the BSB Handbook. Both impose core duties of honesty, integrity, independence and upholding the administration of justice. Foreign lawyers may appear without domestic qualification and remain subject to their home bar rules. The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation are persuasive and applicable where adopted.

For arbitrators, the binding core is statutory: the non-derogable duties of fairness and impartiality (Section 33) and disclosure (Section 23A), breach of which may lead to removal (Section 24) or challenge to the award (Section 68), together with the implied duty of confidentiality. Arbitrators who are solicitors or barristers remain subject to their professional codes. CIArb members are subject to its Code of Professional and Ethical Conduct, and institutional rules add detailed impartiality and disclosure requirements. The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest reflect good practice but, as Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48 confirms, have no binding legal effect.

The regime is permissive and light-touch; third-party funding is an accepted, mature market. Maintenance and champerty were abolished by the Criminal Law Act 1967 but survive as residual public policy controls. A funding agreement may be unenforceable if it tends to corrupt justice, eg, through excessive funder control. The market is primarily self-regulated through the Association of Litigation Funders’ Code of Conduct, addressing capital adequacy, withdrawal limits and prohibitions on funder control.

There is no general duty to disclose funding, though a funder’s identity may be required by institutional rules for conflicts purposes or ordered on a security for costs application. Funding alone does not justify security. Funders face potential non-party costs orders in court proceedings under Section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981: the Arkin cap is no longer rigid. The tribunal cannot award costs directly against a funder, but a successful party may recover funding costs as “other costs” under Section 59(1)(c) (Essar Oilfields Services Ltd v Norscot Rig Management Pvt Ltd [2016] EWHC 2361 (Comm)).

The reform picture remains unresolved. In PACCAR [2023] UKSC 28, the Supreme Court held that funding agreements based on a percentage of damages are damages-based agreements subject to statutory regulation, creating uncertainty. Although primarily arising in the litigation context, its application to arbitration is untested. The government has announced legislation to clarify that funding agreements are not damages-based agreements and to introduce proportionate regulation. That legislation is awaited.

Consolidation is only possible with party agreement. Under Section 35, parties may agree to consolidation or concurrent hearings, but absent such agreement, the tribunal cannot order either. The English courts have no power to consolidate.

In practice, consent may come from an express clause, a later procedural agreement, or institutional rules.

Consolidation should be distinguished from joinder (adding a party), co-ordinated case management and a single arbitration embracing claims under multiple contracts where one arbitration agreement is broad enough to cover them. The latter is a question of construction, not consolidation. There is no presumption that an arbitration clause in one contract captures disputes under another – that is a matter of careful construction, even if the result is fragmentation.

The starting point is strict: arbitration is consensual, and an arbitration agreement binds only its parties. English law does not recognise the “group of companies” doctrine (Peterson Farms Inc v C&M Farming Ltd [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm)). A non-signatory is bound only where, under the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, it can properly be regarded as having consented (Dallah v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46).

Nonetheless, recognised routes exist. Under Section 8 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, a third party enforcing a contractual right subject to an arbitration clause is treated as a party for that purpose (Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves & Company Ltd [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm)). Section 82(2) extends “party” to persons claiming under or through a party, capturing assignees, novatees, subrogated insurers and universal successors (Republic of Mozambique v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) [2023] UKSC 32). Agency principles may bind a principal, including an undisclosed principal. Operation of law supplies further routes: death (Section 8), a trustee in bankruptcy’s adoption of a contract, and statutory transfers under the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010. Piercing the corporate veil is confined to exceptional evasion cases (Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34). A narrow conflict-of-laws route exists (Egiazaryan v OEK Finance [2015] EWHC 3532 (Comm)), where the question of whether a foreign parent was bound was referred to the law of incorporation. Unlike Dallah, where French law did not establish common intention, in Egiazaryan Russian law permitted joinder by statute.

As to awards, Section 58 provides that an award is final and binding only on the parties and privies, though it may found an issue of estoppel against a privy in interest. At enforcement, Sections 66 and 101 do not permit enforcement against a non-party or privy.

English courts cannot compel a foreign third party to arbitrate absent consent, but their orders may affect foreign parties in practice. Anti-suit injunctions operate in personam against anyone amenable to the court’s jurisdiction, including in support of foreign-seated arbitrations (UniCredit v RusChemAlliance [2024] UKSC 30). Section 44 orders (eg, for preserving evidence) may be made against third parties, though service outside the jurisdiction requires the court’s permission (Section 44(4)), and enforceability against persons with no presence or assets in the jurisdiction remains limited. By contrast, Sections 23A (arbitrator disclosure) and 39A (summary disposal) apply to the tribunal, not third parties.