International Trade 2026 Comparisons

Germany is a member of the WTO, having been a founding member since 1 January 1995. Germany is also a member state of the EU, which is itself a WTO member. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU has exclusive competence over the common commercial policy. As a result, the EC represents the EU (and therefore its member states) in WTO negotiations and dispute settlement proceedings. At the same time, Germany participates internally in shaping the EU’s position through its role in the European Council, whereby EU member states co-ordinate and decide on common strategies.

In addition to the multilateral WTO agreements, through the EU, Germany participates in a number of plurilateral agreements concluded within the WTO framework. These include the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), the Civil Aircraft Agreement and the Information Technology Agreement. Participation in these agreements commits the EU, and therefore Germany, to enhanced obligations relating to tariff elimination, regulatory transparency and procurement market access.

Although WTO law does not have direct effect in German law, in most circumstances, WTO commitments influence legislative design and may inform judicial interpretation before the ECJ.

Germany does not generally negotiate or conclude trade agreements independently but is represented by the EU in this area. As a result, Germany is party to a large number of regional and preferential trade agreements through its membership in the EU. Under the TFEU, the EU has exclusive competence for the common commercial policy, including the negotiation and conclusion of free trade agreements.

To the extent that an agreement covers areas falling within the competences of EU member states (such as Mercosur or the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA)), ratification by the national Parliaments of the EU member states may also be required. In Germany, such agreements generally require approval by the Bundestag and ‒ where the constitutional requirements are met ‒ the consent of the Federal Council (Bundesrat) before Germany can complete its ratification procedures. For an overview of existing free trade agreements applicable to Germany through the EU, please see the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie)’s website.

Among the EU’s major trade agreements currently in force or moving into provisional application are those concluded with Canada, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and New Zealand. The EU also maintains partnership and association agreements with neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as well as economic partnership agreements with several African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.

Germany participates in a number of autonomous trade arrangements through its membership in the EU. The most significant of these arrangements is the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) – under which, developing countries benefit from unilateral tariff reductions when exporting goods to the EU, including Germany. The GSP framework includes a special incentive arrangement known as GSP+, which provides additional tariff preferences to countries that commit to implementing a series of international conventions relating to human rights, labour standards, environmental protection and good governance.

Germany also participates in other preferential arrangements established by the EU, including those applicable to Overseas Countries and Territories associated with certain EU member states. These arrangements are intended to promote economic development and facilitate closer economic integration with the EU internal market.

Although these schemes do not constitute reciprocal free trade agreements, they give rise to legally binding obligations that are applicable in Germany through EU law. Notably, they establish rules relating to tariff treatment, rules of origin, and compliance requirements for importers operating in the EU market.

Germany is affected by trade negotiations conducted by the EU on behalf of its member states, as the EU has exclusive competence over the common commercial policy.

Ongoing negotiations include discussions with countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. The EU is also updating and modernising several existing agreements in order to incorporate provisions addressing digital trade, sustainability commitments and regulatory co-operation.

Significant recent developments include the conclusion of negotiations for the EU‒Australia Free Trade Agreement in March 2026 and the EU‒India Free Trade Agreement in February 2026. Both agreements are expected to improve market access for EU exporters and are currently undergoing legal review and ratification procedures.

The EU also continues to negotiate complementary agreements with certain trading partners in areas such as investment protection and geographical indications.

As Germany’s trade policy is largely shaped at the EU level, key developments in EU trade policy have a direct impact on Germany.

A notable development was the signing of the EU–Mercosur free trade and partnership agreement after more than two decades of negotiations. The agreement aims to remove most tariffs on bilateral trade and create one of the largest free trade areas globally. However, the agreement remains politically sensitive within the EU, particularly with regard to environmental protection and agricultural market access. In January 2026, the European Parliament requested an opinion from the ECJ on the agreement’s compatibility with EU law, while the EC subsequently announced that the agreement would move towards provisional application.

Another important development was the conclusion of negotiations on the EU–India Free Trade Agreement and the EU–Australia Free Trade Agreement in 2026.

More broadly, the EU has increasingly integrated sustainability, supply chain resilience and economic security considerations into its trade agreements, reflecting a shift beyond traditional tariff-focused trade policy.

The ratification and implementation of recently negotiated agreements, including the EU–India Free Trade Agreement, the EU–Australia Free Trade Agreement and the EU–Mercosur agreement, will remain key priorities.

The EU is also reviewing its GSP. Proposed reforms aim to strengthen environmental and human rights conditionality and improve monitoring of beneficiary countries. Concerning Mercosur, the EU–Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement entered into provisional application on 1 May 2026 following the completion of the necessary procedures by the EU and the ratification of the agreement by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. This happens after the European Parliament accepted a request for judicial review by the ECJ of the EU-Mercosur agreement, which delays proper EU ratification.

In addition, EU trade agreements are increasingly expected to incorporate provisions addressing economic security, supply chain diversification and strategic autonomy. Future agreements may therefore include stronger enforcement mechanisms relating to sustainability commitments and supply chain transparency.

Customs matters in Germany are governed primarily by EU law, reflecting Germany’s participation in the EU customs union. The legal framework is primarily set out in the Union Customs Code (UCC) and related implementing and delegated regulations.

At EU level, the EC ‒ in particular, the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union (the “DG TAXUD”) – is responsible for developing customs legislation and co-ordinating customs policy across the EU. Operational enforcement and administration of customs law, however, remain the responsibility of EU member states.

In Germany, customs matters are administered by the Federal Customs Administration (Bundeszollverwaltung), which operates under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Finance. The customs administration is centrally co-ordinated by the General Customs Directorate (Generalzolldirektion), while operational customs functions are carried out by the principal customs offices (Hauptzollämter) and their subordinate customs offices throughout Germany.

Customs laws and regulations in Germany are administered and enforced by the Federal Customs Administration, which is subordinate to the Federal Ministry of Finance. The General Customs Directorate acts as the central co-ordinating authority for the customs administration. Enforcement of customs laws is carried out by the Main Customs Offices and, in relation to customs-related offences, by the Customs Investigation Offices (Zollfahndungsämter).

Germany does not maintain a national instrument comparable to Section 301 of the US Trade Act. Such measures are implemented at EU level, as the EU has exclusive competence over the common commercial policy and represents Germany in trade defence matters.

The EU Trade Barriers Regulation provides a framework for addressing trade barriers and other restrictive practices in third countries that adversely affect EU businesses. Under this mechanism, EU companies, industry associations and member states may submit complaints to the EC requesting an investigation into alleged violations of international trade rules or obstacles to market access. The EC may also initiate proceedings on its own initiative.

Investigations are conducted on an ad hoc basis following a complaint or EC initiative. During the investigation process, interested parties – including foreign companies and third-country governments – may submit information and participate in consultations.

The EC publishes the initiation and conclusions of investigations, typically through notices or reports made publicly available, including in the Official Journal of the European Union.

In addition, the EU has adopted the Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 (the “Anti-Coercion Instrument”), which enables the EU to respond to economic pressure exerted by third countries through trade or investment restrictions. Potential countermeasures may include tariffs, restrictions on services or investment measures.

As Germany forms part of the EU customs union, recent developments in EU customs policy have a direct impact on German customs administration and businesses engaged in international trade.

Recent EU customs policy has focused on stronger enforcement and modernised procedures. In November 2025, the EC confirmed that the EUR150 duty exemption for low-value imports will be abolished and a EUR3 levy per parcel charged from 1 July 2026. The change targets e-commerce shipments used to avoid duties and distort competition with EU retailers. Low-value parcels will instead be subject to simplified duties.

At the enforcement level, customs fraud and evasion remain a significant focus for both the European Anti-Fraud Office (Office Européen de Lutte Anti-Fraude, or OLAF) and – where the EU’s financial interests are affected ‒ the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Their investigations increasingly concern undervaluation, misclassification, origin fraud, and organised abuse of import procedures, particularly in high-volume trade flows and e-commerce.

Additionally, concerning EU–US transatlantic tariff tensions, the EU extended until 6 August 2026 the suspension of its commercial rebalancing measures against the USA, following earlier EU and US understandings reached in 2025. The underlying dispute remains relevant because the EU countermeasures have not been withdrawn and may be reactivated if negotiations deteriorate.

As Germany is part of the EU customs union, the ongoing reform of the EU customs framework will significantly affect German customs administration and businesses operating in international trade. The reform aims to simplify customs procedures, strengthen enforcement and improve data exchange across EU member states.

A central element is the creation of an EU Customs Data Hub and a more integrated risk management framework, with the first operational phase currently expected in 2028.

The EU–US tariff dispute also remains a live issue. Although EU countermeasures were recently suspended, that suspension ran only until 6 August 2026, so further negotiations or renewed retaliatory measures remain possible. As a result, transatlantic tariff tensions continue to affect the outlook for EU import measures and customs policy.

Germany’s sanctions regime is primarily based on international and European measures. At the international level, sanctions may be imposed by the United Nations Security Council through resolutions that are binding on all United Nations (UN) member states under international law. However, UN sanctions do not have direct legal effect in Germany and must be implemented by the relevant states pursuant to Article 25 of the UN Charter. At the European level, sanctions are adopted within the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

EU sanctions may target specific individuals or entities or restrict selected sectors or entire economies. Measures commonly include asset freezes and travel bans, as well as trade restrictions and financial prohibitions.

As EU sanctions are generally implemented through EU regulations, they take effect in Germany without the need for further legislative implementation. The adoption of sanctions under the CFSP requires unanimity among EU member states.

At the national level, the enforcement of sanctions in Germany is governed primarily by the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz, or AWG), the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung, or AWV) and the Act on the Enforcement of Economic Sanctions (Sanktionsdurchsetzungsgesetz, or SanktDG).

Sanctions applicable in Germany are primarily adopted at the international and European levels.

At the international level, the United Nations Security Council may impose sanctions through resolutions that are binding under international law on all UN member states. At the European level, sanctions are adopted within the framework of the EU’s CFSP.

Sanctions are adopted in a two-step process by the European Council. Acting unanimously under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Council first adopts a Council Decision, which is then implemented through a Council Regulation. In practice, the two legal acts are adopted at the same time. The EC as well as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are involved in the drafting process of these legal acts.

The Council Decision establishes the political framework for the sanctions regime, whereas the Council Regulation gives the measures direct legal effect within the EU.

Various authorities are involved in the administration and enforcement of sanctions in Germany, as follows.

The Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, or BAFA) is responsible for issuing authorisations and exemptions under applicable sanctions regulations, particularly with regard to the export of goods and the provision of goods-related services.

The Central Office for Sanctions Enforcement (Zentralstelle für Sanktionsdurchsetzung) is responsible for enforcing financial sanctions against designated persons and entities, including investigating frozen assets.

The Deutsche Bundesbank is responsible for certain sanctions-related obligations concerning funds and financial assets, including the receipt of notifications and the granting of authorisations where required under applicable sanctions regulations.

The sanctions regime in Germany is administered by the Federal Customs Administration. However, enforcement is primarily carried out by the Main Customs Offices.

German sanctions laws and regulations apply to all natural and legal persons within the territory of Germany. In addition, German nationals and legal entities incorporated in Germany may also be subject to sanctions obligations when acting abroad, insofar as the applicable EU sanctions regulations or provisions of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance provide for such extraterritorial application.

Sanctions may therefore also apply to activities taking place outside Germany where they involve German persons or entities.

Germany does not maintain a separate national sanctions list. Instead, the EU maintains consolidated lists of sanctioned persons and entities. These lists are adopted through Council Regulations (or Council Implementing Regulations) and are regularly updated.

Individuals and entities may be listed, for example, where they are considered responsible for actions threatening international peace, violating human rights or undermining democratic institutions.

Germany does not maintain any embargo regimes against countries or regions. Instead, Germany implements sanctions adopted at the EU level.

The EU is currently not imposing full embargoes. However, it maintains sectoral sanctions regimes against several countries and regions. These regimes typically focus on strategic sectors such as defence, finance and energy.

Examples of more comprehensive sanctions programmes include sanctions targeting Iran, Russia and North Korea.

An overview of the EU embargo measures can be found in BAFA’s Overview of Country-Specific Embargo Measures on the the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy’s website.

Germany does not maintain any national sanctions or embargo regimes. Instead, as mentioned in 3.6 Sanctions Against Countries/Regions, Germany implements sanctions and embargo measures adopted at the EU level.

In addition to country-specific embargoes and asset-freeze listings, the EU maintains a range of other restrictive measures. These include thematic sanctions regimes, such as measures targeting terrorism, cyber-attacks, chemical weapons proliferation, and serious human rights violations.

The EU also uses sectoral sanctions that do not depend on the listing of individual persons. These may restrict trade in specified goods, the provision of certain services, and access to capital markets, as well as investment, transport, or financial transactions. In practice, the EU frequently combines listed-party restrictions with broader sectoral measures aimed at particular industries or activities.

Germany does not maintain a sanctions regime comparable to secondary sanctions applied by some other jurisdictions. Sanctions applicable in Germany are primarily based on EU restrictive measures, which generally require a sufficient EU jurisdictional connection. However, certain measures may have indirect effects in third countries ‒ particularly under the EU’s Russia sanctions – where restrictions also target non-EU operators allegedly involved in circumvention. The Belarus and Russia regimes also require EU companies to make best efforts to ensure that their non-EU subsidiaries comply.

Violations of sanctions measures are punishable in Germany under Sections 17 to 19 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and Section 82 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance.

Depending on the nature and severity of the infringement, a violation may constitute either a criminal offence or an administrative offence. Serious sanctions violations may result in imprisonment of up to five years and, in particularly serious cases, up to ten years. Following the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1226, recent amendments broadened the range of criminally sanctionable conduct and increased the maximum fines for legal entities from EUR10 million to EUR40 million for certain sanctions violations.

Licences authorising activities that would otherwise be prohibited under sanctions measures are available where the relevant EU sanctions regime provides for a derogation or exemption. As EU sanctions are directly applicable in Germany, the availability and scope of such licences depend on the provisions of the respective EU regulation.

In Germany, licence applications are generally handled by the competent national authorities. Depending on the nature of the transaction, these may include the BAFA or the Deutsche Bundesbank. In practice, these are usually individual licences granted by the competent national authority rather than general licences.

Companies operating in Germany are expected to maintain effective sanctions compliance systems, including counterparty screening and transaction monitoring.

There is no one-size-fits-all compliance standard under German sanctions law. Rather, companies are generally expected to adopt a risk-based approach, taking into account factors such as the size of the business and the activities and risk profile of the business, among other things.

Although German law does not generally prescribe specific elements of a sanctions compliance programme, companies engaged in export-controlled activities are required to appoint an export control officer at management level, who bears overall responsibility for ensuring that adequate export control compliance measures are in place.

Under Article 6b of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, the so-called general obligation to report applies – ie, natural or legal persons, entities and organisations must report information that helps implement EU sanctions or detect breaches. In addition, German law contains specific notification obligations – for example, in Section 64 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance and Section 10 of the Sanctions Enforcement Act.

Such reports must generally be submitted within two weeks to the competent authority – namely, BAFA for goods and services and the Deutsche Bundesbank for funds and financial assets.

Germany maintains national anti-boycott rules. Under Section 7 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, German residents are generally prohibited from making declarations that amount to participation in a foreign boycott in foreign trade transactions.

In addition to this, the EU maintains a Blocking Statute (Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96) designed to counter the extraterritorial application of certain foreign sanctions regimes ‒ namely, the extraterritorial sanctions imposed by the USA against Cuba and Iran. EU operators are barred from complying with those legal acts, unless the EC grants an authorisation under certain specific conditions.

As Germany implements and enforces EU sanctions, developments at EU level have a direct impact on the German sanctions framework.

On 29 September 2025, the European Council reimposed a broad range of restrictive measures against Iran following the reintroduction of UN sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snap-back mechanism. The measures include asset freezes, travel bans and extensive restrictions across sectors including energy, finance, trade and transport.

In addition, the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package against Russia and Belarus in April 2026. The package further tightened restrictions, closed loopholes and expanded anti-circumvention measures, including additional measures targeting trade flows, financial services, energy-related transactions and third-country facilitators. Preventing sanctions circumvention remained a key enforcement priority. Most recently, the EU agreed on a 21st sanctions package in July 2026.

Another important development has been the increasing attention given to the use of proceeds generated by immobilised Russian central bank assets to support Ukraine.

At the same time, the EU also adjusted other sanctions regimes. In February 2025, the European Council suspended certain restrictive measures on key economic sectors in Syria and in May 2025 formally lifted all economic sanctions on Syria except those based on security grounds.

A significant development in Germany was the amendment of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, which entered into force on 6 February 2026 to implement Directive (EU) 2024/1226. Key changes included the criminalisation of certain transaction bans and forms of sanctions circumvention, the introduction of criminal liability for certain grossly negligent violations involving dual-use goods, and stronger penalties for serious sanctions violations.

As Germany’s sanctions regime is largely determined by EU law, future developments at the EU level will continue to have a direct impact on German businesses and enforcement authorities.

During the next 12 months, a key issue will be whether the EU revives its long-discussed reform of the Blocking Statute. Since 2021, the EC has considered amendments intended to strengthen protection for EU operators against the extraterritorial application of third-country sanctions, streamline the current regime, and reduce compliance burdens. Although the review remains formally announced, it does not appear as a headline initiative in the EC’s 2024–29 political guidelines, so the timing and scope of any legislative proposal remain uncertain.

Another important issue on the horizon is the continued expansion of EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus. In addition, following the adoption of the 20th sanctions package, the EU agreed on its 21st sanctions package against Russia and Belarus in July 2026. The 21st package further expanded measures targeting the energy, financial services, crypto and trade sectors and, for the first time, the fisheries sector. Preventing sanctions circumvention remains a key enforcement priority.

Export controls in Germany are governed by directly applicable EU legislation and national law. The principal framework consists of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 on dual-use items, the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance. Additional requirements may arise under sector-specific EU rules on firearms, anti-torture goods, and sanctions or embargo measures.

In Germany, BAFA serves as the central licensing and administrative authority for export controls. BAFA operates under the authority of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

Beyond its licensing function, BAFA plays a central role in the implementation of Germany’s export control policy and is closely involved in international and EU-level export control co-operation. Notably, BAFA participates in the relevant EU working groups and international export control regimes, thereby contributing to the co-ordination and development of export control measures aimed at preventing, among other things, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the destabilising accumulation of conventional arms.

Export controls are administered primarily by BAFA and the German customs authorities. Enforcement is primarily carried out by the Main Customs Offices.

The Federal Customs Administration is responsible for supervising exports at the border and monitoring compliance with applicable export control requirements. Meanwhile, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control serves as the central licensing authority, assessing licence applications and ensuring compliance with export controls.

German export control laws apply to all natural and legal persons involved in export-related activities in Germany. This includes exporters, manufacturers, traders, service providers, intermediaries, and entities engaged in technology transfers. Export control obligations may also arise for universities, research institutions, scientists, and their employees where goods, software, technology or technical know-how are transferred abroad or made accessible to foreign persons.

The regime covers dual-use items, military goods under national rules, and certain non-listed items where a catch-all control applies because of military, weapons-related or sanctions-related end uses.

Germany does not maintain a separate export-control-specific list of restricted persons separate from the sanctions framework. In practice, export restrictions linked to persons or entities usually arise under EU sanctions regulations and embargo regulations, which may prohibit exports to listed persons, entities or sectors.

In Germany, export controls are based on a combination of EU and national legislation. The principal list of controlled items is contained in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (the “EU Dual-Use Regulation”), which identifies dual-use goods, software and technology requiring authorisation for export. Annex IV of the EU Dual-Use Regulation contains a narrower category of particularly sensitive dual-use items that are subject to additional restrictions, including certain intra-EU transfers.

In addition, export controls may arise under the German Export List, which forms part of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance. Part I of Section A of the German Export List covers military goods, while Part I of Section B concerns national dual-use goods.

In Germany, export controls are not limited to items expressly listed in the applicable control lists.

Non-listed goods may also be subject to authorisation requirements where the exporter is aware, or has been informed by BAFA, that such goods are intended for specific sensitive end uses. These so-called catch-all controls are set out in Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821. In addition, Germany maintains national catch-all controls in Section 9 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance.

Furthermore, Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 allows controls on certain non-listed dual-use items where another EU member state has introduced national export controls and those controls have been published by the EC.

Violations of export control measures are punishable in Germany under Sections 17 to 19 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and Section 82 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance.

Serious export control violations, including unauthorised exports of controlled goods and breaches of embargo or export restrictions, may constitute criminal offences. Depending on the offence, penalties may include imprisonment of up to five years and, in particularly serious cases, up to ten years.

Less serious or negligent violations may be prosecuted as administrative offences and may result in substantial fines. Following recent amendments to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, fines imposed on legal persons may reach up to EUR40 million in certain cases. In addition, companies themselves may be subject to fines under Sections 30 and 130 of the German Act on Administrative Offences (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten, or OWiG).

German export control law provides for various types of authorisations. BAFA may grant individual export licences (Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen), including licences up to a specified maximum value (Höchstbetragsgenehmigungen), as well as collective licences (Sammelgenehmigungen) for reliable exporters and certain large-scale projects.

In addition, general export authorisations (allgemeine genehmigungen) are available for specified categories of transactions and may be used without a separate application where their conditions are met.

Exporters may also apply for a Nullbescheid (negative clearance), confirming that a proposed export is neither prohibited nor subject to a licensing requirement.

Companies operating in Germany are expected to identify whether their goods, software or technology are subject to export controls and to assess destination, end-use and end-user risks. Exporters are generally expected to exercise adequate due diligence and to investigate red flags indicating potential export control violations or circumvention risks.

Although internal compliance programmes (ICPs) are not generally mandated by law, companies dealing with listed goods or goods that may be used for sensitive end uses are generally expected to maintain appropriate compliance structures. In practice, ICPs are often relevant when applying for broader authorisations, such as collective licences.

Reporting requirements in Germany arise principally in connection with export licensing procedures. Exporters must apply for licences where required under applicable EU and German export control laws and provide the information necessary for the licensing assessment.

A significant development in Germany was the introduction, on 1 February 2026, of a package of measures aimed at simplifying and accelerating export control procedures. The reforms introduced new and expanded general export authorisations, facilitated certain European defence co-operation projects, and eased the use of cloud-based technology transfers in specified circumstances. The package also strengthened BAFA’s decision-making powers with a view to streamlining licensing procedures, particularly for technology transfers within Europe and within corporate groups.

At the EU level, recent developments have focused on economic security and tighter control of advanced technologies. In December 2025, the EC’s Economic Security Communication announced measures aimed at harmonising export control procedures across EU member states and assessing whether additional controls (including possible outbound investment screening) are needed in strategically sensitive sectors. In September 2025, the EC also amended Annex I to the Dual-Use Regulation, expanding controls over a number of advanced technologies. At the national level, the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy also published guidance on the classification of loitering munition as war weapons, highlighting the increasing regulatory focus on emerging military technologies.

As Germany’s export control regime is largely determined by EU law, the main issue during the next 12 months will be whether the EU moves towards greater harmonisation of licensing practice and a broader economic security framework. Current policy discussions also concern emerging technologies, outbound investment risks and resilience in sectors such as semiconductors, clean tech and critical raw materials. The ongoing reform of the FDI Screening Regulation may further increase the relevance of export controls in FDI screening by extending mandatory screening to certain targets active in the dual-use sector. These debates are likely to shape both future export control reforms and national enforcement priorities.

EU anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures are governed by EU legislation and administered by the EC, principally through the Directorate-General for Trade. Definitive measures are imposed by EC regulation following the applicable procedure under the basic anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard regulations, in accordance with the comitology procedure where EU member states exercise oversight over the EC’s adoption of implementing acts through the examination procedure and voting by qualified majority.

The EC investigates, imposes and monitors trade defence measures. In Germany, enforcement of such duties is carried out by the Federal Customs Administration, which imposes the applicable duties upon importation and ensures their collection in accordance with the Union Customs Code.

German customs authorities may also investigate cases involving the evasion, circumvention or non-payment of trade defence duties. OLAF and, in some cases, EPPO assist enforcement by investigating fraud and the evasion and circumvention of trade defence measures.

As Germany is part of the EU trade defence system, German producers and industry associations may petition the EC to initiate the review of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures, provided the applicable standing requirements are met. The EC may also initiate certain review proceedings of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures (particularly interim reviews) ex officio.

Safeguard reviews, on the other hand, are initiated ex officio by the EC. Unlike anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures, there is no formal mechanism for German producers or industry associations to petition for the initiation of a safeguard review.

Anti-dumping and CVD reviews are generally initiated on an ad hoc basis following a request by interested parties or, in some cases, by the EC itself. However, there are important nuances and statutory time periods for certain types of reviews. Most notably, expiry reviews can be requested by domestic producers no later than three months before the lapse of measures. Moreover, interim reviews can be requested by interested parties only after at least one year has elapsed since the imposition of definitive measures. Within the first year, only the EC or an EU member state may initiate an interim review on their own initiative.

Exporting producers, importers, users, foreign governments and other interested parties may participate in both AD and CVD and safeguard reviews if they register their interests within the deadlines prescribed in the relevant notice of initiation. Once registered, parties can typically submit evidence or written comments, request a hearing, and access non-confidential versions of the investigation files. Although the EC tends to only consider submissions from parties that register on time, it retains discretion to take into account late submissions of significant relevance, provided that this does not compromise procedural fairness of the investigation.

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations usually start with a complaint lodged by the EU industry. The complaint must contain sufficient prima facie evidence of dumping or subsidisation, injury and causation. The EC then decides whether to initiate proceedings within a 45 days deadline and, if it does so, publishes a notice of initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. The EC may also initiate investigations ex officio where sufficient evidence of dumping/subsidisation, injury, and causation exists.

Once an investigation is initiated, interested parties are invited to register, submit questionnaire responses, request hearings and provide written comments. The EC typically conducts sampling where there are numerous exporters, importers or EU producers involved. Following the submission of questionnaire responses, the EC typically carries out on-site verifications to ensure accuracy of the data submitted by interested parties. The EC then assesses whether the legal conditions to impose measures are met, determines the appropriate level of duties to remedy dumping/subsidisation or injury, and evaluates whether the imposition of measures would be in line with or against EU interest.

Provisional measures may be applied if the legal conditions are met, generally for up to six months, and may be retroactive for a maximum of 90 days if imports were registered at customs following the EC’s request. Following provisional measures, the EC adopts definitive measures in the implementing regulation, taking into account all comments and submissions. Investigations are usually concluded within 13 months, extendable to 16 months in exceptional circumstances. EU member state customs authorities then enforce and collect duties at importation.

Safeguard Investigations

Safeguard investigations follow a different logic and require higher thresholds, as they focus on a sudden, sharp increase in imports causing serious injury.

Unlike in AD/CVD cases, safeguard actions are initiated by the EC. The investigation is initiated upon information provided by an EU member state (or member states) that there is sufficient evidence to support the initiation of a safeguard investigation. The EC is required to initiate the investigation within one month of receiving information from an EU member state and to publish a notice of initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. In practice, safeguard complaints are predominantly prepared by the domestic industry or industrial associations, which collect and structure the evidence of import surges and injury. These complaints are then co-ordinated and formally transmitted by the relevant EU member state(s) to the EC, which triggers the initiation of the investigation.

A safeguard investigation must normally be completed within nine months ‒ although the period may be extended to 11 months in exceptional circumstances. Questionnaires are not as comprehensive as AD/CVD investigations and focus on overall trends in imports, market conditions, and injury indicators rather than individual prices or costs. Interested parties may have access to relevant non-confidential information and may be able to present their comments in writing, which may be crucial in determining EU interest.

Provisional measures may be applied in critical cases for a limited period (up to 200 days). They are usually not retroactive in nature.

The EC publishes notices of initiation, regulations imposing measures, and regulations or decisions concluding or terminating proceedings in the Official Journal of the European Union. Disclosure documents and case information are also provided to interested parties during the investigation but are usually not available to external stakeholders not registered to the investigation as interested parties.

In principle, the EU may impose trade defence measures on imports from any jurisdiction if the legal conditions are met. An exception exists in sectors covered by the European Economic Area framework, where the use of such instruments between the parties is generally excluded, subject to sector-specific limitations (agriculture and fishery). Moreover, certain developing countries (eg, African, Caribbean, and Pacific states) benefited from preferential arrangements that in some sectors temporarily limited or waived the application of trade defence measures. Most of these arrangements have expired or been replaced by new frameworks. Therefore, trade defence measures may now apply where they previously could not. In the case of Türkiye, the Customs Union Agreement does not include a limitation to impose trade defence measures.

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures normally remain in force for five years unless repealed earlier or extended following an expiry review. Before the five-year period ends, the EU industry may request a review if it can show that the expiry of the measures would likely result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping or subsidisation and injury. For other proceedings, such as interim reviews, new exporter reviews and anti-absorption investigations, the five-year timeframe does not apply.

Safeguard measures operate on a shorter timeline. Definitive safeguard measures may remain in force for up to four years, including any provisional period. Where their duration exceeds three years, a mid-term review is required and the measures may be extended once, up to a total maximum duration of eight years. In practice, safeguard measures have been subject to frequent, sometimes annual functional reviews, such as in the case of steel safeguard measures. This reflects the EC’s effort to ensure the measures remain proportionate, effective, and in line with EU interest.

In AD/CVD investigations, a review is usually initiated following a substantiated request by the EU industry (or by the EC ex officio), an exporter, an importer or another interested party, depending on the type of review. The request must contain sufficient evidence supporting the grounds for review, such as changed market conditions, continuation of injury, circumvention, or the need to reassess the duty level.

If the EC considers that the evidentiary threshold is met, it opens the review by notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. The procedure then broadly follows the structure of an original investigation, including questionnaires, submissions, hearings and disclosure of essential facts. Existing measures generally remain in force while the review is pending, especially in expiry reviews.

The outcome may be the maintenance, amendment, extension or repeal of the measures, depending on the type of the review. In expiry reviews, the EC can only extend the duration of the measure or repeal it. The exact timetable depends on the type of review, but many reviews must be concluded within nine to 15 months.

Safeguard Investigations

In safeguard reviews, the EC follows a similar procedure as an original safeguard investigation, but focuses on whether the conditions for the measure continue to exist, including import trends, the existence of a serious injury, the causal link between increased imports and injury, EU interest, and adjustments in the EU industry. In practice, however, the EC has greatly extended the scope and role of safeguard reviews ‒ not just to verify whether the conditions for a measure continue to exist but also to redesign and adapt its design and operation.

In successive steel safeguard reviews, the EC conducted detailed assessments of the operation of tariff rate quotas, the impact of liberalisation rates, quota utilisation and circumvention issues, and trade diversion caused by global capacity. This has led to adaptations in quota volumes, liberalisation rates, quota flexibilities, and country coverage.

EU regulations and/or imposing or maintaining trade defence measures may be challenged before the General Court of the European Union under Article 263 of the TFEU within two months of their publication. Actions are typically brought by exporting producers, associations or ‒ in some rare cases ‒ EU complainants that can show direct and individual concern.

The General Court of the European Union reviews whether the EC respected procedural rights, applied the law correctly and committed any manifest error of assessment. Judgments of the General Court of the European Union may be appealed on points of law to the ECJ.

Importers and users often have more limited standing for direct actions and may instead challenge the validity of measures before national courts. Those courts may then refer questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on validity or interpretation under Article 267 of the TFEU.

In February 2026, the EC imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of valine from China after finding that dumped imports were causing injury to the EU industry. The duties range from 31.3% to 53.8%, which illustrates the EC’s continued readiness to act in relatively specialised product markets where it considers EU producers to be materially injured.

The EU has recently adopted a new Global Overcapacity Instrument (GOI), which is an additional instrument in the EU’s toolbox aimed at fighting global overcapacity in certain sectors, offering structural adjustments in third countries and providing for the possibility of tailored measures.

In its recently concluded fuse alumina investigation, the EC has explicitly referenced economic security considerations in its reasoning for the first time, opening the door to a broader interpretation of the EU interest test that goes beyond traditional injurious effects.

The ongoing ferroalloys safeguard investigation shows the EC’s willingness to apply safeguards to intermediate products that play essential roles in manufacturing supply chains. This points to a more granular targeting (eg, distinct combined nomenclature (CN) codes within related product groupings) to address specific distortions.

The EC has recently streamlined the registration of imports practice during investigations. This means that retroactive duty applications may be observed more commonly.

No major legislative reform pertaining to trade remedies is currently expected. However, certain EU industry stakeholders are requesting changes with regard to:

• lifting the Lesser Duty Rule in order to allow duties to be based on the full amount of dumping in cases where it is greater than injury;
• factoring labour and environmental compliance costs into normal value or export price calculations to ensure a fair and equitable calculation and to align with injury margins;
• developing a system of support for SMEs and refining the sampling procedure to ensure greater user involvement in investigations; and
• relaxing the high threshold applied for safeguard investigations to address structural problems in certain key industries.

Germany operates a comprehensive foreign investment screening regime under the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy is the competent authority administering Germany’s foreign investment screening regime.

German investment screening distinguishes between cross-sectoral and sector-specific review procedures. The cross-sectoral review procedure generally applies to acquisitions by non-EU and non-EFTA (European Free Trade Association) investors. The sector-specific review procedure applies to acquisitions involving defence-related businesses and certain IT security products and may also apply to investors from other EU member states.

Certain acquisitions are subject to mandatory notification requirements. Depending on the type of target business, notification thresholds may apply at voting rights levels of 10%, 20% or 25%.

The review process generally consists of two phases. In Phase I, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy has two months from obtaining knowledge of the acquisition to decide whether to open an in-depth review. If opened, Phase II generally lasts four months from receipt of all necessary documentation. The period may be extended by three months in particularly difficult cases and by a further month where significant defence interests are affected. At the conclusion of the review, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy may clear the transaction, approve it subject to conditions, conclude a public law agreement or prohibit the acquisition.

In addition, Germany participates in the EU co-operation mechanism under Regulation (EU) 2019/452 ‒ under which, the EC and other EU member states may provide comments or opinions on transactions raising security or public order concerns. At the national level, Germany is also preparing a dedicated Investment Screening Act, partly in response to the ongoing reform of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452.

Investment screening is administered by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

At EU level, the EC co-ordinates the co-operation mechanism and receives notifications of transactions under review in EU member states. The list of screening mechanisms notified to the EC by EU member statements is available on the CIRCABC website.

A transaction may be subject to investment screening in Germany where a foreign investor acquires a direct or indirect participation in a German company and the acquisition falls within the scope of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance.

Under the cross-sectoral investment review regime, acquisitions by non-EU and non-EFTA investors are generally subject to review where the investor acquires at least 25% of the voting rights in a German company. For certain particularly security-relevant target companies, including operators of critical infrastructure and businesses active in other sensitive sectors specified in the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, lower review thresholds apply. Depending on the type of activity concerned, the acquisition of 10% or 20% of the voting rights may already trigger a notification requirement and investment review.

The sector-specific investment review regime applies to acquisitions involving particularly sensitive security sectors, including manufacturers and developers of military equipment, certain defence technologies and specified IT security products. In these cases, a review may be triggered where a foreign investor acquires at least 10% of the voting rights in the German target company.

Under the cross-sectoral review regime, acquisitions of German companies operating in particularly security-relevant sectors listed in Section 55a of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance are subject to mandatory notification to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

Under the sector-specific review regime, acquisitions involving companies active in the fields of defence, military equipment and certain IT security products are generally subject to mandatory notification.

Certain transactions may be exempt from Germany’s foreign investment screening regime. In particular, under Section 55(1b) of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, acquisitions carried out as part of an intra-group reorganisation are exempt from cross-sectoral review where the ultimate parent company remains unchanged, only the ownership chain is restructured, and no shareholders from a previously uninvolved jurisdiction are introduced.

Apart from this specific exemption, intra-group transactions and internal restructurings are, in principle, capable of falling within the scope of Germany’s investment screening regime if they involve the direct or indirect acquisition of a German undertaking by a foreign investor.

More generally, acquisitions falling below the applicable voting rights thresholds are not subject to mandatory notification requirements.

Violations of Germany’s foreign investment screening regime may constitute either criminal offences or administrative offences. Criminal offences under Section 18(1b) and (2) No 8 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act are punishable by imprisonment of up to five years or by a criminal fine.

In addition, administrative fines may be imposed for certain intentional or negligent violations. The relevant provisions include Section 19(1) No 2 and Section 19(3) No 2 Foreign Trade and Payments Act.

The legal basis is the Federal Fees Act and the Special Fee Ordinance for War Weapons Control, Export Control and Investment Screening.

The amount of the fee depends on the stage and complexity of the review. Where the review is completed during Phase I, a fee of EUR800 is generally charged. If an in-depth review (Phase II) is opened, fees generally start at EUR2,500 and may increase to EUR6,000. Where the review results in the imposition of conditions, mitigation measures or a public law agreement, fees of up to EUR30,000 may be charged, depending on the complexity of the case.

A key recent development was the reform of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the “EU FDI Screening Regulation”). Following the conclusion of negotiations, the European Parliament adopted the new regulation on 19 May 2026 and the European Council approved it on 8 June 2026. The reform is intended to make the current framework more uniform by requiring all EU member states to maintain screening mechanisms, introducing minimum sectoral coverage, strengthening the EC’s co-ordination role and providing clearer procedural timelines.

At EU level, the policy debate has moved beyond traditional FDI screening. The EC’s December 2025 Economic Security Communication linked investment screening more closely with export controls and supply chain resilience, particularly in strategic sectors. In parallel, the draft Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) suggests a more interventionist approach, including a separate screening mechanism for certain large investments linked to clean tech, AI, and electric vehicle batteries. Although not yet law, it shows that investment control is increasingly discussed not only in security terms but also as industrial policy.

As Germany’s investment screening regime is closely linked to developments at EU level, the principal issue on the horizon is the adoption and implementation of the revised EU FDI Screening Regulation. The reform is intended to further harmonise national screening mechanisms, introduce minimum sectoral coverage requirements and strengthen co-operation between EU member states and the EC.

At national level, the German government is expected to prepare a draft Investment Screening Act in 2026 to implement the EU reforms and consolidate rules currently contained in the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance. Discussions include the treatment of asset deals and atypical control acquisitions, privileges for intra-group restructurings, and revised case categories. Germany’s current Phase I review period of up to two months may also need to be aligned with the shorter 45-day timeline envisaged by the revised EU framework.

In Germany, there are no subsidy or other incentive programmes aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production.

There are no standards or other technical requirements employed in Germany that are aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production.

There are no sanitary and phytosanitary requirements employed in Germany that are aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production.

There are no competition policies or price controls employed in Germany that are aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production.

In Germany, there are no state trading measures, state-owned enterprises and privatisation measures aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production.

Germany does not generally maintain “buy national” requirements in public procurement. As a member state of the EU and a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement through the EU, its public procurement regime is generally based on the principles of non-discrimination and open competition.

That said, current policy discussions increasingly refer to “Buy European” or similar concepts in strategic sectors, especially defence and industrial policy. This trend is reflected in recent EU initiatives such as Security Action for Europe (SAFE), which includes European content requirements for certain defence procurements, and the proposed Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA), which is designed to promote European technological sovereignty and may introduce sovereignty-related requirements in public procurement of cloud and AI services. The draft IAA also points towards possible sourcing, production and ownership requirements in particularly sensitive sectors – although this is not yet binding law.

Germany applies the EU system for the protection of geographical indications. The EU maintains an extensive system for protecting geographical indications for agricultural products, foodstuffs, wines and spirits. These schemes are aimed at protecting product names linked to specific origins and production methods, rather than at reducing imports. They nevertheless provide commercial advantages to qualifying EU and non-EU producers whose products meet the relevant conditions.

There are no other significant issues or developments in German law that have not been addressed elsewhere in this questionnaire.