Japan has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since 1955. Japan has also been a member of the WTO plurilateral agreements, including:
Japan is also a member of:
As of 20 September 2024, Japan is a member of 20 free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs), including:
See 1.2 Free Trade Agreements.
As of 20 September 2024, the following agreements are being negotiated:
Japan is a founding member of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPFE).
This is not relevant in this jurisdiction.
Customs Duty Rates
The principal laws governing customs duty rates in Japan are the following:
The Customs Act stipulates general rules applicable to customs administration, including:
Article 3 of the Customs Act prescribes that, in cases where a treaty provides special provisions for customs duties, such special provisions shall apply. Thus, the customs duties prescribed in EPAs directly apply based on this provision.
The Customs Tariff Act mainly covers matters related to customs duty rates, including:
This Act sets forth the general rates of customs duties in its Appended Table.
The Temporary Tariff Measures Act stipulates temporary rates for customs duties as an exception to the Customs Act and Customs Tariff Act, taking into account the surrounding industrial and economic circumstances. For example, Article 8 of the Temporary Tariff Measures Act stipulates a special reduction of customs duties that applies to imports of products produced by processing certain raw materials exported from Japan, if the final product is imported within one year (or a longer period determined by the Director General of the relevant regional customs) from the date of the export permission of the raw materials. In addition, Article 8-2 of the Temporary Tariff Measures Act stipulates the duties under the generalised system of preferences (GSP).
Rules of Origin
The principal laws and regulations governing rules of origin are the following.
Non-preferential rules of origin
Preferential rules of origin (EPA)
The rules of origin described in EPAs directly apply without being converted into domestic rules or regulations, pursuant to Article 3 of the Customs Act.
Preferential rules of origin (GSP)
Customs Classification
When considering customs classification, the Appended Table of the Customs Tariff Act (the “customs tariff schedule”) and notices that prescribe the interpretation of the schedule are generally referenced. The customs tariff schedule and other customs-related regulations (such as the Appended Table 1 of the Temporary Tariff Measures Act) were amended, effective from 1 January 2022, to revise them in accordance with HS 2022.
Customs Valuation
Customs valuation is principally governed by Article 3 of the Customs Act and Articles 3 and 4 through 4-9 of the Customs Tariff Act.
The Customs and Tariff Bureau, which is an internal department of Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF), is in charge of matters related to customs laws and regulations. Japan Customs are the local branch offices of the MOF, and the headquarters of regional customs are located in nine locations throughout Japan – ie:
In Japan, there are no legal instruments similar in nature to the EU’s Trade Barriers Regulation or to Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974.
However, as referential materials, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) publishes:
Through these publications, the METI identifies trade practices in other jurisdictions that have negative impacts and that are suspected of being inconsistent with trade agreements (WTO, EPA, etc). While these publications are not connected to any legal actions (and are published for policy reasons), they demonstrate that the METI is concerned with such matters.
Moreover, a certain provision allows Japan to impose retaliatory duties without relying on rules under the WTO. In particular, paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Customs Tariff Act exceptionally prescribes retaliatory duties on countries that have not ratified the WTO Agreement; these are applicable in cases where any goods exported from or through Japan are treated less favourably than goods exported from or through any other country. These retaliatory duties outside the WTO framework have not been applied to any goods since this paragraph was enacted.
The following measures have been introduced recently.
Extension of Reduction in Customs Duty Rates for Goods Manufactured From Raw Materials Previously Exported From Japan
The reduction of customs duties that applies to imports of products produced by processing certain raw materials exported from Japan under certain conditions (as described in 2.1 Authorities Governing Customs) was extended by three years. Previously, this tariff reduction was applicable to cases where the raw materials were exported on or before 31 March 2023. This was extended to cases where the raw materials are exported on or before 31 March 2026.
Clarification of Who Should Be the Importer
Considering that there have been cases in which import declarations fraudulently indicated low prices of imported goods to evade payment of customs duties, the eligibility standards for “importers” (ie, those who should file import declarations) were amended as of 1 October 2023. After this amendment, an “importer” means:
For instance, if a foreign operator retains a Japanese customs broker to handle the customs procedures with a view to selling the goods in Japan after the import permission, through fulfilment services operated by an e-commerce platform, that foreign operator (rather than the customs broker) must be the importer. In this scenario, the goods are still unsold at the time of the import declaration; therefore, the right to dispose of the goods belongs to the foreign operator.
Enhanced Efforts to Prevent National Security Threats
Considering the importance of security export control (see 4.1 Export Controls through 4.6 Sensitive Exports), Japan Customs has decided to strengthen its efforts to prevent exports that may cause security threats. This strategy includes:
In addition, the Economic Security Intelligence Centre was established in July 2022 at Tokyo Customs, for purposes of centralising information relating to security export control and conducting analysis.
Considering that there have been many cases in which counterfeit goods or illegal drugs were purchased on e-commerce platforms and imported into Japan, the Order for Enforcement of the Customs Act was amended to require that import declarations include the following information.
These pieces of information would enhance the ability of customs officers to identify the importations of counterfeit goods and illegal drugs. This amendment will enter into effect on 12 October 2025.
Japan does not have a single comprehensive law authorising sanctions; sanctions are implemented through a patchwork of laws and regulations. While the majority of Japan’s economic sanctions programmes are derived from resolutions of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Japan also implements sanctions measures based on international co-operation with other countries, as well as unilateral sanctions measures against North Korea, which are not derived from UNSC resolutions or international co-operation.
The primary law in this area is the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA), under which the following types of transactions may be subject to sanctions and permission or approval of the Minister of Finance or the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (“Minister of METI”):
Other acts that implement sanctions include:
Unless otherwise specifically mentioned, the explanations throughout the remainder of 3. Sanctions apply to sanctions regulated by the FEFTA.
As the primary act governing economic sanctions, the FEFTA sets out the types of transactions subject to sanctions, and the conditions under which sanctions may be imposed (see 3.1 Sanctions Regime and 3.3 Government Agencies Enforcing the Sanctions Regime). Further details of the rules are stipulated by subordinate regulations and notices as follows.
The Export Trade Control Order stipulates the areas and items subject to sanctions for the exportation of goods.
Other subordinate orders relating to the FEFTA (ie, the Foreign Exchange Order and the Import Trade Control Order) authorise the competent ministers to further designate specific areas, items and persons subject to sanctions on the importation of goods, service transitions, international payments and capital transactions. The competent ministers then publish notifications relating to the factors above, pursuant to such orders.
Under the FEFTA, the relevant government agencies that impose and enforce sanctions differ depending on the type of subject transactions and the conditions relied on to impose/enforce sanctions.
In particular, sanctions could be imposed/enforced if the Minister of Finance or of METI finds it necessary either:
In this circumstance:
Regarding service transactions, international payments and capital transactions subject to sanctions, either the Minister of Finance or of METI authorises the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to designate individuals and entities subject to sanctions.
Sanctions could also be imposed/enforced if the Cabinet decides to take countermeasures necessary to maintain peace and security in Japan (eg, unilateral sanctions). In this circumstance, Cabinet decisions must be approved by the Diet and will be enforced by the Minister of Finance or of METI, depending on the types of subject transactions.
In most cases, the obligation to obtain permission or approval under the FEFTA applies to:
Specifically, the persons below must obtain permission from the competent authorities when conducting a transaction subject to sanctions.
The FEFTA also applies to actions taken in a foreign country by the representative, agent, employee or other worker of a legal entity with a principal office in Japan or of a person with a domicile in Japan, if such transactions are undertaken in connection with the assets or business of that legal entity/person.
The MOFA, authorised by either the Minister of Finance or of METI, designates sanctioned individuals and entities under the FEFTA (see 3.2 Legal or Administrative Authorities Imposing Sanctions).
Japan implements a general ban on imports and exports to/from North Korea and self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “republics”, and a general ban on imports from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Japan also implements a ban on exports of a wide range of products to Russia and Belarus, and on imports of certain products from Russia.
Japan prohibits North Korean nationals, vessels and aircraft from entering Japan, as part of its unilateral sanctions.
Japan does not apply secondary sanctions.
Penalties for violating the FEFTA and relevant regulations with respect to international payments, capital transactions and service transactions are as follows.
Penalties for violating the FEFTA and relevant regulations with respect to trade in goods are as follows.
Please note that penalties will be imposed on a legal entity only if a violation by a natural person is committed in connection with the business or assets of the legal entity.
The FEFTA requires a person to obtain permission or approval for transactions subject to economic sanctions. However, generally such permission will not be granted, with certain limited exceptions, such as for humanitarian aid purposes.
Although there are no specific compliance guidelines for sanctions as of 28 October 2024, the MOF provides the guidelines for financial institutions or certain other service providers subject to the FEFTA regarding compliance with the FEFTA and the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. The MOF also conducts foreign exchange inspections to check whether financial institutions and certain other service providers subject to the FEFTA are complying with the related acts.
Effective from 1 April 2024, financial institutions and certain other service providers subject to the FEFTA are obligated to establish an internal system to properly implement asset-freezing measures in accordance with the compliance standards prescribed under the FEFTA (eg, conducting risk assessments for violations of asset-freeze measures, maintaining a list of individuals or organisations subject to asset-freeze measures, etc).
Moreover, the FEFTA provides for a post-review system, under which the Minister of METI conducts post-reviews to clarify the cause and to prevent recurrence of incidents regarding payments, service transactions and imports/exports subject to sanctions, where it later becomes clear that they were not approved by the Minister METI and thus may violate FEFTA sanctions regulations.
Under the FEFTA, banks, other financial institutions and certain other service providers (eg, fund transfer service providers, crypto-asset exchange service providers) are prohibited from conducting transactions unless they have confirmed that international payments or capital transactions subject to sanctions have been permitted by the relevant ministers.
The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds also requires banks, other financial institutions and certain other service providers to notify the government of “suspicious transactions”, including transactions suspected of being related to specific crimes, terrorism and exports/imports that violate economic sanctions.
Japan does not have any blocking statutes, anti-boycott regulations or other restrictions that prohibit adherence to other jurisdictions’ sanctions.
Since February 2022, various sanctions measures against Russia and Belarus have been implemented by the Japanese government in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in co-ordination with the USA, the EU and the G7 member states. Economic sanctions based on these co-ordinated efforts are ongoing as of October 2024, and Japan is expanding the scope of the sanctions, in co-operation with these countries.
The Japanese government also has implemented asset-freezing measures in line with UNSC resolutions. To contribute to international efforts for peace aimed at resolving issues related to violent acts by Israeli settlers in the West Bank, Japan implemented additional asset-freezing measures in July 2024 targeting designated individuals.
The FEFTA and other related laws were amended in December 2022, in response to the result of the fourth round of multilateral evaluations and analysis of Japan’s compliance with the recommendation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Financial institutions or certain other service providers subject to the FEFTA are obligated to establish an internal system to properly implement asset-freezing measures in accordance with the compliance standards prescribed under the FEFTA (effective from April 2024).
Other than those changes explained in 3.14 Key Developments Regarding Sanctions, as of 28 October 2024 no major changes are planned.
In Japan, the FEFTA provides the legal basis for export controls, as follows.
Article 48 of the FEFTA provides a framework for regulation of the exportation of goods, and delegates the list of specific goods subject to export control to the Export Trade Control Order (ETCO). The rules specified in the ETCO are further detailed by relevant Ministry Orders and notifications.
Article 25 of the FEFTA provides a framework for regulation of the transfer of technologies, and delegates the list of specific technologies subject to export control to the Foreign Exchange Order (FEO). The rules specified in the FEO are further detailed by relevant Ministry Orders and notifications.
See 4.1 Export Controls.
When a person/entity intends to export goods or transfer technologies subject to export control, such person/entity is required to obtain a licence from the Minister of METI.
In Japan, there are two main types of export controls for goods and technologies: “list control” and “catch-all control”. Items subject to these export controls, together with the person required to obtain a licence, are as follows.
Export Control on Goods
List control
The specific goods subject to list control are detailed in Appended Table 1 of the ETCO as categories 1 through 15, and correspond to goods regulated under the international regimes of which Japan is a member, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. If the goods to be exported qualify as controlled goods, a licence is required for exportation regardless of the destination.
Catch-all control
The goods subject to catch-all control are those that are not subject to list control, and fall within one of the chapters of the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature specified in Appended Table 1 of the ETCO as category 16. In summary, the catch-all control covers any transaction of these goods when either of the following conditions is met.
Note that the exact conditions listed in the first bullet point differ depending on the destination of goods and whether the concern is related to weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. In addition, the catch-all control described above does not apply when the destination of goods is a country listed in Appended Table 3 of the ETCO – so-called Group A countries, which used to be known as “white” countries. South Korea was removed from the list of Group A countries in August 2019, but was re-added to the list in July 2023.
Persons subject to the export licence requirement
Exporters, regardless of their nationality, who plan to export controlled goods should obtain a licence.
Export Control on Technologies
List control
The specific technologies (including programs/software) subject to list control are detailed in the Appended Table of the FEO as categories 1 through 15, and correspond to technologies regulated under the international regimes of which Japan is a member, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group.
Catch-all control
The technologies subject to catch-all control are those that are not subject to list control, and pertain to the design, production or use of the goods that fall within one of the chapters of the HS nomenclature specified in the Appended Table of the FEO as category 16. In summary, the catch-all control covers any transfer of these technologies when either of the following conditions is met.
Similar to exportations of goods, the exact conditions listed in the first bullet point above differ depending on:
In addition, the catch-all control described above does not apply when the destination of the technology transfer is any of the Group A countries or a non-resident who has nationality in a Group A country.
Persons subject to the licence requirement
The following persons who plan to transfer controlled technologies should obtain a licence:
For the definitions of “resident” and “non-resident”, please see 3.4 Persons Subject to Sanctions Laws and Regulations.
The METI compiles a list of foreign end users that may be involved in developing, manufacturing, using or storing weapons of mass destruction (the “Foreign End User List”). Exporters/transferors need to check whether their end users fall within this Foreign End User List in determining whether their exports or technology transfers are subject to catch-all control. If the end user is listed in the Foreign End User List, exporters/transferors need to obtain a licence from the Minister of METI, except where it is obvious that the goods or technologies will not be used to develop, manufacture, use or store weapons of mass destruction.
See 4.4 Persons Subject to Export Controls. As mentioned in 4.1 Export Controls, the ETCO and FEO specify the export controls and contain lists of sensitive exports/technology transfers. The lists are made and updated according to the international export control regimes (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement) and the Chemical Weapons Convention; thus, the controlled items are basically identical to those specified by those regimes. For an exception to this alignment with international regimes, please see 4.12 Key Developments Regarding Exports.
See 4.4 Persons Subject to Export Controls.
Administrative sanctions and criminal penalties apply for those who export controlled goods or transfer controlled technologies without obtaining licences.
Specifically, a natural person or legal entity that violates the export control-related provisions of the FEFTA may face administrative sanctions, imposed by the Minister of METI, that prohibit any (or some) exports or technology transfers for a period of up to three years. It is worth noting that administrative sanctions have no statute of limitations, and there have been cases where administrative sanctions were imposed even when criminal penalties were not.
A natural person that violates the export control-related provisions of the FEFTA may face criminal penalties, which include up to seven years (ten years in the case of goods/technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction) of imprisonment and/or a fine of up to JPY20 million (JPY30 million in the case of goods/technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction) or five times the value of the goods/technologies that were exported/transferred, whichever is higher.
When a natural person (ie, representative or employee) commits a violation in connection with a legal entity’s business, the legal entity may also be fined up to JPY700 million (JPY1 billion in the case of goods/technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction) or five times the value of the exported goods or transferred technologies, whichever is higher.
If goods and technologies are subject to export control, they cannot be exported or transferred without obtaining individual licences for each transaction, or bulk licences. There are several types of bulk licences, depending on the specific details of the transactions, including their scheme, the types of goods/technologies covered by the transactions and their destinations.
Under the FEFTA, a party who exports controlled goods or transfers controlled technologies on a regular basis is obliged to comply with legally defined standards (ie, Compliance Standards for Exporters and Persons Conducting Similar Transactions) which set conditions related to in-house compliance mechanisms. Furthermore, as one of the conditions for obtaining certain bulk licences, a party is required to establish and register with the METI an in-house compliance mechanism, in which certain processes specified by the METI must be adopted.
There are several instances where a party is requested/obliged to report to the authority, including the following.
Where a party intending to export goods or transfer technologies realises, based on information from anyone other than the importer or end user of goods or the recipient or end user of technology, that the subject goods or technologies would be used to develop, manufacture, use or store weapons of mass destruction, it is required to report such finding to the METI. Upon receipt of such a report, the Minister of METI may send a notice to that party that it must apply for a licence for the relevant goods’ exportation or technology transfer.
While general requirements for reports are not applicable to every transaction, the Minister of METI has broad authority to request reports, as necessary, from parties involved in exportation of goods or technology transfers, such as those who plan to implement or have implemented potentially relevant transactions.
When bulk licences are granted, exporters of goods or transferors of technologies are required to make periodic reports, depending on the types of goods they export.
Clarification of the Scope of Deemed Exports
Previously, a transfer of technologies from one resident to another resident within Japan was not considered a transaction for the purpose of transferring a controlled technology to a non-resident, which is subject to Japanese export control (please see 4.5 Restricted Persons). However, as the development of cutting-edge technologies involves rigorous participations of foreign people residing in Japan, concerns have developed about the risk of leakage of sensitive information through a resident who is under the strong influence of a foreign country.
In order to address this risk, the METI’s notification regarding technology transfers was amended to clarify that transfers of a controlled technology from a resident to another resident are deemed to be transactions for the purpose of transferring the technology to a non-resident, when the recipient qualifies under any of the following categories:
This amendment entered into effect on 1 May 2022.
Additional Adoption of Export Control on Advanced Semiconductor-Related Equipment
After the amendment that became effective on 23 July 2023, the Ministry Order specifying the details of goods and technologies subject to list control was further amended, effective on 8 September 2024. In this new amendment, certain goods (such as quantum computers and scanning electron microscope equipment), as well as programs designed for the design or production of those goods (in the case of quantum computers, certain components thereof) and technologies necessary for the design or production of those goods (again, in the case of quantum computers, certain components thereof), were added to the scope of list control.
In the case of scanning electron microscope equipment, programs designed for processing images taken by those microscopes were also added. In addition, the specifications in the definitions of the goods added to the scope of list control through the 23 July 2023 amendment have been refined to be more precise. This amendment was made by many states that participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement, although it was not the result of an agreement thereunder, due to disagreement by some states.
Restructuring of Catch-All Control
The Subcommittee on Security Trade Control, established under the Trade Committee of the Industrial Structure Council of the METI, issued its intermediary report (the “Intermediary Report”) in April 2024. This report suggests a restructuring of catch-all control to the effect that catch-all control for conventional weapons should apply to exports destined for Group A countries to a limited extent (among other restructuring measures). Specifically, the METI may issue a notice to the exporter to require a licence application, when a relevant product or technology is ultimately likely to reach a high-risk destination, even if the initial destination is a Group A country. This is a change from the current system, in which exports to Group A countries are categorically excluded from the catch-all control (see 4.4 Persons Subject to Export Controls).
Establishment of Public-Private Dialogue for Sensitive Technology Transfers
In September 2024, the METI proposed establishing a public-private dialogue for export controls on certain sensitive technology transfers. The proposal included a requirement that a party that intends to transfer relevant technologies through investment in a foreign entity, production outsourcing or other business activities, in a manner that would enable a production or design of products in a foreign state, report an outline of the intended transfer to the Minister of METI in advance.
In the September 2024 proposal, this requirement applies to technologies relating to ten products in the electronics, advanced fibre, integrated circuit and electron microscope industries. Upon receipt of a report from a transferor, the METI will engage in discussions with the transferor, with a view to ensuring that the technology at issue will not be diverted to the design, production, etc, of nuclear or conventional weapons.
However, when concerns about potential diversions remain unresolved, the METI may issue a notice to the transferor obligating the transferor to apply for a licence. Generally, this notice should be issued within 30 days of the transferor’s report. This new report-and-dialogue system will not apply to technology transfers to Group A countries. The scheduled implementation date for this new system is two months after the publication of the final text of the relevant regulations, which is 30 December 2024.
The principal laws governing anti-dumping duties (AD), countervailing duties (CVD) and safeguards (SG) (collectively, “trade remedies”) are the following:
Various government agencies would be involved in the decision-making process – in particular, the Ministers of Finance and METI, and any other minister responsible for the specific industry that is subject to the trade remedies.
In Japan, investigations of trade remedies would generally be initiated at the request of members of domestic industries; however, the relevant laws also allow the investigating authority to self-initiate an investigation.
There has only been one case in which the initiation of the investigation was requested by the relevant minister – namely, the SG case against leeks, raw shiitake mushrooms and tatami mats. This investigation was conducted in 2000–01. For review proceedings, which will be initiated and conducted once trade remedies are imposed, please see 5.9 Frequency of Reviews.
In Japan, there are no time restrictions for initiating investigations (both for initial impositions and for re-impositions) and for the initial imposition of trade remedies, and domestic industries can request initiation of an investigation on an ad hoc basis. However, there is a time restriction on re-imposing SGs.
Specifically, when an SG is re-imposed on products that were subject to a previous SG (ie, an SG that has expired or been terminated), re-imposition of an SG is allowed only after a period of time equivalent to the period during which the previous SG was taken or a period of two years (whichever is longer) has elapsed from the day on which the previous SG expired or was terminated. AD and CVD have no time restrictions for re-imposition.
For review proceedings, which will be conducted once trade remedies are imposed, please see 5.9 Frequency of Reviews.
In Japan, non-domestic companies are allowed to participate in the investigation as relevant parties. For review proceedings that will be conducted once trade remedies are imposed, please see 5.9 Frequency of Reviews.
Process for Imposing AD
The typical steps and timelines for imposing AD are as follows.
The investigating authority reviews the petition submitted by the domestic industry, and decide whether sufficient facts are presented to initiate the investigation. This review typically takes two months.
Once the investigation is initiated, the investigating authority sends a questionnaire to the interested parties. The investigating authority may also send a follow-up questionnaire. In general, responses to the questionnaire should be provided within three months from the initiation of the investigation.
When requested by interested parties, the investigating authority will conduct a simultaneous examination process that allows one interested party to raise questions to another interested party in a meeting. In general, this process is held around five months from the initiation of the investigation.
The investigating authority conducts on-site verifications of the submitted information. In general, this process is held around six months from the initiation of the investigation.
A preliminary determination is published around eight months from the initiation of the investigation. If it is deemed necessary, provisional measures could be taken based on this determination.
Disclosure of essential facts, which will be the basis for the final determination, is made around ten months from the initiation of the investigation. Interested parties can provide comments to the disclosure.
A final determination is typically published within one year from the initiation of the investigation, but can be extended for up to six months.
Process for Imposing CVD
The typical steps and timelines for imposing CVD are similar to those of AD as explained above.
Process for Imposing SG
The typical steps and timeline for imposing SG are as follows.
Once the investigation is initiated, the investigating authority will send a questionnaire to the interested parties. After responses to the questionnaire are provided, a public hearing is held.
A preliminary determination could be published, and, if it is deemed necessary, provisional measures could be taken based on this determination.
A final determination is published within one year (but can be extended) from the initiation of the investigation.
The investigating authority publishes the following reports during the investigation of trade remedies.
In addition, when conducting an investigation of AD/CVD, the investigating authority also provides the disclosure of essential facts to the interested parties in writing (see 5.6 Investigation and Imposition of Duties and Safeguards). This finding explains the facts that will form the basis for the final determination.
This matter is not relevant in this jurisdiction.
Review of AD
There are several review processes for AD measures, as detailed below.
New shippers review
A new shipper may request initiation of an investigation to calculate their individual dumping margin. The investigation should be completed promptly and within one year, but can be extended for up to six months.
Interim review
Interested parties may request initiation of an investigation to review the AD measure once the measure has been in force for one year. The review will examine whether there are any changes in circumstances relating to dumping, injury of domestic industry, and their causation. The investigation should be completed within one year, but can be extended.
Sunset review
Domestic industry members may request initiation of a sunset review up to one year before the end of the AD measure. The review will examine whether the AD measure should be extended. The investigation should be completed within one year, but can be extended.
Review of CVD
There are several review processes for CVD measures, as detailed below.
Review for exporters not subject to the initial investigation
Exporters not subject to the initial investigation may request initiation of an investigation to calculate their individual duty rate. The investigation should be completed promptly and within one year, but can be extended for up to six months.
Interim review
Interested parties may request initiation of an investigation to review the CVD measure once the measure has been in force for one year. The review will examine whether there are any changes in circumstances relating to subsidies, injury of domestic industry, and their causation. The investigation should be completed within one year, but can be extended.
Sunset review
Domestic industry members may request initiation of a sunset review up to one year before the end of the CVD measure. The review will examine whether the CVD measure should be extended. The investigation should be completed within one year, but can be extended.
Review of SG
Domestic industry members may request initiation of a review, which will examine whether the SG measure should be extended. The investigation should be completed within one year, but can be extended.
See 5.9 Frequency of Reviews.
Preliminary and final determinations for imposing trade remedies are likely capable of being appealed to the district court, but there are no precedents for this in Japan.
This matter is not relevant in this jurisdiction.
The Japanese government is planning to amend its AD/CVD legislation to introduce an anti-circumvention system allowing the extension of existing AD/CVD measures to imports that circumvent the existing measures. The amendment is planned to be made in 2025.
In Japan, the FEFTA together with its subordinate regulations, the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment and the Order on Inward Direct Investment are the primary legal instruments regarding foreign investment regulation.
In the FEFTA, “foreign investors” making “foreign direct investments” (acquisitions of shares, equity, bonds, etc, of Japanese companies) or “specified acquisitions” (acquisitions of shares or equity in non-listed Japanese companies from another foreign investor) must file either a prior notification (ie, pre-closing notification) or post-investment report, generally depending on whether the investments are made in relation to “designated business sectors”.
See 6.3 Transactions Subject to Investment Security Measures and 6.4 Mandated Filings/Notifications for the definitions of foreign investors, foreign direct investments and designated business sectors.
When a prior notification is filed according to the FEFTA, the MOF and ministers who have jurisdiction over the target business will conduct a review. The standard waiting period is 30 days, which could be shortened to two weeks or extended to up to five months.
Aside from the FEFTA, sector-specific laws and regulations – such as the Civil Aeronautics Act, the Broadcast Act and the Radio Act – also regulate certain foreign investments by limiting the ratio of shareholding by foreign investors.
The MOF is primarily responsible for implementation of the FEFTA. When a prior notification is filed according to the FEFTA, the Minister of Finance and ministers who have jurisdiction over the target business (eg, the Minister of METI) will conduct a review; if they find that the investment is likely to impair national security, etc, they may recommend, and ultimately order, modification or discontinuation of the investment.
In general, if a foreign investor is making a foreign direct investment or specified acquisition, the investor is required to file either a prior notification or post-investment report.
A prior notification is also required if the nationality or country of location of the foreign investor is neither Japan nor a white-listed country. The white list comprises 173 countries, including China and Russia, but does not include countries such as North Korea and Somalia. Certain types of transactions that involve parties related to Iran are also subject to a prior notification obligation. However, since investors are usually concerned about regulation regarding a foreign direct investment in the designated business sectors, the following focuses on the regulation of these types of investments.
The term “foreign investor” is defined in Article 26, paragraph 1 of the FEFTA, and includes, but is not limited to, the following persons:
A foreign direct investment includes the following actions:
In general, if a foreign investor is making a foreign direct investment or specified acquisition in relation to designated business sectors, prior notification is required.
Designated business sectors are designated in the relevant public notices as those that are related to national security, the maintenance of public order and the protection of public safety, etc. More specifically, these designated business sectors are those relating to:
In August 2024, various business sectors were added as designated business sectors. See also 6.8 Key Developments Regarding Investment Security for this change.
With respect to foreign direct investments in non-designated business sectors, in general, post-investment reports are required (for acquisitions of shares, equity, etc, only investments of 10% or greater shareholding require post-investment reports).
The MOF publishes a list that categorises Japanese listed companies into companies engaging in business activities in:
This list was most recently updated in September 2024, and can be found on the MOF’s website.
See 6.5 Exemptions for the explanation on core designated business sectors and non-core designated business sectors.
If a foreign investor, except for whom a review is deemed particularly important (eg, government entities and state-owned enterprises without MOF accreditation), acquires shares, equity, voting rights, etc, the prior notification obligation is exempted under the following conditions.
Listed Companies
If the investments are made in listed companies in relation to designated business sectors, a financial institution is exempted from the prior notification requirement if the investment meets the following conditions:
If a foreign financial institution does not file a prior notification in accordance with this exemption, a post-investment report is required when the investor acquires 10% or more of the shareholdings.
If the investor is a general investor (ie, a foreign investor who is not a foreign financial institution), there are two different types of exemption systems for investments made in core designated business sectors and non-core designated business sectors from among the designated business sectors.
Among the designated business sectors, the business sectors that are most likely to affect national security are designated as core designated business sectors. They include all businesses relating to:
They also include a portion of the business relating to:
In August 2024, various business sectors were added to the core designated business sectors. See 6.8 Key Developments Regarding Investment Security for this change.
If a general investor is investing in core designated business sectors, the prior notification exemption applies to investments of less than 10% shareholding, provided that the investment meets exemption conditions (d) and (e) below as well as conditions (a), (b) and (c) above:
If a general investor is investing in non-core designated business sectors, the prior notification exemption applies if the investment meets the exemption conditions (a), (b) and (c) above.
If a general investor does not file a prior notification in accordance with the exemptions above, the general investor must file a post-investment report when the shareholding ratio reaches 1% and 3% for the first time and when it reaches 10% or more for each transaction.
Non-Listed Companies
When investments are made in relation to non-listed companies in non-core designated business sectors, exemption from the prior notification obligation applies if the investment meets conditions (a), (b) and (c) above. No exemption system is available for investments made in core designated business sectors. Even if an investor does not file a prior notification in accordance with this exemption, the investor must file a post-investment report.
If the MOF and the minister(s) with jurisdiction over the target business find, upon review of the prior notification, that the investment at issue is likely to impair national security, etc, they may recommend and ultimately order modification or discontinuation of the investment. However, to date, there has only been one case of such an order being disclosed by the authorities.
Failure to file a prior notification or provision of false information in the prior notification, violation of the waiting period, and failure to comply with the order to modify or discontinue the investment are subject to criminal penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to three times the value of the investment, or JPY1 million (whichever is higher), or both (FEFTA, Article 70).
Where there has been a failure to file a notification or a filing of a false notification by a foreign investor, and the case is deemed likely to impair national security, etc, the foreign investor may be subject to divestiture or another action order.
No fees are required for submission of notifications required by the FEFTA.
Effective from 16 August 2024, the scope of core designated business sectors and designated business sectors was modified to include various business sectors, such as those relating to:
One purpose of this amendment, as with the April 2023 amendment, is to align with the Japanese government’s initiatives for securing a stable supply of critical commodities under the ESPA (see also 7.1 Subsidy and Incentive Programmes for Domestic Production). Another reason is to address the risk of technology leaks and diversion of commercial technologies to military use.
As of 28 October 2024, no major changes have been published.
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s Headquarters for Economic Security has published recommendations and submitted them to the Japanese government regarding several initiatives to prevent technology leaks. The proposed initiatives include investment security measures, some of which may be implemented in the coming years – eg, for foreign investors who are categorically recognised as posing a high risk to national security, restrictions on the use of the prior notification exemption system should be considered, from the perspective both of investor attributes and of the business characteristics of the Japanese company in which the investment will be made.
The supplementary provisions to the 2020 amendment to the FEFTA state that, five years after the amended law comes into effect, necessary measures should be taken if deemed required. In accordance with these provisions, a review should be conducted to consider any necessary revisions to the FEFTA.
In recent years, the Japanese government has been introducing various programmes to promote domestic production. For example, the Japanese government has been providing subsidies to companies establishing domestic production facilities through the following scheme, to ensure supply chain resilience and to support green transitions in key strategic sectors (eg, semiconductors, batteries, green steels, green chemicals):
There are no standards or other technical requirements in Japan aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production. The Japanese government has adopted technical regulations and standards in various fields to ensure the safety and quality of products, including the following:
There are no sanitary or phytosanitary requirements in Japan aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production. The Japanese government has adopted various sanitary and phytosanitary requirements to ensure food safety and to prevent incursion of animal and plant illnesses caused by imported products, including the following:
The government of Japan has adopted certain price support measures to support and encourage domestic production of certain agricultural products, including subsidy programmes adopted by the Agriculture & Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC). ALIC’s programmes apply to products such as beef and veal, pork, milk, vegetables and sugar. Further details are explained in ALIC’s brochure.
There are no state trading, state-owned enterprises or privatisation measures in Japan specifically aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has adopted state trading systems for the following products:
Further details on the state trading systems adopted by the Japanese government can be found in the notification made by the Japanese government to the WTO (G/STR/N/18/JPN); see on state trading.
Since December 1995, the Japanese government has been a member of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which prohibits discrimination between domestic and imported products of GPA member origin. Moreover, to date the Japanese government has adopted a policy to treat GPA members and non-GPA members equally. As such, in Japan, no “buy national/local” requirements are applied to government procurement.
There are no geographical indication (GI) protection measures aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production. In Japan, GIs are protected under the Act on Protection of the Names of Specific Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Products and Foodstuffs (the “GI Act”). The number of foreign GIs protected under the GI Act is increasing, reflecting the amendment of the Japan-EU EPA. Explanation of the GI Act and a list of GI products can be found on the Japan Geographical Indications website.
This is not relevant in this jurisdiction.
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www.nishimura.comIn recent years, as geopolitical risks have heightened crisis awareness, various regulations have been enacted worldwide to protect national economic security, technological security and other interests. Japan has also followed this trend by implementing a number of important laws and regulations, and by taking various measures.
Japan has implemented the following key developments, as further explained in detail below:
Establishment of a Security Clearance System in the Economic Security Sector
On 10 May 2024, the Diet passed the Act on the Protection and Utilization of Important Economic Security Information (the “CESI Act”). The CESI Act provides for the establishment of a new security clearance system in the economic security sector.
In Japan, the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (the “SDS Act”) already exists as a law providing for a security clearance system. However, the SDS Act only covers highly sensitive government information (ie, top-level and general-level designated secrets); therefore, it is expected that recipients of information in the private sector are limited to defence contractors. On the other hand, the CESI Act was established to protect less sensitive information (ie, confidential information) in the economic security sector, the protection of which has recently become increasingly important. Generally, recipients of information are expected to be private companies.
The CESI Act consists of:
This is similar to the SDS Act, and the security clearance systems under the SDS Act and the CESI Act will operate seamlessly together in the future. The details of the CESI Act will be determined by regulations to be established by the end of 2024.
Designation of information subject to protection
The range of information to be protected under the CESI Act extends to certain information related to critical infrastructure and the supply chain of critical products (“critical economic security information”, or CESI).
In the Diet deliberations, the government has described the following as examples of CESI:
Regarding the second point listed above, in order to prevent critical facilities of essential infrastructure from being misused as a means of disrupting the stable provision of services from outside Japan, the ESPA states that the government must conduct pre-screenings and make recommendations or orders related to the introduction or the outsourcing of maintenance, etc, of critical facilities (details are described in Commencement of Pre-Screening Process Regarding Essential Infrastructure Under the ESPA below).
Provision of information to security clearance holders
An administrative agency may disclose CESI to other administrative agencies or to private companies when a certain necessity to disclose CESI is recognised. In doing so, persons handling CESI are required to obtain security clearance, whether they are employees of administrative agencies or of private companies – in the case of private companies, the companies must further meet certain requirements related to the installation of specified facilities and equipment, as well as other requirements necessary for the protection of CESI. When such companies meet all such requirements, they will be recognised as “Eligible Contractors”. Specifically, a person, with their consent, must undergo an investigation conducted by the Cabinet Office, and, based on the results of such investigation, the administrative agency disclosing the information must find that there is no risk of CESI being leaked.
Penal provisions for leakage
If a person who engages in the handling of CESI leaks CESI, such an offence is punishable with up to five years in prison. If said leakage was committed in relation to the business of a private company, the company itself may also be fined.
Effect on companies outside Japan
The CESI Act only covers information held by the government, and not information generated in the private sector. Therefore, information developed by foreign companies operating in Japan is not unilaterally designated as CESI by the Japanese government.
Nevertheless, after the enactment of the CESI Act, if it becomes necessary to receive disclosure of the CESI held by the Japanese government in the context of operations in Japan or international joint development with Japanese companies, etc, the foreign companies must be recognised as Eligible Contractors and their employees engaged in handling CESI must obtain security clearance. In doing so, it should be noted that the CESI Act itself does not discriminate between Japanese and foreign companies, and whether or not security clearance can actually be obtained heavily depends on individual circumstances.
Introduction of a Prior Notification System for Overseas Technology Transfers in Key Technological Fields Such as Semiconductors (Effective December 2024)
On 6 September 2024, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced a draft amendment to the ordinances relating to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA), requiring the submission of prior notifications to the competent authority (the “Prior Notification System”) for technology transfers overseas in ten sectors, including electronic components and semiconductors sectors. The draft amendment was expected to be finalised around mid-October 2024 and will take effect after a public notice period, with implementation scheduled for December 2024.
The Prior Notification System targets transactions that enable manufacturing or design overseas using key technologies as outlined below, with the aim of preventing the outflow of technologies in which Japan holds a competitive advantage.
As a background to the establishment of the Prior Notification System, the risk of technology outflow has increased in recent years, particularly due to the intensification of global technology hegemony struggles; considering the increased difficulty in controlling technology compared to physical goods once leaked, a new technology management scheme based on public-private dialogue is being introduced under the FEFTA to better manage technology transfers.
Details of the Prior Notification System
The newly introduced public-private dialogue-based technology management scheme involves the establishment of the Prior Notification System to strictly manage the transfer of key technologies from a security perspective.
Specifically, business operators intending to engage in transactions with the purpose of providing key technologies overseas through investments in foreign entities, manufacturing outsourcing or other business activities must submit a report regarding such transaction to the METI before entering into the relevant contract. The report must include details such as the type and content of the technology and the purpose and background of the transaction. Failure to report may result in the METI issuing administrative guidance or improvement orders based on the FEFTA to such business operators; penalties may be applied if such business operators fail to comply with such guidance or orders, or in the case of serious violations.
Based on the submitted prior notification report, the public and private sectors will share awareness of the current situation and challenges, and will consider technology management strategies through evaluating support measures, providing information on concerns and offering advice on specific countermeasures.
Although, in principle, the goal is to resolve issues through such public-private dialogue, if concerns about technology outflow cannot be resolved, the METI may issue a notice to the relevant business operator requesting that such business operator submit an application for a permit. The decision on whether to issue this notice will be made within 30 days of the prior notification, taking into account the results of the public-private dialogue on technology management.
Key technologies subject to prior notification
The transactions subject to prior notification have been narrowed down to those with a high risk, in terms of both the type of technology and the nature of the transactions. The key technologies subject to prior notification are summarised as follows for target technologies (technologies for design and manufacturing).
Commencement of Pre-Screening Process Regarding Essential Infrastructure Under the ESPA
On 17 May 2024, pursuant to the ESPA, Japan introduced a pre-screening process for the introduction or outsourcing of maintenance, operation or management of critical facilities in essential infrastructure. This process prevents critical facilities in essential infrastructure from being used as a means to interfere with the stable provision of services related to such infrastructure, such as in the case of cyber-attacks. The following is a summary of the pre-screening process.
Pre-screening process regarding essential infrastructure
Covered entities
Currently, the ESPA designates the following 15 industries as the Specified Essential Infrastructure Businesses (“SEI Businesses”), and the covered entities under the pre-screening process are designated by the ministry with jurisdiction over an SEI Business (the “Competent Ministry”) from entities that carry out SEI Businesses:
The port and harbour transportation industry was newly added by the amendment of the ESPA in May 2024. The amendment is scheduled to take effect within one year and six months from 17 May 2024. The actual pre-screening for transactions that fall within this industry will commence six months after the date of the designation of the covered entities.
The relevant Competent Ministry for each SEI Business has announced the names of the covered entities in their public notices. The Cabinet Office also publishes materials on its website summarising the announcements made by all Competent Ministries (however, they are currently only available in Japanese).
Covered transactions
The transactions covered under the pre-screening process are:
The details of SCF and Critical Maintenance and Management, etc, are specified by ministerial ordinances for each of the SEI Businesses. Although it is impractical to list all of them, the following are some examples for telecommunications businesses.
Recommendations, orders and review criteria
A covered entity is required to submit a notification to the relevant Competent Ministry prior to conducting the covered transaction. The standard review period is 30 days from receipt of the notification but can be extended up to four months if the Competent Ministry deems it necessary.
If, as a result of the review, it is found that the SCF is highly likely to be used as a means to interfere with the stable provision of essential infrastructure services, the Competent Ministry will recommend that the covered entity voluntarily take the necessary measures to prevent such interference. Such necessary measures may include taking certain risk management measures or, ultimately, changing the supplier or the outsourcing contractor.
If the Competent Ministry’s recommendation is not complied with without a valid reason within the prescribed period, an order may be issued; a violation of such order may result in penalties (imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, a fine not exceeding JPY1 million, or both).
The review criteria for a recommendation/order consist of the following four points; see Basic Guidelines for Securing Stable Provision of Specified Infrastructure Services by Preventing Specified Interference (the “Basic Guidelines”).
Major matters that companies outside Japan are required to address
Under the pre-screening process, a covered entity is generally a Japanese company (in fact, the current list of covered entities does not include any companies outside Japan). Therefore, it is unlikely that companies outside Japan will be required to submit such notifications.
On the other hand, it is common in practice for suppliers or contractors outside Japan to supply SCFs to covered entities or to have the Critical Maintenance and Management, etc, outsourced to them. Therefore, for such suppliers and contractors outside Japan, the main aspects of the pre-screening process are considered to be required by covered entities in order to collaborate, by providing information or taking certain risk management measures for the preparation of or in response to the process.
Many examples of risk management measures are listed in the Basic Guidelines under the ESPA (an outline of the risk management measures is also provided in a document issued by the Cabinet Office here). Although the Basic Guidelines clearly state that business operators are not always required to implement all the risk management measures described in the Guidelines, it is in fact recommended to implement at least certain important ones. Thus, for the adoption of the appropriate risk management measures in specific cases, it is highly recommended to seek advice from experts in Japanese economic security law.
Addressing Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
The global supply-chain network has expanded along with the promotion of free trade in the international order centered around World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. However, recent geopolitical events and the COVID-19 pandemic have made it a major challenge for countries/economies to address the vulnerabilities of global supply chains.
With regard to supply chain resilience, the Japanese government is promoting the following initiatives to reduce excessive dependence on specific countries and to secure a stable supply of essential goods. Another major goal of the government is to promote the research and development of next-generation technologies and to protect such technologies from leakage. Furthermore, the government has also stressed the importance of maintaining and strengthening the rules-based international order, in accordance with WTO rules and other international rules, for the predictability and stability of business operators. Recently, there have also been several developments in intergovernmental co-operation among like-minded countries for such purposes.
As one of the initiatives to strengthen supply chains, the Japanese government has taken certain measures, including the provision of subsidies, to secure the stable supply of certain goods designated as essential goods (“specified critical products”) pursuant to the ESPA. Goods designated as specified critical products by the minister of the Competent Ministry are the following items of which the Competent Ministry finds it particularly necessary to ensure a stable supply, considering risks of excessive dependence on other countries/economies or risks of supply chain disruption:
On 23 December 2022, 11 items were designated as specified critical products:
On 2 February 2024, advanced electronic components (capacitors and high-frequency filters) were added to the list, and uranium was added to the items within the category of critical minerals pursuant to the Cabinet Order on Additional Designation of Specified Important Goods.
It should be noted that the government continues to review the circumstances of the specified critical products in light of risk inspections and reports from business operators. Upon careful consideration, the government may remove certain specified critical products when it considers that it is no longer necessary to take measures to ensure the stable supply of such item(s).
The Competent Ministry is responsible for establishing a Policy to Ensure Stable Supply of Specified Critical Products for each product and for approving the Plans to Ensure Stable Supply of Businesses regarding such products as are submitted by business operators (“Plans”). Since 23 April 2024, the Competent Ministries have approved 85 Plans (as of 4 June 2024) and provide support through grants and loans pursuant to the ESPA and such policies.
Business operators planning to obtain approval for their Plans should be careful to check the latest information regarding the ministries’ policies. The authors note that a new requirement was added for the approval of a Plan for certain specified critical products (ie, machine tools, industrial robots, aircraft components, semiconductors, storage batteries, advanced electronic components), requesting business operators to implement measures to prevent the outflow of technology.
To address supply chain resilience through the protection of advanced technology, the Japanese government has strengthened the enforcement of investment screening based on the FEFTA. Inward direct investments and equivalent actions made on or after 15 September 2024 are subject to the amended rule, which aims to secure stable supply chains and to reduce the risk of outflow of technology (see mof.go.jp regarding amendment to the public notices adding the core business sectors of the FEFTA to secure stable supply chains).
Under the FEFTA, foreign investors, such as non-residents or foreign entities, are required to file a prior notification when conducting inward direct investments and equivalent actions (eg, acquiring 1% or more voting rights of a listed company, acquiring a share of an unlisted company) (Articles 26(2), 27(1), 26(3) and 28(1) of the FEFTA).
It should be noted that in the case of “core business sectors”, designated by the Ministry of Finance and other relevant ministries as those with significant threat to Japan’s national security, foreign investors cannot use the exemption from prior notification stipulated in Article 27 bis of the FEFTA. As per the amended rule noted above, manufacturers of semiconductor-related equipment, advanced electronic components, machine tool components, marine engines, fibre optic cables and multifunctional machines were added to the core business sectors. Consequently, all business sectors of “specified critical products” are now covered as core business sectors, and business operators in those sectors are required to make prior notifications for inward direct investments and equivalent actions under the FEFTA.
A stable international trading environment is essential for maintaining supply chain resilience. Japan participates in several international frameworks, including but not limited to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Under the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement, which took effect in February 2024, an action plan team was established in September 2024 for critical sectors and key goods identified by the participating countries, including semiconductors, chemicals and critical minerals (mainly for storage batteries). Domestically, the Japanese government supports key business sectors in addressing supply chain resilience through various means. Semiconductors are also regarded as important strategic goods by the Japanese government, and continued support is provided through the ESPA and the Act on Promotion of Developing/Supplying and Introducing Systems Making Use of Specified Advanced Information Communication Technologies (Act No 37 of 2020).
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