The United States joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an original member. Congress adopts implementing legislation to enact obligations under the WTO agreements and other free trade agreements (FTAs), as the United States understands them. Whether and how to implement adverse WTO panel or Appellate Body reports rests with Congress and the pertinent agencies consistent with Title 19 of the United States Code Sections 3501, 3533 and 3538 (19 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3533, 3538).

The United States belongs to WTO plurilateral agreements, including the Civil Aircraft Agreement, the Government Procurement Agreement and the Information Technology Agreement.

The United States maintains FTAs with 20 countries: Australia; Bahrain; Canada and Mexico (USMCA); Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (CAFTA-DR); Israel; Jordan; South Korea (KORUS); Morocco; Oman; Panama; Peru; and Singapore.

The United States developed Trade & Investment Framework Agreements with various individual countries and regional organisations. It maintains bilateral investment treaties with over three dozen countries identified on the website of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The United States operates the Caribbean Basin Initiative preferential trade programme. It has not renewed the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

In its second term, the Trump Administration negotiated various bilateral deals – also referred to as “frameworks” – that may entail a temporary tariff truce. Such framework deals emphasise reciprocity with respect to tariffs, investment in the United States and removal of trade barriers. This trend away from traditional FTAs that include Congressional approval and implementation towards these “framework” agreements is likely to continue.

After proclaiming various tariff actions referenced in 2.3 Legal Instruments, the Trump Administration announced preliminary agreements with seven trading partners that include a reduction in tariffs – Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, the UK, the European Union (EU) and Japan. Thus far, it has announced the implementation of “framework” agreements only with respect to the UK, the EU, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia. On 26 October 2025, the Administration announced trade agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia, with additional progress on “frameworks” for agreements with Vietnam and Thailand. More recent “framework” agreements include Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

In addition to the likely continued development of “framework” trade agreements, the United States formally initiated the process that precedes the joint trilateral review of the USMCA in July 2026.

Title 19 of the United States Code and Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations are the legal authorities that generally govern customs matters. US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also provides rulings, directives and guidance that govern the agency and importer actions. CBP’s website, Customs Bulletin and Decisions, the Federal Register, the Cargo Systems Messaging Service and Customs Rulings Online Search System (CROSS) provide these agency documents and other helpful informed compliance publications.

CBP enforces US customs law and regulations. CBP’s decisions in customs matters are generally appealed to the US Court of International Trade (CIT), and those decisions then can be appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) and, ultimately, the US Supreme Court.

Section 301

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2411 et seq) (“Section 301”) grants USTR the authority to investigate and impose penalties in the form of tariffs on other countries in response to unfair trade practices. Such unfair trade practices can include discriminatory policies against the United States and intellectual property theft. USTR solicits comments from the public, holds public hearings, and publishes notices in the Federal Register regarding the status of Section 301 proceedings and measures. Until 2025, USTR predominantly used Section 301 to address unfair trade practices by China.

More recently, investigations under Section 301 have expanded into Brazil’s acts, policies and practices relating to digital trade and electronic payments services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption enforcement; intellectual property protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation.

Other Legal Instruments

2.4 Key Developments in Customs Measures and 8. Other Significant Issues address other US legal instruments.

Key developments in the last 12 months include the following:

• In 2025, customs measures changed significantly with the use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq) (IEEPA) to impose “reciprocal” tariffs on trading partners around the world ranging from 10% to over 100% at times, as discussed in 8. Other Significant Issues. The revised tariff framework resulted in a baseline tariff from which to launch bilateral negotiations with various key US trading partners.
• USMCA member countries are seeking feedback from their constituents before undertaking a scheduled formal review of the agreement in July 2026.
• The United States also significantly increased use of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1862) (“Section 232”) to address national security within the framework of certain sectors such as steel, aluminium, copper and lumber, as 8. Other Significant Issues also discusses. These changes required importers to closely scrutinise their supply chains and customs declarations in order to accurately respond to reporting requirements.
• In addition to these measures, 2025 resulted in the elimination of the “de minimis” exemption from formal entry requirements for imports under USD800 per person, per day.

It is safe to say that 2025 involved an unprecedented rearrangement of US policy on customs measures across all platforms.

Customs measures are likely to continue trending towards protecting US industry through the use of tariffs. The question of whether the President can impose tariffs under the authority of IEEPA is before the US Supreme Court, as discussed in 8. Other Significant Issues. Regardless, any such decision will not deter future actions to impose similar tariffs under other legal authorities. The result will likely be continued and increased bilateral trade agreements as trading partners around the world seek to negotiate more favourable terms.

Sector-based tariffs will likely continue to develop as this administration identifies industries for which production should be incentivised in the United States, such as furniture, automobiles and pharmaceuticals.

The United States imposes economic and trade sanctions against parties that engage in activities that threaten its national security, foreign policy or economy. Targets include foreign jurisdictions, individuals and companies. US sanctions take various forms, ranging from blocking the property of specific individuals and companies to prohibiting transactions with a country or a geographic region. Certain sanctions may prohibit only transactions involving a specific sector of the economy.

As the primary authority for most US sanctions programmes, IEEPA authorises the President to regulate or prohibit transactions and freeze assets upon declaring a national emergency in response to threats to US national security, US foreign policy or the US economy.

Additional authorities include the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq) (TWEA), the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. § 9401 et seq), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (22 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq), the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq) and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq).

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces US sanctions laws in conjunction with the Department of State’s Office of Economic Sanctions Policy, which develops and implements foreign policy-related sanctions. The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) develops and administers export controls in line with these policies.

US sanctions laws apply to all US persons, including US citizens and permanent residents wherever located, all persons and entities physically located within the United States, and all US incorporated entities and foreign branches. US sanctions also may apply to foreign subsidiaries owned or controlled by US persons in the case of certain programmes. US sanctions laws also prohibit non-US persons from causing or conspiring to cause a US person to violate US sanctions or engaging in conduct that violates US sanctions.

OFAC maintains several lists of sanctioned parties, most significantly the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) with whom transactions are prohibited. Restrictions also apply to entities designated on the following lists:

• Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) List;
• Foreign Sanctions Evaders (FSE) List;
• Non-SDN Palestinian Legislative Council (NS-PLC) List;
• List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List);
• Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions List (NS-MBS List); and
• Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List (NS-CMIC List).

OFAC administers 24 sanctions programmes that target specific countries and/or geographic regions. Countries/regions subject to comprehensive embargoes, which effectively prohibit all transactions, include Cuba, Iran, North Korea and “Covered Regions” of Ukraine (Crimea and the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic). The remainder are selective sanctions programmes, which target specific individuals, entities or sectors within a country as opposed to the country as a whole.

Sanctions against Russia do not rise to the level of a full-on embargo, but they target specific individuals, sectors and activities while also imposing broad economic restrictions.

Thirteen US sanctions programmes target specific conduct, including the Counter Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions, Rough Diamond Trade Controls, and Cyber-Related Sanctions. These selective sanctions programmes do not involve geographic restrictions but instead target individuals or entities that engage in certain activities, such as terrorism, cyberattacks, corruption or human rights abuses.

Secondary sanctions target non-US persons for doing business with, supporting or facilitating transactions with regimes, persons and entities subject to certain US sanctions programmes when the transaction has no US nexus. Pursuant to secondary sanctions, the United States can add non-US-person individuals and entities that engage in such transactions to US restricted party lists.

The United States may assess both civil and criminal penalties for violations. IEEPA currently provides a statutory maximum for civil penalties of USD377,700 per violation or twice the amount of the transaction value, whichever is the greater. Criminal penalties for wilful violations include up to 20 years in prison and/or fines of up to USD1 million.

OFAC issues two types of sanctions licences. General licences authorise certain transactions that otherwise would be prohibited by a particular sanctions programme. These licences may authorise transactions with certain entities or sectors; OFAC frequently issues general licences to authorise humanitarian activities.

When a general licence does not apply to a transaction, a party may apply for a specific licence. Issued by OFAC on a case-by-case basis, specific licences authorise the licensee to engage in certain otherwise prohibited transactions. If a transaction meets the terms and conditions of a general licence, that obviates the need to apply for a specific licence.

Sanctions programmes also may exempt (and therefore not prohibit) certain transactions, often including humanitarian donations, personal communications, and information and informational materials. Exceptions vary by sanctions programme.

The United States enforces sanctions on a strict liability basis, holding persons and entities civilly liable for engaging in prohibited transactions even if they were unaware that their conduct violated US sanctions laws. The Department of Justice (DOJ) may conduct criminal investigations or other enforcement actions for wilful violations, typically when OFAC refers matters to it.

US persons holding, unblocking or transferring blocked property must submit a report to OFAC within ten business days of the property being blocked, unblocked or transferred. Annual reports on all blocked property must be filed by 30 September. US persons who reject transactions that are not blocked but cannot be processed or engaged in without violating OFAC regulations must report such rejections to OFAC within ten business days.

Specific licences may also contain reporting requirements for the licensee to confirm compliance with the requirements of the licence.

The BIS Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC) administers and enforces US anti-boycott provisions, which prohibit US persons from taking certain actions in furtherance or support of unsanctioned foreign boycotts. This applies to all unsanctioned foreign boycotts, principally the Arab League boycott of Israel.

Key developments in the last 12 months include the following:

• OFAC extended its record-keeping requirement from five years to ten years, aligning with a longer statute of limitations for violations of IEEPA and TWEA.
• US sanctions increasingly targeted Iran’s oil exports and maritime “shadow fleet” used to evade sanctions. OFAC issued designations and guidance for shipping and maritime stakeholders to disrupt illicit Iranian oil flows.
• The United States removed its comprehensive Syria sanctions programme, revoking the Syrian Sanctions Regulations but maintaining sanctions on Bashar al-Assad and his associates, human rights abusers, Captagon traffickers and others.
• OFAC reversed earlier measures authorising certain transactions with Venezuela, issuing general licences to wind down transactions related to Chevron Corporation’s joint ventures involving PdVSA. Following this shift, an Executive Order authorised the application of secondary tariffs on any country importing Venezuelan oil.

Developments over the last year reflect a shift that is likely to continue, including more aggressive enforcement of Iran‐related sanctions and a strengthening of policies towards Venezuela and its energy sector. With the recent application of secondary tariffs to India because of its purchases of Russian oil, along with additional sanctions measures against Russian oil companies, continued focus on Russia and its economy is likely.

The United States imposes export controls on goods, software, technology and certain activities to protect US national security and serve its foreign policy interests. US export controls cover the export, re-export and transfer of dual-use items that may have civil and military applications, as well as defence articles and defence services that provide critical military or intelligence advantages.

The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), administered through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), serves as the primary legal authority for dual-use export controls. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), administered through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), serves as the primary legal authority for defence articles.

BIS administers and enforces the EAR; the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) administers and enforces the ITAR.

US jurisdiction applies to any item that is subject to the EAR. This includes:

• all items located in the United States;
• all US-origin items, wherever located;
• foreign-made items that contain more than a de minimis level of controlled US-origin content;
• foreign-made items that are the direct products of specified US-origin technology.

US jurisdiction also applies to the export, re-export or retransfer of any defence article subject to the ITAR.

BIS maintains four restricted party lists: the Entity List, the Unverified List, the Denied Persons List and the Military End-User (MEU) List.

DDTC maintains a Debarred Parties list of persons and entities convicted of violating, or conspiring to violate, the AECA.

The EAR contain the Commerce Control List (CCL), which lists commodities, software and technology that are subject to the authority of BIS. The CCL identifies the specific licensing requirements as well as licence exceptions that apply to listed items. Items not included on the CCL are not subject to specific licensing requirements, but they may be controlled for export to certain destinations or end-users, or for certain end-uses.

The ITAR contain the US Munitions List (USML), which identifies items deemed to be defence articles.

Other US agencies exercise export control responsibilities for certain types of items, such as medical devices, drugs and biologics, nuclear materials and equipment, and fish and wildlife. These include the Food and Drug Administration, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy and the Department of the Interior.

The United States may assess both civil and criminal penalties for EAR and ITAR violations. Under the ECRA, EAR violations currently involve a statutory maximum of USD374,474 per violation or twice the amount of the transaction value, whichever is the greater. Criminal penalties for wilful violations include up to 20 years in prison and/or fines of up to USD1 million.

Under the AECA, ITAR violations currently involve a statutory maximum for civil penalties of tUSD1,271,078 per violation or twice the amount of the transaction value, whichever is the greater. Criminal penalties for wilful violations include up to 20 years in prison and/or fines of up to USD1 million. Persons and entities convicted of violating the AECA are added to the Debarred List.

Export licences may be required for dual-use items depending on their classification on the CCL, the controls that apply to that classification, and the end-use, end-user and/or destination of the items. Exceptions to licence requirements may be available, again depending upon the factors listed above. Exporters may apply to BIS for a licence for specific transactions.

Manufacturers, exporters and brokers of defence articles and services must register with DDTC. Registration identifies to the US government the parties involved in the export of defence articles and services but does not confer upon registrants the right to export. Parties that want to export items subject to the USML must apply for an export licence from DDTC.

The United States enforces export controls under a strict liability standard and may hold exporters civilly liable for violations of the EAR or ITAR even if they were unaware that their conduct violated US export control laws. The DOJ may conduct criminal investigations or other enforcement actions for wilful violations, typically when BIS or DDTC refers matters to it.

Exporters must submit reports to BIS for certain transactions that involve particular items. Examples include thermal imaging cameras, conventional arms, items controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement, certain encryption items and specific types of technology.

DDTC requires that registered parties timely report material changes to their registration, including changes in ownership, control or key senior officers.

Key developments in the last 12 months include:

• BIS reversed course on the AI Diffusion Rule, which would have imposed new export licensing requirements on advanced AI model weights and computing chips worldwide. This rescission moved away from broad-based licensing structures towards more tailored, risk-based controls.
• BIS issued the Affiliates Rule, under which any foreign entity that is 50% or more owned (directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate) by one or more entities designated on the Entity List, the MEU List or certain SDN programmes is automatically treated as subject to the same export controls.
• DDTC expanded the scope of the USML, with numerous changes to 15 of the 21 USML categories and the addition of a licence exemption.

Additional regulation is expected in the technology space, with a sharper focus on supply-chain links to adversaries (notably China) and a recalibration of the approach to AI and other high-tech export restrictions. Revisions to the USML are anticipated, with DDTC expected to add/remove items, address space-related controls and certain military and intelligence services, and revise the definition of “defence services”.

The Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1677) provides the statutory authority and legal predicates to impose anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) at the conclusion of an investigation. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2255) provides the statutory authority to impose a “global safeguard” against a surge in imports. Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations includes the associated administrative regulations.

For AD/CVD investigations and enforcement, the relevant authorities include Enforcement and Compliance in Import Administration at the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), the International Trade Commission (ITC) and CBP. Commerce calculates the dumping margins and the subsidy rates, whereas the ITC determines whether the unfairly traded imports caused (or threaten to cause) material injury to the domestic industry. Finally, CBP collects duties, monitors compliance and works with Commerce to prevent circumvention.

For safeguard measures, the ITC determines whether a surge in imports is causing serious injury and recommends a remedy, USTR plays a significant role in the interagency process to provide recommendations to the President, and the President makes the final decision with respect to what, if any, remedial action should be taken.

The following domestic interested parties may petition for a new AD/CVD investigation:

• a US manufacturer, producer or wholesaler of a like product;
• a union representing an industry that manufactures, produces or wholesales a like product in the United States;
• a trade association with most members manufacturing, producing or wholesaling a like product in the United States;
• an association primarily composed of any of the above entities.

Commerce may self-initiate a new AD/CVD investigation but has only rarely done so. A domestic interested party, foreign government, exporter or producer covered by the Order, or US importer of subject merchandise may request a review of rates under existing AD/CVD Orders.

With respect to safeguards, trade associations, firms, unions or workers’ representatives of an industry may petition for relief. The ITC on its own motion, the President, USTR, and the House Ways and Means or Senate Finance Committees also may request a safeguard investigation.

Under the US retrospective tariff assessment system, importers pay a cash deposit of estimated AD/CVD duties upon entry. Through annual “administrative reviews”, Commerce calculates the AD/CVD rate ultimately assessed upon imports for each reviewed producer/exporter.

AD/CVD Orders do not automatically remain in place. In five-year “sunset” reviews, Commerce and the ITC evaluate whether revoking the AD/CVD Orders would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, countervailable subsidies and material injury.

Commerce conducts other AD/CVD proceedings addressing specific circumstances, for example:

• Scope inquiry: whether an AD/CVD Order covers a given product;
• Circumvention inquiry: whether a production fact pattern unlawfully circumvents an AD/CVD Order;
• New shipper review: calculating an AD/CVD duty rate for a new producer/exporter; and
• Changed circumstances review: addressing various changed circumstances (eg, corporate restructuring) that may affect how an AD/CVD Order is applied.

US law also provides for proceedings to monitor global safeguards (19 U.S.C. § 2254) and to investigate whether to extend (19 U.S.C. § 2254(c)) or modify (19 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(4)) those measures.

Non-domestic companies (ie, foreign producers and exporters) have the opportunity to participate in AD/CVD and safeguard proceedings.

Non-domestic companies may request a review of their imports to obtain a lower AD/CVD duty rate. Once selected, however, they are obligated to respond to Commerce’s questionnaires to the best of their ability. Those not individually investigated or reviewed may also participate but are not assigned their own duty rates. Non-domestic companies also have the ability to appeal adverse agency determinations to US courts with jurisdiction, the WTO dispute settlement and USMCA binational panels (when appropriate).

Commerce and the ITC conduct administrative AD/CVD investigations in parallel. As described above, the ITC determines whether a domestic industry is injured (or threatened) with material injury, or the establishment of the industry is materially retarded by reason of the imports that are the subject of the investigations. Commerce determines whether dumping or subsidies exist and calculates the pertinent margins.

The following major AD/CVD timelines may be extended:

• Upon the filing of a petition, Commerce typically initiates the investigation within 20 days (confirming domestic industry support and necessary information in the petition), while the ITC has 45 days to make a preliminary determination whether there is a reasonable indication of injury to the domestic industry.
• Following an affirmative preliminary determination by the ITC, the investigation continues at Commerce (a negative ITC preliminary determination terminates the investigation).
• Commerce issues preliminary determinations within 115 days following the ITC’s preliminary determination in anti-dumping investigations (40 days in countervailing duty investigations). Commerce issues final determinations 75 days thereafter.
• ITC’s final determination occurs by the later of 120 days after Commerce’s preliminary determination or 45 days after Commerce’s final determination.
• Ultimately, affirmative determinations by both agencies lead to duty orders.

Safeguard investigations provide global relief where an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury (or threat thereof) to the corresponding domestic industry. Within 120 days (though this may be extended by 30 days) of the filing of the petition, the ITC undertakes an administrative process to determine whether there is “serious injury” and, if so, whether the increase in imports is a “substantial cause” of that injury. In the event of an affirmative injury determination, the ITC undertakes the remedy phase of the investigation, which concludes with a recommendation to the President on the most effective way to facilitate positive adjustment to import competition. Typically, the ITC must issue a report to the President within 180 days of the filing of the petition. The President ultimately may impose relief in the form of tariffs, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, orderly marketing agreements, etc.

Administering agencies publish in the Federal Register summary notices of initiation, scheduling, preliminary outcomes and final outcomes for certain AD/CVD and safeguard proceedings:

• Commerce:
1. Investigation
2. Administrative Review
3. Circumvention Inquiry
4. Five-Year Review
5. New Shipper Review
6. Changed Circumstances Review
• ITC:
1. Investigation
2. Five-Year Review
• President:
1. Safeguard

For the above-listed proceedings, Commerce and the ITC also post detailed reports or memoranda on their electronic dockets. Commerce’s website also posts determinations concerning the scope of AD/CVD Orders.

The United States sets import duties federally and applies duties nationally, without differentiating based on the US state or territory of entry.

US law does not exempt any jurisdiction from AD/CVD measures, aside from negligible imports and imports with no/de minimis dumping or subsidy margins – standards that vary for certain developing and least developed countries. In safeguard proceedings, certain preferential trade programmes or FTAs require separate findings regarding certain imports (eg, CBERA, GSP, USMCA, CAFTA-DR, KORUS, and FTAs with Australia, Israel, Jordan, Panama, Peru and Singapore).       

The AD/CVD statute permits, upon request by interested parties (both domestic and foreign entities), an annual review by Commerce to determine whether the amount of dumping or subsidisation has changed during the period. In addition, the statute requires a five-year review of the orders by both Commerce and the ITC to determine whether revocation would be likely to lead to continuation/resumption of dumping/subsidies and material injury to the US industry.

For safeguard measures, the ITC will conduct a proceeding to monitor developments, including the progress and efforts made by US firms and workers to adjust positively to import competition. It will issue a report to the President by the mid-point of the remedy.

Firms must request annual administrative reviews by the last day of the anniversary month of the AD/CVD Order. Commerce initiates the review within 30 days of the request, and it generally takes at least one year to conclude.

Mandatory five-year (sunset) reviews begin with the publication of notices in the Federal Register (no later than 30 days before the fifth anniversary of the AD/CVD Order). Unless the domestic industry adequately responds, Commerce will revoke the Order. Depending on the responses to this notice, the agencies may conduct an expedited review in which they base their determination on information available on the record and from prior proceedings. Alternatively, either or both agencies may decide to conduct a full review of whether terminating the Order will lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping, subsidies or material injury.

Domestic or foreign interested parties that participated in the underlying administrative proceeding may appeal most final AD/CVD determinations by Commerce or the ITC to the CIT. Non-appealing parties may timely intervene in the litigation.

When ruling against the government, the CIT typically remands the matter to the agency for further explanation or reconsideration. Thereafter, litigants may contest the legality of the agency’s revised decision.

Litigants may appeal the CIT’s final judgments to the Federal Circuit. Thereafter, they may petition for further review, but the US Supreme Court seldom grants it.

Apart from government appeals to the WTO, interested parties may appeal some AD/CVD determinations involving Canada or Mexico to a USMCA binational panel.

US courts generally limit appeals of safeguards to very narrow procedural grounds.

Commerce and the ITC continue to face historically high AD/CVD caseloads involving original investigations, administrative reviews and five-year reviews. Government funding-related shutdowns impact the timing of these proceedings.

The most recent safeguard measure, regarding imports of fine denier polyester staple fibre, took effect in November 2024.

Effective from 15 January 2025, Commerce amended its AD/CVD regulations to:

• change the AD rate calculation methodology for cases involving designated “non-market economies” (NMEs) and expand the application of (generally high) “entity-wide” NME rates, including to some companies located outside the NME country; and
• revise subsidy rules potentially covering additional programmes, such as agricultural subsidies and Free Trade Zone tax and import charge benefits.

As part of a renewed focus on tariff compliance enforcement, a March 2025 Executive Order encourages interagency information-sharing. Additionally, on 29 August 2025, the US government revitalised and expanded a Trade Fraud Task Force featuring Department of Homeland Security and DOJ personnel.

In June 2025, Commerce proposed, but has not yet implemented, further AD/CVD regulatory changes:

• Eliminating or significantly modifying procedures for undertaking expedited, company-specific subsidy investigations, known as “expedited reviews”.
• Modifying Commerce’s practice for assigning AD rates to unaffiliated resellers, potentially increasing those rates.

The Trump Administration’s March 2025 assertion that agency efforts controlling transfers of goods across US borders constitute a “foreign affairs function” may reduce the lead time for future regulatory changes affecting AD/CVD and customs enforcement.

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) serves as the primary US mechanism to address investment security. CFIUS reviews certain transactions involving foreign investments in the United States to determine their potential impact on national security. Operating under Section 721 of the Defense Production Act, as amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 and the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, CFIUS possesses the authority to block, unwind or impose mitigation measures on transactions that could result in foreign control of a US business. CFIUS also exercises the authority to review non-passive, non-controlling investments in US businesses that deal in critical technology, critical infrastructure or sensitive personal data (collectively referred to as “TID businesses”), as well as certain real estate transactions through which a foreign person acquires property in proximity to certain listed military and government installations. The CFIUS review process helps ensure that foreign investment in the United States does not compromise national security while maintaining an open investment environment.

The Outbound Investment Security Program took effect on 2 January 2025, establishing the “Outbound Rules” for investments in “countries of concern” by US persons and by US-controlled foreign entities. Currently, the Outbound Rules apply to investments involving China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and China-related companies involved in sensitive technologies and products critical for military, intelligence, surveillance or cyber-enabled capabilities.

CFIUS consists of an interagency committee composed of the heads of the Departments of the Treasury (chair), Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State and Energy, USTR and the Office of Science & Technology Policy. The Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of Labor serve as non-voting members; several White House offices serve as observers.

Treasury administers the Outbound Rules, in consultation with relevant agencies as appropriate.

CFIUS jurisdiction over inbound US investments extends to:

• control transactions that could result in foreign control over a US business;
• non-control investments in a TID US business through which a foreign person acquires at least one of the following: access to material non-public technical information, board membership or observer rights, or involvement in substantive decision-making regarding critical technology, critical infrastructure or sensitive personal data; and
• covered real estate transactions through which a foreign person acquires property within a specified distance of certain enumerated military and government installations.

The Outbound Rules apply to certain covered transactions made by US persons, including the direct or indirect acquisition of an equity interest or contingent equity interest; certain debt financing that affords certain rights to the lender; the conversion of a contingent equity interest; a greenfield investment or other corporate expansion; entrance into a joint venture; and certain investments as a limited partner or equivalent (LP) in a non-US-person pooled investment fund. The Outbound Rules prohibit certain transactions involving advanced integrated circuits, quantum computing and AI systems.

Parties to transactions involving a TID US business must submit a mandatory filing at least 30 days prior to the completion date of a covered transaction in which: (a) a foreign person obtains a 25% or greater voting interest in a TID US business and a non-exempt foreign government holds a 49% or greater voting interest in that foreign person or (b) a foreign person acquires a TID US business involved in a critical technology and a US regulatory authorisation would otherwise be required to export such critical technology to that foreign person or any entity that owns 25% or more voting interest in that foreign person. Parties to transactions not subject to mandatory filing requirements may also submit the transaction for voluntary CFIUS review to obtain clearance prior to closing. Alternatively, parties may submit declarations, which are short-form filings typically used to obtain CFIUS clearance for non-sensitive transactions.

The Outbound Rules define notifiable transactions as covered transactions that involve the design, fabrication or packaging of certain integrated circuits, or the development of certain AI models.

CFIUS exempts qualifying foreign persons from excepted foreign states (currently, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK) from mandatory filing requirements and from CFIUS jurisdiction over non-controlling investments and real estate transactions. CFIUS still has jurisdiction to review control transactions involving excepted investors.

The Outbound Rules exempt certain transactions where a US person would not have rights beyond those of a standard minority shareholder, such as investments in publicly traded securities. US persons may also request a national interest exemption.

CFIUS possesses the authority to review any unreviewed covered transaction at any time, including those transactions not subject to mandatory filing requirements. If CFIUS determines that national security risks cannot be sufficiently mitigated, it can recommend that the President block or unwind the investment.

Any person that fails to submit a mandatory filing or that violates CFIUS mitigation requirements can receive a civil penalty of the greater of up to USD5 million or the value of the transaction. Persons making material misstatements, omissions or false certifications to CFIUS may also face civil penalties of up to USD5 million per violation.

IEEPA currently imposes a maximum civil penalty for violations of the Outbound Rules of USD377,700 or twice the value of the transaction, whichever is the greater. Treasury may also nullify, void or otherwise compel the divestment of any prohibited outbound investment transaction.

CFIUS bases filing fees for notices on the value of the transaction. These range from no fee for transactions valued at less than USD500,000 to a maximum fee of USD300,000 for transactions valued at USD750 million or more. Declarations do not require filing fees; however, if CFIUS has concerns or additional questions about a transaction, it can require parties that submit declarations to file a notice.

No fees apply to notifications under the Outbound Rules.

Key developments in the last 12 months include the following:

• Outbound Rules now apply to certain covered transactions made by US persons.
• The “America First Investment Policy” established a policy aimed at incentivising investment in the United States by creating a “fast-track” process and welcoming passive investment, while tightening review of active or control investments from “foreign adversaries” into US technology, infrastructure and strategic sectors.
• Penalties and investigations continued to increase, with CFIUS issuing five penalties in 2024 that totalled USD88 million, including a penalty of USD60 million, the largest it has ever assessed.

CFIUS is expected to continue implementing the America First Investment Policy, leading to a more differentiated review process that includes a fast-track element. The continued focus on enforcement may lead to increased reviews of non-notified transactions, whereas the growing use of mitigation agreements indicates that compliance will remain a priority.

The CHIPS and Science Act (P.L. 117-167) signed into law in 2022 allocated USD39 billion to a fund to bolster US semiconductor manufacturing capacity. Not all of these funds had been disbursed before the election of President Trump. In August 2025, President Trump announced a possible reallocation of some of that funding towards critical mineral projects.

Also in 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act (P.L. 117-169) was signed into law, dedicating billions of dollars (in the form of tax credits, grants and loans) towards clean energy technology, manufacturing and innovation aimed at incentivising private investments in such projects. Funding pauses during the Trump Administration created uncertainty around those programmes.

The Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has a mandate to develop and promote standards that support US innovation and industrial competitiveness. The American National Standards Institute functions as the private, non-profit corollary to NIST that co-ordinates national standardisation.

The United States maintains restrictions on poultry and poultry product imports from various countries due to health concerns. It also maintains quotas on products such as sugar, peanuts, peanut butter and cheese. CBP maintains a list of the commodities subject to quotas on its website.

In addition to antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the United States recently deployed the strategic use of broad-based import tariffs that have the effect of inflating the cost of the foreign goods.

The United States does not rely on state trading enterprises or state ownership of commercial entities to impact domestic product and/or reduce imports. It does, however, maintain state-owned enterprises in certain sectors such as defence and transportation (such as Amtrak). The Departments of Agriculture, Defense and Energy also engage in strategic purchasing and/or stockpiling to support domestic producers.

Three principal frameworks establish US domestic content requirements:

• The Buy American Act of 1933 (BAA) applies to direct federal procurement, requiring federal agencies to purchase domestic end products and use domestic construction materials. Whether a product qualifies as “domestic” depends on the percentage of domestic content and the type of product. The current domestic content threshold of 65% is scheduled to increase to 75% by 2029. Exceptions that allow agencies to purchase foreign products in certain circumstances include unavailability of domestic products, increases in costs, and inconsistency with public interest.
• The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA) provides exceptions to the BAA for products from countries that have qualifying trade agreements with the United States, such as the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and certain free trade agreements. Under the TAA, eligible products from designated countries receive equal consideration to domestic offers in federal procurements that exceed specified monetary thresholds.
• The Build America, Buy America Act (BABA), enacted as part of the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), broadens the scope of federal Buy America domestic content requirements. Before the IIJA, these requirements primarily applied to federal funding for certain transportation-related infrastructure projects, ensuring that recipients used domestically produced goods. BABA extends these requirements to a wider range of infrastructure projects – including broadband networks, electric transmission facilities and others – and mandates that all iron and steel products, manufactured goods and construction materials used in covered projects be produced in the United States.

To qualify as a domestic product, an item must be manufactured in the United States and contain more than 55% domestic content, although some agencies impose stricter standards. Waivers may be granted in limited circumstances, if applying the requirements would be inconsistent with the public interest, when needed materials are unavailable domestically, or when US-made products would impose unreasonable costs.

The Lanham Act provides protection for Geographical Indications (GIs) in the United States by registering them as trademarks. This includes certification marks and collective marks. Examples of domestic GIs include Florida oranges, Washington apples, Vidalia onions, Napa Valley wines and Idaho potatoes. Geographical protections remain a contentious issue with the EU for GIs associated with established quality schemes as opposed to a brand or trademark.

In 2025, the Trump Administration asserted expansive authority to impose tariffs pursuant to Section 232 and IEEPA.

Section 232 empowers Commerce to investigate whether a given article is being imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair US national security. If Commerce makes an affirmative finding, the President may concur and act – through, eg, tariffs, quotas or stockpiling – to adjust imports of the article and, optionally, its derivatives.

The two Section 232 regimes in force at the beginning of 2025 assigned 25% tariffs to certain articles of steel and steel derivatives and assigned 10% tariffs to certain articles of aluminium and aluminium derivatives. Each regime identified certain exceptions. Both regimes changed significantly in 2025:

• February: The Administration generally increased aluminium tariffs to 25% and variously revoked steel and aluminium tariff exceptions or allowed them to expire.
• April: Commerce created a process for eligible parties to petition to cover new derivative articles under each tariff regime.
• June: Steel and aluminium tariffs increased from 25% to 50%, respectively.
• The list of derivative articles subject to each tariff regime further expanded in February, June and August.

The President resurrected a dormant Section 232 proceeding concerning imports of passenger vehicles, light trucks and their parts (PVLTP), which had concluded in 2019 with instructions to continue monitoring PVLTP imports. Citing this monitoring, the President imposed 25% tariffs on PVLTP imports, although rebate systems temporarily offset the 25% tariff for automobile parts accounting for up to 15% of the value of US-built PVLTs and PVLT engines, respectively.

The President also launched a dozen new Section 232 investigations, in the following order:

1. Copper and Derivative Products (*)

2. Lumber and Derivative Products (*)

3. Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment and Derivative Products

4. Pharmaceuticals, Pharmaceutical Ingredients and Derivative Products

5. Medium- and Heavy-Duty Trucks (MHDVs) and Parts (*)

6. Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products

7. Commercial Aircraft, Jet Engines, and Their Parts and Components

8. Polysilicon and Derivative Products

9. Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Their Parts and Components

10. Wind Turbines and Their Parts and Components

11. Robotics and Industrial Machinery and Their Parts and Components

12. Personal Protective Equipment, Medical Consumables and Medical Equipment

Thus far, the three investigations marked with an asterisk (*) above yielded formally proclaimed tariff actions, with duties of 10% to 50%. The Administration otherwise instructed Commerce to establish MHDV part tariff rebate programmes analogous to those for PVLT parts. The President and other Administration officials signalled forthcoming tariffs for certain other investigated products.

Section 232’s product-specific framing limits its flexibility, but tariffs imposed pursuant to Section 232 withstood several federal court challenges, increasing legal certainty regarding Section 232 tariff regimes. Nevertheless, the 2025 Section 232 tariff actions greatly expand the products deemed “derivatives”. Also notable, the United States reduced Section 232 tariff rates on certain products pursuant to framework agreements with, eg, the UK, Japan, South Korea (automobiles) and the EU.

As the first to impose tariffs pursuant to IEEPA, the Trump Administration faces disputes regarding the extent of tariff-making authority IEEPA confers. The Trump Administration views IEEPA as empowering the President to impose tariffs to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States, and with respect to which a national emergency has been declared. Thus, the President has invoked IEEPA to proclaim several new tariff regimes in 2025:

• Executive Order 14193 and 14194 (1 February 2025), as amended: Often termed “trafficking” or “fentanyl” tariffs, these regimes impose tariffs of 10% to 35% on nearly all products of Canada and Mexico, respectively, unless the product qualifies for duty-free preference under the USMCA.
• Executive Order 14195 (1 February 2025), as amended: Another “trafficking or “fentanyl” tariff regime, this imposes a 20% tariff on nearly all products of China.
• Executive Order 14245 (24 March 2025): Although not yet applied in practice, this empowers the US Secretary of State to trigger, by designation, a 25% tariff on nearly all products of any country that imports Venezuelan oil.
• Executive Order 14256 (1 February 2025), as amended, and 14324 (31 July 2025): These suspend the availability of duty-free treatment for “de minimis” entries valued at or below USD800. They prescribe alternative duty rates for products of China and products of other trading partners.
• Executive Order 14257 (2 April 2025), as amended: Often called “reciprocal” tariffs, this regime imposes tariffs on many goods imported from nearly every country in response to a global trade-in-goods deficit. The reciprocal tariff regime excludes a substantial list of goods, including many products subject to Section 232 actions or investigations, certain food products and others. Since being introduced, the excluded products list has expanded, but contraction may occur. As originally promulgated, the “reciprocal” tariff regime provided for a near-global baseline tariff of 10%, with higher rates for 57 named trading partners. The Administration stayed implementation of the partner-specific tariff rates and adjusted most from the originally announced rate. Ultimately, in August 2025, partner-specific tariffs of 15% to 41% took effect for 65 named countries, and the EU received a variable rate. Other partner-specific rate reductions or product exclusions have been introduced at various points to implement framework agreements with, eg, the UK, Japan, South Korea and the EU.
• Executive Order 14323 (30 July 2025): This subjects certain products of Brazil to a 40% tariff, in response to Brazil’s prosecution of former President Bolsonaro, regulation of online platforms, and other reasons.
• Executive Order 14329 (6 August 2025): This subjects most products of India to a 25% tariff, in response to India’s importation of Russian oil.

Plaintiffs challenged the “reciprocal” tariff regime and the three “trafficking” tariff regimes before various US federal courts. The CIT, the US District Court for the District of Columbia and a 7:4 majority of the Federal Circuit each deemed these four tariff regimes to be unlawful overreaches of the authority conferred by IEEPA. Each court’s rationale differed in the particulars. The Federal Circuit stopped short of holding that IEEPA does not confer any tariff-making authority, finding it sufficient to hold that the four challenged regimes exceeded statutory authority.

The US Supreme Court heard the government’s final appeal on a highly expedited schedule. If the Supreme Court deems one or more of the challenged IEEPA tariff regimes unlawful, the courts and Administration will take time to determine the scope and process for relief.

Finally, the Trump Administration attempted to manage the extent to which Section 232 and IEEPA tariff regimes “stack” on top of each other. It established a hierarchy to identify which tariff regime(s) apply to an imported article.