The Swedish sanctions landscape has shifted considerably over the past year. The most notable legislative development is the new Swedish Sanctions Act implementing Directive 2024/1226. The legislation materially strengthens the enforcement framework:
A misdemeanour offence carrying up to six months’ imprisonment has also been introduced. Agencies are also obliged to refer suspected breaches to the relevant enforcement authorities, and forfeiture powers have been extended to cover property not belonging to the offender. Because these rules are recent, their practical application has yet to be tested in the courts.
Enforcement activity in Sweden has also become significantly more prominent. The March 2026 police raid on the Kubal aluminium producer (the country’s sole aluminium producer, under ultimate control of a Russian group), with the arrest of two senior executives for allegedly channelling approximately SEK940 million in dividends to a sanctioned person, represents a steep change in domestic enforcement visibility. Concurrently, the Swedish Coast Guard has conducted boardings of five suspected shadow fleet vessels, invoking grounds such as unseaworthiness, statelessness, falsified documentation and environmental violations. New rules applicable since 1 July 2025 require proof-of-insurance checks for vessels transiting Swedish territorial waters or its economic zone.
At the EU level, regulatory activity has intensified markedly. Four further Russia sanctions packages – the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st – have been adopted during the past 12 months, with measures progressively tightening. Key developments include:
Additional targeted measures have addressed domestic repression, the unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children, the Russian military-industrial complex, hybrid threats, the shadow fleet ecosystem and third-country circumvention networks. Restrictive measures against Belarus have likewise been reinforced, with expanded controls on trade routes and dual-use goods.
Overall, compared with 12 months ago, the sanctions sector is characterised by a considerably more robust legislative framework, faster adoption of EU sanctions packages, and a noticeably more active enforcement posture by Swedish authorities.
Legislative Strengthening and Criminalisation
The foremost trend has been the overhaul of Sweden’s sanctions enforcement framework through the new Swedish Sanctions Act. By raising maximum penalties, eliminating fines as a sentencing option, criminalising ancillary forms of participation and imposing reporting duties on agencies, the legislation signals a clear shift towards treating sanctions violations as serious criminal conduct.
Escalating EU Measures Against Russia
The continued adoption of sanctions packages – four in the space of roughly a year – reflects an acceleration of EU restrictive measures against Russia. Key focal points have included countering the Russian shadow fleet (with port-access bans now extending to over 790 vessels), restricting energy trade (notably the LNG import embargo and lowered oil price cap) and limiting financial channels through transaction bans and payment system restrictions.
Broadening of Russia Sanctions Beyond Russia
The expansion of EU restrictive measures against Iran – including listings for military support to Russia and Russian sanctions circumvention – illustrates a widening of the sanctions agenda beyond the Ukraine conflict. Similar “secondary sanctions” have been imposed against actors in Central Asia, China and Thailand, among others.
Heightened Domestic Enforcement
The Kubal investigation and the arrest of senior executives (see 1.1 Sanctions Market) indicates an increased ambition to enforce sanctions and to pursue high-profile, complex cases, signalling that corporate actors face genuine prosecution risk. The boardings of multiple suspected shadow fleet vessels in Swedish territorial waters and the application of new insurance verification requirements for transiting ships also underscore a more proactive maritime enforcement by Sweden, which aligns with broader EU and member state efforts to disrupt the illicit transportation networks sustaining Russian oil exports.
Judicial Clarification of Asset Freeze Scope
The CJEU’s 2026 rulings in Cases C-483/23 T Trust and C-84/24 EM SYSTEM have clarified the scope of the asset freeze provisions in EU sanctions regimes, endorsing a broad, functional interpretation of the notion of “control”. In the T Trust case, the Court confirmed that trust assets may fall within the scope of asset freezes where the listed person retains de facto influence over the trust’s assets or trustee decisions. In the EM SYSTEM case, the Court affirmed that a 50% capital stake creates a presumption of control over the subsidiary’s assets, which is why a subsidiary’s assets may be frozen on behalf of a listed parent even if the subsidiary is not designated. However, the Court stressed that this presumption must be rebuttable and is subject to judicial review. These two cases are important decisions providing essential clarification on the notion of “control” under EU sanctions law.
A large share of Swedish trade passes through the Swedish shipping industry, meaning this industry is particularly affected by the multiple EU sanctions directed at trade. Moreover, Sweden has a comparatively large industrial output, with several global actors based in the country, making sanctions compliance essential, as multiple industrial goods are caught primarily by EU sanctions against Russia. The same applies to actors within Sweden’s large mining and forestry sectors.
Sweden does not adopt or issue autonomous national sanctions. The restrictive measures applicable in Sweden are exclusively those adopted by the European Union and the United Nations. EU sanctions are directly applicable in Sweden without the need for further domestic transposition, with limited exceptions. UN sanctions, together with other binding obligations arising under public international law, are given effect through the legislative mechanism set out in Sections 15–17 of Act (2025:327) on International Sanctions (the Swedish Sanctions Act).
At present, Sweden is bound by approximately 40 distinct sanctions regimes, encompassing 29 geographical sanctions as well as thematic programmes that address human rights abuses, cyber-attacks, chemical weapons proliferation and terrorism. The most extensive sanctions programmes currently in force target Russia, Belarus, the separatist or Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea and Sevastopol), Iran and North Korea. The measures include asset freezes, travel bans, arms embargoes, trade restrictions on goods and services (notably dual-use items), export controls and financial sector prohibitions.
Violations of sanctions that are committed on Swedish territory, or committed abroad by a Swedish citizen, fall within the scope of the Swedish Sanctions Act.
EU sanctions have a broader jurisdictional reach. They apply:
There is no formal definition of “business carried out in whole or in part within the European Union”, although academic commentary and case law lend some support to the view that, at a minimum, importing goods into the EU and enforcing contracts within the EU qualify.
In addition, the EU has in recent years sanctioned non-EU entities situated in countries such as China, Serbia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Vietnam for facilitating or participating in sanctions circumvention in relation to Russia. Numerous vessels in Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, many sailing under non-Russian flags, have likewise been sanctioned when found to be transporting Russian oil, or for enabling Russian energy exports in other ways. Beyond these specific designations, EU sanctions against Russia contain provisions that could be characterised as secondary sanctions and that aim to prevent circumvention. The general prohibition on circumventing EU restrictive measures (a core feature of every EU sanctions regime) may also catch transactions that on their face have no connection to the sanctioned country, if their purpose is to evade the sanctions.
As mentioned in 1.4.1 Types of Sanctions, sanctions that apply in Sweden derive entirely from supranational bodies – the EU and the UN. Sweden does not maintain its own sanctions lists, nor adopt autonomous restrictive measures.
Unlike some jurisdictions with a centralised sanctions authority, Sweden distributes this responsibility among multiple government bodies. Matters concerning arms embargoes, dual-use goods, prohibitions on internal repression equipment, and the release of frozen funds fall under the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (Inspektionen för strategiska produkter). The National Board of Trade (Kommerskollegium) manages licence requirements arising from sanctions, as well as controls on the export of goods and services.
Several other agencies also play enforcement and supervisory roles within their respective areas, including the Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) and Swedish Customs (Tullverket). When new restrictive measures are adopted, government ordinances assign competence to specific agencies. Until such a designation is made, the Government Offices (Regeringskansliet) act as the competent authority, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), including in respect of granting derogations. The Ministry also serves as the co-ordination point for Swedish sanctions policy.
There is no civil enforcement regime for sanctions breaches in Sweden. Sanctions offences amounting to contractual breaches are enforced through the dispute mechanism applicable to the contract in question.
Criminal enforcement is the responsibility of the Prosecution Authority’s National Security Unit (Riksenheten för säkerhetsmål). Criminal investigations are carried out by the Police Authority (Polismyndigheten), together with the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen).
Legal persons that commit a sanctions breach and are subject to regulatory oversight may face regulatory enforcement action by the supervisory authority competent under the applicable legislation.
In many cases, a breach of sanctions will constitute a criminal offence in Sweden. Only intentional acts, or acts committed with gross negligence, give rise to criminal liability; the standard of proof is “beyond reasonable doubt”. Liability also extends to instigation, aiding and attempted commission of a sanctions offence.
Under the new Swedish Sanctions Act, an ordinary sanctions offence carries a custodial sentence of up to three years. Gross or repeated offences are punishable by two to six years’ imprisonment. A separate misdemeanour category exists, carrying a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment, where prosecution is deemed to be in the public interest. In practice, petty offences will attract only fines. For individuals, the maximum fine for a single sanctions offence is SEK150,000, rising to SEK200,000 where multiple offences are involved. No financial penalty is imposed where the offence warrants a prison sentence.
Under the new penalty regime, prison sentences in less serious cases may be conditional or partly conditional, and a conditional sentence can be combined with a duty to pay fines, community service obligations, or surveillance. Property connected to the offence may also be subject to forfeiture, even where it does not belong to the wrongdoer.
Regarding legal entities, Swedish law does not recognise corporate criminal liability – only natural persons can commit criminal offences. However, where a crime has been committed within the scope of a company’s operations, the company may be ordered to pay a corporate fine under Chapter 36, Section 23 of the Swedish Criminal Code. A corporate fine may be imposed if the company did not take reasonable steps to prevent the offence, or if the offender was someone in a leading or supervisory role. For larger legal entities, corporate fine can reach a maximum of SEK500 million for gross sanctions offences (see Chapter 36, Sections 24 and 25). For other violations, or for companies that do not qualify as “larger legal entities”, the standard range is SEK5,000 to SEK10 million, depending on the gravity of the offence.
It should be noted that, in Sweden, criminal sentencing is shaped predominantly by case law. Given that case law on sanctions violations remains extremely limited, it is challenging to assess with any precision the penalties likely to be imposed for such breaches – including whether custodial sentences will generally tend towards unconditional or conditional imprisonment under the new penalty framework. When enacting the Swedish Sanctions Act, the legislature expressly acknowledged that it would fall to the courts to determine whether sanctions violations should ordinarily carry a custodial sentence.
As there is no civil enforcement regime (see 2.2.1 Enforcement Responsibilities), there is no enforcement action to report.
On 26 March 2026, a law enforcement tactical unit executed a raid on the Russian-owned Kubal aluminium smelting facility in Sundsvall. Two individuals holding senior management positions are suspected of aggravated sanctions violations; one of the suspects serves as the company’s CEO. The full basis for the criminal suspicions has not been disclosed and the criminal investigation is ongoing. Under applicable law, an individual convicted of aggravated breach of sanctions legislation faces a term of imprisonment of no less than two years and no more than six years.
Since early 2026, the Swedish Coast Guard has boarded five vessels suspected of links to the so-called shadow fleet. The legal bases for these interventions include:
All boardings except one took place in Swedish territorial waters off the coast of Skåne; the exception involved a vessel suspected of an environmental offence – an oil discharge – committed in Sweden’s exclusive economic zone, which was subsequently ordered to anchor in territorial waters. The vessels boarded were the Caffa (6 March), Sea Owl I (12 March), Flora 1 (3 April), Hui Yuan (12 April) and Jin Hui (3 May 2026).
As regards corporate fines, a company can only be held liable if it failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the crime, or if the offence was committed by a person in a leading or supervisory position. This implies that demonstrating robust preventative measures may serve as a defence against a corporate fine.
Under Swedish law, these considerations are reflected in the statutory rules on the mitigation and remission of corporate fines. Chapter 36, Section 26 of the Swedish Criminal Code provides that a corporate fine may be reduced in cases of more palpable double jeopardy, where the company has already been subject to criminal damages, forfeiture or the conviction of, for example, a small business owner. Reduction can also be possible when the company has, to the extent possible, sought to prevent, remedy or limit the harmful effects of the offence, or has voluntarily reported it. Case law confirms that these grounds form part of an overall proportionality assessment, while emphasising that remission is exceptional and fact-specific.
More broadly, the EU and Swedish authorities stress that businesses should generally adopt a risk-based approach to sanctions compliance. The European Commission has stated that appropriate due diligence must be calibrated to the specificities of the business and its sanctions risk exposure, encompassing risk assessment, counterparty due diligence and ongoing monitoring.
Under Council Regulation 833/2014, express compliance obligations have also been codified – for example, Article 12gb requires exporters of certain sensitive goods to identify, assess, mitigate and manage the risks of those goods being diverted to or used in Russia. Furthermore, as many EU sanctions measures also catch indirect actions as well as circumvention, robust and effective compliance programmes are generally integral to preventing breaches of EU sanctions.
Neither the Swedish criminal statutes nor EU sanctions regimes operate on a strict liability basis. Only intentional acts and those committed with gross negligence give rise to criminal liability in Sweden. Likewise, actors breaching EU sanctions can typically not be held liable unless it is proven that they at least had reasonable cause to suspect that their actions were contrary to EU sanctions law.
Exemptions from applicable sanctions regulations may be granted upon application to the relevant Swedish competent authority – in most cases either the National Board of Trade or the Inspectorate of Strategic Products. The assessment is based solely on the applicable EU sanctions act. Exceptions vary between different sanctions regimes, and some come as de minimis derogations. For example, regarding deposits from Russia, it may be noted that receiving a deposit amounting to less than EUR100,000 is not prohibited. Examples of recurring grounds for derogations include humanitarian aid, international co-operation and civil nuclear activities.
There is no general licence for the provision of legal services; as with exemptions from sanctions, each individual sanctions regime specifies whether the provision of legal services to designated persons may be exempted. For example, pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 269/2014 concerning sanctions against Russia, and Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 359/2011 concerning sanctions against Iran, funds or economic resources intended for the payment of reasonable costs in connection with legal services may be released. No amendments to these two provisions have been made in the past 12 months.
There is no general, blanket reporting obligation under Swedish sanctions law, although several specific duties exist.
Sanctions-related personal data processing is also subject to recent regulatory developments. In November 2024, a new ordinance issued by the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten) came into force. This ordinance removes the prior requirement for entities in the financial, security and defence industries to seek advance authorisation from the supervisory authority when conducting screenings against non-EU sanctions lists, so long as the data processing is governed by the applicable sectoral rules. For organisations active in other fields, a case-by-case GDPR assessment may still be necessary.
As mentioned in 1.1 Sanctions Market and 1.2 Key Trends, Sweden has seen significant developments in recent years, but there have been no court decisions directly related to sanctions in the past three years.
On the EU level, three important case law developments can be mentioned. Aside from the notion of “control” cases, as discussed in 1.2 Key Trends, the CJEU judgments in Cases C-109/23, Jemerak, and C-351/22, Neves 77 Solutions, are of particular interest.
In the Jemerak case, the CJEU was asked whether German notary and translation services in relation to an immovable property sale were covered by the prohibition to provide legal advisory services to a Russian legal person under Regulation 833/2014. The Court answered the question in the negative, emphasising that the independent functions of a notary in the German legal system distinguished such notary services from the services that a legal counsel would perform. The notary services in question would thus not fall under the EU sanctions on the provision of legal services, nor would related translation services.
In the Neves 77 Solutions case, the CJEU confirmed its jurisdiction to interpret EU Council sanction decisions directly in cases not covered by EU regulations implementing the sanctions. In the case at hand, a Romanian company had brokered a transaction with Russian military radio equipment in violation of a prohibition in a 2014 Council decision adopted in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which at the time had not yet been implemented in Regulation 833/2014; however, the prohibition had been enshrined in Romanian law. In the national proceedings, the Court was asked to interpret the decision. While several parties claimed that the Court lacked jurisdiction to interpret the decision as the Council had failed to implement it into a regulation, the Court held that this failure did not impair its jurisdiction to interpret the underlying decision. Although Council decisions are normally implemented directly into directly applicable regulations, this judgment clarifies that the CJEU can provide a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a measure of general scope in an act adopted within the CFSP.
Several developments are anticipated in the near term.
The EU anti-money laundering package, adopted in 2024, is set to harmonise the framework for preventing the misuse of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing across the Union. It comprises the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR), the Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD6) and the Regulation establishing the new EU anti-money laundering agency (AMLAR). The package will enter into force on 10 July 2027, at which point the regulations will start applying and the directive should be transposed into national law. With the new framework, the anti-money laundering compliance rules for private actors are transferred to the AMLR, whereas the Sixth AML Directive regulates the organisation of national anti-money laundering authorities. The new AMLR will require “obligated entities” (ie, the institutions and actors with extended AML/CFT obligations under EU law) to manage risks for non-implementation and evasion of EU and UN financial sanctions, include such sanctions in their business-wide risk assessment, and integrate sanctions screening into their customer due diligence, beneficial ownership checks and ongoing monitoring.
Reforms to Sweden’s military equipment export controls are forthcoming. In light of amendments passed in 2026, the Swedish export control framework for military equipment has been aligned with the country’s NATO membership, and the government can now legally grant exemptions from licensing obligations to suppliers of parts to licensed manufacturers. Notably, two key exceptions apply to exports carried out by the Swedish Armed Forces and to exports conducted under EU or NATO programmes. These changes take effect on 1 August 2026 and are expected to enable more streamlined defence industry collaboration within the Alliance.
A challenge to an EU sanctions designation can be made before the EU General Court, by lodging an action to annul the listing in the Regulation. Before taking legal action, a request to delist can be submitted to the General Secretariat of the EU Council. It is also possible to challenge a listing in the framework of national court proceedings, although this would require the national court to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU on the validity of the listing.
A United Nations delisting request should be submitted to the United Nations secretariat. Delisting requests regarding the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list may also be submitted to the United Nations Ombudsman.
Successful EU and United Nations delisting challenges can result in either removal from the list or amendment of the designation, depending on the order sought.
It is possible to obtain damages for an illegal EU sanctions listing. In a few cases, the CJEU has both considered and upheld claims of damages, and left open the possibility of receiving compensation for both material and non-material damages. Illustratively, in Case C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, the Court of Justice upheld a judgment of the General Court awarding the Iranian plaintiff a sum of EUR50,000 for non-material damages for an improper listing under EU sanctions against Iran. However, the Court of Justice also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for several million euros worth of damages relating to claimed economic injuries, as the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently demonstrate that these were a result of the listing. For example, while accepting the fact that the plaintiff suffering the termination of a contract with a major supplier was a direct result of the sanctions listing, this did not itself give rise to damages; the plaintiff also needed to demonstrate the impact of the termination on its financial results.
Whereas the timeline for the processing of a delisting request to the EU Council or United Nations Secretariats will vary depending on the circumstances in the case, a court challenge is almost certainly a longer procedure. Annulment proceedings in the EU General Court will normally take well over a year, often longer, as will appeals proceedings in the Court of Justice.
Trade and export restrictions regarding services are adopted by the United Nations and the European Union. As noted in 1.4.1 Types of Sanctions, Sweden does not maintain any sanctions regimes adopted at national level, and this principle extends to trade and export sanctions. Where applicable, trade sanctions on services are specified within the relevant sanctions framework.
For example, EU Regulation 2022/355, containing export and import restrictions against Belarus, and Regulation 833/2014 concerning Russia prescribe such measures, and Regulation 2022/263 concerns export of services from the occupied territories of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk.
There are multiple trade and export restrictions regarding goods. These restrictions are regulated in the same manner as those pertaining to services, meaning that sanctions regimes established by the United Nations and the European Union, where applicable, specify prohibitions on the export or import of goods within the relevant regulatory framework.
For example, the EU regulations mentioned in 5.1 Services all include multiple prohibitions relating to the export and import of goods, ranging from military and dual-use items to industrial and luxury products, and similar prohibitions can be found in other EU sanctions regulations. United Nations import or export bans are enshrined in UN Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits the procurement, import or transport of arms and related materiel of all types from Iran. This prohibition is implemented through several Swedish transposition measures, such as the Military Equipment Act (Lag (1992:1300) om krigsmateriel).
As far as is known, the Swedish courts have made no recent decisions assessing sanctions compliance as a contractual breach.
Swedish law affords parties broad freedom of contract, and parties are generally free to agree whether, and to what extent, the imposition of sanctions is to constitute a force majeure event or otherwise relieve a party from performance. In the absence of an express sanctions clause, the interpretation of any agreed force majeure wording will govern the outcome, and the parties’ allocation of risk will as a basic rule be respected. Where the contract is silent, the position is governed by general Swedish contract law principles. Force majeure is not expressly defined in a Swedish statute, but it is a well-recognised principle of contractual interpretation in Swedish law. When confronting force majeure defences, Swedish law often draws on the closely related control liability principles mainly enshrined in Sections 27 and 57 of the Swedish Sale of Goods Act (köplagen (1990:931)) and Article 79 of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, although force majeure and statutory control liability should not be treated as identical concepts.
On that basis, Swedish law allows for sanctions to constitute force majeure where they make performance unlawful or practically impossible, or in exceptional cases are considered objectively to be so burdensome that performance cannot reasonably be required. In line with the principles of Sections 27 and 57 of the Swedish Sale of Goods Act, a party would – in theory – need to show that the imposition of sanctions was outside its control, could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of contracting, and could not reasonably have been avoided or overcome, including by using alternative lawful means of performance or seeking available licences or exemptions. Whether these conditions are met depends on an assessment of the facts in the specific case; sanctions already in force, or clearly foreseeable, when the contract was concluded thus seem unlikely to liberate a party from contractual liability.
As far as is known, the Swedish courts have made no recent decisions that directly determine how the enforcement of a judgment should be handled where sanctions issues arise. In Sweden, the enforcement of judgments is handled primarily by the Swedish Enforcement Authority (Kronofogden), whose decisions are subject to judicial review.
Generally, EU sanctions law prohibits the satisfaction of claims connected with contracts or transactions whose performance is prohibited under EU sanctions. An example of such a prohibition to satisfy sanctioned claims can be found in Article 11 of Regulation 833/2014. Directed at judicial and regulatory authorities, this prohibition also applies to Swedish enforcement authorities, prohibiting the Enforcement Authority and the courts from taking measures to satisfy sanctioned claims.
An unresolved issue is the question of whether Swedish courts and the Enforcement Agency should examine the risk of satisfying sanctioned claims of their own motion. In Case C-802/24 Reibel, the Svea Court of Appeal referred questions to the CJEU on whether a national court must examine of its own motion whether an arbitral award under its review gives effect to a claim in violation of Article 11 of Regulation 833/2014. The forthcoming decision is expected to clarify the approach that should be taken by national courts and authorities, including Swedish courts and, by extension, the Enforcement Authority, where enforcement measures would risk contravening EU sanctions.
Sweden does not maintain its own sanctions list; the sanctions designations that apply in Sweden stem solely from EU or UN decisions.
Under EU sanctions law, designation decisions are made by the Council of the European Union. The Council adopts restrictive measures under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union in the framework of the CFSP, which requires unanimity. Where measures have economic or financial effects, such as asset freezes or trade prohibitions, they are implemented through Council regulations under Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with qualified majority. EU designations are thus directly applicable in Sweden with no implementing measures required, with few exceptions.
United Nations sanctions designations are decided by the UN Security Council, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. UN sanctions are implemented in Sweden in accordance with the procedure in Sections 15–17 of the Sanctions Act. Through this procedure, the Swedish government will issue an Ordinance implementing new UN sanctions, which needs to be approved by Parliament within two months to remain in force.
EU designations can have indirect effects on non-designated entities, mainly in two ways.
The sanctions regimes applicable in Sweden generally contain express anti-circumvention provisions. The relevant prohibitions are primarily found in EU regulations, such as Article 12 of Regulation 833/2014, which prohibits knowing and intentional participation in activities whose object or effect is to circumvent the prohibitions in that Regulation. Equivalent or closely similar provisions are found in Article 9 of Regulation 269/2014, concerning Russia, and in Regulations 267/2012 and 359/2011, concerning Iran, as well as in the regimes concerning the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine, Libya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
In practice, these provisions are capable of capturing arrangements that preserve the economic substance of a prohibited transaction while seeking to avoid its formal appearance. This may include the use of intermediaries, nominee arrangements, third-country routing, re-export structures, misleading ownership information or other devices designed to conceal that funds, economic resources, goods, services or technology ultimately benefit a sanctioned person, entity, sector or destination.
Section 5 of the Sanctions Act expressly criminalises circumvention of a prohibition, obligation or restriction contained in an EU Council sanctions regulation or in Swedish rules or decisions adopted under the Act. The following acts of circumventions are criminalised:
Criminal liability requires intent or gross negligence. The penalties applicable to the crime of circumvention are the same as the penalties applying to other sanctions offences; see 2.2.2 Breaching Sanctions.
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Overview and Current Trends
Sweden’s international sanctions framework is undergoing its most significant change in decades. The international sanctions applicable in Sweden are principally those adopted by the European Union, including measures implementing sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.
The International Sanctions Act (SFS 2025:327), which entered into force in June 2025, introduced a broader and more stringent criminal law framework for sanctions violations. This was followed in July 2026 by the establishment on a permanent footing of the Sanctions Co-ordination Council, bringing together the principal Swedish authorities involved in sanctions implementation and enforcement.
These developments reflect a broader shift in Sweden’s approach to international sanctions: from a regime centred primarily on self-driven compliance to one with a more pronounced enforcement orientation. For Swedish businesses, international sanctions are consequently becoming a question of criminal exposure, corporate governance and transaction risk.
The Legal Framework: Broader Criminal Enforcement
The International Sanctions Act
The International Sanctions Act (SFS 2025:327) entered into force in June 2025 and is the core legislation governing international sanctions under Swedish law. It sets out which sanctions apply in Sweden, and provides for their criminal law enforcement.
More specifically, the provisions of the Act are structured as blanket offences. Criminal liability arises from breaches of prohibitions, obligations or restrictions adopted by the European Union under the Common Foreign and Security Policy or the United Nations Security Council; see Restrictions of Practical Importance below for more detail.
Importantly, Swedish sanctions legislation is primarily prohibition-based. It designates conduct as prohibited or restricted, but does not prescribe specific control measures that individuals and businesses must proactively perform in order to be compliant. There are therefore no statutory requirements under Swedish law to conduct sanctions screening, perform sanctions-specific due diligence or maintain particular policies, procedures or internal controls, although such controls are often justified as a practical approach to ensuring compliance; see Governance and Compliance Gain Importance below for more detail.
European Union sanctions
International sanctions within the European Union are normally introduced through a decision under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; where European Union-level implementation is required, they are given effect through directly applicable Council regulations. Measures requiring action by individual member states, such as certain arms embargoes or admission restrictions, are implemented nationally. The substantive restrictions applicable to Swedish businesses are therefore determined principally at European Union level.
United Nations sanctions
United Nations Security Council sanctions bind Sweden under international law but do not create obligations directly enforceable under Swedish law. They are normally implemented through European Union regulations. Pending European Union implementation of certain United Nations asset freezing designations, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority must adopt corresponding interim measures under the International Sanctions Act.
Personal scope
Criminal liability under the International Sanctions Act attaches to natural persons, while legal persons may be subject to corporate fines where an offence is committed in their business; see Materially Strengthened Enforcement Regime below for more detail.
Territorial scope
The territorial scope of the applicable international sanctions is separate from the scope of Swedish criminal law jurisdiction.
As Sweden does not maintain an autonomous national sanctions regime, the territorial scope of the international sanctions obligations applicable in Sweden is determined by the relevant European Union regulation. Sanctions adopted by the European Union typically apply:
A company incorporated under Swedish law therefore remains subject to European Union international sanctions in respect of its activities inside and outside the European Union, including activities conducted through a foreign branch. Swedish nationals are likewise bound by the relevant prohibitions while abroad.
Subsidiaries of Swedish parent companies domiciled outside of Sweden are not – solely by having a Swedish parent – automatically subject to European Union international sanctions. However, the Swedish parent remains subject to its international sanctions obligations under Swedish law, including applicable anti-circumvention prohibitions forming part of European Union sanctions applicable in Sweden. In addition, certain European Union sanctions explicitly require European Union persons and entities to undertake their best efforts to avoid any participation by their subsidiaries in activities that undermine the relevant sanctions.
Where international sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council are implemented through European Union regulations (as is normally the case), their territorial scope in practice corresponds with that of other sanctions resolved by the European Union.
The territorial scope must be distinguished from the jurisdiction of Swedish courts over an alleged international sanctions offence. Swedish criminal jurisdiction is governed by the Swedish Penal Code (SFS 1962:700). An offence is regarded as having been committed in Sweden where:
In certain circumstances, Swedish courts may have jurisdiction over international sanctions offences committed abroad. For offences under the International Sanctions Act, Swedish jurisdiction is not conditional on the conduct also being criminal in the country where it occurred.
Foreign sanctions and competing legal obligations
Sanctions adopted by other states are not binding as such under Swedish law. United States and United Kingdom sanctions may nevertheless be relevant to Swedish businesses because of their corporate structures, contracts, financing or other jurisdictional connections. Compliance with such measures must be distinguished from compliance with sanctions applicable under Swedish law.
One relevant consideration is that compliance with international sanctions applicable under European Union or Swedish law may provide a lawful basis for processing personal data, whereas obligations arising solely under foreign law may not. This may limit the circumstances in which a Swedish business may screen individuals against foreign sanctions lists.
Another relevant consideration is that Regulation (EU) 2271/96 – commonly referred to as the Blocking Regulation – prohibits Swedish legal persons from complying, directly or indirectly, with requirements or prohibitions arising from certain extraterritorial United States laws listed in its Annex.
Importantly, this does not prohibit the consideration of, or compliance with, United States international sanctions generally. A Swedish legal person must therefore determine whether a decision to refuse, suspend or terminate a transaction or business relationship is based on directly applicable United States law, on genuine and independent commercial considerations or solely on an attempt to comply with an extraterritorial United States measure covered by the Blocking Regulation. In the latter case, compliance is prohibited unless authorised by the European Commission.
Interaction with adjacent regulatory regimes
Swedish law differentiates between international sanctions and adjacent but independent regulatory regimes.
One example is the export control regime. Legislation on export controls applies independently from that on international sanctions, and imposes separate requirements concerning classification, licensing, end use and end users. In practice, this means that the same transfer may be subject to both export control requirements and international sanctions requirements. An export control licence does not over-ride a prohibition under an international sanctions regime, and an authorisation or exemption under an international sanctions regime does not dispense with any separate export control licence.
Another example is the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime. Legislation in this area applies independently from that on international sanctions, and imposes separate requirements concerning risk assessments, customer due diligence, ongoing monitoring and suspicious transaction reporting. In practice, this means that the same customer relationship or transaction may be subject to both anti-money laundering requirements and international sanctions requirements. Compliance with anti-money laundering obligations does not over-ride a prohibition under an international sanctions regime, and compliance with international sanctions obligations does not dispense with any separate anti-money laundering or counter-terrorist financing requirement.
Fragmented Responsibilities But Closer Co-Ordination
Sweden has no central sanctions authority; responsibility is divided among several authorities according to the relevant measure. For example:
Suspected sanctions offences are investigated by the competent law enforcement authority – principally the Swedish Police Authority or Swedish Customs, with the Swedish Security Service involved in matters falling within its national security remit.
This fragmentation has been identified as a weakness in the Swedish enforcement framework. To improve co-ordination, the Sanctions Co-ordination Council, led by the Swedish Police Authority, was placed on a permanent footing in July 2026. It does not replace the participating authorities nor create a single point of contact, and businesses must still identify the competent authority for each specific application, notification or inquiry.
Restrictions of Practical Importance
Common structure of European Union sanctions regimes
As Sweden principally applies sanctions adopted through European Union regulations, the substantive restrictions are set out in the regulation governing the relevant sanctions regime. Their precise scope varies, but the recurring measures include asset freezes, prohibitions on making assets available, restrictions on trade and services, and prohibitions on circumvention; see The Legal Framework: Broader Criminal Enforcement above for more detail.
Asset freeze – screening and indirect exposure
International sanctions commonly require all funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by a listed person or entity to be frozen. They also prohibit funds or economic resources from being made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of a listed person. These obligations apply to all Swedish operators, not only regulated financial institutions.
International sanctions may therefore prohibit more than direct payments to listed persons. Transactions involving employees, creditors, service providers, relatives or intermediaries may also be prohibited where they release value to, discharge an obligation of or otherwise benefit a listed person.
Consequently, international sanctions screening cannot be limited to the immediate counterparty. Businesses must also consider whether an unlisted counterparty is owned or controlled by a listed person.
Ownership will generally exist where a listed person holds at least 50% of the proprietary rights or a majority interest. Holdings of several listed persons may need to be aggregated.
Control is a separate, substance-over-form assessment. Relevant considerations include the ability to appoint or remove a majority of the governing body, control voting rights, exercise dominant influence or otherwise direct the entity’s affairs. Where ownership or control exists, making assets available to the entity will generally be treated as indirectly making them available to the listed person.
Systematic sanctions screening has traditionally been less common among Swedish businesses operating primarily in the domestic market, particularly outside the regulated financial sector. This is changing, and more Swedish businesses are introducing counterparty screening. The appropriate level of screening and due diligence depends on the company’s risk profile, including its ownership structures, payment flows and exposure to foreign jurisdictions; see Governance and Compliance Gain Importance below for more detail.
Sectoral and trade restrictions – a reality for Swedish businesses
International sanctions may also restrict, inter alia, imports, exports, financing, investment and the provision of professional services to specified counterparties, sectors or whole jurisdictions.
These measures remain highly relevant to Sweden’s export-oriented industrial and technology sectors. For many Swedish businesses, the sanctions against Russia represented their first significant exposure to broad sectoral restrictions affecting a geographically proximate market. Although sectoral measures were introduced in 2014, their expansion following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought sanctions compliance into the day-to-day operations of a much wider range of Swedish industrial, technology, financial and professional services businesses.
Circumvention – a potential enforcement priority
Participation in arrangements intended to circumvent international sanctions is prohibited under international sanctions regimes. Circumvention may include:
Swedish authorities have specifically highlighted the diversion of Swedish-origin industrial products and technology through third countries to actors connected with the Russian military industrial sector. Higher risk products and supply chains may therefore require enhanced counterparty, end use and transaction due diligence.
Circumvention is likely to remain a central Swedish enforcement priority. Further investigations and prosecutions can be expected as the authorities increase their focus on indirect exports, procurement networks and the use of third-country intermediaries; see Materially Strengthened Enforcement Regime below for more detail.
Governance and Compliance Gain Importance
Compliance is mandatory, internal measures voluntary
Swedish sanctions law is prohibition-based rather than process-prescriptive. Businesses must comply with the applicable restrictions, but are not generally required to maintain specific screening, due diligence or internal control arrangements. Unless such requirements arise under sector-specific regulation, the choice of compliance measures is therefore formally voluntary.
This distinction is becoming less significant in practice. The broader criminal law framework introduced in 2025 has increased the importance of businesses being able to identify and address international sanctions risks.
The board of directors is ultimately responsible
The board of directors is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the company conducts its business in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations, including international sanctions. The board should therefore ensure that responsibilities are allocated and that proportionate procedures and controls are in place in this area.
Documented compliance arrangements may be relevant both when assessing whether an individual acted with gross negligence and when determining whether the company took the measures that could reasonably have been required to prevent an offence. Appropriate controls may therefore reduce both the risk of a violation and the resulting exposure to individual criminal liability and corporate fines; see Materially Strengthened Enforcement Regime below for more detail.
Compliance framework – developing market practice
Structured sanctions compliance frameworks cannot yet be regarded as standard practice across all segments of the Swedish market. It is nevertheless becoming more common, particularly among established businesses, exporters and companies with international operations or supply chains.
Developing best practice, which has been codified by the European Banking Authority’s non-mandatory guidelines applicable as of 30 December 2025, includes a documented risk assessment, clear allocation of responsibilities, and practical controls tailored to the company’s operations and sanctions exposure.
The risk assessment should identify where sanctions violations may arise in light of the company’s operations, markets, products, customers, suppliers, payment flows, distribution channels and corporate structure. Higher risk arrangements should receive particular attention, including those involving distributors, agents, freight forwarders and foreign subsidiaries. The assessment should be updated following material changes to the business or its sanctions exposure.
Responsibility for sanctions compliance should be clearly allocated between management and relevant operational functions. Internal procedures should specify when transactions may be approved, escalated, suspended or rejected, and training should be directed at functions exposed to sanctions risk, including sales, procurement, finance and logistics.
Screening, due diligence and other control measures should be proportionate to the company’s sanctions exposure, and may extend beyond the direct counterparty to owners, controlling persons, intermediaries, banks, consignees and end users. Higher risk transactions may require verification of ownership records, product classifications, end use information, shipping documents, payment flows and commercial rationale. Businesses with complex supply chains should also consider re-export restrictions, downstream obligations, information and audit rights, ongoing monitoring and termination provisions, without relying on contractual assurances where other circumstances indicate a risk of diversion or circumvention.
Materially Strengthened Enforcement Regime
Individual liability
Individual liability for sanctions violations is criminal in nature under Swedish law. Liability therefore requires that the offence was committed intentionally or through gross negligence; ordinary negligence is insufficient.
The International Sanctions Act establishes the following offences.
Attempts to commit a sanctions offence, minor sanctions offence or aggravated sanctions offence are also punishable. The general Swedish rules on participation apply, meaning that a person who induces or facilitates an offence may be liable for incitement or aiding and abetting.
Criminal liability attaches to natural persons and depends on the individual’s own acts, omissions or participation rather than their formal position. A director, officer or employee is therefore not liable merely because of their role. Gross negligence does not require an intention to violate sanctions, but represents a substantial departure from the required standard of care. Relevant considerations may include the person’s responsibilities, authority, knowledge and response to identified risks. Proceeding despite clear warning signs or failing to carry out elementary checks may support a finding of gross negligence, depending on the circumstances.
Corporate liability
Legal persons cannot themselves be convicted of criminal offences under Swedish law. A company may nevertheless be subject to a corporate fine where an offence has been committed in its business and:
A corporate fine may be imposed even if no individual has been convicted, provided that the underlying offence and the conditions for corporate liability are established.
The corporate fine is based on a sanction value of between SEK5,000 and SEK10 million. For larger companies, a sanction value of at least SEK500,000 may be increased by reference to the company’s financial position, resulting in a maximum fine of SEK500 million. Remedial measures and voluntary reporting may justify a reduction. Property connected with the offence may also be confiscated.
Limited case law
As the International Sanctions Act only entered into force in June 2025, there is not yet an established body of published case law interpreting its provisions. However, investigations announced during 2026, including cases involving persons in senior corporate functions, indicate that sanctions enforcement is becoming more active. Published judgments and further guidance on gross negligence, corporate preventative measures and the classification of aggravated offences can therefore be expected as these cases progress.
Sanctions Move Into Transactions and Disputes
The expansion of the sanctions against Russia and the introduction of the International Sanctions Act have made sanctions a more prominent feature of Swedish transaction practice. Recent criminal investigations involving persons in senior corporate functions have further increased awareness that sanctions exposure may result in personal liability, corporate fines and intrusive investigations.
In Swedish mergers and acquisitions, the focus has expanded from straightforward list screening to the target’s historical and indirect exposure. Relevant areas include:
In a share acquisition, historical exposure remains with the target after completion. Identified risks may be addressed through warranties, covenants, conditions precedent, indemnities or purchase price protection, while incomplete information may justify enhanced pre-completion review or post-completion remediation.
Financing and payment arrangements increasingly require separate analysis. A transaction may be lawful in principle but impossible to complete through the proposed banks, currencies or payment routes because a bank applies stricter internal policies, requires further ownership information or is unwilling to assume the relevant risk. Transaction documents may therefore need to address restrictions affecting lenders, account banks, sources of funds and payment intermediaries. A contractual payment obligation does not authorise a prohibited transfer, and an authorisation covering one element of a transaction does not necessarily extend to related financing, fees or payments.
Sanctions clauses have accordingly become more common in Swedish commercial agreements. Under Swedish law, sanctions do not automatically terminate or suspend an agreement, nor exclude liability for non-performance. The consequences depend on the applicable restriction, the contractual terms and general principles of Swedish contract law. Clauses may address suspension, termination, alternative performance, notice and prolonged prevention of performance. They should also distinguish between legally binding sanctions and internal policies or foreign sanctions that do not apply under Swedish law.
Disputes may arise over contractual performance, payment obligations and the enforcement of judgments or arbitral awards. Certain sanctions regimes contain no-claims provisions restricting claims by designated or specified parties where performance has been affected by sanctions. Even where the parties’ underlying contractual rights have been determined, payment, transfer of assets or enforcement may remain prohibited. The existence of a contractual right must therefore be distinguished from whether that right can lawfully be exercised or enforced.
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