Public & Administrative Law & Judicial Review 2026

Last Updated April 16, 2026

Mexico

Law and Practice

Authors



Martens Abogados (MARTENS) is a Mexican disputes firm with a team of 20 professionals. The firm has notable experience in public and administrative law, particularly in constitutional litigation, amparo proceedings, administrative nullity trials and judicial review of regulatory and governmental action. This practice is closely linked to the firm’s broader disputes work, including commercial litigation, arbitration and sector-focused regulatory controversies. MARTENS regularly acts for domestic and international clients in matters involving permits, sanctions, public procurement, concessions and sovereign measures, especially in the energy, infrastructure and financial services sectors. Recent work includes strategic challenges to regulatory restrictions, administrative acts and other measures of public authority affecting business operations and investment.

Mexico combines a general constitutional remedy of universal application with a specialised administrative litigation regime.

The Amparo

Governed by Articles 103 and 107 of the Constitution and the Amparo Law (Ley de Amparo), the amparo lies against any act of authority that violates fundamental rights or the constitutional distribution of powers. It takes two forms:

  • amparo indirecto, which targets administrative decisions, regulations and omissions; and
  • amparo directo, which challenges final judicial or quasi-judicial decisions.

The 2024 constitutional reform prohibits amparo suspensions with general effects against general rules, a significant limitation on the systemic reach of individual constitutional challenges.

The Administrative Nullity Trial

For federal administrative acts, the Federal Administrative Justice Tribunal (Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administrativa, TFJA) provides a specialised forum through the nullity trial (juicio contencioso administrativo), governed by the Federal Law of Administrative Contentious Proceedings (LFPCA). Each state maintains a separate administrative justice tribunal with analogous jurisdiction over state and municipal acts.

These mechanisms are complementary. Parties frequently pursue both sequentially: first seeking nullity before the TFJA, then challenging the tribunal’s judgment through amparo directo.

The 2024 Judicial Reform

The 2024 constitutional reform introduced the popular election of federal judges (first cohort seated in September 2025), reduced the Supreme Court from 11 to nine justices, and replaced the Federal Judiciary Council with a Judicial Discipline Tribunal and a Judicial Administration Body. The substantive jurisdiction of both remedies remains intact, but the institutional framework within which they operate has been redrawn.

Federal District Courts (Juzgados de Distrito)

This is the primary forum for amparo indirecto, hearing challenges against administrative acts, regulations and omissions. Specialised administrative district courts operate in major cities. Following the 2024 reform, district judges are selected through popular election, with the first cohort taking office in September 2025.

Collegiate Circuit Courts (Tribunales Colegiados de Circuito)

These appellate-level courts hear amparo directo against final TFJA decisions and other quasi-judicial bodies, as well as appeals (recurso de revisión) against district court amparo judgments.

The Supreme Court (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, SCJN)

Now comprising nine justices (reduced from 11), the Court hears amparo cases involving constitutional questions of exceptional importance. A declaration of unconstitutionality requires at least six affirmative votes.

The TFJA

This autonomous tribunal is the specialised forum for the nullity trial, operating through Regional Chambers, a Superior Chamber and a Specialised Environmental and Regulatory Chamber. It handles tax, customs, trade regulation, procurement, administrative sanctions and regulatory matters.

State Administrative Tribunals

Each state maintains its own administrative justice tribunal for challenges to state and municipal administrative acts.

Susceptibility is determined primarily by the nature of the act rather than the formal status of the issuing entity. The defining concept is the so-called act of authority (acto de autoridad), focusing on whether the action was performed unilaterally, imposed coercively, and affected the legal sphere of individuals.

In amparo, the 2013 Amparo Law codified a functional definition: any entity, including private persons, that creates, modifies or extinguishes legal situations in a unilateral and obligatory manner, under powers conferred by a general rule, qualifies as an authority for amparo purposes (Article 5, Fraction II). This express statutory recognition of amparo against private parties performing public functions was a defining innovation of the 2013 law. The Supreme Court’s Second Chamber developed a consistent three-part test requiring that:

  • the entity perform or omit acts equivalent to those of an authority (unilateral and obligatory);
  • such acts affect rights by creating, modifying or extinguishing legal situations; and
  • the entity’s functions be established in a general rule conferring authority-like powers, generally with a degree of discretion (Jurisprudencia 2a./J. 40/2023 and 2a./J. 43/2023).

In the nullity trial, the TFJA’s jurisdiction is defined by enumeration: the challenged act must fall within the categories established in the TFJA’s Organic Law and the LFPCA, including tax determinations, customs resolutions, administrative penalties and procurement disputes.

The amparo expressly permits challenges to primary legislation through the amparo contra normas generales (Articles 103 and 107 of the Constitution). Grounds include violation of fundamental rights under the Constitution or international human rights treaties (applying the pro persona principle under Article 1), infringement of the constitutional distribution of powers, retroactive application (Article 14), and violation of legal certainty, proportionality or equal treatment.

Challenges may be brought upon the first act of application or, for self-applying laws, within 30 business days of entry into force.

An amparo judgment protects only the individual claimant (the Otero formula). The 2011 reform introduced the general declaration of unconstitutionality (DGI): when the Supreme Court establishes binding jurisprudence finding a statute unconstitutional and the legislature fails to remedy the deficiency within 90 calendar days, the Court may invalidate the provision with erga omnes effects (requiring six of nine votes). The Court has exercised this mechanism, notably in DGI 1/2018, invalidating General Health Law provisions regarding cannabis self-consumption.

Primary legislation may also be challenged through actions of unconstitutionality (acciones de inconstitucionalidad), brought by legislative minorities, the Attorney General or human rights commissions, which can result in direct invalidation with general effects.

The 2024 reform prohibits amparo suspensions with general effects against general rules. Interim relief can no longer prevent enforcement of the challenged law against the broader population during proceedings.

Secondary legislation, including presidential decrees, ministerial regulations (reglamentos), official Mexican standards (Normas Oficiales Mexicanas, NOMs) and administrative rules of general application, can be challenged through both the amparo and the nullity trial.

  • Through amparo: The same constitutional grounds available for primary legislation apply. Regulatory overreach is a particularly common ground, as the Constitution requires that all essential elements imposing obligations be established by statute (principio de reserva de ley). The 2024 prohibition on general-effect suspensions applies equally here.
  • Through the nullity trial: The LFPCA allows challenges to administrative acts, decrees, and general administrative rules, excluding reglamentos, either as self-applying norms or together with the first act of application (Article 2). The TFJA may declare the nullity of the general rule, though such a declaration benefits only the individual claimant (Article 52, Fraction V(c)). Proceedings may be filed through the TFJA’s Online Justice System (Sistema de Justicia en Línea).

Self-applying secondary legislation may be challenged within 30 business days of entry into force through both amparo (Article 17, Amparo Law) and the nullity trial (Article 13, LFPCA). For hetero-applying rules, the amparo deadline is 15 business days from the first act of application; the nullity trial deadline is 30 business days from notification of the challenged resolution.

Challenging individual government decisions is the most frequent application of judicial review. Individual administrative acts, such as permit denials, licence revocations, administrative sanctions and disciplinary decisions under the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities, constitute the largest volume of cases before both the amparo courts and the TFJA.

The affected individual may bring an amparo indirecto or, where the act falls within the TFJA’s jurisdiction, initiate a nullity trial. In many cases, the individual must first decide whether to pursue an internal administrative appeal before proceeding, a strategic choice, as the administrative appeal suspends enforcement without requiring a bond, while the TFJA offers a more thorough evidentiary process. The principle of definitividad generally requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before amparo.

Sanctions under the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities, including disqualification, economic penalties, and dismissal, are challenged before the TFJA and represent a significant and growing category of administrative litigation.

Purely private law agreements, even with a public body as a party, are generally not subject to amparo or nullity review, as they involve coordination between parties on equal footing rather than acts of authority.

Significant exceptions arise when the public body exercises sovereign prerogatives. Government procurement contracts are subject to challenge before the TFJA, particularly where the entity exercises unilateral administrative rescission (rescisión administrativa) or imposes contractual penalties. Concession agreements in mining, telecommunications and energy involve inherently public acts, revocation, imposition of regulatory conditions or denial of extensions, subject to both amparo and nullity review. Public-private partnership agreements similarly contain administrative law provisions making specific acts reviewable.

The key question is whether the specific act constitutes an exercise of sovereign authority (imperio) or merely a contractual action on equal terms, assessed case by case under the functional test.

Acts that do not create, modify or extinguish rights or obligations, such as guidance, informational communications or internal memoranda, are generally not challengeable. The Amparo Law requires that the act affect the claimant’s legal sphere; the LFPCA requires a definitive resolution.

Three exceptions qualify this rule. First, administrative guidance treated in practice as binding can be challenged if it effectively determines rights or obligations. Second, preparatory acts become reviewable if they cause immediate, irreversible harm to fundamental rights (actos de imposible reparación); a preliminary determination that freezes a company’s operations may be challenged before a final resolution is issued. Third, negative omissions: an authority’s failure to act where legally required is expressly challengeable through amparo.

These exceptions rest on the constitutional distinction between acts of deprivation and acts of interference. Article 16 requires that any act interfering with an individual’s person, family, domicile, papers or possessions be issued by a competent authority with legal grounds and justification (fundamentación y motivación), meaning even acts falling short of formal legal effect may be subject to challenge.

Mexican law expressly permits amparo against non-governmental entities performing functions equivalent to acts of authority. Article 5, Fraction II of the 2013 Amparo Law codified a functional standard: private persons whose acts create, modify or extinguish legal situations unilaterally, under powers conferred by a general rule, are subject to amparo. This was a defining feature of the 2013 reform, elevating what had been a judicial construction to an express statutory ground.

The Supreme Court has applied this standard to an ever-widening range of private actors through binding criteria issued under current law. Private universities omitting to process and deliver professional degrees are treated as equivalent to authorities, given that their certification function derives from the General Education Law and is exercised in a position of supraordination over students (Jurisprudencia 2a./J. 43/2023). Private employers who unilaterally suspend pension payments under collective bargaining agreements may be challenged via amparo when their actions affect social security rights derived from the mandatory regime (Jurisprudencia 2a./J. 40/2023). State-owned productive enterprises such as Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) act as authorities when they exercise public procurement functions, omitting to formalise a public works contract, which operates in a plane of supraordination regulated by public law (Jurisprudencia 2a./J. 42/2022). Sports commissioners exercising delegated disciplinary powers under public utility functions have also been treated as equivalent authorities (Jurisprudencia PC.I.A. J/33 A, 2023).

The 2024 reform dissolved several autonomous regulatory bodies, including COFECE and the IFT, transferring their functions to federal ministries. This alters the institutional context without changing the substantive legal framework.

Purely commercial disputes between private parties on equal footing are channelled through civil or commercial courts. However, once such a dispute has been litigated through all ordinary instances, the losing party may bring an amparo directo challenging the final judgment on constitutional grounds. The amparo thus functions as a quasi-cassation remedy, a pervasive feature of the Mexican legal system not confined to public law.

The amparo jurisdiction cannot be ousted by legislation, contract or any other means. Articles 103 and 107 of the Constitution enshrine it as an inviolable guarantee. Arbitration clauses in government contracts may govern commercial aspects of a dispute, but cannot preclude review of acts performed in the exercise of sovereign authority.

The principal qualification is the principle of definitividad (exhaustion of remedies): claimants must generally exhaust ordinary remedies before resorting to amparo. This is a procedural prerequisite, not an ouster, subject to important exceptions, including violations of fundamental rights, acts affecting personal liberty, and situations where the ordinary remedy would be insufficient to prevent irreparable harm. Article 61 of the Amparo Law establishes additional grounds for dismissal (causales de improcedencia) that operate as procedural barriers without constituting substantive ouster.

The 2024 reform introduced a novel tension. Decisions of the newly created Judicial Discipline Tribunal are declared “non-appealable” (inatacables) by the Constitution itself. The amparo has historically served as the ultimate guarantee against any act of authority; a constitutional provision purporting to shield a body’s decisions from this guarantee creates an internal constitutional tension rather than a conventional ouster, with implications for the separation of powers that remain actively debated.

Mexico recognises two categories of standing for amparo, significantly broadened by the 2011 constitutional reform.

Legal Interest (Interés Jurídico)

The traditional standard: a subjective right directly and personally affected by the challenged act (concrete, personal and current). This remains the applicable test for challenges involving individual liberty, property and most administrative matters.

Legitimate Interest (Interés Legítimo)

Introduced by the 2011 reform and authoritatively defined by the Pleno in Jurisprudencia P./J. 50/2014, this broader standard allows individuals with a qualified, current, real and legally relevant interest, distinct from a mere general public grievance, to bring an amparo challenge even absent a subjective right, provided that annulment of the challenged act would produce a concrete benefit in their legal sphere. The affectation need not be exclusively patrimonial and is assessed under a reasonableness standard. Importantly, the Pleno clarified that legitimate interest is not limited to collective or diffuse interests: it may be asserted individually where the claimant’s specific circumstances create a differentiated position vis-à-vis the challenged act.

The Second Chamber subsequently distilled three concurrent requirements:

  • a constitutional norm establishing a protected interest benefiting a collectivity;
  • that the challenged act infringes upon such collective interest, whether on an individual or collective basis; and
  • that the claimant belongs to that collectivity (Jurisprudencia 2a./J. 51/2019, Reg. 2019456).

These three elements are concurrent – the absence of any one renders the amparo inadmissible.

Legitimate interest has proven particularly important in environmental, urban planning and consumer protection matters. A claimant with a legitimate interest may obtain annulment, but not full restitution, where doing so would affect third-party rights.

NGOs and civil associations whose corporate purpose includes the promotion, protection or defence of collective human rights may bring amparo challenges under the legitimate interest standard. The First Chamber established a five-element test (Jurisprudencia 1a./J. 167/2023, Reg. 2027535), under which the association must demonstrate:

  • a constitutional norm protecting a diffuse interest;
  • that the challenged act transgresses it;
  • its belonging to the affected collectivity;
  • that its corporate purpose encompasses defence of the relevant collective right; and
  • that the challenged act impedes the exercise of that purpose.

This mechanism has been applied to allow reproductive rights organisations to challenge state criminal legislation and environmental groups to contest permits and regulations, broadening the available pathways beyond class actions.

Environmental organisations have successfully challenged development permits and mining concessions, relying on the right to a healthy environment (Article 4). Indigenous rights organisations have invoked the right to prior consultation under ILO Convention 169 to challenge infrastructure projects. Urban planning associations have challenged zoning decisions. Courts have dismissed claims where the organisation’s connection was deemed too generic.

Certified consumer and environmental organisations may act as representative plaintiffs in class actions, though this mechanism has seen limited application in administrative law. Separately, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) has standing to bring actions of unconstitutionality directly before the Supreme Court against legislation that violates human rights – distinct proceedings that require six of nine votes to invalidate a law.

In Amparo, multiple claimants may file a joint amparo when challenging the same act with common grounds. Related cases may be consolidated (acumulación) on the court’s own initiative or upon request.

The Amparo Law provides for a third interested party (tercero interesado), allowing affected individuals to participate in pending proceedings without initiating a separate challenge. Third interested parties include the counterpart in the underlying proceeding, the beneficiary of the challenged act, and anyone whose interests could be affected by the ruling. The respondent authority identifies them when filing its justified report; the court may also summon them ex officio. Failure to notify a known third interested party may result in reopening proceedings.

In the nullity trial, a similar third-party figure operates. The LFPCA also permits consolidation of related cases, which is frequently used where multiple parties contest the same determination.

In amparo, the principal parties are the claimant (quejoso), the respondent authority (autoridad responsable) and the third interested party (tercero interesado). The respondent defends the challenged act through its justified report. The third interested party has full procedural rights:

  • submitting evidence;
  • presenting arguments;
  • objecting to evidence; and
  • appealing the judgment.

The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público Federal) may intervene where public interest is at stake, though infrequently. The amicus curiae figure is formally recognised by the Supreme Court; briefs are regularly accepted in cases of broad social significance, though they carry no binding force on the court.

In the nullity trial, the LFPCA recognises a similar structure. The Federal Taxpayer Ombudsman (PRODECON) may represent claimants and facilitate alternative dispute resolution in tax-related proceedings.

Mexico’s administrative law proceedings do not feature automatic disclosure or discovery comparable to common law systems. There is no pre-trial document exchange obligation; each party bears the burden of presenting its own evidence.

However, the burden of production falls asymmetrically on the government: the respondent authority must produce the complete administrative file in both amparo and nullity proceedings, with adverse presumptions attaching to any failure (see 8.2 Alternatives to Disclosure/Discovery). Mexico’s transparency framework (the General Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information) also provides claimants with a pre-litigation tool to obtain government files through formal information access requests.

El Informe Justificado

In amparo, the respondent authority must submit a detailed, justified report explaining the challenged act, accompanied by complete supporting documentation, within 15 days (Article 117 of the Amparo Law). Failure creates a presumption that the act exists as described by the claimant. At the suspension stage, a preliminary report (informe previo) confirms or denies the existence of the act.

The Administrative File

In both proceedings, the authority must produce the complete administrative file (expediente administrativo). In the nullity trial, failure to produce requested documents generates an adverse presumption regarding the facts those documents were intended to prove (Article 45, LFPCA). Where the claimant alleges a lack of fundamentación y motivación, the burden of proving legality shifts to the authority.

Judicial Powers

Both the amparo courts and the TFJA may request additional evidence when necessary. In amparo, courts must supplement deficient arguments (suplencia de la queja deficiente) under Article 79 of the Amparo Law – a broad judicial power that applies across subject matters, including administrative cases, when the court identifies a manifest violation that left the claimant without defence.

Both proceedings are primarily documentary, and neither features cross-examination as understood in common law systems.

In amparo, evidence typically consists of documentary exhibits and the administrative file. Witness testimony is permissible but uncommon and is conducted through written questionnaires (interrogatorios) with counter-questionnaires (repreguntas). Expert evidence (dictámenes periciales) plays an important role in complex cases (particularly in telecommunications, competition, environmental, energy and regulatory matters). The claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the challenged act; the authority bears the burden of justifying its legality through the informe justificado.

In the nullity trial, the evidentiary range is broader: documentary evidence, witness testimony, expert opinions and on-site inspections are all available. Expert witnesses are particularly prominent in regulatory compliance, environmental assessments and complex financial matters. Where the claimant alleges a lack of legal grounds, the burden of proving legality shifts to the authority.

There is no requirement for pre-action correspondence or a pre-litigation protocol.

However, a formal challengeable act must exist. Where the authority has not issued a formal resolution, claimants frequently invoke the constitutional right of petition (derecho de petición, Article 8), which requires authorities to respond to written petitions within a brief period. If the authority fails to respond within the applicable deadline, the silence is deemed a negative resolution (negativa ficta), constituting a challengeable act before both the TFJA and the amparo courts.

The principle of definitividad (exhaustion of remedies) is fundamental. Before resorting to amparo, the claimant must generally exhaust all available ordinary remedies; failure results in dismissal under Article 61, Fraction XX of the Amparo Law. In many areas, this means filing an administrative appeal or proceeding directly to the nullity trial – options that are generally alternative, not cumulative, with the election being irrevocable.

The Amparo Law establishes important exceptions. Exhaustion is not required when:

  • the challenged act involves violations of fundamental rights such as personal liberty;
  • the sole ground is unconstitutionality of the applied statute;
  • the available remedy does not provide for suspension and the act could cause irreparable harm;
  • the act lacks fundamentación y motivación; or
  • the ordinary remedy requires greater formalities than the amparo.

These exceptions are strictly construed.

In the nullity trial, no prior exhaustion of administrative appeals is generally required and the claimant may file directly.

Amparo

The standard time limit for amparo indirecto is 15 business days from the notification of the challenged act (Article 17 of the Amparo Law). Self-applying statutes may be challenged within 30 business days of entry into force. Acts affecting agrarian land rights are subject to a seven-year limit, and criminal sentences imposing imprisonment may be challenged within eight years. Acts violating personal liberty or involving forced disappearance or torture have no time limit.

Nullity Trial

The time limit is 30 business days from the date of notification of the challenged resolution.

Time limits are strictly enforced. Courts examine timeliness ex officio; untimeliness results in dismissal regardless of whether the respondent invokes it. However, improperly notified acts may be challenged (nulidad de notificaciones), effectively reopening the time limit.

In amparo, the claimant must file a written complaint (demanda de amparo) containing:

  • identification of the claimant and the respondent authority;
  • a description of the challenged act;
  • the constitutional rights allegedly violated; and
  • the factual and legal grounds (Article 108, Amparo Law).

Documentary evidence in the claimant’s possession must be attached. No minimum evidentiary threshold is required; the claim is admitted on the pleading and the evidentiary record develops through subsequent stages.

In the nullity trial, the complaint must identify the challenged resolution, the issuing authorities and specific grounds for illegality (Article 14, LFPCA). A copy of the challenged resolution must be attached. Documentary evidence must generally be offered with the complaint.

In both proceedings, filing requirements are procedural rather than evidentiary. The system imposes no threshold equivalent to common law merits tests at the initiation stage.

In amparo indirecto, the claimant files the complaint; the respondent authority files its justified report within 15 days (Article 117); the claimant may offer additional evidence and amplified arguments; the court sets a constitutional hearing (audiencia constitucional) for evidence admission, objections, and final arguments (alegatos); the court then issues judgment. All arguments must be raised in the complaint or its extension, subject to suplencia de la queja deficiente (see 8.2 Alternatives to Disclosure/Discovery).

In amparo directo, the proceeding is more streamlined. The complaint is filed before the issuing tribunal, which forwards it with the case file to the Collegiate Circuit Court. There is no separate evidentiary stage – the court reviews the existing record.

In the nullity trial, three principal stages unfold:

  • pleading (complaint, authority’s response, and possible amplification);
  • instrucción (evidence is offered, admitted, and produced); and
  • closing (final arguments and judgment).

For the expedited summary trial (juicio en la vía sumaria), these stages are compressed under a shorter timeline (Articles 58-1 to 58-15, LFPCA).

Both proceedings include an initial admissibility review, though neither imposes a merits-based sifting test.

In amparo, the district court must rule on the admissibility of the complaint within 24 hours of filing (Article 112), verifying formal requirements (Article 108), checking for manifest grounds for dismissal (causal de improcedencia manifiesta e indudable), and confirming jurisdiction. Deficient complaints receive a five-day clarification order (prevención). If a ground for dismissal is manifest and beyond doubt, untimeliness, express consent to the act or lack of jurisdiction, the court may dismiss outright (desechamiento). If any ambiguity exists, the court must admit the claim and resolve admissibility at the merits stage.

In the nullity trial, the TFJA magistrate conducts a similar review, granting five days to cure deficiencies and dismissing only manifestly untimely or jurisdictionally deficient claims.

In both systems, the sifting is procedural rather than substantive: the question is whether the claim meets formal requirements, not whether it is likely to succeed.

The primary mechanism for addressing urgency is the interim suspension of the challenged act rather than expedition of the proceeding itself.

Suspension ex officio is granted automatically when the challenged act involves threats to life, deportation, forced disappearance, torture, or military trial of civilians. Suspension upon request requires demonstrating that the act exists, suspension would not harm the public interest, and the harm would be difficult to repair.

The Amparo Law provides for special-urgency measures: claims may be filed and suspensions granted outside regular court hours (including weekends and holidays) when the act poses an imminent threat to personal liberty or physical integrity.

The LFPCA provides for an expedited summary trial (juicio en la vía sumaria) for lower-value disputes (Articles 58-1 to 58-15), with a compressed timeline. Neither system provides for a general fast-track procedure at the claimant’s request; urgency is addressed through interim relief rather than acceleration.

The scope of review encompasses both merits and process, though depth varies by proceeding and nature of the challenged act.

In amparo, the court examines whether the challenged act violates fundamental rights, or the fundamentación y motivación under Article 16 and whether it is substantively consistent with constitutional standards. The scope is defined by the claimant’s arguments (conceptos de violación), subject to suplencia de la queja deficiente (see 8.2 Alternatives to Disclosure/Discovery).

In the nullity trial, the TFJA examines the legality of the resolution under Article 51 of the LFPCA, including procedural violations that left the claimant without defence, errors in interpretation or application of legal provisions and factual determinations unsupported by the administrative file.

For discretionary acts, courts verify that the decision was not arbitrary, was adequately reasoned, and did not exceed the boundaries of the conferred discretion. Courts do not substitute their judgment on policy or technical matters but will intervene where discretion is disproportionate, insufficiently justified, or tainted by extraneous considerations.

Mexico has a written federal constitution promulgated in 1917, with Chapter I of Title I establishing a comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights.

Following the 2011 reform, Article 1 mandates that all authorities apply the law in the manner most protective of human rights (pro persona), whether found in the Constitution or in international treaties. The Supreme Court in Contradicción de Tesis 293/2011 issued two foundational jurisprudencias. First, Jurisprudencia P./J. 20/2014 established that constitutional and treaty-based human rights are not hierarchically related but together form the “parameter of constitutional regularity control”, subject only to express constitutional restrictions, which prevail by virtue of constitutional supremacy. Second, Jurisprudencia P./J. 21/2014 held that Inter-American Court jurisprudence is binding on Mexican judges regardless of whether Mexico was a party to the case, provided the same underlying reasoning applies, subject to a three-step methodology: verify applicability, attempt harmonisation with domestic standards and, only if harmonisation proves impossible, apply whichever criterion is more favourable to the individual.

Procedural errors are among the most frequently invoked and effective grounds for challenge.

The foundation is Article 16, which requires that any act of authority be issued in writing, by a competent authority, with adequate legal grounds and justification (fundamentación y motivación). This dual requirement – citing the specific legal provision and explaining its application to the facts – is the single most litigated ground in Mexican administrative law. Additional procedural grounds include:

  • violation of the right to be heard (garantía de audiencia, Article 14);
  • failure to follow mandatory procedural steps;
  • incompetence of the issuing authority; and
  • deficient notification.

The Supreme Court has further developed a doctrine of enhanced reasoning (motivación reforzada), requiring heightened justification where administrative acts affect fundamental rights (Jurisprudencia 1a./J. 81/2025, Registro 2030482).

In the nullity trial, Article 51 of the LFPCA lists procedural violations as a ground for annulment, provided the violation left the claimant without defence (dejó sin defensa al particular). In amparo, procedural deficiencies are subsumed within the constitutional analysis: any breach of Articles 14 or 16 is a viable ground for relief.

Factual errors are a viable ground in both proceedings. In the nullity trial, Article 51 of the LFPCA permits annulment where the motivating facts are not supported by the evidence in the administrative file, or where the authority misappreciated the facts. The TFJA conducts a full review of the factual record, making it a more robust forum for factual challenges. Expert evidence is the principal tool in technical matters.

In amparo, factual errors are addressed indirectly. The amparo court reviews whether the authority’s factual determinations were consistent with the record and adequately supported. A factual determination wholly unsupported by evidence amounts to a violation of fundamentación y motivación under Article 16. In amparo directo, the Collegiate Circuit Court may review whether the tribunal’s factual appreciation was arbitrary, though it will not ordinarily reassess the weight of evidence.

In practice, factual challenges are most effective when framed as legal deficiencies: an authority relying on incorrect facts has failed to adequately justify its decision.

Mexican law does not employ common law terminology but addresses both concepts through established constitutional principles.

Abdication, delegating a decision without legal basis, violates the principle of competence (principio de competencia). Under Article 16, competence must be expressly conferred by law; an authority that defers its decision-making power to an unauthorised entity acts outside its constitutional mandate. Failure to exercise a legally required power constitutes a reviewable omission.

Fettering (mechanically applying a rigid policy without considering individual circumstances) constitutes a failure of fundamentación y motivación. Article 16 requires not only citation of the applicable provision but also explanation of why it applies to the specific case. A decision applying a blanket rule without individualised reasoning fails this standard. The Supreme Court has held that when the law confers discretion, the authority must exercise it through reasoned analysis of the particular facts.

In regulatory contexts, authorities may legitimately use internal criteria to promote consistency, but must retain, and demonstrably exercise, the capacity to depart when individual circumstances require.

The right to an impartial decision-maker is protected by Articles 14 and 17 of the Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 8.1).

In judicial proceedings, formal recusal (impedimento) mechanisms allow parties to challenge a judge for personal interests, relationships with a party, prior involvement or circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt of impartiality. For administrative decision-makers, the Federal Law of Administrative Procedure requires public servants to excuse themselves when personal interests could compromise objectivity. Bias may also be challenged through amparo by arguing the decision was motivated by animosity, improper influence or institutional conflicts of interest.

A recurring structural concern is institutional bias, in which the same entity performs both investigative and adjudicative functions. The 2024 reform dissolved autonomous regulatory bodies (COFECE, IFT) and transferred their functions to federal ministries, consolidating these roles and raising renewed questions about structural impartiality.

Equal treatment is protected by Article 1 of the Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on grounds including ethnic origin, gender, age, disability, health, religion, sexual orientation and any ground impairing human dignity.

Challenges arise when similarly situated individuals receive materially different treatment without objective justification, including inconsistent licensing conditions, selective enforcement or arbitrary exclusion from procurement processes. The Supreme Court holds that distinctions are permissible where they are based on objective criteria, pursue a constitutionally legitimate purpose and are proportionate.

The Constitution establishes a dedicated principle of tax equity (equidad tributaria, Article 31, Section IV), requiring that statutory classifications imposing different burdens on similarly situated taxpayers demonstrate objective and reasonable justification. The Supreme Court draws on both domestic jurisprudence and Inter-American Court standards in its equality analysis.

Mexico is a state party to the American Convention on Human Rights and has accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Mexico is also party to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, among other instruments.

These instruments are directly invocable in domestic proceedings. Article 1 of the Constitution mandates that all authorities apply the law most protective of human rights, whether sourced in the Constitution or in international treaties (pro persona). Treaty-based human rights rank alongside constitutional rights as the highest normative rank (Contradicción de Tesis 293/2011; see 10.2 Constitutional Challenge). Claimants regularly invoke American Convention protections (particularly due process (Article 8), property (Article 21) and judicial protection (Article 25)). All courts must exercise conventional control (control de convencionalidad), verifying that domestic law conforms to Mexico’s international obligations.

International human rights law is not a supplementary layer; it is an operative and enforceable source of rights, regularly applied at all levels.

The Supreme Court applies a four-part proportionality analysis:

  • a measure restricting a fundamental right must pursue a constitutionally legitimate purpose (finalidad legítima);
  • be suitable to achieve it (idoneidad);
  • be necessary – no less restrictive alternative available (necesidad); and
  • be proportional in the strict sense, maintaining a reasonable balance between interference and achievement (proporcionalidad en sentido estricto).

The Pleno consolidated this framework in Jurisprudencia P./J. 3/2022 (Registro 2024425), striking down an absolute prohibition in the Tobacco Control Law for failing the necessity and strict proportionality prongs.

Scrutiny varies by classification. Suspect classifications (race, gender, sexual orientation) trigger strict scrutiny demanding compelling justification. Quasi-suspect categories receive intermediate scrutiny. Ordinary legislative distinctions require only a rationality test, a reasonable relationship between the measure and a legitimate purpose.

This framework is applied in amparo proceedings involving restrictions of fundamental rights and is routinely invoked against regulatory measures, licensing conditions, and administrative sanctions.

Several additional grounds are regularly invoked.

Retroactive Application

Article 14 prohibits retroactive legislation that is detrimental to individuals, frequently invoked against transitional regimes that alter vested rights.

Freedom of Trade (Libertad de Comercio)

Article 5 protects the right to engage in any lawful occupation, subject to restrictions established by law for public interest reasons. Regulatory measures restricting this right without adequate justification are vulnerable.

Right to a Healthy Environment

Article 4 recognises this right, with increasing prominence in challenges to environmental permits, extractive concessions and government enforcement omissions.

Proportionality of Sanctions

Administrative sanctions must be proportionate to the infraction; disproportionate sanctions violate the prohibition of excessive penalties. The Pleno recently reaffirmed that administrative fines must allow the authority to individualise the penalty based on the gravity of the infraction, the offender’s economic capacity, and recidivism (Jurisprudencia P./J. 31/2026, Registro 2031944).

Legitimate Expectations (Confianza Legítima)

Formally recognised by the Supreme Court (Tesis Aislada 2013882), defined as a manifestation of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) prohibiting authorities from suddenly modifying established legal contexts without adequate justification.

Legality in Tax Matters (Principio de Legalidad Tributaria)

Article 31, Section IV requires all essential tax elements to be established by statute; administrative acts exceeding the statutory text are challengeable.

Few absolute exemptions exist. Supreme Court resolutions are not subject to further domestic review. Electoral tribunal decisions on electoral matters are excluded from amparo and reviewed through specialised electoral proceedings. Certain Senate decisions in impeachment proceedings (juicio político) are considered non-reviewable political acts. Acts of the constituent power amending the Constitution have been held outside amparo’s scope – though this was contested in relation to the 2024 reform itself.

The 2024 reform added decisions of the Judicial Discipline Tribunal to the list of “non-appealable” (inatacables) matters declared by the Constitution (see 5.1 Legislative or Contractual Limits on Judicial Review).

Even where the substantive decision may be unreviewable, procedural aspects generally remain subject to scrutiny – whether the authority followed proper procedures, afforded the right to be heard, and provided adequate fundamentación y motivación – reinforcing the principle that no exercise of public power is entirely beyond the rule of law.

In amparo, the respondent authority presents its defence through a justified report (informe justificado), due within 15 days of notification (Article 117 of the Amparo Law). The report must describe the challenged act, confirm or deny its existence, provide the legal and factual basis, and attach complete supporting documentation – serving as both defence and mandatory disclosure.

In the nullity trial, the authority files its answer (contestación) within 30 business days. Failure to respond creates a presumption that the claimant’s alleged facts are true.

Common defences include:

  • untimeliness (extemporaneidad);
  • lack of standing (falta de interés jurídico o legítimo);
  • failure to exhaust remedies (falta de definitividad);
  • consent (consentimiento) (express or implied acquiescence to the challenged act); and
  • mootness (cesación de efectos).

On the merits, authorities typically demonstrate compliance with fundamentación y motivación, the correctness of factual determinations and the reasonableness of their exercise of discretion.

Interim relief primarily takes the form of suspension of the challenged act.

Suspension in Amparo

The suspension operates in two stages. A provisional suspension may be granted within 24 hours of filing to prevent imminent irreparable harm. A definitive suspension follows an incidental hearing within approximately five business days, at which the court evaluates the likely existence of the act, the probability of success (apariencia del buen derecho), the impact on public interest and the balance of harms. A proportionate bond may be required. The suspension may preserve the status quo, restrain the authority or, in ongoing violations, require provisional positive action to protect rights.

The First Chamber has further developed the suspension framework in environmental matters, holding that courts must integrate international standards, including the Escazú Agreement’s principles of in dubio pro natura, precaution, and access to environmental justice, into the constitutional analysis when ruling on suspension (Jurisprudencia 1a./J. 193/2023). In such cases, the suspension operates not merely as a status quo measure but as genuine anticipatory relief (tutela anticipada) under Article 147, second paragraph, of the Amparo Law – provisionally restoring the claimant’s enjoyment of the violated right pending a final determination.

2024 Reform Limitation

Amparo suspensions may no longer be granted with general effects against general rules. Interim relief now protects only the individual claimant, significantly reducing the systemic impact of challenges to government policy.

Suspension in the Nullity Trial

The LFPCA provides for suspension of execution upon request, subject to similar conditions. Courts have held that bond requirements must be proportionate and must not operate as a barrier to access to justice.

Amparo and nullity proceedings primarily aim to annul the challenged act and restore the affected legal situation. In amparo, restitution to the full enjoyment of the violated right (Article 77, Amparo Law) may exceptionally require economic compensation when no other form of reparation is feasible. In the nullity trial, Article 6 of the LFPCA provides a specific damages mechanism: the authority must indemnify the claimant when the challenged resolution is annulled due to a falta grave – defined as lack of fundamentación or motivación (as to substance or competence), contradiction with binding Supreme Court jurisprudencia on legality, or abuse of discretion (Article 51, Fraction V) – provided the authority did not acquiesce (allanarse) in its answer.

The Federal Law of Patrimonial Liability of the State (Ley Federal de Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado) establishes an objective and direct regime for damages caused by irregular administrative activity, not requiring proof of fault. Claims may be brought before the TFJA, requiring proof of objectively irregular activity that causes quantifiable harm and establishes a direct causal nexus. Only irregular activity triggers liability; regular activity causing incidental damage does not.

The general rule is that an amparo judgment protects only the individual claimant (the Otero formula). Two mechanisms allow general-effect invalidation.

General Declarations of Unconstitutionality (DGI)

When the Supreme Court has established binding jurisprudence finding a statute unconstitutional and the legislature fails to remedy the deficiency within 90 calendar days, the Court may invalidate the provision with erga omnes effects (six of nine votes required). This has been exercised in practice (see 3.1 Challenging Primary Legislation).

Actions of Unconstitutionality (Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad)

Legislative minorities, the Attorney General and human rights commissions may challenge legislation directly; six of nine votes can invalidate legislation with general effects.

Constitutional Controversies (Controversias Constitucionales)

When legislation from one level of government invades another’s constitutional jurisdiction, the affected branch may bring a controversy before the Supreme Court, with invalidation requiring a six-justice supermajority.

The amparo judgment is not merely declaratory; it is restitutory in nature. Article 77 of the Amparo Law requires that when amparo is granted, the judgment restores the claimant to the full enjoyment of the violated right, which may require the authority to perform a specific act.

For unlawful positive acts, the court orders nullification and restoration of the status quo ante. For omissions, it orders the authority to act within a specified period. Compliance is rigorously enforced: the authority must demonstrate compliance within three business days, with escalating sanctions (fines, separation from office and criminal charges) for non-compliance. Evasive or deficient compliance may be challenged through an incidente de inejecución, ultimately referable to the Supreme Court.

In the nullity trial, the TFJA may declare nullity for specific effects (nulidad para efectos), ordering the authority to issue a corrected resolution or plain nullity (nulidad lisa y llana), recognising the claimant’s right outright without remand – the more powerful remedy, providing definitive resolution.

The consequences depend on the proceeding and the nature of the deficiency identified.

In amparo, the judgment has restitutory effect: the authority must restore the violated right. Unlawful positive acts must be nullified; omissions must be remedied. Where the deficiency lies in reasoning or procedure rather than substance, the court may order a new decision correcting the defects – leaving the authority free to reach the same or a different conclusion, provided the identified deficiencies are cured. Compliance must be demonstrated within three business days (see 13.3 Mandating Government Action Through Court Orders).

In the nullity trial, two types of nullity carry materially different consequences. Nullity for specific effects (nulidad para efectos) annuls the resolution and remands to the authority, specifying the deficiencies to correct (this is more common but leaves residual decision-making power). Plain nullity (nulidad lisa y llana) annuls definitively, recognising the claimant’s right without remand.

This distinction is among the most strategically significant in Mexican administrative litigation. Claimants strongly prefer nulidad lisa y llana for its finality; nulidad para efectos can lead to successive rounds of challenge if the authority’s new resolution is itself deficient.

Mexico’s system is structurally designed to minimise cost barriers.

No Court Fees

Amparo proceedings carry no filing fees (Article 17, Constitution). The nullity trial is similarly free of charge.

No Adverse Cost Orders

Neither proceeding operates under a “loser pays” regime; each party bears its own costs regardless of outcome.

Bond Requirements

The principal financial burden may be the bond (garantía) required for interim suspension. Courts must set bonds proportionately, and claimants in financial hardship may request a reduction or exemption.

Free Legal Representation

PRODECON offers free representation to taxpayers before the TFJA. Federal public defenders under the Federal Public Defender Institute provide counsel in amparo proceedings to individuals who cannot afford private representation.

The question does not arise in the same terms as in common law jurisdictions. Mexico does not operate under a “loser pays” regime; each party bears its own costs in amparo and nullity proceedings, with no mechanism to award costs against the losing party.

The practical effect is that public interest litigation carries no cost risk beyond the claimant’s own legal fees. Combined with the legitimate interest standing rules (6.1 Requirements for Administrative Law Challenges) and the absence of court fees, the system imposes relatively low financial barriers to public interest challenges. The institutional mechanisms described in 14.1 Mechanisms to Protect Claimants From Excessive Costs provide additional mitigation, though their scope does not extend to all areas of public interest litigation.

There is no wasted cost regime. Since each party bears its own costs with no adverse cost orders, there is no mechanism for a court to order a legal representative to bear costs caused by improper conduct.

Procedural misconduct is addressed through other means. The Amparo Law empowers courts to impose fines for bad-faith or dilatory conduct, and to sanction parties who file manifestly groundless claims. The LFPCA contains analogous provisions; notably, Article 6 allows cost condemnation against claimants who challenge resolutions with manifestly dilatory purposes. Attorneys are also subject to professional disciplinary proceedings and serious misconduct (such as fraud in judicial proceedings) may result in criminal liability.

Mexico provides multiple avenues of appeal, ensuring that virtually no first-instance decision is final.

District court amparo judgments may be appealed through the recurso de revisión to a Collegiate Circuit Court, examining questions of law. TFJA judgments may be challenged through amparo directo before a Collegiate Circuit Court; within the TFJA itself, Regional Chamber decisions may be appealed to the Superior Chamber in defined categories. Collegiate Circuit Court decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court when constitutional questions of exceptional importance are involved. Interlocutory decisions may be challenged through the recurso de queja (complaint appeal).

District court amparo judgments are appealed to a Collegiate Circuit Court. TFJA Regional Chamber decisions are reviewable through amparo directo before a Collegiate Circuit Court and, in certain categories, through internal appeal to the Superior Chamber. Collegiate Circuit Court decisions may reach the Supreme Court when a constitutional question of exceptional importance is involved.

The recurso de revisión and amparo directo are both available as of right; no permission from any court is required.

Supreme Court review operates through two mechanisms functioning as permission filters. First, the recurso de revisión reaches the Court when the case involves the constitutionality of a statute or direct interpretation of a constitutional provision (a subject-matter threshold). Second, the facultad de atracción allows the Court to draw cases from Collegiate Circuit Courts that it considers of exceptional public importance, exercised at the request of a Court, the Attorney General or on the Court’s own initiative. This serves as the principal mechanism for controlling its docket and developing constitutional doctrine.

Appeals are reviews on legal and constitutional grounds rather than rehearings. Appellate courts do not receive new evidence or conduct de novo fact-finding.

The recurso de revisión examines questions of law and constitutionality; the Collegiate Circuit Court does not independently reassess facts, though it may review factual questions intertwined with the legal issue under review. Amparo directo examines whether the TFJA’s decision is consistent with constitutional and legal standards, without de novo evidentiary review, though the court may conclude that the tribunal’s legal conclusions are unsupported by its own factual findings.

The TFJA’s internal appeal is broader in scope: the Superior Chamber may examine both law and fact in disputes involving significant amounts or interpretive criteria of general importance. Supreme Court review is confined to constitutional questions.

Martens Abogados

Carlos Graef Fernández 222
Torre 1, Piso 6
Santa Fe
Mexico City
Mexico

+52 555 292 9015

Info@martens.com.mx martens.com.mx
Author Business Card

Trends and Developments


Authors



Galicia Abogados, S.C. prides itself on a culture that fosters collaboration and excellence. The firm has cultivated an environment where the sharpest minds come together to solve complex legal challenges. Its market offering sets it apart, blending the precision of renowned transactional and regulatory expertise with the strategic acumen required for high-stakes litigation. Galicia is recognised as a leader in the Mexican and Latin American legal ecosystems. In addition to being recognised in the Mexican market for its international and cross-border capabilities, Galicia is a firm with broad international reach through its alliances and “best friends” network in Europe, Latin America, the United States and Asia. Galicia is ranked as a leading firm in Mexico and Latin America by renowned international publications such as Chambers and Partners, among many others.

The Counter-Majoritarian Question and the Mexican Experiment

The debate over the counter-majoritarian question has persisted in constitutional law theory since Alexander Bickel coined the concept in 1962.

The question is deceptively simple: on what basis may an unelected judiciary override the will of the majority as expressed through its elected legislature? The answer, in most constitutional democracies, has been that judicial review serves as a necessary safeguard for fundamental rights and the structural integrity of the state, even at the cost of a perceived democratic deficit.

In the Mexican context, this long-standing tension reached a breaking point and produced a remarkable institutional response where, rather than choosing between judicial independence and democratic legitimacy, the current administration pursued a hybrid solution in which judges would be elected by popular vote while retaining the power to declare the unconstitutionality of laws approved by Congress. This experiment, paralleled only by the Bolivian 2011 and 2017 elections, seeks to dissolve the counter-majoritarian objection altogether by granting the judiciary a democratic mandate of its own.

The Trigger: A Judiciary That Rarely Sided With the Government

This structural overhaul did not come alone. For years, Supreme Court justices and federal judges had developed a consistent record of ruling in favour of plaintiffs challenging government action, rarely siding with the administration.

The legislative measures whose constitutionality was challenged before the Supreme Court include:

  • modifications to the legal regime of the energy sector with potential implications for the environment and energy prices;
  • a major reform of the electoral system, reducing the effectiveness of the body in charge of organising elections;
  • the disappearance of trusts financing various activities of the judiciary; and
  • the militarisation of the agency in charge of public security tasks at the federal level.

Each of these was ultimately struck down by the Court on the grounds of protecting fundamental rights.

This pattern, perceived by the ruling coalition as a form of institutional resistance, fuelled the political will to overhaul the judiciary. In September 2024, the Federal Official Gazette published the constitutional reform to the Judicial Branch (the “Judicial Reform”), establishing a popular vote as the method of appointment for judges and magistrates at both the federal and local levels. Committees formed by each branch of government reviewed the candidates to confirm their suitability, and the candidate lists for the first round of elections, covering 872 judicial positions, had been approved by early 2025.

The positions to be elected included nine Justices of the Supreme Court of Justice, two magistrates of the Superior Chamber of the Federal Electoral Tribunal, 15 magistrates of the Regional Chambers of the Electoral Tribunal, five members of the Judicial Discipline Tribunal, 464 circuit magistrates and 386 district judges. In December 2024, the General Council of the National Electoral Institute (INE) approved the ballot designs for the judicial election, with a total of six ballots containing more than 64 candidacies for justices, circuit magistrates and district judges.

Last Year’s Guide: Institutional Overhaul

In last year’s edition of this guide, this article focused on the major structural changes underway in the judiciary and independent agencies. That analysis addressed the Judicial Reform itself, the dissolution of seven autonomous constitutional bodies – including the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE), the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) and the National Institute for Transparency (INAI) – and the transfer of their functions to the Federal Executive Branch. According to the amendment, the primary objective was to reduce bureaucracy and associated expenses by centralising functions to improve administrative efficiency.

This Year: Measuring the Net Status Quo Change

This year’s guide shifts the focus from institutional design to institutional performance. Once the fog of war has begun to dissipate – the elected judges having taken office in September 2025 and the first months of their tenure now behind us – we can begin to assess their performance with a degree of empirical rigour that was unavailable last year.

To begin, it is reassuring that the Órgano de Administración Judicial, which replaced the former Consejo de la Judicatura Federal as the administrative backbone of the federal judiciary, has continued publishing judicial statistics with the same rigour and regularity as its predecessor. This suggests that the judiciary’s efficient administrative infrastructure remains largely untouched and that the institutional machinery underpinning case management, data collection and transparency continues to function. The availability of reliable data is itself a measure of institutional health, and it allows us to pose the central question of this year’s analysis with confidence.

  • Now that the first cohort of elected judges and magistrates has begun to exercise its functions, has the net outcome of judicial decision-making changed?
  • Are elected judges more prone to defer towards government decisions, or do they continue to protect the rights of plaintiffs with the same, or even greater, vigour?

Legal Remedies Available to Challenge Government Action

Before turning to the results, it is worth providing a brief summary of the two principal legal remedies available to individuals and companies seeking to challenge government orders, penalties, public policy, laws and regulations in Mexico.

The first and most prominent remedy is the amparo action before federal District Courts, a constitutional lawsuit enshrined in the Mexican Constitution. The amparo serves as a broad mechanism for protecting fundamental rights and may be brought against laws, regulations and individual acts of authority.

The second remedy is the juicio contencioso administrativo (contentious administrative trial) before the Federal Court of Administrative Justice (Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administrativa, or TFJA), a court of legality with jurisdiction over disputes arising from administrative acts, tax assessments, fines and other determinations issued by federal authorities.

Returning to the question of whether elected judges would defer to the government or protect the rights of those who elected them, we turn to a statistical analysis of judicial outcomes. The following data illustrates the relevant trends.

We sampled rulings issued by federal District Courts in administrative matters (Juzgados de Distrito en Materia Administrativa) across three comparable four-month periods: October 2021 to January 2022 (“Period 1”), October 2022 to January 2023 (“Period 2”) and October 2025 to January 2026 (“Period 3”), the latter corresponding to the first months of the elected judges’ tenure. The results, disaggregated at the national and Mexico City levels, are as follows.

National numbers v Mexico City

At the national level, during Period 1, a total of 50,508 rulings were issued: 57.40% resulted in sobreseimiento (dismissal on procedural grounds), 17.59% granted full amparo protection and 15.54% resulted in a combination of amparo and sobreseimiento (partial rulings). In Period 2, the number of rulings rose slightly to 51,783, with dismissals falling to 47.47%, full amparo grants increasing to 21.12% and partial rulings reaching 16.75%. In Period 3, the first four months under the elected judges, the total number of rulings grew to 62,415, dismissals dropped further to 40.26%, full amparo grants rose sharply to 29.57% and partial rulings climbed to 19.92%.

The Mexico City data follows a broadly similar trajectory. In Period 1, 56.62% of rulings resulted in dismissal, 16.87% granted full amparo protection and 15.53% were partial rulings. In Period 2, dismissals fell significantly to 36.70%, though full amparo grants also dipped to 15.45% and partial rulings to 12.83%. By Period 3, dismissals stood at 40.92%, full amparo grants rose to 21.01% and partial rulings reached 17.37%.

The trends are striking. At the national level, the proportion of rulings granting full amparo protection rose from 17.59% in Period 1 to 29.57% in Period 3 – an increase of nearly 12 percentage points. Meanwhile, the rate of outright dismissals (sobreseimiento) fell from 57.40% to 40.26%, suggesting that elected judges are not only reaching the merits more often but are also ruling in favour of plaintiffs at a significantly higher rate. The Mexico City data reflects a similar pattern: amparo protection granted rose from 16.87% to 21.01%, while partial rulings combining amparo and dismissal increased from 15.53% to 17.37%. Notably, the total volume of rulings at the national level grew from 50,508 to 62,415, indicating that the new cohort of judges has maintained, and indeed increased, the judiciary’s output.

Elected Judges and Day-to-Day Justice

Based on the statistical evidence gathered during the period under review, we conclude that elected judges are, overall, more inclined to rule in favour of the plaintiff than their predecessors.

As the figures above illustrate, the rate at which elected judges grant amparo protection has increased across every metric, both nationally and in Mexico City, while dismissal rates have declined. These figures support the conclusion that elected judges are exercising their review powers at least as robustly as their predecessors, if not more so.

This finding holds true for what may be described as “day-to-day justice” – the routine amparo and administrative cases in which individuals and companies challenge government action. In these matters, the data suggests that the democratic mandate obtained through popular elections has not, as of today, translated into judicial deference towards the government; if anything, elected judges appear to be exercising their review powers robustly. The most plausible explanation may lie in an inherent paradox of the hybrid model: now vested with what appears to be democratic legitimacy, elected judges may feel empowered to rule against the government, as their mandate derives from the electorate rather than from the political branches that appointed them.

A Richer Legal Landscape: Normativity, Jurisprudence and the Limits of the Learning Curve

There is another explanatory variable that deserves consideration when assessing the relatively robust performance of elected judges – namely, the normative environment in which they now operate is considerably denser than it was a decade ago.

Mexico’s regulatory framework has expanded substantially across specialised fields (tax, energy, telecommunications, environmental law and financial regulation, among others), producing a body of sector-specific rules that provide granular guidance on when and how legal standards apply. This accumulated normativity reduces the margin for interpretative uncertainty and equips judges, regardless of how they came to office, with a rich body of positive law upon which to ground their decisions. Equally significant is the weight of consolidated jurisprudential criteria developed over decades by the federal judiciary, whose binding and non-binding precedents continue to structure legal reasoning and provide the substantive scaffolding for well-founded rulings. Elected judges, in this sense, are not navigating uncharted waters; instead, they are operating within a sophisticated normative architecture that, by itself, tends to produce rights-protective outcomes when correctly applied.

The challenge, then, shifts from the bench to the bar. The true test for litigants and their counsel lies in their capacity to present complex legal arguments in terms that are clear, concrete and accessible to a new generation of judges who are still ascending a steep learning curve in the exercise of their jurisdictional functions. A judge who is technically new to the role but confronted with a well-constructed argument grounded in applicable regulation and settled jurisprudential criteria is considerably more likely to rule on the merits and to rule correctly than one left to navigate unaided.

In this light, the advocate’s craft becomes more important, not less, in the current institutional moment. The quality of legal reasoning placed before elected judges may well prove to be the decisive variable in whether the normative richness of Mexico’s legal system is translated into sound judicial outcomes.

When Cases Turn Political

The picture changes, however, whenever a case acquires a political dimension. In those instances, the outcome is more likely to favour the government. This is especially true for cases that reach the Supreme Court, which is currently controlled by justices aligned with the actual government’s ideology. When a case touches upon the administration’s core political agenda, the institutional incentives shift and the independence that characterises routine adjudication gives way to a more deferential posture.

A particularly illustrative example involves the protracted tax dispute between the federal tax authority (Servicio de Administración Tributaria, or SAT) and the owner of one of Mexico’s most powerful media and retail conglomerates.

What began as a conventional tax collection matter – spanning years of litigation over substantial unpaid tax liabilities – gradually acquired a political dimension as the conglomerate’s owner engaged in an increasingly public confrontation with the administration. Once the dispute acquired political overtones, the judiciary’s treatment of the case shifted perceptibly. Rulings that might otherwise have followed the patterns observed in routine tax litigation appeared to reflect the heightened political stakes, raising questions about whether the outcome was driven by the merits of the case or by the political context surrounding it. This case serves as a cautionary example of the risks inherent in a system in which judicial independence may be tested whenever powerful economic interests and political agendas collide.

This tendency is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s apparent willingness to take politically significant cases onto its docket. Through its power to attract cases over matters it deems of sufficient importance, the Court has already begun to concentrate high-profile disputes before its bench with notable frequency. Given the breadth of these procedural tools and the political alignment of the current justices, close attention should be paid to how the Court exercises this discretion in the coming months – and, more importantly, to whose interests its rulings ultimately serve.

A Conservative Alternative: The Contentious Administrative Trial Before the TFJA

Beyond the amparo, the juicio contencioso administrativo before the TFJA remains a vital and increasingly favoured remedy for challenging federal administrative and tax determinations. Unlike the judiciary, the TFJA was not subject to the Judicial Reform, and its structure and operations remain unchanged. This institutional stability has made it an attractive forum for litigants seeking to challenge administrative and tax determinations at the federal level, and the trend towards greater reliance on TFJA proceedings is expected to accelerate. In a landscape where the federal judiciary has undergone an unprecedented restructuring, the TFJA’s continuity offers predictability – a quality that litigants and their counsel value above almost all others.

Alternative Dispute Resolution in Administrative Matters

A noteworthy development in this sphere is the issuance of the regulation governing the Centro Público de Mecanismos Alternativos de Solución de Controversias (Public Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution) of the TFJA. This regulation was enacted pursuant to the General Law on Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms published on 26 January 2024, which granted the TFJA the authority to conduct alternative dispute resolution proceedings through its Public Centre.

The regulation establishes three mechanisms (negotiation, mediation and conciliation) and explicitly excludes arbitration. These mechanisms may be initiated in an administrative setting (sede administrativa), before or during the administrative procedure, or in a jurisdictional setting (sede jurisdiccional), once the complaint has been admitted and before a final judgment is rendered, as well as during the enforcement stage of a final judgment.

The Public Centre is staffed by certified facilitators (lawyers with at least three years of experience in tax or administrative law) who assess the viability of cases, conduct sessions, and draft settlement agreements (convenios) between the parties.

Once an agreement is reached, it must be submitted to a Magistrate, who verifies that it does not contravene public order, infringe third-party rights or impose disproportionate terms. Upon approval, which must occur within ten business days, the agreement acquires the status of cosa juzgada (res judicata) and the trial is terminated. The entire procedure has a maximum duration of three months, extendable for an equal period. Commencement of the mechanism stays the underlying trial; if no agreement is reached, the Magistrate lifts the suspension and proceedings resume. The regulation also includes safeguards against dilatory use, empowering facilitators to report abusive practices and allowing fines to be imposed where mechanisms are pursued in bad faith.

The regulation represents a significant step towards reducing the TFJA’s caseload. Its success will, however, depend on the willingness of government agencies to issue the required dictamen técnico-jurídico authorising their participation, without which the mechanism is deemed inadmissible, and on the broader adoption of a collaborative dispute resolution culture in the administrative law sphere. Nevertheless, these mechanisms represent a growing option that, if properly embraced, could consolidate as a genuine alternative to traditional litigation. A shift from a predominantly adversarial culture to one that favours negotiated solutions in administrative disputes would not only ease the burden on courts but also offer litigants a faster, less costly path to resolution – an outcome that benefits all parties involved.

It is worth noting that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are not exclusive to the TFJA, but are also contemplated within the Organic Law of the Federal Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de la Federación), which provides for a separate Public Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (Centro Público de Mecanismos Alternativos de Solución de Controversias) operating under the federal judiciary. However, as of the date of this guide, no implementing regulation has been issued detailing the scope, procedures or conditions for submitting administrative disputes to this forum. Nonetheless, this could soon be supplemented in light of the issuance of the TFJA’s framework.

Outlook

The Mexican experiment with elected judges represents a novel response to the counter-majoritarian question – one that the international legal community will watch closely.

For the time being, the evidence suggests that day-to-day administrative and constitutional justice continues to function in favour of the plaintiff’s rights. Elected judges appear to be exercising their constitutional mandate robustly in routine matters, lending credence to the view that the hybrid model has not, at least in the short term, undermined the quality of ordinary justice.

The true test, however, lies in the judiciary’s capacity to resist political pressure in high-profile cases and to preserve the institutional checks that sustain democratic governance. The reform remains a work in progress – one whose architects acknowledge will require correction before the second round of judicial elections in 2027. Meanwhile, the TFJA continues to consolidate its role as a reliable and increasingly sophisticated forum for administrative disputes, with the introduction of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms marking a promising step towards a more efficient administrative justice system.

The coming years will reveal whether these parallel developments – an elected judiciary and an evolving administrative court – converge to strengthen the rule of law in Mexico, or whether the political currents that set them in motion ultimately pull them in divergent directions.

Galicia Abogados, S.C.

Torre SOMA Chapultepec
Av. Campos Elíseos, 204 – 27th floor
Polanco, 11550, Mexico City
Mexico

+52 555 540 9200

contacto@galicia.com.mx www.galicia.com.mx
Author Business Card

Law and Practice

Authors



Martens Abogados (MARTENS) is a Mexican disputes firm with a team of 20 professionals. The firm has notable experience in public and administrative law, particularly in constitutional litigation, amparo proceedings, administrative nullity trials and judicial review of regulatory and governmental action. This practice is closely linked to the firm’s broader disputes work, including commercial litigation, arbitration and sector-focused regulatory controversies. MARTENS regularly acts for domestic and international clients in matters involving permits, sanctions, public procurement, concessions and sovereign measures, especially in the energy, infrastructure and financial services sectors. Recent work includes strategic challenges to regulatory restrictions, administrative acts and other measures of public authority affecting business operations and investment.

Trends and Developments

Authors



Galicia Abogados, S.C. prides itself on a culture that fosters collaboration and excellence. The firm has cultivated an environment where the sharpest minds come together to solve complex legal challenges. Its market offering sets it apart, blending the precision of renowned transactional and regulatory expertise with the strategic acumen required for high-stakes litigation. Galicia is recognised as a leader in the Mexican and Latin American legal ecosystems. In addition to being recognised in the Mexican market for its international and cross-border capabilities, Galicia is a firm with broad international reach through its alliances and “best friends” network in Europe, Latin America, the United States and Asia. Galicia is ranked as a leading firm in Mexico and Latin America by renowned international publications such as Chambers and Partners, among many others.

Compare law and practice by selecting locations and topic(s)

{{searchBoxHeader}}

Select Topic(s)

loading ...
{{topic.title}}

Please select at least one chapter and one topic to use the compare functionality.