In Brazil, an offence is defined as a typical, unlawful, and culpable act.
Typicality means that an act must correspond to the legal definition of an offence as defined by law. The act must also be unlawful, meaning it must be contrary to the legal order, without justifications, such as self-defence. Finally, the individual must be morally responsible for the act, without any extenuating circumstances that would negate their criminal responsibility (culpability). These elements combined determine whether an act constitutes an offence under Brazilian law.
Brazil’s law classifies offences as crimes or misdemeanours. Despite being ontologically identical, they have some differences established by law. According to Article 1 of the Introduction to the Criminal Code, a crime is considered as a criminal offence for which the law imposes a penalty of imprisonment or detention, whether alone or alternatively or cumulatively with a fine; whereas a misdemeanour is a criminal offence for which the law imposes, either alone, a penalty of simple imprisonment or a fine, or both alternatively or cumulatively. Therefore, crimes are considered more severe violations of law than misdemeanours, so are punished with more harsh penalties (imprisonment or detention), while misdemeanours are punished with less severe sanctions (notably simple imprisonment, which does not follow the penitentiary rigour of the former).
Also, according to the Criminal Code, an offence can be felonious – when the agent intended the result or assumed the risk of producing it – or culpable – when the agent caused the result through recklessness, negligence, or malpractice. Felonious offences generally carry more severe penalties because they involve a deliberate or knowingly risky action, while culpable offences involve a failure to adhere to a standard of care, which, although less intentional, still results in criminal liability.
Finally, an attempt to commit a crime is punished according to Article 14, sole paragraph, of the Criminal Code, resulting in a reduction of the penalty prescribed for the offence. In turn, although an attempt to commit a misdemeanour may occur in practice, it is not punishable, as stipulated by Article 4 of the Misdemeanour Law.
In Brazilian criminal procedure, the principles of presumption of innocence and in dubio pro reo (when in doubt, for the accused) are upheld. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the prosecution to bear the burden of proof regarding the defendant’s guilt, beyond any reasonable doubt. In this context, it is up to the prosecutor to substantiate their claims – namely, the crime, its circumstances, and the authorship – by presenting evidence with the ultimate goal of influencing the judge’s decision and obtaining a conviction.
In Brazilian criminal procedure, there are two types of statute of limitations:
The statute of limitations for punitive claims is governed by the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for the offence and must observe the deadlines established in Article 109 of the Criminal Code. That is, it will occur in:
It is worth noting that the statute of limitations, as a rule, begins to run from the day the offence was completed. Nevertheless, in continuous offences, the statute of limitations begins to run from the day the offence ceases to occur.
Also, it is relevant to highlight that the Criminal Code provides for certain causes that interrupt the statute of limitations, such as the receipt of the indictment, the publication of the conviction sentence, and the initiation of the execution of the sentence (Article 117).
In turn, the statute of limitations for enforcement claims applies after the final judgement of the conviction and is governed by the penalty applied, also observing the deadlines established in Article 109 of the Criminal Code.
Brazilian criminal jurisdiction is regulated by the principle of territoriality, meaning that authorities/courts, as a rule, do not have jurisdiction to act independently outside of the country. However, Article 7 of the Criminal Code addresses the principle of extraterritoriality, enabling the application of Brazilian law to crimes committed outside its territory, for instance, if they involve Brazilian interests, or nationals, or if international obligations require it.
With regard to international co-operation, in Brazil, the Ministry of Justice has been designated as the Central Authority for international legal co-operation, a role carried out through the Department of Asset Recovery and International Legal Co-operation (DRCI). The measures requested for co-operation include, but are not limited to:
The request for extradition is not limited to countries with which Brazil has a treaty. It can be made to or requested by any country. When there is no treaty in place, the request must be accompanied by the documents specified in Law No 13,445/2017, and must be based on the promise of reciprocal treatment for analogous cases.
In Brazil, legal entities are generally not subject to criminal liability, except in the case of environmental offences. In such instances, they can only be held liable if the offence is committed by the decision of their legal or contractual representative, in their interest or for their benefit. It is important to note that the criminal liability of legal entities does not exclude that of a natural person. Nevertheless, according to the Supreme Court (STF), a legal entity can be the sole defendant in a criminal proceeding, without the necessity of identifying and prosecuting the natural persons within it.
Moreover, there isn’t a policy preference as to when to pursue a legal entity or a natural person, meaning that if both are found criminally liable, they will be subject to the same type of criminal prosecution.
In the context of (non-fraudulent) mergers and acquisitions, the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) holds that the merger of a legal entity accused of an environmental crime should lead to the extinction of its criminal liability, as there is no regulation authorising the transfer of this criminal responsibility to the merging company.
The assessment of penalties occurs after the conviction sentence. From then on, as provided by Article 68 of the Penal Code, the calculation of the penalty must follow three phases:
The first stage involves a subjective analysis of eight factors: culpability, criminal record, social behaviour, the agent’s personality, motives, circumstances of the crime, consequences, and the behaviour of the victim. In this assessment, the more unfavourable the circumstances, the closer the penalty is to the maximum.
After determining the base penalty, the judge assesses mitigating factors (confession, whether the defendant is over 70 years of age etc) and aggravating factors (recidivism, trivial motive etc).
Finally, in the third phase, the causes for increasing (eg, continuous crime) and decreasing (eg, attempt), set by the law, are considered and can increase the sentence above the maximum limit or reduce it below its minimum.
Also, upon conviction, the judge must assess whether the penalty may be substituted with an alternative sanction (other than imprisonment), or if the enforcement of the penalty can be suspended – in this case the offender will be subject to a probationary period.
Regarding the assessment of fines, according to Article 49 of the Penal Code, the fine is determined by the judge, who determines the number of daily fines and then establishes the value of each daily fine. The Penal Code stipulates a minimum of ten and a maximum of 360 daily fines. Furthermore, the fine cannot be less than one-thirtieth of the highest monthly minimum wage in effect at the time of the offence, nor exceed five times that wage. Finally, its value will be adjusted at the time of enforcement according to monetary correction indexes.
In the event of deferred prosecution agreement, non-prosecution agreement or plea agreement, see 2.6 Deferred Prosecution and 4.3 Plea Agreements, Co-operation, Self-Disclosure and Leniency.
Under Article 387, IV, of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPP), the judge, when delivering a convicting sentence, will set a minimum amount for the compensation of damages caused by the offence, considering the losses suffered by the victim. The determination of the compensation amount must also consider the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the intensity of the victim’s suffering, the severity of the harm, the economic condition of the defendant, and the compensation-punishment balance.
In addition, Article 63, sole paragraph of the CPP also states that the amount set in the criminal sentence does not prevent the party from seeking liquidation to determine a higher amount, thereby obtaining full compensation for the damage. Lastly, according to Brazilian Superior Courts (STF and STJ), it is possible to claim compensation for collective moral damages in criminal actions.
White-collar offences in Brazil are prosecuted by the state, represented by three main authorities: the civil Judicial Police, the Federal Police and the Prosecution Office. In addition, white-collar offences are adjudicated by judges in State Courts and Federal Courts. Depending on the state or federal jurisdiction, there may be specialised courts or panels for handling such offences.
According to Article 144 of the Brazilian Constitution, both the Civil Police and the Federal Police are responsible for preserving public order and ensuring the safety of people and property. The Civil Police has the function of investigating criminal offences, except military ones, while the Federal Police, in addition to its other duties, is responsible for investigating offences related to the political and social order, as well as those affecting the Union’s assets, services, and interests, its autonomous entities, and public companies. The Federal Police also handles offences with interstate or international implications that require uniform enforcement. Since white-collar offences often involve such cross-border elements or impact authorities, they are commonly investigated and enforced by the Federal Police.
The Public Prosecution Office is the authority responsible for criminal prosecutions. According to the Constitution (Article 127), it is a permanent and essential institution for the state’s judicial function, tasked with defending the legal order, the democratic regime, and social and individual interests. Consequently, the Public Prosecution Office, represented by federal prosecutors in Federal Courts and state prosecutors in State Courts, is responsible for initiating criminal proceedings and prosecuting individuals accused of white-collar offences.
In addition to these three main authorities with criminal jurisdiction, there are administrative and civil bodies that address possible administrative offences related to white-collar crimes. For instance, the Council for Financial Activities Control (COAF) is authorised by the Anti-Money Laundering Law (Articles 14 to 17 of Law 9,613/98) to investigate financial crimes. It can initiate administrative punitive proceedings to impose administrative sanctions.
If public officials are also investigated, the case may involve the General Comptroller (CGU, the internal control body) and the Court of Auditors (TCU, which oversees financial activities and budget execution).
Also, the Central Bank (BC) and the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) can initiate sanctioning administrative proceedings to investigate and apply penalties related to financial offences (Articles 2 and 33 of Law 13,506/17). Finally, CADE (Administrative Council for Economic Defence) is authorised by the Competition Defence Law (Articles 66 to 68 of Law 12,529/11) to initiate administrative investigations into economic offences.
White-collar crime investigations can be initiated based on complaints or reports made by individuals, companies, or other entities. These reports can be submitted to authorities such as the Federal Police, the Public Prosecution Office, or regulatory agencies. Also, they can be initiated throughout routine audits and inspections by regulatory agencies, like the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Revenue Service, and the Central Bank, which conduct routine audits and inspections that might uncover irregularities or signs of white-collar crimes.
Moreover, the Federal Police can initiate investigations into white-collar crimes based on intelligence, ongoing operations, or referrals from other agencies. The Public Prosecution Office may also initiate investigations, and, according to the Supreme Court, it requires: (i) immediate notification to the competent judge regarding the initiation and conclusion of the investigative procedure, with proper registration and distribution; (ii) adherence to the same deadlines and rules established for the completion of police inquiries; (iii) the need for judicial authorisation for any extensions of deadlines.
Under Brazilian criminal law, a judge must be presented with probable cause to authorise dawn raids and search warrants. When the investigating authority deems that a search and seizure are necessary, it must request a search warrant from a competent judge, providing justified reasons for the need to employ this measure.
It is important to note that, according to the Supreme Court, generic search and seizure warrants, without individualisation, can constitute a form of fishing expedition; a tactic that is prohibited.
The court’s decision to authorise a raid must detail the scope of the measure, specifying which papers, documents, or objects are to be searched and seized. The court order must also include the reasons for the investigation and its objectives.
With regard to questioning employees, officers, directors, or third parties, the authorities may issue subpoenas requiring them to provide testimony or information. The questioning must be conducted following legal procedures to ensure that the rights of the individuals are protected, such as the presence of a lawyer and the right to remain silent.
Internal investigations are not legally mandatory in Brazil. Nevertheless, they play a relevant role in managing risks, demonstrating compliance, and influencing how enforcement authorities and courts approach white-collar crime cases. Therefore, companies are encouraged to conduct thorough internal investigations to manage legal and regulatory risks effectively and to potentially benefit from reduced penalties or leniency, if they co-operate with authorities.
After an investigation is completed, if sufficient evidence is gathered, the Public Prosecutor’s Office will file a formal indictment with the court. After that, the judge reviews the complaint and decides whether there is enough basis to proceed with the trial. If the judge deems the evidence sufficient, the formal trial process begins.
The Public Prosecutor’s Office has discretion in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed with charges. However, this discretion is not absolute and must align with legal standards. This means that the Public Prosecutor may decide not to pursue a case when it is evident that the facts do not constitute a crime or that there are grounds for not prosecuting. Otherwise, criminal prosecution would be mandatory.
According to Article 89 of Law No 9,099/1995, in crimes in which the minimum penalty prescribed is equal to or less than one year, the Public Prosecutor, when filing the indictment, may propose suspending the proceedings for two to four years, provided that the defendant is not being prosecuted or has not been convicted of another crime. In this case, the defendant will be subjected to a probationary period under the following conditions:
Additionally, Article 76 of the same law states that, in the case of misdemeanours and crimes with a maximum penalty of up to two years, the Public Prosecutor may propose an agreement for the case to be dismissed, with the immediate imposition of restrictive penalties (such as monetary compensation, forfeiture of assets, weekend limitation, and community service), or fines to the defendant. The requirements for this agreement to be made are:
Finally, Article 28-A of the Criminal Procedure Code allows non-prosecution agreements in cases where the minimum penalty is less than four years of imprisonment and the crime was not committed with violence or significant threats. To enter into such an agreement, the defendant must:
Criminal company law and corporate fraud offences are primarily governed by Law No 7,492/1986.
Article 4 of the law criminalises fraudulently managing a financial institution, which is defined by unlawful acts performed by those responsible for managing a financial institution, involving deceitful practices and deliberate fraud. The penalty for this crime is imprisonment for a period ranging from three to 12 years, and a fine. Moreover, the sole paragraph of this Article typifies reckless management, which is characterised by the impetuousness with which business is conducted, which increases the risk that business activities may end up causing harm to third parties or misusing the money invested in the company. The penalty provided is imprisonment for two to eight years, and a fine.
Misappropriation and embezzlement of funds is found in Article 5. This crime involves administrators of a financial institution appropriating or diverting funds, money, or movable property for personal benefit or that of others. The penalty is imprisonment for a period ranging from two to six years, and a fine.
Article 9 provides a penalty of imprisonment for a period ranging from one to five years and a fine for those who defraud regulatory authorities or investors, inserting a false or differing statement in a document evidencing investment in securities or financial assets. Finally, Article 11 provides the same penalty for those who maintain or handle resources or values in parallel to the accounting required by law.
Brazil’s Criminal Code, within its chapter dedicated to offences against Public Administration, incriminates the acts of active and passive corruption.
According to Article 333, active corruption involves the offering or promising of an undue advantage to a public official in order to persuade them to perform, omit, or delay an official act. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from two to 12 years, and a fine. This penalty is increased by one-third if, due to the advantage or promise, the public official delays or omits an official act, or performs it in violation of their functional duties.
On the other hand, passive corruption, as established by Article 317, consists in the requesting or receiving, by the public official, for themselves or for others, of an undue advantage, even if outside of or before assuming the function, but in connection with it, or accepting a promise of such an advantage. The penalty for this offence is the same as mentioned above. Passive corruption can also occur if the public official performs, fails to perform, or delays an official act in violation of their functional duties, yielding to a request or influence from another person. In this case, the penalty ranges from three months to one year of detention, or a fine (Article 317, Paragraph 2).
In addition to those crimes, Brazil’s Criminal Code also criminalises the practice of graft (Article 316), which is defined as the demand, for oneself or for others, of an undue advantage, even if outside the public function or before assuming it, but because of it. It has the same penalty as the offences mentioned above. The difference between this crime and passive corruption is that, in the latter, the official makes a simple request or solicitation, without any implicit or explicit threat; whereas in graft there is an actual demand, that is, a threat (element of coercion).
Moreover, Article 332 incriminates influence peddling, which occurs when an individual requests, demands, collects, or obtains for themselves or for others an advantage or a promise of advantage, under the pretext of influencing an act performed by a public official in the exercise of their duties. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from two to five years, and a fine.
Brazil also considers the following acts as offences: active corruption of a foreign public official (Article 337-B), which is punishable by imprisonment for a period ranging from one to eight years, plus a fine, and influence peddling in the context of international business transactions (Article 337-C), punishable by two to five years’ imprisonment, also with a fine. The penalty for influence peddling can be increased by up to 50% if the agent claims or implies that the advantage is also intended for a foreign official.
Besides the regulations provided by the Criminal Code, Brazil has additional legal provisions addressing bribery and corruption. A key piece of legislation in this area is Law No 12,846/2013, commonly known as the Anti-Corruption Law. It addresses the administrative and civil liability of legal entities for acts against national or foreign public administration.
According to the Law, the following acts are considered harmful to public administration:
Other notable legislation includes:
Finally, although compliance programmes are not mandatory in Brazil, Decree No 11,129/2022, which regulates Law No 12,846/2013, specifies that sanctions may be reduced for legal entities that have implemented and maintained a compliance programme. This offers a significant advantage to companies facing penalties for violations.
Law No 6,385/1976, in its Article 27-C, defines the crime of market manipulation, which is characterised by conducting simulated operations or engaging in other fraudulent manoeuvres aimed at raising, maintaining, or lowering the quotation, price, or trading volume of a security, with the intent of obtaining undue advantage or profit, for oneself or others, or causing harm to third parties. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from one to eight years, and a fine of up to three times the amount of the illicit advantage obtained as a result of the crime.
On the other hand, using relevant information that one is aware of, which has not yet been disclosed to the market and which is capable of providing undue advantage to oneself or others, through trading securities, constitutes the crime of insider dealing under Article 27-D. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from one to five years, and a fine of up to three times the amount of the illicit benefit obtained as a result of the crime.
The same penalty applies to anyone who discloses confidential information related to a significant fact that they have accessed due to their position or role at a securities issuer, or because of a commercial, professional, or trust relationship with the issuer. Finally, the sanction is increased by one-third if the agent commits the crime of insider dealing using relevant information that they know and are required to keep confidential.
Tax crimes are primarily provided for in Law No 8,137/1990. Article 1 of the law states that it constitutes a crime against the tax order to suppress or reduce taxes, and social contributions, through the following conduct:
The penalty established for any of these actions is imprisonment for a period ranging from two to five years, and a fine.
In addition, Article 2 sets out what constitutes a crime of the same nature, namely:
In those cases, the penalty provided is detention for a period ranging from six months to two years, and a fine.
Article 10 of Law No 7,492/1986 criminalises the act of inserting false elements or omitting required elements in the financial statements of specific entities, including financial institutions, insurance companies and institutions involved in the securities distribution system. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from one to five years, and a fine.
The conduct of a cartel is defined in Article 4 of Law No 8,137/1990, which states that the following constitutes a crime against the economic order:
The penalty provided is imprisonment for a period ranging from two to five years, and a fine.
Moreover, the practice of a cartel in public procurement is defined in Article 337-F of the Criminal Code, as the act of frustrating or defrauding, through agreements, combinations, or any other means, the competitive nature of the bidding process, with the intent of obtaining an advantage resulting from the award of the object of the bid. The established penalty is imprisonment for a period ranging from four to eight years, and a fine.
In turn, administrative responsibility for cartel practices is defined in Article 36, § 3, item I, of Law No 12,529/2011, which characterises it as the act of agreeing, combining, manipulating, or adjusting with a competitor, in any form:
The practice of this infraction subjects those responsible to the following penalties:
Lastly, Law No 9,279/1996, in its Article 195, criminalises unfair competition, which occurs when a natural or legal person engages in business practices that harm competitors by attracting clients through illegal, immoral, or abusive means, employing simulation, dissimulation, fraud, subterfuges, and other illegitimate methods. The penalty provided for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from three months to one year, or a fine.
The most relevant crimes against consumer relations are listed in Article 7 of Law No 8,137/1990, which provides for the following conduct:
The penalty for anyone who commits any of these actions is detention for a period ranging from two to five years, or a fine.
Article 154-A of the Criminal Code criminalises unauthorised access to computer devices, with the intent to obtain, alter, or destroy data or information without the authorisation of the device’s user, or to install vulnerabilities to obtain an illicit advantage. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from one to four years, and a fine. The same penalty applies to anyone who produces, offers, distributes, sells, or disseminates a device or computer program with the intent of enabling the conduct defined above.
If the invasion results in the obtaining of content from private electronic communications, trade or industrial secrets, confidential information, or unauthorised remote control of the invaded device, the penalty is increased to imprisonment for a period ranging from two to five years, and a fine.
Moreover, the breach of company secrets is criminalised by Article 153 of the Criminal Code. The conduct consists of disclosing, without just cause, the content of a private document or confidential correspondence, of which one is the recipient or holder, and the disclosure of which could cause harm to another person. The penalty for this offence is detention for a period ranging from one to six months and a fine.
Lastly, Article 154 of the Brazilian Criminal Code provides for the crime of breach of company secrets, establishing a penalty of imprisonment for a period ranging from three months to one year to one who reveals, without just cause, a secret, which they are aware of due to their function, ministry, trade or profession, and whose revelation could cause harm to others.
The Criminal Code, in its Article 334, provides for the crime of improper clearance. It refers to the evasion, in whole or in part, of the payment of a fee or tax due for the entry, exit, or consumption of goods. The penalty is imprisonment for a period ranging from one to four years. One is also involved in a crime of improper clearance if they:
In addition, the offence of smuggling is provided for by Article 334-A, which is defined as the act of importing or exporting prohibited goods. The penalty is imprisonment for a period ranging from two to five years. The same penalty applies to those who:
Law No 12.850/13, which defines criminal organisations and addresses the legal measures and criminal offences related to them, stipulates that the same penalties applicable to the crime of being part of a criminal organisation (Article 2, main provision) will apply to anyone who prevents or, in any way, hinders the investigation of a criminal offence involving a criminal organisation. Therefore, if an individual who has contact with a certain criminal organisation becomes aware of an investigation into that organisation and begins to use mechanisms to obstruct it, making it confusing or even preventing it from progressing, they will be committing the offence. The penalty provided is three to eight years of imprisonment.
Brazil’s Criminal Code determines that anyone who, in any way, contributes to a crime is subject to its prescribed penalties, according to their level of involvement (Article 29). Nevertheless, in case the assistance is of minor importance, the penalty may be reduced by one-sixth to one-third. Also, if any of the participants intended to commit a less serious crime, they will be subject to the penalty for that crime; this penalty will be increased by up to half if a more serious outcome was foreseeable.
In Brazil, money laundering is classified as a crime under Article 1 of Law No 9.613/98. According to the legislation, the crime of money laundering consists of concealing or disguising the nature, origin, location, disposition, movement, or ownership of assets, rights, or values that come directly or indirectly from criminal offences. With the innovation brought by Law No 12.683/2012, any criminal offence (crimes and/or misdemeanours) that has the potential to generate assets of illicit origin can now be considered a predicate offence for money laundering. The penalty prescribed is imprisonment for three to ten years, and a fine.
The same penalty applies to anyone who, to conceal or disguise the use of assets, rights, or values derived from criminal offences:
The legislation also punishes anyone who:
In regards to money laundering, individuals, companies, and financial institutions listed in Article 9 of Law No 9.613/98 are subject to various obligations related to its prevention, such as:
Failure to comply with these obligations can result in the following administrative sanctions:
In Brazil, the main defences used in cases involving white-collar offences are:
It is important to note that an effective compliance programme is not a criminal defence, however it plays a crucial role in mitigating criminal corporate liability and influencing penalties, especially under the crimes set forth by the Anti-Corruption Law (Law No 12,846/2013).
In Brazil, there are no formal de minimis exceptions for white-collar offences, and no specific industries or sectors are exempt from liability.
Law No 12,850/2013, later amended by Law No 13,964/2019, establishes the institute of plea bargaining (colaboração premiada), which is a means of obtaining evidence based on the co-operation of a person suspected of involvement in the investigated facts. This process aims to provide the authorities responsible for the investigation with information about criminal organisations or unlawful activities.
In the statements one provides, the collaborator will waive, in the presence of their lawyer, the right to remain silent and will be subject to the legal obligation to tell the truth. Also, the plea bargaining agreement assumes that the collaborator will cease involvement in illegal conduct related to the subject of the collaboration, under penalty of termination.
For collaboration to be considered effective, at least one of the conditions outlined in Article 4 of Law 12,850/13 must be demonstrated by the defendant:
If one or more of the conditions described are demonstrated, the reward benefit may be granted according to the provisions of Article 4 of Law 12,850/13:
With regard to legal entities, the Brazilian legal system allows leniency agreements in the context of cartels and anti-competitive infractions, as well as for harmful acts against Public Administration (national or foreign).
Under Law No 12,529/2011, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) may enter into a leniency agreement, leading to the termination of the punitive action by the public administration or a reduction of one to two-thirds of the applicable penalty, provided that there is effective co-operation with the investigations and the administrative process, and that this co-operation results in:
Also, the agreement may only be entered into if the following requirements are cumulatively met:
In respect of infractions related to harmful acts against the Public Administration, entering into a leniency agreement exempts the legal entity from certain sanctions (such as publication of the convicting decision) and reduces the applicable fine by up to two-thirds.
In Brazil, Law No 13,608/2018, which deals with telephone service for receiving complaints and rewards for information that aids in police investigations, established the concept of the so-called whistle-blower within the public sector. In this regard, there has been recognition of some important components of whistle-blowing policy for the prevention, suppression, or investigation of crimes or administrative violations:
In 2019, additional enhancements to this policy in the public sphere were introduced with the enactment of Law No 13,964/2019, including:
However, there is still no mandatory regulation requiring private companies to implement reporting channels. Among private companies, adopting reporting channels as part of a broader integrity system is a decision made:
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recepcao@mudrovitsch.adv.br www.mudrovitsch.adv.brBrazil’s White-Collar Enforcement: An Introduction
In Brazil, the enforcement of white-collar criminal law is constantly evolving. The early 1990s to the present day saw non-linear growth that is expected to continue in the near future. This growth is directly linked to Brazil’s own political-economic development curve following the country’s re-democratisation at the end of the 1980s, which, although also non-linear, is rising rapidly, resulting in the existence of developed and sophisticated markets in Brazil across various economic sectors.
There has been a constant process of creation and enhancement of criminal and procedural criminal legislation, as well as of legislation that in some way influences the criminal law space, either through attempts to incorporate legal models already adopted abroad, especially in the United States and Europe, or through brand new legislation. This most often arises as a legislative response to specific episodes that have shaken the perspective of various segments of society. In either case, this passing of new criminal legislation does not always prove adequate, and even often ends up producing various negative effects – increased legal uncertainty being one of them.
Additionally, at times Brazil has had to deal with special investigations that have become highly politicised and that have attracted huge media coverage. These politicised investigations have often produced more intense criminal enforcement than would otherwise be typical; enforcement that can even sometimes exceed legal limits in its attempt to respond to the public outcry engendered by such coverage.
The movement that occurred in Brazil, mainly between 2014 and 2021 at the height of the so-called “Lava Jato” (“Car Wash”) operation, which put the country in the global white-collar crime enforcement spotlight, and with a focus on anti-corruption, antitrust and anti-money laundering, is a great recent example of that. It produced various effects that particularly affected national and foreign businesses operating in Brazil, while it also had significant repercussions abroad – putting Brazil on the global map of international co-operation in white-collar crime enforcement. Although the Lava Jatospecial task forces in charge of those investigations were formally ended in 2021, the legal and non-legal results of those probes produce effects in Brazil to this day.
Therefore, for various reasons, there is a clear intersection between the enforcement of white-collar criminal law and the manner in which in which business is carried out in Brazil. For this reason, a deep understanding of white-collar criminal law and how it is enforced, as well as the current trends in the space, for which highly specialised legal advice is a must, are fundamental for investing and conducting business in Brazil.
Legal framework, criminal liability, and criminal investigation and processing: an overview
Brazilian criminal law is statutory and exclusively set forth by the federal legislative branch: the Congresso Nacional. There are no criminal laws at the state or municipal level. Crimes that affect the interests of the Federative Republic of Brazil itself (the “Union”), such as national assets or the functions of the federal agencies, fall under the jurisdiction of federal courts, whereas most criminal offences are prosecuted before state courts. There are also other specialised criminal spheres, however these are very rarely used, such as the military courts and the electoral courts.
Criminal liability in Brazil is personal and subjective, generally applying only to individuals. The sole exception is environmental crimes, for which companies can also be held criminally liable. Authorities may press charges against any individual acting wilfully or negligently (the latter only as expressly provided by law) to commit or help commit an offence, either directly or indirectly. Managers, officers or employees involved in criminal misconduct, whether through action or omission and even if acting on behalf of a company, may face criminal charges to the extent of their personal contribution to the offence. Anyone who assists the offender, knowing they are contributing to the offence, shall be held accountable in proportion to their participation. Brazilian authorities have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any person, including foreigners, whenever the action or the result of the unlawful action occurs – even only partially – within the country.
As a rule, in Brazil, criminal investigation is conducted by State Civil Police or the Federal Police Department, under the supervision of the respective State and Federal Public Prosecutor’s Offices, which can also conduct direct investigations without police involvement. Some investigative measure may require judicial authorisation – which is the rule for measure that are deemed to affect individual’s fundamental rights (eg, in the case of arrest orders, search and seizures, breaching bank secrecy, phone tapping or asset freezing). At the end of the pre-trial investigation, the files are sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, who will then assess the evidence and, depending on whether there is probable cause, must either file criminal charges before the court or dismiss the investigation.
To effectively combat fraud and corruption affecting the government, the Brazilian Constitution designed a complex multi-agency system to fight corruption in the administrative sphere, known as the “U-System” and comprised of the Comptroller-General of the Union (CGU), the Solicitor-General of the Union (AGU), and the Federal Audits Court (TCU), whose administrative enforcement actions can be – and often are – used by criminal prosecutors to help gather evidence of misconduct and press criminal charges before the courts.
There exist potential deals to be negotiated with the Public Prosecutor’s Office to avoid prosecution and conviction. Misdemeanours may be resolved by low fines that prosecutors can propose before filing an indictment and without requiring any admission of guilt (Article 76, Law 9,099/1995). Following a formal indictment, and still for relatively low-level criminal cases, there may occur an agreement to suspend the lawsuit under certain conditions to be fulfilled by the defendant, future compliance with which may lead to the extinction of the case without sentencing (Article 89, Law 9,099/1995. For mid-level offences, the Public Prosecutor’s Office may propose a non-prosecution agreement before the formal charges (Article 28-A, Code of Criminal Procedure), provided that the investigated confesses to the illicit act and repairs the damage caused by the offence. A collaboration agreement with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, through which the defendant must admit misconduct and present self-incriminatory evidence and evidence against others, may apply to more serious cases where there have been conspiracies and/or organised crime. All the aforesaid deals can be used in white-collar crime cases.
During the criminal lawsuit, the victim – either an individual or a legal entity – can formally act as an assistant to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, presenting written and oral arguments when applicable, throughout the proceedings, as well as conducting the cross-examination of witnesses and all defendants. Once the case has been ruled on by the lower court, both defence counsel and the public prosecutor can appeal and request a second appraisal of the entire case. The appeal will be judged by a state or a federal court of appeals. After the appellate verdict, it might still be possible for the parties to file a special appeal to the Superior Court of Justice (if there is a clear violation of a federal law) or to the Supreme Court (if there is a clear violation of the Constitution), subject to certain additional procedural requirements.
The present scenario and the years ahead
Based on our professional experience and on present legal and political debates, it is possible to anticipate some trends in the enforcement of white-collar criminal law in Brazil, which will likely soon became the particular focuses of local enforcers, defence counsel, and local and foreign businesspersons conscious of legal risks.
Over the last decade or so, Brazilian society has become increasingly intolerant of corruption, so anti-corruption enforcement will remain a crucial issue on the public agenda despite a recent backlash and some frustration stemming from prosecutorial mistakes made in the Lava Jato years – and despite opportunistic effort from politicians, especially in the Congresso Nacional, to hinder sensitive prosecutions. In turn, as technology evolves, securities fraud and financial system protection remain a growing concern for regulators and enforcement agencies at the federal level.
The growing public awareness of environmental issues and of the climate emergency has given rise to public debates on toughening the enforcement of environmental law, and some bill proposals have been considered in this regard, while the years 2023 and 2024 have seen a special enforcement focus on tackling money laundering where environmental crimes were the predicate offences.
Sports betting and its potential links with money laundering and other criminal activities – such as organised crime – have become a crucial issue for Brazilian policymakers. As the federal government is expected to pass a new regulatory framework for sports gambling between the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025, it is expected that the near future will see a lot of enforcement action targeting those not complying with the applicable laws and regulations.
Despite not being used in practice as much as it could, the concept of the whistle-blower in Brazil has gained importance following the enactment of Law 13,608/2018, which establishes the obligation of a reporting channel for crimes against public administration, administrative infractions, or any actions or omissions harmful to the public interest. Brazilian legislation seeks to protect these whistle-blowers against retaliation, ensuring anonymity and security, thus encouraging transparency and integrity in institutions, as well as the payment of rewards if there is a recovery of the product of the crime against the public administration. In addition, Law 12,846/2013, known as the Anti-Corruption Law, also reinforces the importance of the whistle-blower’s role by providing for the strict liability of companies for harmful acts against the public administration, encouraging the creation of internal reporting mechanisms.
Anti-corruption enforcement
Brazilian agencies have lately faced a departure from the anti-corruption criminal prosecution model adopted during the Lava Jato operation and in force between 2014 and 2021, and therefore from some of its unwelcome repercussions. A number of impactful reversal decisions rendered by higher courts, especially the Supreme Court, recognised unlawful prosecutorial practices and judicial mistakes in these operations, harming the “task force” model of fighting corruption. Some of those illegalities had been noted from the beginning of the Lava Jato probe, including by the authors of this article in their various professional guises. Several cases related to the Lava Jato probe, which were still pending before the federal courts of Curitiba, Rio de Janeiro, and other places were special task forces had been established (as well as before appellate courts), ended up being annulled, while others were transferred to electoral courts, as the federal courts were seen to lack jurisdiction to prosecute them; as a result, many of those cases could not be resumed as they were time-barred by statute of limitations.
Justice Dias Toffoli, of the Supreme Court, has rendered single-judge decisions that have impacted the effects of plea bargain/collaboration agreements entered into by individuals, as well as leniency agreements by companies. These decisions have recognised the unlawfulness of evidence provided in those agreements, generating consequences not only in Brazil but also abroad. Although some of his decisions have been subject to appeals filed by the Prosecutor General to the panel of Justices, the recognition of the illegality of evidence derived from such deals may interfere with criminal proceedings in other countries, in that they may have used evidence originating from international co-operation in the context of the Lava Jato probe.
This new state of things has thus led to the recalibration of anti-corruption criminal prosecution in Brazil. Criminal enforcement agencies, such as the country’s police departments and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, whether at the state or federal level, have abandoned the use of special task forces and – to some extent – “trial by media”. The use of plea deals as central tools to boost investigations has also decreased, with fewer reports of relevant agreements being entered into in recent years. It is possible to affirm a significant decrease in prosecutions related to major corruption cases in Brazil. The existing investigations today relate to more specific episodes, with a more defined scope and limits, compared to the recent past.
The above does not seem to mean, however, leniency from the criminal prosecution agencies towards corruption. The federal anti-corruption agency, (the CGU), has opened important administrative proceedings against public servants and private companies and individuals, and has lately presented positive enforcement results. In December 2023, a new Prosecutor General of the Republic (PGR) was appointed by the president of Brazil, and in the first year of his two-year mandate he has proven to be – as expected – much more independent than his predecessor, who earned a reputation for protecting top-ranking politicians of the former government and their allies from sensitive investigations. Still, the Federal Police Department has, following a few years of diminished activity, embarked on several new anti-corruption investigations since 2023. Actions like these are likely to gradually grow in number in the years to come.
Private corruption
It is also important to note the possibility, in the coming years, of the expansion of criminal prosecution activity to include cases of private corruption, following the example – and influence – of foreign jurisdictions such as the USA, the UK and Germany. At present, private corruption in general is not considered a crime in Brazil, except for some similar conduct taking place in the context of unfair competition (Law 9,279/1996) or sports organisations (Law 14,597/2023). As time of writing (September 2024), Bill 4,436/2020, which intends to broadly criminalise private corruption, is at an advanced stages in the Senate. Should it end up being approved, anyone who “demands, requests or receives undue advantage, as an employee or representative of a private company or institution, to favour themselves or third parties, directly or indirectly, or accepts the promise of such advantage, in order to perform or omit an act inherent to their duties” may be held criminally liable and punished with a penalty of two to five years of imprisonment, in addition to a fine.
The proposed bill also criminalises the conduct of offering, promising, delivering, or paying, directly or indirectly, to the employee or representative of a private company or institution, the “undue advantage” in question, subject to the same penalties. This expansion of the punitive scope of the anti-corruption framework to reach private corruption will certainly lead to an increase in criminal prosecution activity in Brazil, as these practices have been culturally tolerated through Brazilian history and remain commonly accepted today in a variety of businesses. No doubt it will also impose new obligations regarding internal controls and compliance policies for companies doing business in Brazil.
Securities fraud enforcement and new crimes against capital markets
In recent years, there was a decrease in the supervisory and sanctioning activities of the Brazilian securities regulator (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, or CVM) in identifying, investigating and punishing possible administrative offences committed in the capital markets. This loss of functional capacity is mainly attributable to budgetary difficulties that have impacted the agency’s structure and hindered its regulatory performance. There have been some restructuring efforts under way, especially since late 2023, but, as it is, activities inherent and essential to the functioning of the securities market have been prioritised to the detriment of sanctioning activities.
Since criminal prosecution activity related to securities typically depends on prior supervisory and sanctioning activity of the CVM with regard to corresponding administrative infractions, the decrease in supervisory and sanctioning activities has also had a negative impact on criminal enforcement. Most criminal investigations targeting capital markets are triggered based on communications made by that agency to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office (MPF), when regulators foresee indications of criminal misconduct in the exercise of the CVM’s supervisory and sanctioning activities. Without these communications there is a material difficulty in autonomously detecting potential securities frauds in the Brazilian system. This helps explain why in August 2024 there were only 89 police inquiries nationwide targeting potential securities crimes based on Law 6,385/1976 (of which only 20 focused on market manipulation, and only 9 focused on insider trading), in a country in which structured and developed capital markets suggest these numbers do not represent reality.
But this situation could be about to change, with a considerable increase in enforcement activities on the horizon. The CVM is committed to obtaining the necessary budget allocation to re-establish its structure and functional capacities; hence an increase in its interplay with the MPF can be expected – and consequently an increase in related criminal prosecutions. Additionally, recent scandals involving important publicly traded companies in Brazil, which revealed possible internal failures and frauds to the detriment of the markets and shareholders, have led to the presentation of bill proposals aimed at toughening criminal enforcement, with the possible creation of new crimes (accounting fraud in the capital markets and misleading investors, among others) and new investigative tools, as well as greater incentives and safeguards for whistle-blowers.
Regulation of betting and gambling
Recent legislative reforms focused on sports betting and online gambling, and their regulation, which are due to be completed by the Ministry of Finance in late 2024, profoundly impact law enforcement applicable to this market. Brazilian criminal law has always punished the exploitation of sports betting and gambling through its outdated Law of Criminal Misdemeanours (Decree-Law 3,688/1941). This prevented the development of a professionalised and structured national betting market, which also kept international investors away from operating directly in Brazil. There was a risk not only of criminal liability for violating the criminal misdemeanour of gambling exploitation but, mainly, of liability for possible money laundering of resources derived from the exploitation of such games. New laws and regulations in late 2018, 2023, and 2024 altered this reality to authorise sports betting exploitation and certain online gambling, provided that a variety of regulatory requirements are met.
Licensed companies are now entitled to legally exploit the sports betting and online gambling market in Brazil, without major risks of criminal enforcement on their business activity. However, it will be necessary to strictly comply with the regulation imposed by the federal government and, chiefly, to establish and implement effective and very strict internal controls and compliance policies to prevent money laundering practices, as well as other related misconduct. If companies do not operate within these limits, there will be great risks to their businesses, although – as mentioned above – criminal liability falls solely on the related individuals (which does not preclude the imposition of high administrative penalties against the entities).
ESG and Greenwashing
In an increasingly ESG-oriented business environment, it is important for companies across all sectors to pay attention to its three pillars. In Brazil, the country’s green market, due to its importance, has played a fundamental role in enhancing and enabling such measures, especially those aimed at environmental issues.
There has been significant growth in the carbon credit market in Brazil, which is being sought and accessed by both national and foreign companies to enable the implementation of an effective and responsible ESG policy in the environmental space. This growth inevitably raises concerns from the white-collar crime perspective.
Law 14,590 was enacted in mid-2023 to allow public forest concession contracts to provide for the transfer of carbon credit ownership (from the granting authority to the concessionaire) during the term of the concession. It also gives concessionaires the right to trade certificates representing carbon credits and associated environmental services, except when related to areas occupied or used by local communities. Such provisions are aimed at incentivising the expansion of the Brazilian voluntary carbon market and enabling new sources of revenue to improve the economic viability of concessions involving public forests and conservation units. This law has since undergone various regulations.
As the carbon credit market becomes increasingly regulated in Brazil, there has been related growth in the detection of frauds associated thereto, raising concerns about the criminal bias, especially from the perspective of greenwashing. Several local and foreign companies have acquired carbon credits that do not meet the applicable regulations, and an increasing number of investigations have targeted the acquisition of fraudulent credits, which are then fraudulently sold to buyers who believe they are acquiring regular credits for use in their CO₂ emission offset policies.
A recent, symbolic example of the above is the so-called “Greenwashing Operation”, launched by the Federal Police in June 2023. The investigations led to the arrest of several individuals suspected of irregularly trading carbon credits in an allegedly fraudulent scheme that moved more than BRL919 million (roughly USD170 million). The probe also resulted in the seizure of a vast set of high-value assets, including airplanes, boats, luxury cars, jewellery, handbags, rifles and pistols.
This underscores the importance of rigorous oversight and efficient controls to ensure the integrity of the carbon credit market, which is essential for mitigating climate change and promoting sustainable business practices. Still in connection with environmental criminal enforcement, it should be emphasised that Brazilian Environmental Crimes Act (Law 9,605/98) is the only statute under which corporations may also be held criminally liable, other than individuals.
Conclusion
The landscape of white-collar crime enforcement in Brazil is marked by a dynamic and ever-evolving legal framework that has been significantly influenced by a variety of factors: symbolic cases, media attention, political pressure, and legislative developments. The Lava Jato probe – the biggest ever set of anti-corruption, and connected antitrust and anti-money laundering, investigations in Brazilian history – exemplifies the intense scrutiny that can arise from high-profile enforcement actions, impacting both domestic and international business environments.
The complex structure and processes of the Brazilian legal system and its enforcement agencies make specialised legal advice vital to effectively navigate its intricacies, such as the “U-system” and the varied approaches that different federal and state enforcement agencies and offices may take. Emerging trends, such as the increasing relevance of whistle-blower protections, the recalibration of anti-corruption efforts, and the potential criminalisation of private corruption, signal a shift towards more effective enforcement action and the need for more robust compliance programmes.
Additionally, the regulation of betting and gambling, along with the burgeoning carbon credit market, highlights the need for stringent compliance measures to mitigate risks associated with new business opportunities – which, naturally, also tend to become more and more important as a means to effectively defend corporations (and also individuals) from criminal and administrative enforcement actions. As Brazil continues to refine its approach to white-collar crime, businesses must remain vigilant and proactive in their strategies to ensure adherence to evolving legal standards and to foster a transparent and ethical business environment.